

JOURNAL OF FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH

Volume XXVIII, Number II. July 2020
(Published in April 2021)

Contents

- | | |
|---|---------|
| Editorial | v-vi |
| 1. Love, Law and Language: Continuing to think with Daya-ji
Jay L. Garfield | 321-336 |
| 2. I Am Thou: Nārāyaṇāśrama's Arguments
Dilipkumar Mohanta | 337-347 |
| 3. Contemporary Indian Philosophy: A Tasting Menu
Daniel Raveh | 348-365 |
| 4. <i>Nityasambandha: Kuch Anālocita Pakṣa</i>
Sachchidanand Mishra | 366-383 |
| 5. Naturalization of Epistemic Values
Gopal Sahu | 384-390 |
| 6. <i>Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa Kī Swatantratā Par Śāstrīya Darśanon Kī Sthiti-Ek Siṅghāvalokana</i>
Arvind Vikram Singh | 391-406 |
| 7. Towards an Intercultural Language
Anthony Savari Raj and Okechukwu Anthony Ezenne | 407-414 |
| 8. Concept of <i>Duḥkha</i> in Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism: A Comparative Study
Apree Datta | 415-428 |
| 9. The Notion of Alterity in an Anterior Lineage of Philosophers: Reflections on Hegel and Sartre
Jitendra Chandolia | 429-437 |
| 10. The Tremendous Three: International Publications of P. T. Raju, Daya Krishna and Biswambhar Pahi
Priyedarshi Jetli | 438-446 |
| 11. Prof. R. S. Bhatnagar – A Tribute: A Thinker on the Long Wave of Reason and Reflection
Melapalayam Rajagopalan Venkatesh | 447-453 |

JOURNAL OF FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH

Volume XXVIII, Number II. July 2020
(Published in April 2021)

JFR
28.2

JOURNAL OF FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH

Volume XXVIII, Number II. July 2020
(Published in April 2021)

Peer-Reviewed
ISSN 2395-5635

UGC-CARE Listed

Chief Editor

Arvind Vikram Singh


Editor

Anubhav Varshney

Associate Editors

Manish Sinsinwar

Manish Gothwal



UGC CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
University of Rajasthan, Jaipur
2020-2021

JOURNAL OF FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH

Editorial Board

Abha Singh, Professor, Patliputra University, Patna
Ambika Datta Sharma, Professor, Harisingh Gour University, Sagar
Asha Mukherjee, Ex. Professor, Visva-bharati, Shantiniketan
Ashok Vohra, Ex. Professor, University of Delhi, New Delhi
Balaganapathi Devarakonda, Professor, University of Delhi, New Delhi
H. S. Prasad, Ex. Professor, University of Delhi, New Delhi
Indoo Pandey Khanduri, Professor, HNB Garhwal University, Srinagar
Jatashankar, Ex. Professor, University of Allahabad, Prayagraj
J. L. Shaw, Ex. Professor, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand
P. K. Mukhopadhyay, Ex. Professor, Jadavpur University, Kolkata
P. P. Gokhale, Ex. Professor, SP Pune University, Pune
P. R. Bhat, Ex. Professor, IIT Bombay, Mumbai
Raghunath Ghosh, Ex. Professor, North Bengal University, Darjeeling
Rajaneesh Shukla, Vice Chancellor, MGA Hindi Vishwavidyalaya, Wardha
Ramesh Chandra Sinha, Hon'ble Chairperson ICPR, New Delhi

Chief Editor

Arvind Vikram Singh, Head, Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan,
Jaipur

Editor

Anubhav Varshney, Assistant Professor, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur

Associate Editors

Manish Sinsinwar, Assistant Professor, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur
Manish Gothwal, Assistant Professor, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur

The *Journal of Foundational Research* is published biannually, in January and July by the Co-ordinator, Centre for Advanced Studies, Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur-302004 (Rajasthan), India, with financial assistance from the UGC under its CAS budget. No paper in this Journal or any part of it may be reproduced, without the publisher's written permission.

Submission of manuscripts

Submissions to the *Journal of Foundational Research* must be made through online submission link available at: www.unirajphilosophy.ac.in or at editorjfruniraj@gmail.com

Instructions for contributors can be found at the aforementioned website and at the back of this issue.

Price: INR 150 (Individual)
INR 300 (Institution)

The present issue was published in April 2021

Printed by: Technocrat Printers Pvt. Ltd., Jaipur

Submission Guidelines and Other Information

- a. Language:** The paper could be in either English or Hindi or Sanskrita.
- b. Originality of the paper:** The paper must not have been previously published elsewhere, nor should it be under-consideration or under-publication in another journal. The authors are requested to undertake a plagiarism check before submission. If the paper has been adapted from one's own doctoral or post-doctoral work, the same must be duly acknowledged. In case of any discrepancy of the sort pertaining to this and/or any other guideline, the legal onus shall lie entirely with the author.
- c. Review of submissions:** Submitted paper shall undergo double blind review and published subsequent to referee reports.
- d. Blinded Manuscript:** The paper must be submitted anonymously to enable blind review, following the submission link available on the journal's website. The manuscript must not bear name or other identities of the author(s). The name, institutional affiliation, mail-address for correspondence, may be submitted in a separate document, i.e., the title page.
- e. Title Page:** The title page should bear the following information, apart from the title-
1.) the name(s) of the author(s),
2.) The affiliation(s) of the author(s) and
3.) an active e-mail address of the author(s).
- f. Abstract and Keywords:** An abstract of around 150 words and 3-8 keywords must be added at the beginning of the main text.
- g. Main Text:** Kindly use end-noting. Notes and references must follow the same style as the remaining of the manuscript. Kindly avoid lengthy end-notes, keeping the same to a minimum.
- h. Referencing:** MLA or Chicago style may kindly be preferred.
- i. Font style:** For English, kindly follow Cambria or Times New Roman, font size 12, 1.5 spacing. For Hindi, Kruti Dev font style is preferred.
- j. Interdisciplinary Papers:** Only such interdisciplinary papers shall be considered which have to do primarily with philosophy or unravel a fresh intersection of another discipline with philosophy. Contributors making interdisciplinary submissions must avoid jargon and nuances of other disciplines.
- k. Length of paper:** Normally papers (inclusive of notes and references) exceeding 10,000 words shall not be accepted.
- l. After Review:** The authors will be communicated changes if any and given a time period of not more than five days to make the moderations.
- m. After Acceptance:** The authors will be intimated and may be mailed a paper-set soft copy of manuscript for proof reading. The same must be done within five days. Only minor changes shall be entertained at this stage.
- n. Author's copy:** Contributing authors shall receive for free a soft-copy and a hard copy of the issue incorporating their paper.

Journal Submission, Subscription and Enquiry

Submission Link:

Blind manuscript, along with a separate title page may be mailed for consideration to editorjfruniraj@gmail.com

Subscription Fee:

Subscription Type	Individual	Institution
Single Issue	INR 150/-	INR 300/-
Annual	INR 300/-	INR 600/-
Seven Years	INR 2000/-	INR 4000/-

Subscription Form may be downloaded from the Download section of the journal's website. Duly filled forms may be mailed at editorjfruniraj@gmail.com or hodphilosophyuniraj@gmail.com or sent to the Head, Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur-302004, through post.

Payment Mode- NEFT of the requisite amount may be made in favour of "Seminar and Students Fund, Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan Jaipur". A/C No.- 674701702067, IFSC-ICIC0006747, ICICI Bank, Bapu Nagar Branch, Jaipur. NEFT details must be mentioned in the form. Contributors shall get a hard-copy of the issue consisting of their paper, for free.

Contact the Journal:

For submission or publication related inquiries mails be sent to hodphilosophyuniraj@gmail.com or editorjfruniraj@gmail.com

Journal's website : www.unirajphilosophy.ac.in

JOURNAL OF FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH

Volume XXVIII, Number II. July 2020
(Published in April 2021)

Peer-Reviewed
ISSN 2395-5635

UGC-CARE Listed

Chief Editor

Arvind Vikram Singh

Editor

Anubhav Varshney

Associate Editors

Manish Sinsinwar

Manish Gothwal



**UGC CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
University of Rajasthan, Jaipur
2020-2021**

JOURNAL OF FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH

Editorial Board

Abha Singh, Professor, Patliputra University, Patna
Ambika Datta Sharma, Professor, Harisingh Gour University, Sagar
Asha Mukherjee, Ex. Professor, Visva-bharati, Shantiniketan
Ashok Vohra, Ex. Professor, University of Delhi, New Delhi
Balaganapathi Devarakonda, Professor, University of Delhi, New Delhi
H. S. Prasad, Ex. Professor, University of Delhi, New Delhi
Indoo Pandey Khanduri, Professor, HNB Garhwal University, Srinagar
Jatashankar, Ex. Professor, University of Allahabad, Prayagraj
J. L. Shaw, Ex. Professor, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand
P. K. Mukhopadhyay, Ex. Professor, Jadavpur University, Kolkata
P. P. Gokhale, Ex. Professor, SP Pune University, Pune
P. R. Bhat, Ex. Professor, IIT Bombay, Mumbai
Raghunath Ghosh, Ex. Professor, North Bengal University, Darjeeling
Rajaneesh Shukla, Vice Chancellor, MGA Hindi Vishwavidyalaya, Wardha
Ramesh Chandra Sinha, Hon'ble Chairperson ICPR, New Delhi

Chief Editor

Arvind Vikram Singh, Head, Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan,
Jaipur

Editor

Anubhav Varshney, Assistant Professor, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur

Associate Editors

Manish Sinsinwar, Assistant Professor, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur
Manish Gothwal, Assistant Professor, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur

The *Journal of Foundational Research* is published biannually, in January and July by the Co-ordinator, Centre for Advanced Studies, Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur-302004 (Rajasthan), India, with financial assistance from the UGC under its CAS budget. No paper in this Journal or any part of it may be reproduced, without the publisher's written permission.

Submission of manuscripts

Submissions to the *Journal of Foundational Research* must be made through online submission link available at: www.unirajphilosophy.ac.in or at editorjfruniraj@gmail.com

Instructions for contributors can be found at the aforementioned website and at the back of this issue.

Price: INR 150 (Individual)
INR 300 (Institution)

The present issue was published in April 2021

Printed by: Technocrat Printers Pvt. Ltd., Jaipur

Contents

	Editorial	v-vi
1.	Love, Law and Language: Continuing to think with Daya-ji Jay L. Garfield	321-336
2.	I Am Thou: Nārāyaṇāśrama's Arguments Dilipkumar Mohanta	337-347
3.	Contemporary Indian Philosophy: A Tasting Menu Daniel Raveh	348-365
4.	<i>Nityasambandha: Kuch Anālocita Pakṣa</i> Sachchidanand Mishra	366-383
5.	Naturalization of Epistemic Values Gopal Sahu	384-390
6.	<i>Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa Kī Swatantratā Par Śāstrīya Darśanon Kī Sthiti-Ek Siṅghāvalokana</i> Arvind Vikram Singh	391-406
7.	Towards an Intercultural Language Anthony Savari Raj and Okechukwu Anthony Ezenne	407-414
8.	Concept of <i>Duḥkha</i> in Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism: A Comparative Study Apree Datta	415-428
9.	The Notion of Alterity in an Anterior Lineage of Philosophers: Reflections on Hegel and Sartre Jitendra Chandolia	429-437
10.	The Tremendous Three: International Publications of P. T. Raju, Daya Krishna and Biswambhar Pahi Priyedarshi Jetli	438-446
11.	Prof. R. S. Bhatnagar – A Tribute: A Thinker on the Long Wave of Reason and Reflection Melalalayam Rajagopalan Venkatesh	447-453

Editorial

The second issue of the twenty eighth volume of *Journal of Foundational Research* is out. The issue consists of nine research articles, an arduously prepared list of international publications of three dons who graced our department, an obituary on another luminary of our department. The journal was started in the year 1993 by Prof. Biswambhar Pahi, as a platform to initiate dialogue on foundational problems and texts of Indian and Western philosophies. Incidentally, almost all the articles in the present issue, delve upon foundational problems of philosophy and some of its very classic and contemporary figures.

The paper by Prof. Jay L. Garfield, engages with one of the last published works of Daya Krishna, *Eros, Logos, Nomos*. It exposes the four linked problems, dealt by Daya ji in the essay and how Daya ji argues that eros is the key to resolve the conundra. Garfield beautifully suggests a pro-Hume and pro-Buddhist emendation upon Daya ji's take on egocentricity. Prof. Dilipkumar Mohanta presents a magisterial exposition of Nārāyaṇāśrama's arguments to establish the central thesis of Advaita. Prof. Daniel Raveh convincingly presents his case for novelty in contemporary Indian philosophy, by citing one radical element of creativity each, in K. C. Bhattacharya, Daya Krishna, Ramchandra Gandhi, Mukund Lath and R. S. Bhatnagar.

Prof. Sachchidanand Mishra presents the various conceptions of *nitya sambandha* in Indian philosophy; he makes a scholarly analysis of several conceptual questions in this regard and gives a textual treat from the classic texts of Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa. Prof. Gopal Sahu elaborates the nuances of naturalized epistemology and explains how Quine understands the key problem of traditional normative epistemology and offers a plausible solution. The former of us, has made an attempt to present views of certain classical thinkers and systems on the independence of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. Prof. Anthony Savary Raj and Mr. Okechukwu Anthony Ezenne make an inquiry into the possibility of intercultural language. Dr. Apree Datta has made a textual study of the notion of suffering in original Pali texts of early Buddhism and also how the same stands in contrast to the notion as in Advaita.

Mr. Jitendra Chandolia has made an attempt to trace back the roots of the notion of alterity in Hegel and Sartre. Prof. Priyedarshi Jetli has

compiled a comprehensive list of international papers of the three legendary figures of our department, Prof. P. T. Raju, Prof. Daya Krishna and Prof. Biswambhar Pahi. Mr. M. R. Venkatesh has presented a sublime portrait of the personality and thoughts of Prof. Rajendra Swaroop Bhatnagar, in his obituary for the latter.

We are indebted to Prof. P. K. Mukhopadhyay, Prof. J. L. Shaw, Prof. Ramesh Chandra Sinha, Prof. Raghunath Ghosh, Prof. K. L. Sharma, Prof. Ashok Vohra, Prof. P. R. Bhat, Prof. P. P. Gokhale, Prof. Dilipkumar Mohanta, Prof. Devendranath Tiwari, Prof. Jatashankar, Prof. Asha Mukherjee, Prof. Ambika Datta Sharma, Prof. Binod K. Agarwala, Prof. H. S. Prasad, Prof. Kusum Jain, Prof. V. S. Shekhawat, Prof. Yogesh Gupta, Prof. Sarla Kalla, Prof. Priyambada Sarkar, Prof. Debashis Guha, Prof. Nirmalya Narayan Chakraborty, Prof. Sanjukta Basu, Prof. V. N. Sheshgiri Rao, Prof. Balaganapathy Devarakonda, Prof. Abha Singh, Prof. M. K. Singh, Prof. D. S. Charan, Prof. Ranjan Panda, Prof. Laxmikanta Padhi, Dr. Arun Mishra, Dr. Rajendra Prasad Sharma, Dr. Shivani Sharma, Dr. Ajay Verma, Dr. Ahinpunya Mitra, Dr. Arnab Kumar Mukhopadhyay, Dr. Amit K. Pradhan, Dr. Manish Sinsinwar and Mr. Manish Gothwal for their support. We express our gratitude to the members of editorial board, to the faculty members of our department, to the administration of University of Rajasthan and to the staff of Technocrat Printers, Jaipur for their cooperation. We are sincerely thankful to the University Grants Commission for its financial support. An inordinate delay in the publication of the present issue, due to global pandemic, is regretted; we hope that the future issues of the journal will see the light of day, in time.

The editorial team deeply condoles the departure of two eminent philosophers of our times, Mukund Lath and Yashdev Shalya, both associated to our department and the Jaipur Gharana of philosophy; may their thoughts keep the contemporary philosophical scene of India, beaming and blooming.

Arvind Vikram Singh
Anubhav Varshney

April 2021

Love, Law and Language: Continuing to think with Daya-ji

Jay L. Garfield

In one of the last essays that he brought to completion, *Eros, Nomos, and Logos*, Daya-ji revisits many of the themes that animate his long philosophical career, drawing them together in a stunning philosophical farewell. He focuses on what he calls time and again “the prison house of I-centricity,” and the need for escape; on the tension between apparent human freedom and the determinism we imbibe with the scientific image; on the nature of creativity, and on our essentially social nature, but also on the consequences of human embodiment and the role of the *puruṣārthas* in human life. I often find myself returning to this beautiful essay, in part because it draws so many of these themes together, but also because it reflects both Daya-ji’s greatest insights and some of the obstacles to bringing those insights to complete fruition in his philosophical project. As always when I read Daya-ji, I imagine his voice behind the words, and then the argument that would ensue over drinks, and the joy in philosophical discourse. Today, I would like to respond to this essay, engaging in just that dialogue with the Daya I remember and imagine before me.

1. The problematic of *Eros, Nomos and Logos*

Eros, Nomos and Logos addresses four linked problems: the relation between freedom and causality; the place for *Logos*—understood as reason and normativity—in the natural world; the relationship between the *puruṣārthas* and normativity, and the relationship between egocentricity and freedom. These problems are linked in part because solutions to any one suggest routes to solutions to the others, but also because together they constitute the larger question, “what is it to be human?” or better, “what makes life worth living?” Through all of this, *Eros*, or our biological nature, constitutes both the heart of the problem and the heart of the solution, as Daya-ji sees it.

Here is how Daya puts the first problem—that about causality and freedom:

...[A]ctivity is itself paradoxical, as it simultaneously involves, or presupposes, both freedom and causality, which are united, as Kant saw, in the teleological judgment, which is unintelligible and hence unacceptable to reason or *Logos*, as the Greeks named it, and thus renders man unintelligible to himself....

The notion of freedom... involves not only the notion of causality... but also the idea of rule or restriction, as without it nothing can be built or brought into being. Kant saw this in his notions of constitutive and regulative rules, without which one cannot delimit or demarcate or get going... (310)

Daya is pointing here to a conundrum that must be faced by any account of human action. For something to count as an *action*, as opposed to an event in which we are *passive*, we must in some sense do it freely; if we are merely caused to behave in a particular way that does not count as *acting*. Nonetheless, action presupposes determinism: after all, if our intentions could not cause behavior, we could not act freely; and if our intentions were not caused by our beliefs and desires, we could not think freely; so, without determinism, we could not be free. Freedom and determinism, therefore, seem both to be opposed to one another and to be mutually entailing. This is why action appears to be paradoxical and unintelligible. But to be human is to act, and so to be human would appear to be both paradoxical and unintelligible.

Daya immediately ties this problem to another paradox: freedom requires constraint by rules. To be free appears to prereflective thought to be capable of doing whatever one desires. But freedom cannot be randomness. To be free—as Kant argued—is to be able to follow rules, to act for reasons, as opposed to behaving in causally determined ways. But rules are prescriptive; so, to be free is to place oneself under the constraint of rules, and so not to be able to do whatever we want. Once again, to be human is to be free, and so is to be caught in a web of paradox. This is the first puzzle Daya sets out to solve in this essay.

The second problem—very closely connected to the puzzle about rules and freedom—concerns the role of *Logos* in the natural world. Just as there is a tension between liberty and constraint in the conception of freedom, there is a tension between the normative force of rules, including rules of reason, and the fact that these rules are instituted by animals like us in a physical world. For natural phenomena just *are*: they do not command; they are not rationally

assessable; and they have no obviously normative force. Nonetheless, we do find ourselves constrained by rules, including rules of reasoning, moral rules, laws and the semantic, syntactic and pragmatic rules that make it possible to communicate and to articulate further rules. Even so, we know that we are nothing more than animals, beings subject to the deterministic laws that govern the universe. Once again, being rule-governed is essential to our humanity, despite the fact that as natural organisms in a scientifically describable world, we are merely determined; once again, our own essence seems to be both paradoxical and incomprehensible. Daya puts it this way:

Logos... brings in the notion of law: a law that governs whatever happens... This is the revolutionary suspicion that occurs to the self-consciousness of man, and he tries to know the *Logos*, that he may understand all that is as well as why it is what it is....

Once it has come into being,....*Logos* acquires a reality of its own, independent of the person or persons who brought it into being. It becomes, so to speak, a part of the natural world order, even though it would have come into being without the human being or beings who occasioned it. This, however, results in its being seen as an object among other objects in the world, demanding to be understood both in terms of what it is and what it can do to others. It begins, thus, to have both a structure and a causality like everything else, except for the radical difference that its origin lies in human choice and thus has to be understood in terms of something that has an inbuilt essential indeterminacy and plurality. (*Ibid.*)

These two problems taken together threaten the very possibility of our life being either comprehensible or meaningful. On the one hand, seeing ourselves as natural objects among other natural objects deprives us of the freedom and responsiveness to reason that makes us human; on the other, taking ourselves to be free and responsive to reasons is incomprehensible given what we know of our natural existence. And unfortunately, we are not given a choice between these two perspectives: we must, in intellectual honesty, take both, and so find our lives *both* meaningless and incomprehensible. Here is Daya:

But the necessity of what *is* also entails the necessity of what *will be* and thus renders all human effort and action meaningless, just as the retrospective necessity of all that *was* makes all history meaningless, rendering all the seers, saints, prophets, geniuses, that is those of whom we feel justly proud, as having been the victims of an illusion and, in the process, making us also succumb to it. (313)

Now, Daya points out (*Ibid.*) that classical Indian thought—in particular Advaita Vedānta—attempted to resolve just this dilemma through the doctrine of *sadasadvilakṣana*—the idea that reality has two aspects, one entirely deceptive (that is *māyā*) and one that is absolutely true (*tattva*). By drawing this distinction, one can have freedom and normativity at the level of reality, while being determined by pure causality at the level of *māyā*. Understanding the source of normativity in this way is attractive, precisely because it offers a route to naturalizing normativity and to grounding our responsiveness to reasons and freedom in our biological and social nature. But, Daya, correctly points out, this simply shifts the problem from one spot to another. We now need to understand how we can constitute any sense of normativity within the world of our own experience.

This is because we ordinarily—especially in the Indian context—think of immanent normativity as constituted by the *pruṣārthas*, the natural human goals that emerge from our embodied, social nature and from the desires—mundane and spiritual—which, in turn, arise from our embodied, social and reflective nature. It is therefore unclear how such purely descriptive facts about us can constitute the requisite freedom and norm-governed life they are meant to explain. Moreover, we still would have to explain how this kind of freedom is possible at the phenomenal level if we are really entirely determined at the ultimate level of reality. I will return to this point later, but for now notice that this puzzle is redolent of the critique of Śāṅkarācārya's *māyāvāda* launched by Aurobindo—that it reinstates the very duality against which it is poised. So, as Daya points out, the *sadasadvilakṣana* approach in fact undermines, rather than supports, this approach. For once we draw the distinction between *māyā* and *tattva*, and place the free and the rational at the transcendent level, there is no explanation of how the *pruṣārthas*, which are grounded in *māyā*, have any normative force at all. They become, once again, facts among facts, with perhaps a causal, but never a normative grip, on us. This is the third puzzle.

And this takes us directly to the final of the four interlocked puzzles to which Daya is concerned to draw our attention, that regarding egocentricity. Daya, as I noted above, was preoccupied in a number of his late essays with what he repeatedly characterized as the “prison-house of I-centricity.” In brief, that prison-house emerges from the following predicament of practical reason: if I take myself to be an autonomous subject of experience and agent, then I immediately posit a special intimate relationship to myself, which gives me a *prima facie* reason to take my own interests as paramount, and to take my own experience as foundational. But to the extent that I do so, nothing can constitute an adequate or compelling reason to abandon that perspective. For any reasons require me to take others seriously, and that will always be irrational given their fundamental difference from *me*. And given how central our moral and epistemic practices—which involve taking others seriously—are to our human life, our very lives as persons appear to be irrational.

This is just a generalization of the “Why be good?” problem that emerges for any ethical theory that treats egoism as even *prima facie* rational. If one does so, then no appeal to the interests of others can surmount the rationality of serving my own interests, an intuition at the heart of much of modern economic theory, which treats self-interest and rationality as synonymous, with tragic but predictable results. It is also connected to the private language problem and to the problem of other minds. In each case, we find that if we start by taking the egocentric perspective—that meaning is constituted by the relation of words to my own ideas, or that I know other minds on the analogy of my immediate knowledge of my own—we can never escape solipsism. And again, if we cannot escape solipsism, we can’t make sense of our lives as human lives at all.

Daya correctly saw that this general egocentric predicament is also bound up with the problem of freedom. We might think that taking ourselves to be autonomous, self-contained agents and subjects is to take ourselves as free from the heteronomy of determination of our experience, action, values, and from the influence of others. Our status as independent egos hence, it would appear, is our guarantor of human freedom. On the other hand, though freedom is possible, as we saw already, only in the context of normativity and sensitivity to reasons, and normativity and reason are collectively, not individually constituted (and here the thought of KC Bhattacharyya regarding the relationship between subjectivity,

freedom, and our embodied and socially embedded nature is relevant—but beyond the scope of the present discussion). So, freedom seems to require not complete subject autonomy, but rather responsiveness to others and to our roles in norm-constituting communities. How to understand ourselves as both autonomous and as responsive to these norm-governed and norm-constituting practices and communities is the key to the escape from the prison of egocentricity, and understanding that route is the central task of this late essay.

2. The Focus on Kant and Hegel

Daya-ji's initial strategy in this essay is to leverage ideas from Kant and Hegel to resolve this complex conundrum. He properly focuses neither on the second *Critique* nor on the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* for his analysis of the relation between transcendental freedom and empirical determinism. The analysis in those texts is patently individualist, and would immediately fall prey to the problems already scouted. Instead, Daya turns to Kant's *Science of Right*, and to Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* that builds on it. Kant, and later Hegel, emphasize in these texts that the right emerges not simply from an individual human being recognizing the transcendental grounds of her own freedom an agency, but rather from participation in a community bound by ties of reciprocal obligation. This would appear to be a first step out of the egocentric predicament, as well as towards the naturalization of normativity Daya seeks as a condition of the intelligibility of human life.

Nonetheless, as Daya concedes, this strategy is not ultimately successful. The reason is straightforward: Kant and Hegel, in their respective analyses of the right, focus entirely on legal norms, and not on moral or cognitive norms. While, as I will argue a bit later, this is a good template for an argument, by itself it will not do the trick. For arguing that legal norms are socially constituted—while this is obviously the case—leaves open the question of the source of the normativity in question. That is, if we are antecedently convinced that there is a problem with merely natural phenomena having normative force, or a puzzle about the source of the normativity of natural conventions or practices, pointing out that artificially constructed legal systems have normative force in virtue of the structures of the communities that institute them will beg the question. We still have to explain how it is that these communities

come to be able to confer normative status on their legal structures. The ultimate source of normativity, and hence its consistency with the deterministic structure of nature, has yet to be addressed.

3. The use of Eros as the pivot

It is here that Daya-ji introduces *Eros* as the key to resolving these conundra. He writes:

The human world... is in-between [*Nomos* and *Logos*], and it is here that *Logos* and *Nomos* reign supreme as it is built on their basis, though it is rooted in *Eros*, whose nature no one knows, though it is there all the time and is the prime mover or the force that does not let anyone rest ever. (319)

Daya's idea is that the source of the unity of *Logos* and *Nomos* is their common root in *Eros*. He is never quite as clear as one would hope regarding how *Eros* is meant to reconcile these two forces, but we can reconstruct the central intuition that animates this strategy. I suspect that it derives not from Kant or from Hegel, but from Hegel's great rival for the post-Kantian mantle, Schopenhauer. Daya reads *Eros* as a kind of blind but ubiquitous life force or drive that underlies all activity, not unlike Schopenhauer's *Wille*. If we take the lead from Schopenhauer, we might see what Daya has in mind. Just as *Wille* is the force that underlies not only causation, but also conation and reasoning—including logical deduction and transcendental argument—*Eros* is seen by Daya as underlying both the natural world and the human world of norms and social practices. It is the drive for growth and development, the drive for association, the drive for progress, the drive to create.

Eros is hence a natural bridge between the biological and the social; reflecting the fact that as human beings, we are biologically determined to be social; the same nature that leads us to eat and to reproduce leads us to constitute families, communities, nations, languages, legal frameworks, and the myriad institutions that make human life possible. As Mandeville would have noted, in this respect, we are no different from the bees, whose biological constitution leads inevitably to the complexity of the hive. Daya puts it this way:

The continuous questioning of both *Logos* and *Nomos*... in each succeeding generation, results in that ever-continuing attempt to

find a more satisfactory solution and has given rise to... civilizations that define the distinctive being of man.... Behind and beneath the ... construction of civilizations lies the dissatisfaction and frustration that man feels in respect of whatever is, as ... it would always be thought of or imagined as different from what it is, thus challenging him to change... in the hope that it would be better for oneself and others, and that the world he lives in would be better place in which to live.

Eros is the name for this, and has to be understood in this way.... It is not *kāma*, or ... pleasure seeking... as Freud saw it, or even the *vāsana* or *tr̥ṣṇa* as the *śrāmanya* or the “world-denying” traditions of India called it, but *pravṛtti* or the ever-outward oriented, positive, valuational consciousness of man... (319-320)

4. The secularization of the transcendental and the recognition of the transcendental character of the mundane

Daya-ji’s project comes into sharper focus only when we reach the end of the essay. His concern in this essay and in so much of his late work, as we have noted, is with the problem of egocentricity. He is concerned only to show both that and why it is rational to be non-egocentric in our outlook. But his is after more than that: Daya also aims to draw our attention to the possibility of the re-enchantment of the commonplace and to the easy availability of a transcendental sensibility.

A good deal of this outlook, I suspect, derives from his reading of Advaita Vedānta through the lens of Aurobindo in *Life Divine*. Daya was very impressed with *Life Divine*, and referred to it in conversation as one of the great masterpieces of 20th century Indian philosophy. And central to Aurobindo’s project in that sprawling study is the demonstration that the manifest universe is not illusory—not *māyā*—but rather the real manifestation of the supramundane in space and time—*līlā*. On this view, conventional reality emerges in a kind of dialectical interplay of consciousness and the absolute—a plunging of consciousness into concreteness—and can be apprehended as the manifestation of the absolute in a reversal of that dialectical project—an ascent to full consciousness. This understanding of the nonduality between manifest reality and *Brahman* simultaneously reveals the world of everyday experience to have an inextricable transcendent dimension and the world of

Brahman to be available to ordinary consciousness. Daya interprets this insight from Aurobindo in terms of the relationship between values and the empirical world, following Kant in identifying valuation with a transcendental perspective and empirical consciousness with the everyday:

The secularization of the transcendental and the transformation of the sensuously given into that miraculous something becomes nonsensuous without losing its sensuousness. This complex character of the given misleads the unwary observer into thinking that it is sensuous still. The secularization of the transcendental is accomplished through an infusion of values. This infusion renders it a symbol of something else. It also constitutes a halting step in a forward movement beyond itself, halting because of the imperfection and incompleteness both of that which was sought to be mirrored and of that which was sought to be realized. (321)

It is this “infusion of values,” Daya insists, that fuses the secular and the transcendent, and it does so by rendering it symbolic, or meaningful. (There is a nice kinship here to the thought of the Native American philosopher *Lame Deer*.) Our everyday life, which can seem insignificant—in both senses of that term—is rendered meaningful—in both senses of that term—when we see that life as connected to what we value, and to that to which we aspire. Our actions and our words are capable of representing greater things, of bringing into reality a future we desire for the sake of those who will follow us, and of inspiring others in similar directions; the world we experience, while bounded in space and time, can carry our thought forward to the abstract, to the merely possible, and to the infinite.

The immanent thereby partakes in the transcendent; the transcendent finds concrete embodiment in the immanent. In the end, the world we experience and the actions we contribute to it become the manifestation of the values we cherish. Daya concludes this final essay with these thoughts:

A little self-reflection and an effort at imaginative identification with the underlying *Eros* of its own reality, in the sense in which we have used it, might help in mitigating or lessening the stranglehold of I-centricity that seem to be inevitable result of self-consciousness in man. It might also, hopefully, make man more aware of these indebtedness to the past generations who had built what he has inherited and responsible towards the future

generations for whom he would leave the world just as others did before him, when he came into being. (321)

So, this is the final point. So long as we remain trapped in the immanent, egocentricity is hard to avoid. This is simply because, on Daya's view, the world as it is merely empirically is bereft of value: value enables and requires connection to the transcendent. And without value, desire is all that can drive us. When *Eros* is understood as mere individual desire, it serves *Nomos* in its causal sense. But when *Eros* is taken as care for others, it serves *Logos*, and motivates a life of gratitude and beneficence.

All of this sounds very hopeful, and it is testimony to the greatness of Daya-ji's spirit that he was so hopeful regarding humanity at the close of his life, in what were indeed dark years geopolitically, as Daya himself notes towards the close of this essay. But while I share with Daya the view that a meaningful life and moral progress require a liberation from egocentricity, as well as the view that the demands of *Nomos* and *Logos* must be simultaneously met in any coherent understanding of human life, I have to regard this approach to those goals as a noble failure.

And I think that the failure was built in from the start, that is, from the use of resources drawn from Kant and Hegel in Europe, and from Śāṅkara and Aurobindo in India; that is, from sources that begin analytically with the individual subject and then try to work out from there. My own suspicion is that Daya's prison-house of I-centricity is in fact inescapable. The only way not to become imprisoned therein is never to enter in the first place. I would therefore like to help Daya to work his way towards these same goals by starting elsewhere, in the matrix of interdependence and collective life, drawing inspiration from Hume in the West and from Buddhists such as Candrakīrti and Śāntideva in India. The relation between *Eros*, *Nomos*, and *Logos* may look different from there.

5. Other ways out: Hume instead of Kant; Buddhism instead of Vedānta

Let us first think further about the relationship between freedom and *Nomos*. Daya-ji, although ambivalent on this point, sets up his problematic by taking causality to be antithetical to freedom, and indeed causality and freedom are often so understood. But, as Hume and Schopenhauer, each in his own way, correctly emphasized, this is a simple conceptual error. Freedom is not only

not antithetical to causal determinism, but it presupposes it. This is because to be free in action is for one's desires and intentions to cause one's acts; to be free in thought is for one's occurrent desires and intentions to be caused by one's standing beliefs and values, in tandem with the environment and its demands at the moment of action. If our actions were not so caused, we would be unfree—either constrained by heteronomous causes, random in our behavior, or simply insane. Augustinian agent causation of the kind that Daya considers central to freedom in this essay is not merely unattainable—it is incoherent. (Garfield 2014)

When we take this fact seriously, we see that we need to understand human freedom in a way different from that adopted by Augustine, Kant, and even Daya. Hume saw this. Freedom, like identity, is a *narrative*, or a *forensic* notion. We act freely when we behave in ways that cohere with the narrative arc of our lives, an arc we describe not as solo narrators, but as co-authors, collaborating always with those around us, who help us to define the ends we pursue, the reasons for which we can act, and the sortals through which our actions and their grounds can be comprehended. Whether an action is free or caused is not a *metaphysical* fact to be determined by an examination of forces, but an *interpretative determination* of what narrative best makes sense of that action. Our identity is, therefore, essentially hermeneutical, and for that reason, essentially collectively constituted.

This hermeneutical dimension of our social and moral lives—our *Logos*—is not, as Daya-ji worries, in tension with the fact that as natural organisms, we are governed by *Nomos*—by natural law. For, as Hume also saw, Human beings are natural artificers. As social animals, we are biologically determined to be artificers. We have evolved to construct languages, social groups, dams and harbours, currencies, banks, governments and alliances. We have hence also evolved to construct norms—ethical, epistemic and linguistic norms among them. This is not accidental; it is part and parcel of our biological nature—it is, in other words, *nomologically necessary* for us to do so; that is, it is nomologically necessary for us to create our *Logos*. The most impressive of the artifacts we are designed to construct are ourselves: beings who are determined understand themselves as free, rational agents. The union of *Nomos* and *Logos* is hence built into our very nature.

I have urged that our self-understanding is narrative, or hermeneutical. But what are the horizons against which we self-interpret? As we answer this question, we enter more deeply into a

conversation with Daya-ji. As social animals, we live and understand ourselves at the intersection of the psychobiological and the psycho-social. It is an oversimplification to see these as independent axes of understanding, given that we have evolved biologically in a social matrix and to be inextricable from that matrix. For these axes are, in complex ways, mutually dependent. But the simplification will do no harm for now.

To understand our own behavior—and to attain the kind of responsiveness to reason that allows us freedom in the sense of that term I have been adumbrating—we must understand both the biological and determinants of our psychology—that includes our individual needs, drives, habits, motives, values and thoughts, as well as their social determinants. The latter include the social rules of the societies we inhabit; the particular social niche within those societies we occupy; our family roles and professional responsibilities; the ideologies and economic circumstances of our times, and so much besides. The narratives in terms of which we make sense of ourselves advert to both of these dimensions in providing reasons for anticipated actions and explanations for those we have executed. Responsibility or exculpation could depend upon reference to phenomena located in a logical and axiological plane defined by these two axes.

One way to put this point as we return to Daya's concerns is that *Eros* indeed ties *Nomos* and *Logos* together in the unity of our lives. But it may not do so as simply as Daya thinks. When we examine the *puruṣārthas* that structure our lives, each has both an individual and a social dimension. If we are attentive to these dimensions, we see *Eros* at work in each *puruṣārtha*, and in each case, both at the individual and the social level.

Kāma may appear to be a purely biological aim. But it is not. As both Aristotle and Hume noticed, human pleasures are not purely physical; they are social. We cannot understand the pleasure we experience when listening to music or viewing art, or in the contemplation of another's achievements, without adverting to the culture that creates these values and without noting our innate resonance with our conspecifics. *Kāma* thus unites the individual and the social.

Ārtha, too, has individual and social dimensions. While we might think of the demand to accumulate enough property for comfort to be a purely self-directed motive, grounded in egoism, it is not. *Ārtha* is a *puruṣārtha* precisely because others depend upon us, and because the indigent impose burdens on all of us. Moreover, we can

only discharge our social duties if we ourselves are not indigent. Once again, the individual and the social are joined. *Eros* aims us in both directions.

Dharma is the *puruṣārtha* most obviously social in nature. But we should not forget that it has individual dimensions as well. It is not simply in the interests of others that we observe our duties; it is also so that we will be better, happier individuals. *Dharma*, when properly conceived, is both in the interest of self and other. And of course, the same can be said of *mokṣa*. While the quest for liberation is in its most immediate dimension an individual goal, the means by which we can pursue that goal, as the *Gītā* emphasizes, are irreducibly social, tied to our roles and our situations.

Daya-ji is correct to identify *Eros* with a drive to fulfill our desires, and he is wise to see those desires in a normative, not a purely descriptive way, tying them to the *puruṣārthas*. And it is a very great insight of this paper to see that it is *Eros* that must enable the reconciliation of *Nomos* and *Logos*. But Daya gets lost when he attempts to understand all of this at the purely individual level. The key to the resolution of this apparent dichotomy, I have been urging, is the very key to the prison-house of egocentricity from which Daya seeks escape: it is the recognition that there is no irreducibly individual standpoint from which *Eros* can be understood in the first place; no *Nomos* that is not in some sense social, and so *Logos* is infused with the nomic and the erotic from the outset.

Another way to put this point is to see that freedom of any kind, and hence the possibility of participation in *Logos* and human life, involves not liberation from, but guidance by rules. Speaking and thinking are rule-governed; rational action is rule-governed, and so forth. But rules only emerge from customs—from social conventions that establish regularities, which regularities induce expectations, which expectations give rise to mechanisms of ensuring conformity, which in turn come to have normative force, allowing us to distinguish correct from incorrect thought, speech or behavior. Freedom—or at least *human* freedom—therefore, is only possible in community.

But it is not only *Logos* that is essentially collective: *Eros* and *Nomos* are as well. For the desires that motivate us are not simply biological, although that is one of their roots. Since we are biologically social, we are wired by our evolutionary history and then shaped by our social environments to have desires that are

essentially social. These include the bonds of affection that bind family, friends and associations, but also political desires, hopes for the future and religious commitments. And inasmuch as our behavior is governed not only by physical, biological or individual psychological laws, but also by social regularities, the *Nomos* that explains our life is also socially constituted.

This is why *Eros*, *Nomos* and *Logos* are so inseparably bound, and why *Eros* can mediate between *Nomos* and *Logos*. In this we can agree. But they are tied not, as Daya-ji would have it, at the level of the individual, but at the collective level. For this reason, we can see that Daya sets off on the right journey, but gets off on the wrong foot. If we begin by taking a communitarian view of human life, as for instance Hume does in the *Treatise*, or Candrakīrti does when he characterizes ordinary life as constituted by *lokavyāvahāra*, we do not face the problem of escaping the prison-house of egocentricity; we never enter it in the first place. Now, this is not to say that Daya is wrong to worry about egocentricity. It is, after all, a pervasive moral and social problem, and one to which philosophy is called to give a solution. But he may be wrong in his imagination of the structure of the problem.

The problem of egocentricity not, as is it is often painted—both in the West and in India—as the problem of the need for reasons to be moral given the *prima facie* rationality of egoism. If that were the problem, it would be insoluble, and no talk of the value of *Eros* would help us, for *Eros* itself would be individual. Instead, as Śāntideva argues in the 8th chapter of *Bodhicāryāvātāra*, and as Hume argues in Book III of the *Treatise*, egoism is not even *prima facie* rational, given our essentially social nature and the absence of any intrinsic individual identity. The problem of egocentricity arises from the irrational tendency to ignore this fact and to take our identity to be intrinsic, and our interests to be egoistic. It is therefore metaphysical re-education that is demanded, not moral re-education, if we are to cultivate a caring attitude in our culture. For this reason, Hume in the West, and the Buddhist tradition in Asia would have been better starting points for Daya in this essay than Kant and Saṅkara.

6. The two truths, the secular transcendent and the transcendent mundane

We can take this idea one step further before closing this dialogue with Daya-ji. At the end of this final essay of his illustrious career,

he calls on us to recognize the secular nature of the transcendent and the transcendent nature of the mundane. As I noted above, this is undoubtedly an illusion to the *līlāvāda* of Sri Aurobindo that Daya so admired. But if we continue the line of thought I sketched above, we can see an alternative route to the same conclusion, one perhaps more conducive to Daya's own aims. That would be to continue to take the Buddhist route instead of the Vedānta route to *mokṣa*.

There are good reasons to take this alternative: the Vedānta route, attractive as it may be in virtue of its nondualistic union of the sacred and the mundane, particularly in its *līlāvāda* manifestation, still involves a commitment to a static absolute, and gives liberation a very transcendentalist, and somewhat non-secular spin, involved as it is with the notion of a *Brahman*. The Madhyamaka alternative is to see the transcendence of the mundane and the secularity of the transcendent in terms of the doctrine of the two truths as adumbrated by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti.

On this view, we can distinguish between two truths—the conventional and the ultimate. But the ultimate is simply the emptiness of all phenomena of intrinsic nature; the fact that they are all interdependent; and so the fact that their only mode of existence is conventional. The ultimate reality of anything on this view is its merely conventional status. The two truths are, therefore, as Nāgārjuna argues in the 24th chapter of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, both distinct and identical: they are intensionally distinct, inasmuch as to apprehend things as conventionally real and to apprehend them as empty are two different cognitive attitudes; but they are extensionally equivalent inasmuch as emptiness and conventional reality are each nothing but thoroughgoing interdependence.

This, as Śāntideva argues in the 8th and 9th chapters of *Bodhicāryāvātāra*, is the metaphysical foundation of an attitude of *mahākaruṇā*, which is the attitude towards which Daya-ji gestures as the close of the essay. And it rests on seeing that we, others and the world we live in are both empty of any intrinsic identity and conventionally real; that these are the same; that the transcendent nature of our existence is its merely conventional reality; and that this makes our lives both too ordinary to take ourselves too seriously and too infused with transcendent meaning to dismiss the significance of our own lives or those of others. This is the vision to which Daya-ji calls us. I join him in that call, but hope to have

convinced you that there is a better route to it than the one he sketched.

Notes and References:

Daya Krishna. (2011). "Eros, Nomos, Logos," in Bhushan, N, J Garfield and D Raveh (eds.), *Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of Daya Krishna*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Garfield, J. (2014). "Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for Mādhyamikas," in Dasti M. and e. Bryant, (eds.), *Freedom of the Will in a Cross-Cultural Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp 164-185. (2014), reprinted in R Reptti, ed., *Buddhism and Free Will*. London: Routledge (2016), pp. 45-58.

Doris Silbert Professor in the Humanities and
Professor of Philosophy, Logic and Buddhist Studies,
Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts, U.S.A.

Other Institutional Affiliations:

Harvard Divinity School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A.
University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
Central University of Tibetan Studies, Sarnath
jgarfield@smith.edu

I Am Thou: Nārāyaṇāśrama's Arguments

Dilipkumar Mohanta

Abstract

'*Advaita-Siddhānta-Sāra-Saṁgrahaḥ*' by Nārāyaṇāśrama of the 16th century Advaita philosophy, opens a new way of understanding the central thesis of Advaita Vedānta metaphysics, that is, 'I am Thou' which is otherwise known as 'Ātman-Brahmaṇa-Identity' thesis among the scholars of Indian Philosophy. This is a theme which is central to all Advaita Vedāntins and dear to all thinkers who work on the non-dualistic philosophy of ancient India. The status of suffering is incidental (*āgantuka*) and *not* natural (*svābhāvika*), according to Advaitin. The root-cause of all our sufferings, according to Advaita Vedānta, is *Ajñāna* or ignorance and ignorance stands no more when the supreme knowledge of 'Ātman-Brahmaṇa Identity' dawns. Here in this short essay, I shall try to explore how this Identity thesis is established with new arguments, supported by appropriate instances in a *prakaraṇa* work titled '*Advaita-Siddhānta-Sāra-Saṁgrahaḥ*' by Nārāyaṇāśrama of the 16th century A. D.

Key words: Ātman, Brahmaṇa, bhāvarūpa, akhaṇḍārtha, draṣṭṛ-dṛśya, śabda-aparokṣavāda.

Text

Śaṅkara authored a small treatise titled '*Brahma-jñānavalīmālā*' (also known as '*Brahma-nāmāvalīmālā*', where in the verse no 21 the gist of Advaita Metaphysics has been said. "Whatever is said in the thousands and thousands of books I can tell you in a half verse. Brahmaṇa is (ultimately) the only Reality, the world (of multiplicity) is false and Jīva is the Brahmaṇa, not at all something other than Brahmaṇa. This is the real teaching of Scriptures and Vedānta also declares the same."¹ Here we see a clear emphasis on the essential identity of Jīva and Brahmaṇa, of 'I and Thou', that is to say, of macrocosm and microcosm. The former represents individual consciousness and the later the infinite cosmic

Consciousness. So, it is said that ‘one who knows Brahmaṇa verily becomes Brahmaṇa’.² Therefore, all questions of knowing Brahmaṇa as an object are irrelevant; one can only realize Brahmaṇa by actually becoming Brahmaṇa. The same is said in ‘That art Thou’ (*Tattvamasi – Chāndyogya Upaniṣad*, 6.8.7). There are other statements expressing the same thesis. These statements express the spiritual experience of the seeker of Truth (*anubhava vākya*). What are the three other statements? “I am Brahmaṇa” (*ahaṁ brahmāsmi- Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 1.4.10), “This Self is Brahmaṇa- ayamātmā brahmā” (*Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, 2) and “Consciousness is Brahmaṇa” *prajñānaṁ Brahmaṇa- (Aitṛeya Upaniṣad*, 5.3). These four great statements (*mahāvākya*-s) are believed to entail the fundamental metaphysical teachings or the wisdom of the Vedas. Here emphasis is given on the dynamics of the alternative approaches for realization of Truth. The gradual process of spiritual training proceeds through listening to the teacher, reflecting on the teaching, and getting transformed into continuous reflection (*śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana*). It brings in the intellect of spiritual aspirant ‘an incessant stream of mental modification’, *concentrating* on the instructive statement, “That art Thou”. Śaṅkara thus states the importance of these great statements of Upaniṣads in verse no 254 of *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*. “That which is beyond caste, creed, family, and lineage; devoid of name, form, merit and demerit; transcending space, time, and sense-objects—that Brahma art thou, mediate on this in thy mind.”³ This is to say that the instructive statement in spiritual uplifting spontaneously transformed into the direct realization of great statement of the form “I am Brahmaṇa.” Brahmaṇa is Consciousness as such (*prajñānaṁ Brahmaṇa*). To show that the whole crux of Advaita Vedānta lies in this, “I -Thou- Identity” thesis. Śaṅkara in the very 1st verse of *Nirvāṇaśatakam* says, “I am neither the mind, nor the intellect, nor the ego, nor the mind-stuff; I am neither the body, nor the changes of the body; I am neither the senses of hearing, taste, smell or sight; nor am I the ether, the earth, the fire, the air; I am existence absolute, Knowledge absolute, Bliss Absolute;”⁴ ‘I am Thou, I am Thou’.

It does not allow any kind of extremism regarding religious belief. Jīva, because of ignorance identifies itself with body and here starts suffering. The question of different forms of worship or conceptions of God has been addressed by Advaitns in convincing way. “The scriptures have prescribed the worship of images made of stone or metals representing the deity. That is why some

worship images as 'Īśvara'. The one Īśvara makes His presence as the Indweller in divine forms and divine images, and gives the fruits of worship to those who commune with Him through those forms. Ignorant people do not understand that Īśvara pervades of all (i.e., *Sarvātmakatva*), so they dispute and fight among themselves assuming that there are many divinities and that the form that one worships alone is the true divinity and that of others are false. On the other hand, all these divinities are true, as the same Īśvara resides in all these forms.”⁵

But question arises here: What is the reason for prescribing different modes of worship if one and the same God is everywhere? The answer from Advaita point of view is as follows: Ordinary people are extrovert and Advaita Vedānta gradually teaches how one becomes introvert. And this gradually guides people to realize the thesis that Jīvātman and Paramātman are not different but identical in essence. It is for psychological states of people “who have this obsession of duality differ in their attitudes and ways of thinking and to suit their varying needs and capacities, the scriptures have prescribed different ways of worship. They are accepted as true only temporarily and not ultimately. ... the same Paramātman gets the status of jīvas when He assumes the adjuncts of individual bodies. When He assumes the individual casual body, the Paramātman is known as Prajñā.”⁶

There is no question of 'outside' and 'inside' – all turn irrelevant. “Actually, there is no outside or inside in Consciousness, but as long as we feel that we are conditioned by *annamaya*, *prāṇamaya*, *manomaya*, *viññānamaya* and *ānandamaya kośa*, in the five layers of the manifestation of Ātman, we need to ask how this individual *annamaya*, individual *prāṇamaya*, individual *manomaya* and the rest are related to their Cosmic counter-parts. When we realize ourselves as conscious entities, conditioned though by the individual layers like *annamaya*, *prāṇamaya* etc, in great wonder we ask how this Consciousness is related to the cosmic Consciousness?”⁷

But a very pertinent question arises here: How to understand the meaning of 'I-Thou-Identity' as said in the four great statements? Among the classical interpreters of Śaṅkara there are two major schools-Bhāmāti represented by Vācaspati and Vivaraṇa by Padmapāda and his followers. According to Bhāmāti theorists, verbal testimony or *śabda* causes indirect cognition and therefore, there cannot be any '*śabda-jñāna*' that is direct in nature. For them, *śabda-aparokṣavāda* is a defective theory and for the realization of

'Truth-in-Itself', the dawn of '*Brahma-jñāna*' listening to the teacher, reflecting on the teaching (*śravaṇa-manana*) have secondary roles while getting transformed into continuous reflection (*nididhyāsana*) has the primary role. On the contrary, according to Vivaraṇa theorists, for the dawn of '*Brahma-jñāna*' listening to the teacher (*śravaṇa*) has the primary role and reflecting on the teaching (*manana*) and getting transformed into continuous reflection (*nididhyāsana*) have secondary roles. The great statement like "That art Thou" (*Tattvamasi*) etc. are the sources of realizing Brahmaṇa as identical with individual self (*Jīva*). This theory is known as *Śabda-aparokṣavāda*.

However, at this point we need to discuss an important question: What is the ground for admitting such a relation of Identity of 'I and Thou.'? Post- Śāṅkara Advaita Vedāntists face fresh criticism from the Nyāya school as well as from other schools of Vedānta to the fundamental thesis of 'Ātman-Brahmaṇa-Identity'. As a result, we come across several attempts to address the issue. In '*Advaita-Siddhānta-Sāra-Saṁgrahaḥ*', Nārāyaṇāśrama (16th century AD) uses four different *anvayi-vyatireki-hetu* with examples to defend the Vivaraṇa-line of interpretation. We all know, if in the presence of x always there is presence of y, then it is called a case of *anvaya* (*tat satte tat sattā*) and if, on the other hand, in the absence of x always there is absence of y, then it is called a case of *vyatireka* (*tadasatte tadasattā*). Let us now elaborate the argument with *anvayi-vyatireki-hetu* in the relation of the 'perceiver-perceived' (*draṣṭṛ-dṛśya*), the 'sufferer-loving one' (*duḥkhi-premāspada*), the witness-witnessing (*sākṣī-sākṣya*) and formative 'extensity'-non-extensity' (*anuvṛttikārāvyāvṛttikārā*) respectively. Now let us elaborate the type of *anvaya-vyatireki hetu*. In this world of multiplicity most of the knowable, say a pot or a piece of cloth etc. are *dṛśya*. As we admit that there are objects of seeing, the existence of their seer must be admitted. Even the sensory and motor organs of the body appear as knowable, object of seeing. But the existence of all objects of cognition is consciousness-dependent. Only consciousness can be the seer of all things. It is intrinsically existent. This Consciousness is reflected as the objects of perception. The thesis that 'only Consciousness exists' is being established, because all objects of the world belong to the class of knowable and Consciousness is the only seer reflected as objects under inveterate ignorance (*avidyā*).⁸ This is the first type of reason based on 'similarity-dissimilarity'.

Now the second form of such reason is as follows. Though it is said that because of its apparent location in suffering etc. in individual consciousness, the self appears to be indistinct (*anvita*) with these, the Universal Self is different from them. Because, It is Bliss as such. So, the Self as such cannot suffer. There is suffering apparently, because of the false identification of the 'Self and not-self', say with the bodily organs etc. The Self is neither the body nor the senses nor the organs of the body but consciousness as such.⁹

For the third *hetu* (reason) it is said that though the Self appears to be related as 'witness-witnessing tie', but the Self is, in fact, not that. Now let us illustrate the fourth type of *anvayi-vyatireki hetu*. When I say, 'I am fatty', 'I am lean' etc., I speak of the bodily experiences. Because of ignorance about the true nature of self, here we identify the self with the body or the senses. But the Self, in fact, is different from all these. Over and above, the body and the senses, the ever-lasting Consciousness is the only reality, which is, in other words, called Brahmaṇa.¹⁰

Let us now use five different example to support the contention of 'I am Thou' which is *Brahmādvaitavāda*. According to Nārāyaṇāśrama, they are (i) redness of crystal, (ii) rope-snake, (ii) reflected-reflection, (iv) pot-space and (v) 'this is that Devadatta'. Because of extraneous condition the crystal appears as red though the crystal as such is not red. Again, we may take the stock example of superimposition taking oft-trodden examples of 'rope-snake' and 'silver-shell'. Superimposition is defined as 'the apparent presentation of something previously seen in some other to consciousness in the form of memory'. This apparent presentational cognition is cancelled subsequently. The possibility of recognition is excluded by the use of the term *smṛtirūpa*, in the form of memory. The object of such experience can neither be categorized as 'existent' nor as 'non-existent' nor as 'both existent and non-existent'. It is, therefore, called indescribable, *anirvacanīya* in Advaita Vedānta. It is metaphorically called *avidyā*, inveterate ignorance, because here 'the effect being put for the cause'. It is also called *ajñāna* which is something positive (*bhāvarūpa*).¹⁰ The status of the world as an independent reality is like the cognition of snake in a rope or a piece of silver in a piece of shell. In case of our cognition of a piece of rope as snake, the insufficient light may be an extraneous condition. It is an instance of illusory perceptual cognition. Likewise, the self, which is pure consciousness as such, is not the agent of any action as usually assigned to it in the form of being creator, enjoyer and destroyer etc. Because of the spell of

ignorance, we admit the self as the agent of any action or the enjoyer. From its own-side or from the trans-mundane standpoint the Self as Consciousness as such, is neither creator nor enjoyer nor destroyer, and therefore, is not different from Brahmaṇa. 'That' or 'Thou' stands for 'Brahmaṇa' and 'I' stands for individual self (*jīva*).¹²

But an important question may arise here: It might be admitted that because of certain extraneous condition like nearness of red flower etc., (*ḥapākusumānaikavāt*) though the crystal is not originally red, still we do have the cognition of the crystal in the cognition of agent-hood of action or creator-ness in itself as pure consciousness? Like the presence of red flower here, there is no such condition. This objection had been anticipated and therefore in the text Nārāyaṇāśrama put forward the second example of 'rope-snake' illusion. Let us explain the message contained in the illustration. It is indeed true that we do have the illusory cognition of the snake in a piece of rope. In a similar way, though the self is consciousness as such, we do have the illusion of intellect in it. Similar is the case of being creator (*sraṣṭā*) in the context of the self as pure consciousness. This cognition does not have any cause (*amūlaka*). From this it is evident that the self is consciousness as such and it is the same as the non-creator Brahmaṇa Itself.

But another pertinent question might arise here: How can this 'identity-thesis' in the context of 'I-Thou' relation be experienced? Without actual experience (*anubhava*) nothing is accepted as established. The moot question now becomes the consideration of the proof (*prāmāṇya*) of this identity relation. The example of the 'reflected-reflection' (*bimba-pratibimba*) is being brought by Nārāyaṇāśrama. In our analysis we can see that what is experienced as difference between 'what is reflected' and 'the reflection itself' is only apparent and not real. The shadow of the tree has no independent existence apart from the tree itself. This is a fact of our common experience. Analogically the difference between the individual self (*jīva*) and Brahmaṇa as the creator, the sustainer and the destroyer etc. is only apparent and not real. An epistemic consideration of this *bheda*, difference is beyond description in categorical terms of 'is' and 'is-not'. This is precisely the reason for which in '*Ātman-Brahmaṇa-Identity*', there is no epistemic error or the question of invalidity.

In the same line of argument, the example of 'space limited by the pot' (*ghaṭākāśa*) comes into consideration. Nārāyaṇāśrama here apprehends an objection that this so-called identity relation cannot

be established, because there is the conjunction of the self as consciousness (*cidātmā*) and worldliness (*samsāratva*). He refutes such an apprehended counter-thesis in this fourth case of example. It is indeed true that because of the associative conjunction of smoke etc. the phenomenal space limited in a pot, the pot-space (*ghaṭākāśa*) seems to appear, but there exists no real conjunction at all. Because, what is called phenomenal or worldly is from ultimate standpoint Brahmaṇa Itself, i.e., 'Thou'. In other words, apart from Brahmaṇa phenomenal world has no independent existence; it is real as the limited appearance of the ultimate Reality, 'Thou' which is verily called Brahmaṇa. Just as the space limited in a pot is essentially the Space as such, the 'pot-space' has no independent existence. It is not a part of Brahmaṇa but the appearance of Brahmaṇa under the limited condition. This is precisely the reason why Brahmaṇa is called part-less (*anaṅga*) in Advaita Vedānta.¹³

"This is that Devadatta" (*So'yam Devadatta*) is the fifth example used by Nārāyaṇāśrama. This is an instance of the indivisible sentence (*akhaṇḍārthaka vākya*). If we analyse this sentence, it would be clear that from such sentences we can understand the meaning of the great sentences (*mahāvākya*-s) expressing the essential identity of macrocosm and microcosm, the individual self and Brahmaṇa, that is to say, 'I am Thou'. "That art Thou" (*tattvamasī*), "I am Brahmaṇa" (*ahaṁ brahmāsmī*) etc. are great statements of the Vedas, expressing the meant as the indivisible whole and through the realization of such great statements of the Vedas, Brahmaṇa is realized as an indivisible whole reality. To eradicate the doubt of the possible opponents, Nārāyaṇāśrama here argues that just as in case of recognition of a person, whom we had seen earlier, we say, 'this is the same Devadatta whom we had seen earlier.' Here we understand the indivisible meaning (*akhaṇḍārtha*) of the sentence expressing the statement of recognition. He considers the defining sentences like *prakṛṣṭa-prakāśacandra* as included within the fifth category and therefore it is justified to mention here that there is no need of admitting the sixth class of sentences.

From the above elaboration it is clear that as an author of *prakaraṇa* type philosophical treatise Nārāyaṇāśrama's main concern is to deal with the special topic of "I am Thou" as a matter of immediate cognition (*aparokṣānubhūti*) through knowing from words of the great statements. We have elucidated the four different reasons based on 'similarity and dissimilarity' applied to

five different set of examples and none of the examples are irrelevant (*avāntara*). The well-known Vedāntic statement of ignorance of one's own existence while counting others excepting oneself is known as 'you are the tenth'—'(*daśamastvamasi*)'. This awareness is immediate and as a whole. This interpretation is a development of the Vivaraṇa school of post-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta, in accordance with the renowned philosophers of Advaita Vedānta. Brahmaṇa is the only Reality. Īśvara is called the cause of this world. This is the secondary (*taṭastha*) characteristics of Brahmaṇa. The Sanskrit word *viśva* is used in the sense of many. Everything in this world is controlled and sustained by Īśvara. "Ignorant people do not understand that Īśvara is the pervader of all (i.e., *sarvātmakatva*), so they dispute and fight among themselves assuming that there are many divinities and that the form that one worships alone is the true divinity and that of others are false. On the other hand, all these divinities are true, as the same Īśvara resides in all these forms."¹⁴ This makes Advaita Vedānta, in our times, a platform for all, a philosophy which is against religious exclusivism, extremism, fundamentalism and fanaticism. It does not stop in 'passive tolerance' but in acceptance of the 'so-called other' as oneself. It paves the way for religious pluralism and interreligious understanding. It gives room for 'engagement, involvement and participation'.

Īśvara is saccidānanda, the very primary characteristics (*svarūpa of Ātman, Brahmaṇa*) that differentiates it from *anātman*, not-self. The three states of consciousness arisen, dream and deep sleep appear as discrete and yet there is an underlying unity and this unity establishes witness-hood of the Self. It is indivisible, unaffected by time, space and matter. It is not marked by differences on account of similar entities, dissimilar entities or any internal aspects. There is, in fact, complete identity of "I and Thou".

In this context it must be remembered that *ātman*, which is *saccidānanda*, Existence-Consciousness-Bliss as such, comes to experience a state of misery (*duḥkha*) on account of its association and identification with the body. Advaita Vedānta therefore speaks of three tiers of ontology of experience – illusory (*prātibhāsika*), tangible (*vyāvahārika*) and ultimate (*pāramārthika*). The first is called human creation, the second is called God's creation and the third is called un-created and eternal. The first two are explained under superimposition (*adhyāsa*). From ontological consideration unlike the third these two are impermanent and difference among the two lies in consideration of the duration only. Illusory state

denotes the man-made momentary perceptions of a purely illusory nature. When a person sees a snake in a piece of rope, there is no real snake but a superimposed 'snake-ness' characterized the piece of rope in question. This may happen due to insufficient light. But as soon as sufficient light is brought there, we can see that there is no snake but only a piece of rope, and the previous cognition is cancelled now. The tangible or functional reality continues for a longer time but vanishes as soon as the ultimate one is realized with the dawn of *saccidānanda*, Existence- Consciousness-Bliss as such. All our sufferings turn ended with the dawn of realization the ultimate state of identity as 'I am Thou'. The moment one realizes one's true nature, all misery and suffering cease to affect him. He may be in the world but the world is not within him. One who realizes one as self as such is liberated. The question of being a *caṇḍāla* or a *brāhmaṇa* in body is not important. In other words, there is no difference (*bheda*). So Śaṅkara says in *Maniṣāpañcakam* (v.2), "caṇḍālo' stu sa tu dvijo'stu gururityeṣā maṇiṣā mama." ^{15 16}

Notes and references:

1. "Ślokārdhena prvaṅśyāmi yaduktam granthakoṭibhiḥ, Brahma satyam jaganmithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ. Idameva tu sacchāstramiti vedānta diṇḍmaḥ"—See, *Brahma-jñānāvalīmālā, Kārikā* No 21, Śaṅkarācārya-Granthamālā, Edited by Pancānana Tarkaratna, vol 2, Basumati Sāhitya Mandir, Calcutta 1995 (1926), p.197
2. "brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati"-- *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, 3.2.9 Ed. By Atul Chandra Sen, Sitanath Tattvabhusana and Mahesh Chandra Ghosh, Haraf Prakashani, Kolkata, 2000(1972), p 250
3. "Jatinītikula-gotrādurgam nāmarūpa-guṇadoṣavarjitam / deśakālaviṣayātivarti yadbhrama tattvamasi bhāvayātmani", See, *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* Text with English Tr. by Madhavananda, Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta 16th Impression, 2000, p. 99
4. "mano-buddhyahamkāraccittāni nāham na ca śrotrajihve na ca ghrāṇanetre /na ca vyomabhūmī nā tejo nā vāyuścidāndanarūpaḥ śivo'hamn, śivo'hamn"-- *Nirvāṇaśatakam*, "I am neither the mind, nor the intellect, nor the ego, nor the mind-stuff; I am neither the body, nor the changes of the body; I am neither the senses of hearing, taste, smell or sight; nor am I the ether, the earth, the fire, the air; I am existence absolute, Knowledge absolute, Bliss Absolute; I am He, I am He." English translation by Swami Vivekananda, See, *The Complete Works*, vol, 3, Advaita Ashrama, Kolkata, 1989, p. 391

5. See *Laghuvasudeva Mananam*, Translated by Swami Tapasyananda, Sri Ramakrishna Math, Mylapore, Madras, 2006, p. 76
6. *Ibid*
7. See, Swami Atmapriyananda, Vivekananda Centenary Vedānta Lecture, published in *The Journal of the Department of Philosophy, University of Calcutta*, Vol 8, 2007, p.43
8. “dehendriyādi svavyatiriktadraṣṭṛkaṁ-dṛṣyatvāt ghatvāt”. See, Nārāyaṇāśrama, *Advaita-Siddhānta-Sāra-Saṁgrah* published by Panduranga Jabji with an introduction written in Sanskrit by Swami Kevalananda, Nirānaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1935, pp i-iii; also see Editorial Cum Introduction, *Advaita-Siddhānta-Sāra-Saṁgrah*, Reconstructed and edited by Professor Dilip Kumar Mohanta, published by Ramakrishna Mission Vivekananda University, Belur, West Bengal, 2012, p. v –vii
9. “duḥkhādisambhinneṣu ahaṁkāraḍiṣu adhiṣṭhā’nvitopyātmā parama-premāspadatvāt tadvyatiriktaḥ.” -- *Ibid*
10. According to Nyāya philosophers, ignorance (*ajñāna*) is negative and like positive entity it can be perceived. But the Advaitins argue that in statement like ‘I do not know’ the ‘I’ refers to Self and therefore it cannot mean the absence of knowledge either particular or general, (*jñāna-sāmānya*). In Advaita Vedānta, knowledge is used for the witness-consciousness, *sākṣi-cetanā*. But by saying ignorance as positive it does not mean any absolute substance like *Brahmaṇa*. In that case liberation (*mukti*) would be impossible. It cannot be categorised either as real or unreal or both. For details see, *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgrah* of Vidyāraṇya, Bengali Translation and editorial by Pramathanath Tarkabhūṣaṇa, vol. 1, Basumati Sahitya Mandir, Calcutta, 1334 Bangabda, pp 145—151
11. “sthūladidehānubhaviṭṛtvena vyāvṛttvasvnuvṛttoyamātmā-vastutastebhyo vyatirikta san niravacchinna-brahmātmāiveti.”—*Ibid*
12. “tena cākaṭraṣūcidātmanaḥ-akartṛ-brahmarūpatā na viruddheti.”— *Ibid*
13. “Dhūmādisaṁsargitvena bhāsamāno’pi ghaṭākāśo yathā vastutastatsaṁsargeṇa na bhavati, taddat cidātmāpi saṁsāritvena saṁsargitayā bhāsamāno’pi vastutaḥ asaṁgabrahmarūpa eveti.”— *Advaita-Siddhānta-Sāra-Saṁgrah*, published by Ramakrishna Mission Vivekananda University, 2012, p. XX
14. See, *Laghuvasudeva Mananam*, English Tr. Swami Tapasyananda, Sri Ramakrishna Math, Malapore, Madras, 2006.
15. ‘brahmaivāhamidaṁ jagacca sakalaṁ cinmatravistāritam sarvaṁ caitadavidyayā triguṇayā’śaṁ mayā kalpitaṁ/ itthaṁyasya dṛḍhā matiḥ sukhatare nitye pare nirmale cāṇḍālo’stu sat u dvijo’stu gururityeṣā maṇiṣā mama// 6 “I am *Brahmaṇa* (pure consciousness). It is pure consciousness that appears as this universe. All this is only something conjured up by me because of inveterate ignorance (*avidya*) which is composed of the three *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*). One who has attained this definite realization about *Brahmaṇa* which is bliss itself, eternal, supreme and pure, is my Teacher (*Guru*), whether he is an outcaste or a *brahmin*.”-See, *Śaṅkarācārya-Grantha-Mālā*, 3rd Vol, edited by Cidghanānandapuri, published by Basumati Sahitya Mandira, Calcutta, 1995, p.398
16. This is the revised version of the paper presented in the plenary session of ICPR organised National Seminar on "Renewing Indian Philosophy through Vedantic tradition" held at Sri Vishnu Mohan Foundation, Chennai during

14 and 15 September, 2019 in connection with the Celebration of Philosophers' Day in commemoration of the Shankara Jayanti.

Professor,
Department of Philosophy,
Calcutta University, Kolkata
Ex. Vice Chancellor,
Kalyani University, Kalyani, Nadia &
The Sanskrit College University, Kolkata
dkmphil@gmail.com

Contemporary Indian Philosophy: A Tasting Menu

Daniel Raveh

Contemporary Indian philosophy is a distinct genre of philosophy that draws both on classical Indian philosophical sources and on Western materials, old and new. It is comparative philosophy without borders, if I may borrow this phrase from Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber (2015). In this paper, I attempt to show how contemporary Indian philosophy works, through five instances from five of its protagonists: Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya (I will speak of his new interpretation of the old rope-snake parable, in his essay “Śaṅkara’s Doctrine of Maya”, 1925); Daya Krishna (I will focus on the “moral monadism” that the theory of karma in his reading leads to, drawing on his book *Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy*, 2004); Ramchandra Gandhi (on the interlacement of word and image and his commentary on the concept of Brahmacharya in correspondence with his grandfather, the famous Mahatma, in his essay “Brahmacharya”, 1981); Mukund Lath (on identity through – not despite – change, with classical Indian music, Rāga music, as his case-study, in his essay “Identity through Necessary Change”, 2003); and finally, Rajendra Swaroop Bhatnagar (on suffering, a crucial concept in the present Covid days, in his paper “No Suffering if Human Beings Were Not Sensitive”, 2019).

My aim in this paper is twofold. First, to introduce five contemporary Indian philosophers, whose names the readers must have heard, but whose work I am not sure that the readers are closely acquainted with. Writing for a journal published by the Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, I chose for my “tasting menu” of contemporary Indian philosophy two thinkers who have taught in this department for many years: Dayaji and Bhatnagar Saab. Another thinker to be discussed here, Mukund Lath, taught in the neighboring Department of History of the same university. I could have also included in my discussion Govind Chandra Pande (1923-2011), of the same department of history. His prolific work on Buddhist, Vedic and Vedāntic sources deserves attentive reflection, a project that I hope to undertake in the near future. The fact that Lath and Pande have been affiliated to a department of history, not philosophy, does not make their work

less philosophical. The broad scope of their scholarship might suggest that defining their work as “philosophy” would be too narrow. Lath, one of my present protagonists, is a polymath known for his work in musicology, for his acclaimed translations from Sanskrit, Prakrit, Hindi and Bengali, for his engagements in the field of Indian art, especially painting, and for his published poetry. My intention is hardly to reduce Lath’s interdisciplinarity into a single rubric, “philosophy”. Quite the contrary. My contention is that contemporary Indian philosophy, comparative and interdisciplinary as it is, is the suitable intellectual arena “to host” his multifaceted work. Or G.C. Pande’s. Their openness to different thinking-traditions and rootedness in several languages – classical and modern – are also paradigmatic of contemporary Indian philosophy as I see it.

Besides introducing my five protagonists philosophically through their work, my second aim is to raise the question of newness and philosophy, newness in philosophy. Is there anything such as “newness” in philosophy? Or is contemporary philosophy just a footnote – a-la Whitehead – to the writings of the great minds of the past? Whitehead famously wrote that “the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato” (1979, 39). Are we to assume, then, that contemporary Indian philosophy, my protagonists included, is just a series of footnotes to classical thinkers both in India and Europe? Footnotes to the Upaniṣads, Nāgārjuna, Dharmakīrti and Śaṅkara, as much as (let us not forget the colonialism and Macaulay) to Plato and Aristotle, and with Whitehead’s permission, even to Kant and Hegel?

I have nothing against footnotes. Shari Benstock reminds us that “inherently marginal [...] footnotes reflect on the text, engage in a dialogue with it, and often perform an interpretive and critical act of it” (1983, 204). I agree that wisdom often comes from the margins, and that footnotes can be creative, almost a parallel text, interpretive, critical. I further believe that the borderline between center and periphery, mainstream and fringe, text and footnote, should be drawn with a gentle touch rather than set in stone. But my present claim is that contemporary Indian philosophy (I leave it to others to plea for contemporary Western philosophy) is not a footnote, it is a text with agency of its own, validity of its own. It is wholly and thoroughly a text worth reading, and it is not written at the bottom (of the cultural or civilizational page as a footnote), but at the top.

In the winter of 2016, during a seminar on the philosophy of Daya Krishna at the University of Delhi, the question about newness in philosophy came up. In reply, one of the participants, a classical thinker, passionately argued:

Alu Gobhi is Alu Gobhi. Even if you change the masalas, it remains potatoes with cauliflower. Nothing more, nothing less.

Nothing new, then, according to him, in cooking and philosophy. *Alu Gobhi is Alu Gobhi.* This culinary illustration remained with me. I am sure that no chef would agree with this statement, but the question about newness in philosophy is ever-relevant. Daya Krishna, one of the five thinkers that I will discuss shortly, strongly believed in the possibility of newness. The illustration used by him when he speaks of philosophical newness is from another department of the culinary field, the department of alcoholic beverages. Dry Martini, Daya Krishna writes in his paper "Thinking Creatively about the Creative Act" (1999) is the result of a mixture ("in a certain proportion", he specifies) of Gin and Dry Vermouth; a potent mixture that creates "a very strong drink". Consequently, Daya Krishna speaks of "a sudden explosion of new meaning" that a mixture of concepts can bring about (2011, 43). It is implied here that a good philosophical argument, which for Daya Krishna necessarily involves a measure of newness, is as intoxicating as the best of cocktails.

Five thinkers, then, five philosophical innovators. It is a "tasting menu", so I will give just one example of newness and creativity for each of them.

1. Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya (K.C. Bhattacharyya, KCB, 1875-1949):

The readers must have heard of KCB, considered by many as "the father" of contemporary Indian philosophy. KCB offers both a new reading, fresh reading, different reading of classical Indian texts, and at the same time he is a unique commentator of Kant and Hegel. His writings can be classified into three rubrics: The first rubric includes "Svarāj in Ideas", a manifesto of decolonization at the level of thinking, originally delivered as a lecture at the Hooghly College in the late 1920s. Here he warns his listeners about the dangers of "cultural subjection", in which "an alien culture

possesses one like a ghost". He further speaks of "assimilated Western ideas fixed in language [that is, in English]", which induce "certain habits of soulless thinking which appear like real thinking [...] shadow mind that functions like a real mind, except in the matter of genuine creativeness" (1984, 384-385).

KCB corresponds in "Svarāj in Ideas" with M.K. Gandhi's essay "Hind Swaraj" (1909). In his Journal *Young India*, Gandhi returns (in his case, an "eternal return") to the concept of swaraj and explains:

I want to write many new things, but they must all be written on the Indian slate. (*Young India* 26.6.1924, CWMG Vol. 28, 201)

But what is, or where is this "Indian slate"? What does it mean for Gandhi, and for KCB after Gandhi? Surely it is not a return, a nostalgic return to classical sources, to the past. Gandhi and KCB were modernists. They strived for something new. Pastness cannot be the newness that KCB and contemporary Indian philosophy after him is in search of. I am not delving into the question of Indianness, or what is Indian in Indian philosophy, or into the difference – that Bhagat Oinam points out in a recent article (Oinam 2018) – between Indian philosophy and philosophy in India.

I spoke of three rubrics in KCB's writings: the first rubric is about politics and decolonization and includes his essay "Svarāj in Ideas". The second rubric includes his philosophical reflection on classical Indian and on modern European philosophical texts. At the Indian end of the scale, KCB writes on Advaita-Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, Pātañjala-yoga, Jainism and the Rasa theory of aesthetics. At the Western end, he offers an analysis of Kant and Hegel. The third and last rubric includes his independent essays (in correspondence with the abovementioned texts, thinkers and traditions of thinking), namely the quartet of "The Place of the Indefinite in Logic" (1916), "The Subject as Freedom" (1930), "The Concept of the Absolute and its Alternative Forms" (1934) and "The Concept of Philosophy" (1936).

Newness and creativity in KCB: In a sense, there is something new in KCB's entire method of philosophizing and his distinct aphoristic, sūtra-like style of writing. Gopinath Bhattacharyya, KCB's son and the editor of his collected works, writes almost apologetically in his editor's introduction:

Much of what KCB has said of Vedānta, Sāṃkhya and Yoga is not to be found in the extant original literature on these subjects. It is an extension or a development in new directions [...] It is the discovery of new potentialities. (2008, xix)

He is right, besides the implied apologetic tone. Development in new directions and discovery of new potentialities is what KCB aims for. Here is an example of KCB's philosophical newness, taken from his essay "Śaṅkara's Doctrine of Māyā" (1925), which offers a novel analysis of the old snake-rope parable, often utilized in the Advaita-Vedānta tradition. In his analysis of this famous parable, KCB focuses on what he refers to as the "the third stage of the snake." In the previous, obvious, referred-to-time-and-again two stages, the snake is perceived (in twilight if you wish) first as "real" and then as "unreal", namely first as a snake and then as a rope. But what happens next? For Śaṅkara (see his *Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya* 1.4.6, Thibaut 1994, Part I, 251) there is no "next". When you realize that the snake is in fact a rope, this is the moment of redemption. Your anxiety is over, as also your conceptual error (*avidyā*), having mistaken a rope for a snake. But KCB begs to differ. According to him, "though corrected, the snake is not forgotten." Writing within the Advaitic framework, as the title of his paper indicates, KCB uses the third stage of the snake, in which he neither (or no longer) "exists" nor "does not exist" to rethink Śaṅkara's notion of *māyā*. He writes:

The indescribable should be nought, but is still given in absolute mockery of thought. It marks, in a sense, the frontier between thought and faith, being the given limit of thought on the one hand and the promise of the annulment of given-ness on the other. (2008, 99)

This is to say that despite the "correction" of the snake in the second stage (correction from snake to rope), the snake is still felt, responded to, and in a sense ("in absolute mockery of thought") even perceived. Moreover, following the encounter with the snake (which, in effect, had been a rope all along), the protagonist of the parable moves on, carrying the snake within him. The snake is imprinted in his consciousness as a *saṃskāra*, "karmic scar". As such, it has the potentiality to be awakened whenever the protagonist sees a coiled "something" before him again. KCB's real

problem is the human (or the subjective, as he puts it) mechanism owing to which one “produces” snakes (in the Advaitic formulation) and is inclined to be bitten by them (in the “family resembling” scorpion-snake parable expounded in *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya* 2.15, Aranya 2012, 143-149). KCB’s reading of the rope-snake parable is creative in the sense that it shifts the spotlight from the “second stage of the snake,” conventionally taken as the final stage, to a new, third stage. He thus extends the boundaries of the parable, using it as a potent tool for discussing what he sees as the crux of the matter, namely “the hidden subjective defect through which the snake is still given”, even after its “correction” in the second stage (2008, 102). KCB’s move is creative to the extent that after reading his analysis, one can no longer be satisfied with the two-stage analysis of the parable. And perhaps this is one of the features of something new and creative: that like the “right piece” of a jigsaw puzzle, it fits the broader picture so well that one can no longer do without it, and “feels” that it must have been here all along.

2. Daya Krishna (1924-2007):

Again, not easy to choose just a single instance of newness in Daya Krishna. His reading of classical Indian sources is so original that I always suspected that there was some *Jādū*, magic, in his *chashmā*, his glasses, which enabled him to see things differently. Take for instance his paper “Adhyāsa: A Non-Advaitic Beginning in Śaṅkara’s Vedānta” (1983). Here he reads Śaṅkara’s *Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya*, and is puzzled by the very first sentence of Śaṅkara’s introduction, his famous *Adhyāsa-Bhāṣya*. In this opening sentence, as every student of classical Indian philosophy knows, Śaṅkara states:

The object (*viśaya*) and the subject (*viśayin*), manifested respectively in the ideas of “you” and “I” (*yusmat* and *asmat-pratyaya*), are different from one another like darkness and light, and should not be identified with one another. (Thibaut 1994, Part I, 3)

Daya Krishna is surprised by Śaṅkara’s definition of *adhyāsa* as the mistaken identification of “you” and “I”. From an Advaitic, non-dualistic perspective, Daya Krishna thinks out loud, the error

should be the other way around. For the Advaitin, and Śaṅkara is supposed to be the champion of Advaita, anything which diverts from the equation “I am Thou” – as Daya Krishna’s contemporary Ramchandra Gandhi titled his Magnum Opus (1984) – is an error. Why and how, then, Daya Krishna wonders, does Śaṅkara choose to open the introduction of his commentary with a formulation of *adhyāsa* which is compatible with the dualistic position of his rivals from the Sāṃkhya school of thought?

Daya Krishna’s full move can be found in his paper “Adhyāsa: A Non-Advaitic Beginning in Śaṅkara’s Vedānta” (1983).¹ I wish to push forward with another illustration of newness in Daya Krishna’s reading of classical Indian philosophy:

In his essay “Socio-Political Thought in Classical India” (1997), Daya Krishna suggests that every political theorist should be interested in the radically-individualistic implications of the theory of karma, which lead – he argues – to “moral monadism”. What is moral monadism, and why and how would the theory of karma lead to moral monadism? According to the theory of karma, one’s present position in the world is the causal result of one’s actions in the past. In the same way, one’s present actions will determine one’s future position. It is implied, and this is Daya Krishna’s concern, that the karma theory leaves no place for the other, for you. The other, at best, is instrumental to enable me to bring to fruition the karmic baggage that I carry along, and hopefully to acquire – owing to my attitude towards him or her – *puṇya*, merit, “good karma”, that will have positive future consequences. One can hardly effect the other. One’s actions determine one’s own karma and one’s future born of this karma. Morally speaking, then, each to his own.

Daya Krishna does not hesitate to reveal a flaw in one of the foremost assets of the Indian culture – the theory of karma. But this is not all. How does this “moral monadism”, Daya Krishna further wonders, fit with the entire procedure of the Vedic *yajña* (sacrifice)? In the *yajña*, the *yajamāna*, the patron of the ritual, hires the services of a *ṛtvika*, a priest, to perform the ritual for him. The labor, the craft, the doing, are all the priest’s, hence according to the theory of karma, the fruits should be his. But surprisingly, it is the *yajamāna* who enjoys, or is supposed to enjoy the fruits of this action. The whole ritual is formed to enable him to reap the fruits.

In light of this alleged contradiction between karma and *yajña*, Daya Krishna appeals to an ensemble of pandits of the Mīmāṃsā

tradition, to ask them if Jaimini, author of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, “accepts the principle that whoever does the karma [the ritual, the action], its *phala* [fruit] goes to him only, [... or] does Jaimini have a different theory of action?”

This is just a tasting menu. I cannot delve into this intriguing dialogue between Daya Krishna and the Mīmāṃsakas. It appears in Daya Krishna’s book *Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy*.² The novelty lies in his ability to raise sharp questions – moral monadism? A conflict between karma and yajña? – that trigger a new discussion about the main theories of action in classical Indian philosophy.

3. Ramchandra Gandhi (1937-2007):

Ramubhai as he was known to all, is the Mahatma’s grandson and commentator, and one of the most creative philosophers in India in the second half of the 20th century (a definition that fits all my protagonists, except for KCB who lived and wrote in the first half of this century). In a series of publications, such as his essay “On Meriting Death” (1981) and his books *I am Thou* (1984) and *Svarāj* (2002), Ramubhai emphasizes what he refers to as “life in the face of death”. The presence of death, according to him – from the *Kaṭha-Upaniṣad* to his grandfather’s fasts unto death, and finally his assassination on January 30th 1948 – reveals a common human denominator which he refers to as *advaita* (nonduality), or *ananyatā* (nondifference). Both notions, according to him, convey a sense of deathlessness. Deathlessness not in the sense of “not dying” in the literal, physical sense, but as the capacity, Ramubhai explains – with his grandfather in mind – to “merit” one’s own death. But what does it mean to merit death? In this tasting menu, I cannot attempt to answer this intriguing question. My present paper is an invitation for the readers to read my protagonists first-hand.

Instead of touching the question of “meriting death”, I wish to look into Ramubhai’s commentary on the concept and ideal of Brahmacharya, in his paper “Brahmacharya” (1981). For a full discussion of Brahmacharya in Ramubhai’s thought, one needs to first visit the Mahatma’s writings, for instance his two chapters on Brahmacharya in his famous autobiography. The Mahatma often explains the meaning of Brahmacharya as he sees it, and shares his experience of practicing Brahmacharya. “Brahmacharya”, he asserts, “means control in thought, word and action, of all the

senses at all times and in all places. The man or woman who observes such perfect Brahmacharya is totally free from disease and therefore he or she lives ever in the presence of God, is like God" (*Young India* 5.6.1924, CWMG Vol. 28, 22-23). Brahmacharya for Gandhi is a matter of self-restraint as empowering, even emancipating act. Here I recall Patañjali of the *Yogasūtra* who writes in sūtra 2.38 that "when Brahmacharya is established, the practitioner acquires power" (*brahmacarya-pratiṣṭhāyām vīryam-lābhaḥ*, Aranya 2012, 221).

Ramubhai opens his discussion of Brahmacharya with a reflection on Amrita Sher-Gil's painting "Brahmacharis" (1937). A central trajectory in his writings is his claim, belief and working-method that the ineffable, which he strived for (like the Mahatma, following the Mahatma), can only be reached if we braid together word and image. It is the very situation of standing before a painting in a gallery which reveals, according to Ramubhai, the meaning of Brahmacharya. In front of a painting, one forgets his physical presence (and the painting too is no longer a physical object hanging on the wall); allows the non-physical reality of the painting to color his consciousness in totality; watching a painting is an experience of emptification and transcendence. One's consciousness is emptied of subjectivity, of "I and my", as to allow the affect born of the engagement with the painting, with art, to take over. This engagement enables the appreciator of art to transcend the immediate circumstances of one's mundane life. Ramubhai implies that this is exactly how Brahmacharya works. I would like to suggest that it was not just the title or the theme of Sher-Gil's painting "Brahmacharis", but her overall presence in painting and life, life as painting, which made it the perfect choice for Ramubhai. Her short life was turbulent and full of passion. Passion for art, for India (having been born in Budapest to a Hungarian Jewish mother and a Sikh father), passion for the physical as much as for the metaphysical. For Ramubhai, passion is not the antonym of Brahmacharya. "Brahmacharis" features five Brahmacharis, "traditional pubescent Kerala boy-scholars", as Ramubhai depicts them. One of them is illuminated, full of light. Two others touch him, and two younger boys complete the circle. Sher-Gil's twin painting, "Bride's Toilet" (also from 1937) - which Ramubhai need not mention, since reference to one evokes the other - portrays five young women (pubescent Kerala girls, if you wish) in preparation for a wedding. One of them (the bride) is illuminated. Two others take part in the bridal activities, and two

younger girls complete the circle. Illumination, or a sense of clarity, is for Ramubhai one side of the coin of Brahmacharya. The other side has to do with a sense of togetherness conveyed in both paintings. Brahmacharya for him stands not as usual for withdrawal and abstention, but quite the opposite: it is the paradigm of togetherness and engagement. A commentator of the Mahatma, Ramubhai highlights aspects of Brahmacharya that he finds crucial. According to him, sexual abstinence and fasting are secondary. Lucidity and togetherness come first. He identifies these features not just in the Mahatma's writings on Brahmacharya, but in his life as a Brahmachari. Ramubhai is a commentator both of the Mahatma's writings and of his life and being in the world as a parallel text, as interesting and significant as his writings. The connections that Ramubhai creates are always interesting. Here he connects the Mahatma and Amrita Sher-Gil to decipher the meaning of Brahmacharya. Her paintings, and her impact in art and through art complement the Mahatma's interpretation of this notion in practice and theory. I would finally add that the interlacement of image and word in Ramubhai's work, illustrated in his appeal to Sher-Gil's paintings, finds its utmost expression in his last book, *Svarāj*, a dialogue with painter Tyeb Mehta through his paintings, again with the Mahatma (as the title implies) in mind.

4. Mukund Lath (1937-2020):

Mukund Lath is (and it is no mistake that I write "is" and not "was", because these potent thinkers are with us in the present tense through their writings); so Lath is a scholar of Sanskrit, a musician and musicologist, a historian of ideas, a translator, a cultural theorist, a poet, painter, and a creative philosopher. I cannot aspire to cover even a tiny bit of his enormous body of work in just a few words. From this vast intellectual-body, I would mention his magnum opus *Dharma-Saṃskṛat* (2004), "Moral Dilemmas", a book in aesthet(h)ics, offering the author's meditations at the interface of ethics and aesthetics. Another central work by Lath is his book *Samgīt evam cintan* (1992, "Music and Thinking"), recapped in two essays in English: "The Aesthetics of Music" (2009) and "Thoughts on Svara and Rasa: Music as Thinking/Thinking as Music" (2016). Here Lath touches the confluence of thinking and music, which at a first glance might seem altogether different from one another. Both music and thinking, he suggests, investigate the meaning of abstraction. Thinking strives for sheer abstraction in the sphere of

abhidhā, music in the complementing sphere of *vyañjanā*. “*Abhidhā*”, Lath explains, “is denotative, indicative meaning, and *vyañjanā* may be characterized as evocative [...] the significance of *vyañjanā* lies in a meaning which is addressed not to our intellect but to our emotive, felt consciousness”. (2016, 94) Abstraction, then, in the realms of “pure intellect” and “pure feeling” which are both part of who we are. The idea of an “emotive, felt consciousness” is interesting. It is a matter of “knowledge” in the realm of feeling, but the word knowledge is just a *lakṣaṇa*, a metaphor, since we are not dealing with the mental faculty. Lath elucidates in the very final sentence of “Thoughts on Svāra and Rasa”:

Music, if it looks at itself in the mirror of thought, can perhaps aim at being more self-consciously thought-like. (2016, 105)

In the mirror of thought music becomes more “thought-like”, or “noetic” in the emotive sense that Lath alludes to. But what happens when thought looks in the mirror of music? I would suggest that first, it can become aware of its own limitations: *abhidhā* without a touch of *vyañjanā* is like *khānā* without *masālā*, or if you wish, it is *śuṣka-tarka*, “dry reasoning”. The experiential dimension that *vyañjanā* brings to the table (and Rāga music is sheer *vyañjanā*), an experience of self, self which is not – Mr. Descartes – just “I think”, is missing if thought is isolated or purified, or abstracted of anything else. And second, perhaps the mirror of music can wean thought off the illusion of a “single”, “final” truth, and take thought in the direction of *anekānta*. Since “svāra is essentially a seeker of *anekānta*, of plurality”, as Lath explains (2016, 104).

Besides the novelty of thinking music through thought and thought through music, I would like to visit yet another instance of newness in Lath’s work, articulated and developed in his essay “Identity through Necessary Change” (2003/2018). “Identity”, Lath writes here, “is usually understood as something which remains the same *despite* change”. His attempt is to explore an alternative to this convention. “There are identities”, he continues to write, “where difference is not contingent but *necessary* to identity. Identity in such cases is formed and maintained through a process of change. [...] This identity does not only accommodate but also invite change and plurality” (2018: 6). Lath’s case-study in his enquiry into

“identity through necessary change” is classical Indian music, Rāga music. “The rāga pattern”, Lath explains,

is given and forms the basis of a free and open ālāpa, an improvised elaboration according to a set of rules which assume the pattern, but allow room for imagination. [...] Identity in a rāga cannot be restricted to a given pattern or even rules, since a good ālāpa reweaves them in its own way, and a great ālāpa can even transform them. (2018: 7)

But what is identity through (not despite) change? How can it be thought of meaningfully, if the usual overtones which accompany the notion of identity imply the very opposite? Or to put it differently, if pattern and rules do not determine the identity of a Rāga, what does? “To be true to a rāga”, Lath provides us with a hint,

is to be true to its bhāva. Rāga-bhāva is the term in use for the felt identity of a rāga. A rāga without rāga-bhāva is believed to be only the shadow of a rāga. Rāga-bhāva may be said to be the inner identity of the Rāga, an identity sought and created by musicians through ālāpa. This is why it has plural possibilities, since different musicians seek the bhāva of a rāga in different ways. (2018: 10)

Lath’s formulation of identity through necessary change is intriguing since it challenges the convention of identity as overcoming change. His case-study, Rāga-music, is unique. But most interesting are the consequences of this thought-experiment. Is our identity, the identity of each of us, different from the identity of a Rāga? Can we think of our own identity as created by change? Can we stop treating change as a threat? Can we accommodate the plural possibilities that Lath speaks of with reference to our identity, to my identity?

5. Rajendra Swaroop Bhatnagar (1933-2019):

I cannot think of a better stage than the *Journal of Foundational Research* for a quick visit to the oeuvre of Bhatnagar Saab, philosopher extraordinaire, who passed away in November 2019 and left a void in the Jaipurite intellectual community. Rajendra

Swaroop Bhatnagar (henceforth RSB) is the translator of Plato's *Republic* (or *Politeia*) from the original ancient Greek into Hindi under the title *Nāgarikī* (2014). The Greek Polis, the famous city-state, resonates in the title that RSB chose for his translation. Like Daya Krishna, RSB is not interested in the beyondness beyond. His philosophical cuisine did not include Ātman, Brahman and Mokṣa. He was certainly interested in selfhood, collectivity and freedom, but not in the metaphysical or spiritual sense. He was a philosopher of the here and now, of the worldly, of the social. In this respect, Plato's text was a perfect fit. RSB dedicated the last decade of his life and writing-career to the concepts of violence and suffering, and the experience-and-reality that they point at. He taught us that there is no use in talking (and there is so much talk about) nonviolence, if one does not begin with what is, namely with violence. In his paper "No Suffering if Human Beings Were Not Sensitive" (2019), one of his very last papers, RSB takes a cue from Patañjali of the *Yogasūtra* (YS), who writes in YS 2.15:

Owing to the suffering inherent in change (*pariṇāma*), in tapas [pain], in the [ripening of the] *saṃskāras* [the karmic residue] and in the strife of the fluctuating *guṇas* [the activators of *prakṛti*, Matter, which create the phenomenal-objective world that we live in], all is suffering for the discerning (*duḥkham eva sarvaṃ vivekinah*). (Aranya 2012, 143, my translation).

It is implied here that for the *vivekin*, the discerning yogin or practitioner of yoga, who can see things "as they are" both on and under the surface, "all is suffering". The others, less sensitive and totally blind to the forces bubbling under the surface, are less exposed. Is it preferable, then, not to see, or to look away?

RSB's answer is No! For him, to be human is to be sensitive, and moreover, it is my suffering which enables me to see the other, to feel empathy to her or his suffering. Interestingly, in his commentary on YS 2.15, with reference to the phrase "all is suffering for the discerning", Vyāsa, Patañjali's Bhāṣya-kāra, compares the yogin to the eye, which is the most sensitive of organs. A falling cobweb, he suggests, hurts the eye, but is hardly felt by any other body part. In the same way, the yogin "feels" the suffering discussed in this sūtra, both under and on the surface. RSB and Vyāsa are on the same page regarding sensitivity and suffering. The eye metaphor is strong, since the eye is not just

sensitive, but also sees. For RSB, seeing is essentially a matter of seeing the other.

Now I come to what I see as an interesting instance of novelty. In the same paper (“No Suffering if Human Beings Were Not Sensitive”), RSB is critical of the fact that in the Indian philosophical discourse, suffering has become identified primarily with old age, sickness and death, owing to the Buddhist narrative (here the question about the Buddhist influence on Patañjali and his commentator lurks between the lines).³ The Buddhist narrative, based on the alleged life-story of the Buddha, took over the discourse of suffering, or *duḥkha*, in the Indian context. “Will this evil (*doṣa*) affect me too?”, prince Siddhārtha asks the royal charioteer when he sees an old man for the first time in his life (I quote from *Aśvaghōṣa’s Buddhacarita*, in Patrick Olivelle’s translation, 2008, 70-71). On illness, he asks the charioteer, “is this an evil (*doṣa* again) peculiar to him (to a sick person he sees), or is the danger of illness common to every living being?” (74-75). And when he sees a dead body he asks: “is such the end that awaits every living being?” (80-81). Freedom (*mokṣa*) is projected in this narrative as release from the *doṣas*, “evils” in Olivelle’s translation, of old-age, illness and death. In the Buddhist narrative, the Buddha seeks a universal remedy for these *doṣas*, or types of suffering, and the particular people that the protagonist meets on his way are shifted from center to periphery. They are just a case-study, illustrating a broader “problem” that needs to be “solved”, namely human life with its inbuilt death sentence. But RSB strives to shift his readers’ attention back from the universal to the particular. He is not interested in general compassion to every sentient being. For him compassion, in order to be compassion, needs a specific addressee, a specific human being that one reaches out to. And Suffering for RSB is first and foremost the suffering of the other, suffering as a social disease with numerous symptoms, from poverty to racism. Social injustice and not old-age, illness and death, which he sees as natural features of being human, of who we are. Thinking of suffering through these features is for him just an example of our usual self-centric stance. He aspires for a more socio-centered approach. He is hardly impressed by the hardships of prince Siddhārtha. He is more concerned with the struggle of migrant workers who pitch their tents – without electricity, running water, education for their children – two-hundred meters from his home in Mansarovar, at the outskirts of Jaipur.

Postscript: The Other Way Around

I started by asking if there is anything new in contemporary Indian philosophy. I went as far as asking whether there is anything new in modern and contemporary philosophy at large, or are we all just writing footnotes to the great thinkers of the past. Then I argued against the footnote-wallahs, those who believe that newness in philosophy is a misnomer since “Alu Ghobi is Alu Ghobi, nothing more, nothing less”. I argued and substantiated my argument with at least five instances of newness in contemporary Indian philosophy. I say “at least”, since I could hardly choose a single instance of newness for each of my protagonists, hence discussed just one instance but mentioned other instances of newness in their work. But at the end of the day, I realize that perhaps my main question – what is new, is there anything new? – is articulated too conservatively and facing “pastwards” instead of “futurewards”. Perhaps the real question is actually this: is there anything relevant in philosophy as it has been done so far? Don’t Plato and Yājñvalkyā, Uddālaka, Śāṅkara, Descartes, Hegel and even Sri Aurobindo – all unique thinkers who contributed immensely and broadened the spectrum of thinking – belong to the museum of ideas, together with their beautiful but outdated ideas such as “truth”, “objectivity”, “mind” and of course “god”, “soul” and Brahman?

In a letter to his friend and colleague D.P. Chattopadhyaya, dated August 2006, Daya Krishna writes:

Philosophy as it has developed up till now has become irrelevant to the emerging situation where “engineered transformation” of all reality, including man himself, life in general, along with the exploration in space are questioning everything. The earth-centricity and bio-centricity of man have determined his thinking. In the realm of nuclear physics, new forms of matter are being created, with properties which question the old notions of matter, space, time and causality. In the field of economics, and to some extent of politics, the situation is even more alarming. The basic parameters on which the sciences of economics and sociology were based are in jeopardy, as the notions of land, labour and capital have gone a sea-change, as they are not there as something “given”,

or as a constraint, but instead as something which can be overcome by human ingenuity and effort. This is the challenge to philosophers, as I see it. Whether we can come to terms with it in any meaningful way is difficult to say, but we must become aware of it, and try to deal with it, so that our thinking may be relevant to the incoming generation which increasingly finds all past knowledge irrelevant to their “living” concerns. ⁴

Fourteen years have passed since these lines were written. Daya Krishna’s plea for new thinking for a new world is even more urgent than it was in 2006, and his invitation to philosophize without the security net of the “wonder that was” is still pending.

Notes and References:

Aranya, Swami Hariharananda (2012) *Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali*, P.N. Mukerji trans., Kolkata: University of Calcutta

Benstock, Shari (1983) “At the Margin of Discourse: Footnotes in the Fictional Text,” *PMLA* 98.2: 204-225

Bhattacharyya, Krishnachandra (2008) “Śāṅkara’s Doctrine of Māyā”, in his *Studies in Philosophy*, ed. Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 95-108

Bhattacharyya, Krishnachandra (1954) “Svarāj in Ideas”, *Visva Bharati Journal* 20: 103-114. Republished in the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* 11.4 (1984): 383-393

Bhatnagar, Rajendra Swaroop (2014) *Nagariki: Platone ki Politiya ka Hindi Anuvad*, Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research and D.K. Printworld

Bhatnagar, Rajendra Swaroop (2019) “No Suffering if Human Beings Were Not Sensitive”, forthcoming in the *Journal of World Philosophies*, July 2021

Chakrabarti, Arindam and Weber, Ralph (2015) (eds.) *Comparative Philosophy without Borders*, London: Bloomsbury

Daya Krishna (2004) *Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy: Issues in Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Nyāya*, Delhi: India Council of Philosophical Research

Daya Krishna (1999) “Thinking Creatively about the Creative Act”, *Punjab University Research Bulletin*, 30.1&2: 18-26. Republished in *Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays by Daya Krishna*, Bhushan et al. eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, 39-45

Daya Krishna (1997) “Socio-Political Thought in Classical India”, in E. Deutsch and R. Bontekoe (eds.) *A Companion to World Philosophies*, Malden MA: Blackwell, 237-247

Gandhi, M.K. (1924) *Young India* 26.2.1924, in the Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (CWMG) Vol. 28, <https://www.gandhiashramsevagram.org/gandhi-literature/mahatma-gandhi-collected-works-volume-28.pdf>

Gandhi, Ramchandra (1981) "Brahmacharya", *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 15.1-2: 205-221

Gandhi, Ramchandra (2011) [1984] *I am Thou: Meditations on the Truth of India*, Delhi: Academy of Fine Arts and Literature

Gandhi, Ramchandra (1981) "On Meriting Death", *Philosophy East and West* 31.3: 337-353

Gandhi, Ramchandra (2002) *Svarāj: A Journey with Tyeb Mehta's Shantiniketan Triptych*, Delhi: Vadehra Art Gallery

Gokhale, Pradeep (2020) *The Yogasūtra of Patañjali: A New Introduction to the Buddhist Roots of the Yoga System*, Delhi: Routledge

Lath, Mukund (2003) "Identity Through Necessary Change: Thinking about Rāga-bhāva, Concepts and Characters", *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research* 20.1: 85-114; reprinted in the *Journal of World Philosophies* 4 (winter 2018), 6-23

Mukund Lath (1992) *Samgīt evam cintan: darśan aur samskṛti kā samgīt-parak vimarś*, Delhi: Prabhat Prakashan, 2nd edition Allahbad: Raka Prakashan for Darshan Pratishthan Jaipur, 2007

Mukund Lath (2009) "The Aesthetics of Music," in Amiya Dev (ed.), *History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization* Vol. XV: *Science, Technology and Philosophy Part III: Science, Literature and Aesthetics*, 177-188

Mukund Lath (2016) "Thoughts on Svara and Rasa: Music as Thinking/Thinking as Music," in Arindam Chakrabarti (ed.) *The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art*, London and New York: Bloomsbury, 93-106

Oinam, Bhagat (2018) "Philosophy in India or Indian Philosophy? Some Post-Colonial Questions", *Sophia* 57.3: 457-474

Olivelle, Patrick (trans.) (2008) *The Life of the Buddha by Ashva Ghosha*, New York: New York University Press

Raveh, Daniel (2020) *Daya Krishna and Twentieth-Century Indian Philosophy*, London: Bloomsbury

Thibaut, G. (1994) Trans. *The Vedānta Sūtras with the Commentary of Śaṅkarācārya* (Part I and II), in *Sacred Books of the East*, ed. Max Muller, Vols. 34 and 38, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass

Whitehead, A.N. (1979) [1929] *Process and Reality*, New York: Free Press

¹ Almost all of Daya Krishna's writings both in English and Hindi (essays, books, recorded lectures), including this paper, are available online at "Daya Krishna: The Open Library", an open-access library at www.dayakrishna.org

² Daya Krishna's *Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy* is open for reading at "Daya Krishna: The Open Library". A full discussion of Daya Krishna's dialogue with the Mīmāṃsā pandits on action in theory and practice can be found in my recent book, *Daya Krishna and Twentieth-Century Indian Philosophy* (Bloomsbury 2020).

³ On Buddhist influence on Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* see Pradeep Gokhale's recent book *The Yogasūtra of Patañjali: A New Introduction to the Buddhist Roots of the Yoga System* (2020).

⁴ I wish to thank the Daya Krishna Archive for sharing with me Daya Krishna's letters (2003-2007) and for the permission to quote from this letter.

Professor,
Department of Philosophy,
Tel Aviv University,
Tel Aviv, Israel
daniraveh@gmail.com

नित्यसम्बन्ध : कुछ अनालोचित पक्ष

सच्चिदानन्द मिश्र

अनेक सम्बन्धों को नित्यसम्बन्ध के रूप में दर्शनों में मान्यता प्रदान की जाती है। उदाहरण के रूप में नैयायिक समवाय को नित्यसम्बन्ध के रूप में स्वीकृति प्रदान करते हैं तो वैयाकरण तथा मीमांसक शब्द तथा अर्थ के मध्य के सम्बन्ध को नित्यसम्बन्ध के रूप में स्वीकृति प्रदान करते हैं। परन्तु इस स्वीकृति में बहुधा यह मुद्दा अनालोचित ही रह जाता है कि नित्यसम्बन्ध से कैसा सम्बन्ध अभिप्रेत है? अथवा नित्यसम्बन्ध की स्वीकृति किन परिप्रेक्ष्यों में सम्भव है? इसी के साथ नित्यसम्बन्ध होने की क्या पूर्वशर्त है? यह भी बहुधा विचारित नहीं होता है। प्रस्तुत आलेख नित्यसम्बन्ध के विषय में लगभग अनालोचित ऐसे ही कुछेक बिन्दुओं पर विचार करने का एक विनम्र प्रयास है।

सम्बन्ध की अवधारणा

सम्बन्ध की अवधारणा अपने आप में ही बहुत उलझी हुई है। सम्बन्ध तात्त्विक हैं या नहीं इस विषय में भी दर्शनों का मतभेद है। अनेक दर्शनों का अभिमत है कि सम्बन्ध वस्तुतः हमारी कल्पना के कार्य हैं। भारतीय दर्शन परम्परा में प्रमुख रूप से इसमें धर्मकीर्ति का नाम लिया जा सकता है। धर्मकीर्ति के अनुसार सम्बन्ध तात्त्विक ही नहीं हैं¹ वहीं कुछ दर्शन सम्बन्धों को भी एकदम उसी प्रकार से वस्तुनिष्ठ आधार प्रदान करते हैं जिस प्रकार से अन्य वस्तुओं को। न्याय एक वस्तुवादी दर्शन है, इसके अनुसार सम्बन्ध भी उसी प्रकार से तात्त्विक हैं, जिस प्रकार से ज्ञान के अन्य विषया न केवल न्याय अपितु मीमांसा भी उसी प्रकार का वस्तुवादी दर्शन है जिसके लिए सम्बन्ध की सत्ता भी उतनी ही महत्त्वपूर्ण है जितनी सम्बन्धियों की या अन्य पदार्थों की। सम्बन्ध हमारी कल्पना के कार्य नहीं हैं बल्कि उसी प्रकार से वस्तुसत् हैं जिस प्रकार से अन्य पदार्थ। परन्तु सम्बन्धों में तथा सम्बन्धातिरिक्त पदार्थों में एक बहुत महत्त्वपूर्ण अन्तर है। अन्य पदार्थ जहाँ स्वतन्त्र रूप से सत्तावान् होते हैं, वहीं सम्बन्ध कभी नितान्त स्वतन्त्र रूप में सत्तावान् नहीं होते। कम से कम सम्बन्ध के रूप में तो वे स्वतन्त्र रूप में सत्तावान् नहीं ही होते हैं। वे स्वतन्त्रतया ज्ञात होने पर तो सम्बन्ध के रूप में जाने भी नहीं जाते। जब कभी हमको किसी सम्बन्ध का ज्ञान होता है तो वह सम्बन्ध किन्हीं दो वस्तुओं के परिप्रेक्ष्य में ही ज्ञात होता है। सम्बन्ध अपनी अवधारणा के स्तर पर भी अपने दोनों

सम्बन्धियों की अपेक्षा करता है। नित्यसम्बन्ध की अवधारणा इसमें वैचारिक समस्या को और बढ़ा देती है।

नित्यता की दो प्राचीनतम अवधारणाएँ

नित्यसम्बन्ध की अवधारणा को समझने के लिए प्रथमतया नित्यता को दृष्टि में रखना आवश्यक है। दार्शनिक दृष्टि से देखा जाये तो नित्यता की अवधारणा एक महत्वपूर्ण बिन्दु है। विशेषतया भारतीय दार्शनिक नित्यता को किस रूप में समझते हैं तथा किस प्रकार से उनका प्रयोग भाषा में करते हैं? नित्य किसको कहा जाता है? दार्शनिक इस प्रश्न का भी एक उत्तर नहीं देते। सांख्य दार्शनिक दो प्रकार की नित्यता की अवधारणा प्रस्तुत करते हैं एक तो वह जिसको वे कूटस्थ नित्य कहते हैं, दूसरा वह जिसको वे परिणामिनित्य कहते हैं। सांख्य द्वारा प्रस्तुत किये गये नित्यता के ये दोनों ही प्रारूप पतंजलि ने अपने महाभाष्य में प्रदर्शित किये हैं। प्रथम प्रारूप को प्रस्तुत करते हुए पतंजलि कहते हैं कि ध्रुव, कूटस्थ, अविचाल्य, उपजन, अपाय तथा विकार से रहित, उत्पत्ति तथा वृद्धि से रहित, अव्यययोगी जो होता है वह नित्य होता है।² नित्यता की दूसरी अवधारणा को प्रस्तुत करते हुए पतंजलि कहते हैं कि उसको भी नित्य कहा जाता है जिसमें तत्त्व की हानि नहीं होती।³ सम्भवतः उन्होंने सांख्य से ही नित्यता की इन दोनों अवधारणाओं को लिया होगा क्योंकि अपने प्राचीन रूप में सांख्य सबसे प्राचीन दर्शनों में से एक है। गौतम बुद्ध को भी सांख्य के दो गुरुओं के आलार कालाम के द्वारा शिक्षा प्रदान की गयी थी ऐसा उल्लेख प्राप्त होता है। सांख्य के अनुसार कूटस्थ नित्यता का उदाहरण है पुरुष तो परिणामिनित्यता का उदाहरण है प्रकृति। प्रथम है कूटस्थ नित्य, जिसमें कोई भी परिवर्तन नहीं होता, इस प्रकार का तत्त्व सांख्य में पुरुष है। प्रकृति निरन्तर परिवर्तित होती रहती है तथापि उसके स्वरूप की च्युति नहीं होती, इस कारण उसको नित्य माना जाता है।

सांख्य की मूल दृष्टि को ग्रहण करते हुए अद्वैतवेदान्त नित्यता का मानक सांख्य से ही ग्रहण करता है। परन्तु उसको अपनाने में उसमें तनिक परिवर्तन कर देता है। उसने दोनों ही नित्यताओं में से एक नित्यता को तो पारमार्थिक माना परन्तु द्वितीय को व्यावहारिक यानी कि मिथ्या। कूटस्थ नित्यता पारमार्थिक नित्यता है जबकि परिणामिनित्यता व्यावहारिक। दोनों में एक स्तर का भेद है। कूटस्थ नित्यता तभी सम्भव है जब धर्म तथा धर्मी ये दो न हों, अद्वैत हो। द्वैत होने पर कूटस्थ नित्यता सम्भव नहीं हो सकती। दो होने पर धर्म को यदि विकार के रूप में लिया जाये तो विकार अपने धर्मी को भी विकारी तो बनायेगा ही। नित्यता के मानकों को सांख्य से लेते हुए अद्वैतवेदान्त ने उसमें अपनी ओर

से एक सोपानक्रम का निर्धारण कर दिया। नित्यता के दोनों मानकों को समान महत्त्व नहीं दिया। एक को पारमार्थिक की पहचान माना तो दूसरे को व्यावहारिक की। वस्तुतः दोनों मानकों को स्वीकार करते हुए दोनों को एक समान स्तर पर रखा भी नहीं जा सकता। दोनों को एक समान स्तर पर रखते हुए सांख्य की तरह एक अस्थिर दर्शन को स्वीकार करना पड़ेगा जो अपने ही सिद्धान्तों के साथ सुसंगत नहीं रह पाता। दो मानकों को लेते हुए दोनों तत्त्वों को समान महत्त्व देते हुए दोनों का एक दूसरे से किस प्रकार से कोई सम्बन्ध बन सकेगा, कैसे कोई दूसरे को प्रभावित कर सकेगा, इत्यादि बहुतेरी समस्याएँ सामने उपस्थित हो जाती हैं, सांख्य जिनका सन्तोषजनक उत्तर नहीं दे पाता। सांख्य दर्शन को सुसंगत बनाने की आवश्यक शर्त है कि या तो उसको अद्वैतवेदान्त की ओर मोड़ दिया जाये है या तो उसके मानकों को बदल दिया जाये। इसी कारण अद्वैती सांख्य को अद्वैत की ओर मोड़ देते हैं।

नित्यता की तीसरी अवधारणा

न्याय तथा मीमांसा की दृष्टि से देखा जाये तो नित्यता की ये दोनों ही अवधारणाएँ विसंगत हैं। इनमें से कोई भी सही नहीं है। क्योंकि यह स्वीकार करना कि कोई तत्त्व परिवर्तित होता है तथापि उसके स्वरूप की प्रच्युति नहीं होती, अपने आप में विसंगत है, आत्मविरुद्ध है, आत्मव्याघाती है। ऐसा कैसे हो सकता है कि कोई तत्त्व नित्य भी हो और उसके साथ ही साथ परिवर्तनशील भी हो? ये तो वही बात हुई कि मुर्गी का आधा हिस्सा खाने के लिए पका लिया जाये तथा आधी मुर्गी से यह अपेक्षा रखी जाये कि वह अण्डा प्रदान करेगी। परिवर्तनशील होना वस्तु की स्वरूप से प्रच्युति ही है, दूध का दही बन जाना दूध का अपने दुग्धस्वरूप से च्युत हो जाना ही है। वस्तु की स्वरूप से प्रच्युति हुए विना दूसरी वस्तु अस्तित्व में आ ही नहीं सकती। इस कारण नित्यता का यह मानक सही नहीं है। दूसरे मानक को लिया जाये तो उसके साथ भी यही समस्या है। जिस तत्त्व में कोई भी परिवर्तन न होता हो उसको कूटस्थ नित्य कहना हो तो जितने उत्पन्न होनेवाले भी पदार्थ हैं वे सब भी कूटस्थ नित्य ही होंगे क्योंकि नैयायिक के अनुसार परिवर्तन तो किसी भी वस्तु में नहीं होता, यदि कुछ होता है तो नवीन वस्तु की उत्पत्ति होती है। दूध जब दही बनता है तो दूध में कुछ भी शेष नहीं बचता जो दही न बन गया हो। नैयायिक कहते हैं कि वस्तुस्थिति तो यह है कि दूध का परमाणुपर्यन्त (परमाणु को छोड़कर बाकी सबका) विनाश हो कर फिर से द्वयणुक आदि के क्रम से नवीन वस्तु दधि उत्पन्न हुआ करती है। जो वस्तु उत्पन्न भी हुई, वह परिवर्तित नहीं होती, कोई भी वस्तु किसी दूसरी वस्तु के रूप में बदलती नहीं है। इस कारण नैयायिक तथा मीमांसक सांख्य

द्वारा प्रस्तावित नित्यता के दोनों मानकों का परित्याग कर देते हैं। वे नित्यता की नवीन अवधारणा प्रस्तुत करते हैं। नित्य उसको कहते हैं जो न तो उत्पन्न होता है और न तो विनष्ट होता है। दूसरे शब्दों में इसको बेहतर रीति से परिभाषित कर सकते हैं कि यदि कोई पदार्थ उत्पन्न होता है तो वह पदार्थ भी नित्य नहीं हो सकता है और यदि कोई पदार्थ नष्ट होता है तो वह पदार्थ भी नित्य नहीं हो सकता है, वह अनित्य होगा। वात्स्यायन अपने भाष्य में अनित्यता की अवधारणा प्रस्तुत करते हैं, उसके विपरीत ही नित्यता को समझा जा सकता है। वात्स्यायन कहते हैं कि जो उत्पन्न होता है, वह उत्पत्तिधर्मक है, इसी प्रकार जो होकर फिर नहीं होता है, अपने स्वरूप का परित्याग कर देता है, विनष्ट हो जाता है वह अनित्य है।⁴ पुनः वात्स्यायन चतुर्थ अध्याय में भी लगभग इसी रूप में अनित्यता तथा नित्यता के स्वरूप को परिभाषित करते हैं। अनित्य वह है जिसका भाव, जिसकी सत्ता कभी हो, हमेशा न हो। अनुत्पन्न उत्पत्तिधर्मक नहीं है और विनष्ट विनाशधर्मक नहीं है।⁵ अभिप्राय है कि जो अभी उत्पन्न नहीं हुआ है उसको उत्पत्तिधर्मक होने के कारण अनित्य नहीं कहा जा सकता है और जो विनष्ट हो गया है, यानी विनाश, उसको हम अनित्य इस आधार पर नहीं कह सकते हैं कि वह विनष्ट हो रहा है क्योंकि विनाश का विनाश नहीं होता। वात्स्यायन द्वारा दिये गये इसी संकेत को आधार बनाते हुए परवर्ती नैयायिक नित्यता तथा अनित्यता को परिभाषित करते हैं। न्याय दर्शन की पारिभाषिक पदावली का प्रयोग करते हुए यदि हम नित्य का लक्षण करें तो कहा जायेगा कि प्रागभावाप्रतियोगित्वे सति ध्वंसाप्रतियोगित्वम् नित्यत्वम्,⁶ नित्य उसको कहते हैं जो न तो प्रागभाव का प्रतियोगी होता हो और न तो ध्वंस का प्रतियोगी होता हो। इन दोनों अंशों को लक्षण के घटक के रूप में देने का उद्देश्य यह है कि ध्वंस न्याय वैशेषिक सिद्धान्त के अनुसार ऐसा पदार्थ है जो उत्पन्न तो होता है परन्तु उत्पन्न होने के बाद कभी भी नष्ट नहीं होता। ध्वंस का प्रतियोगी वही पदार्थ हो सकता है जो नष्ट होता है। परन्तु ध्वंस कभी भी नष्ट नहीं होता, ध्वंस उत्पन्न होने के बाद हमेशा रहता है। इस कारण यदि केवल ध्वंस का प्रतियोगी न होना अंश ही नित्य के लक्षण में रखा जाये तो ध्वंस को भी नित्य मानना पड़ेगा जो कि उचित नहीं है। इसी प्रकार से यदि केवल प्रागभाव का प्रतियोगी न होना अंश ही नित्य के लक्षण में रखा जाये तो प्रागभाव को नित्य मानने की पाली आ जायेगी। प्रागभाव अनादि है, परन्तु जब वस्तु उत्पन्न हो जाती है तो वह नष्ट हो जाता है। इस कारण दोनों ही अंशों को नैयायिक नित्य के लक्षण में रखते हैं। इसके विपरीत अनित्यता की परिभाषा की जाती है कि प्रागभाव का प्रतियोगी होना अथवा ध्वंस का प्रतियोगी होना अनित्य होना है।⁷ इस परिभाषा में तथा

न्यायभाष्यकार द्वारा प्रस्तुत परिभाषा में एक महत्वपूर्ण अन्तर है जिसका संज्ञान लेना चाहिए। न्यायभाष्यकार ने नित्यता की परिभाषा में सत्ता को भी स्पष्ट रूप में शब्दशः सम्मिलित रखा है। परन्तु परवर्ती नैयायिक नित्यता की परिभाषा में सत्ता को भी स्पष्ट रूप में शब्दशः सम्मिलित नहीं करते। न्यायसूत्रकार ने भी उत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्व को ही अनित्यता का लक्षण माना है। वस्तुतः सांख्य के अनुसार उत्पत्ति स्वीकार्य नहीं हो सकती क्योंकि उत्पत्ति के स्थान पर सांख्य परिणाम को अभिषिक्त करता है। उसकी मूलभूत धारणा है कि न तो असत् की उत्पत्ति हो सकती है और न तो सत् का विनाश ही सम्भव है।⁸ इसी कारण अनुभव की व्याख्या करने के लिए वह दो प्रकार की नित्यता को स्वीकार करता है।

नित्यता की तृतीय अवधारणा का विस्तार

नित्यता को इस रूप में परिभाषित करने पर नित्यता को नवीन आयाम प्राप्त हो जाते हैं। नित्यता की अवधारणा बहुत सारे उन तत्त्वों पर भी लागू की जा सकती है, जिन पर ऊपर की दोनों अवधारणाएँ लागू नहीं हो सकती थीं। उदाहरण के तौर पर नित्यता की उपर्युक्त दोनों ही परिभाषाएँ सम्बन्ध पर लागू नहीं हो सकती हैं। नित्यसम्बन्ध की अवधारणा को लिया जाये। ऊपर के दोनों ही मानक नित्यसम्बन्ध के ऊपर लागू नहीं किये जा सकते। सम्बन्ध के विषय में यह बात नहीं की जा सकती है कि कोई सम्बन्ध कूटस्थ नित्य है क्योंकि अपने सम्बन्धियों की अपेक्षा के विना सम्बन्ध सम्बन्ध ही नहीं रह जाता। इसी प्रकार सम्बन्ध पर परिणामिनित्यता का मानक भी नहीं लागू किया जा सकता है। सम्बन्ध परिवर्तनशील नहीं होता है यह बात हम सम्बन्ध के बारे में उसी प्रकार से नहीं कह सकते जिस प्रकार से प्रकृति के बारे में हम कह सकते हैं। सम्बन्ध तो सम्बन्धियों का सन्दर्भ लिए विना हमारे विचार और ज्ञान का विषय भी नहीं हो पाता। इसी प्रकार कूटस्थ नित्यता का मानक भी हम सम्बन्ध के ऊपर लागू नहीं कर सकते। जब हम सम्बन्ध के बारे में सम्बन्धियों का सन्दर्भ लिए विना न तो विचार कर सकते हैं और न तो जान सकते हैं, तो किसी सम्बन्ध को कूटस्थ नित्य कहना बेमानी होगा। परन्तु न्याय की यह परिभाषा नित्यसम्बन्ध के ऊपर भी लागू हो सकती है। सम्बन्ध में कोई भी परिणाम नहीं होता। परन्तु नैयायिक नित्यता को जिस रूप में परिभाषित करते हैं, उसको हम सम्बन्ध पर लागू कर सकते हैं। यहाँ तक कि जो नितान्त असत् है, उस पर भी यह नित्यता की अवधारणा लागू हो सकती है। उदाहरण के रूप में आकाशकुसुम को लें। इसके ऊपर भी नित्यता की यह अवधारणा लागू की जा सकती है। आकाशकुसुम भी न तो उत्पन्न ही होता है और न तो नष्ट ही होता है। इसका कारण यह है कि नित्यता की परिभाषा में सत्ता अन्तर्निहित नहीं है। किसी का भी ध्वंस का प्रतियोगी न होना तथा उसके साथ ही साथ

प्रागभाव का प्रतियोगी न होना ही पर्याप्त है। एक प्रकार से कहा जाये तो नित्यता की परिभाषा एक निषेधात्मक परिभाषा है। पश्चिमी दर्शन परम्परा में तो नितान्त निषेधात्मक परिभाषा स्वीकार्य ही नहीं होती। तो क्या हम आकाशकुसुम को नित्य मान सकते हैं? निश्चित ही नहीं। इसका कारण यह है कि आकाशकुसुम कोई वस्तु ही नहीं है, उसके विषय में हम कोई बात भी नहीं कर सकते। इस कारण उस पर भी नित्यता की अवधारणा लागू हो रही है। परन्तु आकाशकुसुम को कोई भी व्यक्ति नित्य तो नहीं कह सकता। नैयायिक इस समस्या से यह कहकर बच जायेंगे कि आकाशकुसुम कोई वस्तु नहीं है। आकाश से सम्बन्धित रूप में भासमान कुसुम को ही आकाशकुसुम कहा जा सकता है, परन्तु आकाश से सम्बन्धित कुसुम तो होता ही नहीं है। फिर उसकी नित्यता की बात करने का कोई मतलब ही नहीं है। यहाँ तक कि उसकी नित्यता का निषेध करने का भी कोई मतलब नहीं होता। हम बात करते हैं कुसुम की तथा आकाश के सम्बन्ध की। कुसुम को तो नित्य नहीं माना जा सकता है क्योंकि हमारे अनुभव में आनेवाले कुसुम अनित्य ही होते हैं। तथा आकाश से सम्बन्धित कुसुम तो होता ही है। इस कारण हमारी भाषा वस्तुतः आकाशकुसुम का सन्दर्भ नहीं लेती है बल्कि कुसुम का सन्दर्भ लेती है, तथा आकाशकुसुम का निषेध तो किया जा सकता है परन्तु उस पर कोई विधान नहीं किया जा सकता क्योंकि उसका निषेध करने का तात्पर्य है कुसुम में आकाशसम्बन्ध का निषेध। आकाश से विशिष्ट कुसुम तो है नहीं इस कारण उस पर कोई विधान सम्भव नहीं है।

सम्बन्धनित्यता की समस्याएँ

नित्यसम्बन्ध की अवधारणा न्याय में भी प्राप्त होती है और मीमांसा में भी। यह दूसरी बात है कि न्याय जिसको नित्यसम्बन्ध कहकर स्वीकृति देता है मीमांसा उस सम्बन्ध को स्वीकार ही नहीं करता और इसी प्रकार मीमांसा जिसको नित्यसम्बन्ध कहकर स्वीकार करता है न्याय में उसको स्वीकार ही नहीं किया जाता। न्याय मत में समवाय को नित्यसम्बन्ध के रूप में मान्यता प्रदान की गयी है। मीमांसा समवाय को स्वीकार ही नहीं करता। मीमांसा में शब्द तथा अर्थ के वाच्यवाचकभाव सम्बन्ध को नित्यसम्बन्ध माना जाता है, परन्तु न्याय किसी वाच्यवाचकभाव सम्बन्ध की स्वतन्त्र सत्ता को स्वीकार नहीं करता। बल्कि वाच्यवाचकभाव की जगह पर ईश्वरेच्छा को रखकर न्याय शब्द से अर्थबोध की प्रक्रिया को व्याख्यायित कर ले जाता है। यद्यपि यह अपने आप में विवेचना का विषय है कि क्या ईश्वरेच्छा को शब्द तथा अर्थ के मध्य का सम्बन्ध माना जा सकता है? क्योंकि जिस रूप में घट शब्द का घट अर्थ के साथ ईश्वरेच्छा रूपी सम्बन्ध सम्भव है

उसी प्रकार से घट शब्द का पट अर्थ के साथ भी ईश्वरेच्छा रूपी सम्बन्ध सम्भव है क्योंकि ईश्वरेच्छा तो एक ही है। परन्तु नैयायिक विषयता तक अपनी बात को खींचते हुए इन समस्याओं का समाधान कर ले जाते हैं।⁹ नैयायिकों के अनुसार ईश्वर की इच्छा एक ही है। ईश्वर की इच्छा को अनेक मानने की कोई आवश्यकता नहीं है, तथा उसकी अनेकता की स्वीकृति निरर्थक है। उसी ईश्वरेच्छा की विषयता के आधार पर शब्द से अर्थावबोध की व्याख्या की जा सकती है। अलग से किसी वाच्यवाचकभाव आदि सम्बन्धों को मानने की आवश्यकता नहीं है। इसके विपरीत मीमांसकों को नैयायिकों द्वारा स्वीकृत समवाय सम्बन्ध नितान्त व्यर्थ लगता है।

नित्यसम्बन्ध को स्वीकार करने के पूर्व यह देखना उचित होगा कि सम्बन्ध की क्या स्थिति है? सामान्यतया माना जाता है कि सम्बन्ध दो के बीच में होता है, एक के सम्बन्ध के बारे में कहने या विचार करने का कोई औचित्य ही नहीं दिखता। नैयायिकों के अनुसार पदार्थों में सम्बन्ध कोई अलग तरह का पदार्थ नहीं है और न तो मीमांसकों के अनुसार ही सम्बन्ध कोई अलग तरह का पदार्थ है। इसी कारण कोई गुण भी सम्बन्ध बन सकता है, समवाय जैसा कोई स्वतन्त्र पदार्थ भी सम्बन्ध बन सकता है, तथा किसी अन्य स्थलों पर वस्तु का स्वरूप भी सम्बन्ध बन सकता है। परन्तु एक बात तो माननी ही पड़ेगी कि सम्बन्ध स्वतन्त्र नहीं हो सकता, वह अपने सम्बन्धियों पर ही निर्भर होता है। विना सम्बन्धियों का सन्दर्भ लिए सम्बन्ध के विषय में विचार करना भी नितान्त अनुपयुक्त तथा असंगत है। सम्बन्ध की बात की जाये तो यह प्रश्न तो आता ही है कि किस का सम्बन्ध? विना उन सम्बन्धियों का सन्दर्भ लिए सम्बन्ध की बात भी नहीं की जा सकती है। उदाहरण के तौर पर संयोग को लिया जाये तो संयोग की चर्चा आते ही प्रश्न उपस्थित होता है कि किसका संयोग? जिनके मध्य संयोग है विना उन दोनों का सन्दर्भ लिए हम संयोग की बात नहीं कर सकते।

नित्यसम्बन्ध की बात की जाये तो इसका तात्पर्य सामान्यतया यह प्रतीत होता है कि वही सम्बन्ध नित्यसम्बन्ध कहा जा सकेगा जो सम्बन्ध होते हुए नित्य होता हो। जैसा कि हमने ऊपर बताया है नित्यसम्बन्ध शब्द की यदि व्युत्पत्ति करते हुए नित्यश्चासौ सम्बन्धः नित्यसम्बन्धः यही कर्मधारय समास करना पड़ेगा। इस कारण नित्यसम्बन्ध की बात की जाये तो हमको उस सम्बन्ध को नित्य मानना होगा जो न तो उत्पन्न होता है और न तो नष्ट ही होता है। यदि इन दोनों में से कोई भी शर्त पूरी नहीं हो रही है तो उसको हम नित्य नहीं कह सकते। अभी ऊपर हमने देखा है कि सम्बन्ध को सम्बन्धियों के साथ ही रखकर देखा और समझा जा सकता है। सम्बन्धियों से पृथक् कर देने पर वह सम्बन्ध ही नहीं रह जाता है। उदाहरण के रूप में संयोग की बात हम करें तो संयोग अपने आप में गुण है।

परन्तु जब किन्हीं दो द्रव्यों के सम्बन्ध के रूप में देखा जाता है तो हम उसको गुण के रूप में न देखते हुए सम्बन्ध के रूप में देखते हैं। हम जब संयोगी द्रव्य की बात करेंगे तो संयोग सम्बन्ध के रूप में नहीं आयेगा, बल्कि एक गुण के रूप में उपस्थित होगा। किन्तु जब हम भूतल में घट के संयोग की बात करेंगे तो वह सम्बन्ध बनेगा। इस परिस्थिति में सम्बन्ध जो कि हमेशा ही सम्बन्धियों के परिप्रेक्ष्य में ही हमारे समक्ष उपस्थित होता है, क्या सम्बन्धियों से काटकर उसकी नित्यता या अनित्यता की बात की जा सकती है? इस कारण यह अधिक युक्तिसंगत जान पड़ता है कि कोई भी सम्बन्ध तभी नित्य हो सकता है जब उसके सम्बन्धी नित्य हों। यदि सम्बन्धी नित्य नहीं हैं तो सम्बन्ध के नित्य होने की बात कुछ समझ में नहीं आती, विसंगत प्रतीत होती है। उदाहरण के रूप में यदि नित्यद्रव्य तथा विशेषों के मध्य सम्बन्ध समवाय की नित्यता के विषय में प्रश्न हो तो यह कहना उचित हो सकता है कि नित्यद्रव्य तथा विशेषों के मध्य का सम्बन्ध समवाय नित्य होगा क्योंकि नित्यद्रव्य परमाणु आदि भी नित्य होते हैं तथा विशेष भी नित्य है। इस कारण इनके बीच का सम्बन्ध समवाय भी नित्य होगा। परन्तु यदि प्रश्न किया जाये कि घट तथा उसके रूप का जो सम्बन्ध है वह नित्य होगा या अनित्य? तो इस प्रश्न का उत्तर देने के पूर्व यह संज्ञान में रखना होगा कि यहाँ पर घट भी अनित्य है और घट का रूप भी अनित्य है। इसी प्रकार यदि अवयव तथा अवयवी के मध्य के सम्बन्ध के विषय में प्रश्न किया जाये, घट तथा कपाल का सम्बन्ध नित्य है या अनित्य ? तो यहाँ पर भी यह स्मरण में रखना होगा कि यहाँ पर सम्बन्ध के दोनों ही सम्बन्धी घट तथा कपाल अनित्य हैं। इसी प्रकार से घट तथा उस घट की क्रिया के मध्य जो सम्बन्ध है वह नित्य है या अनित्य तो यहाँ पर भी यह स्मरण में रखना होगा कि यहाँ पर भी सम्बन्ध के दोनों ही सम्बन्धी घट तथा कपाल अनित्य हैं। एक अन्य सन्दर्भ को ध्यान में रखा जा सकता है कि घटत्व जाति तथा घट का सम्बन्ध नित्य है या अनित्य? यहाँ पर थोड़ा सा अन्तर है वह यह कि यहाँ पर एक सम्बन्धी तो नित्य है परन्तु दूसरा सम्बन्धी अनित्य है, घटत्व को नैयायिक नित्य मानते हैं जबकि घट अनित्य है। पाँच जोड़े हैं जिनमें नैयायिक नित्यसम्बन्ध स्वीकार करते हैं अवयव और अवयवी, गुण तथा गुणी, क्रिया तथा क्रियावान्, जाति तथा व्यक्ति और नित्यद्रव्य तथा विशेष। इनमें से केवल पाँचवाँ जोड़ा ही ऐसा है जिनमें दोनों ही सम्बन्धी नित्य हैं, बाकी चौथा जोड़ा ऐसा है जिसमें एक तो नित्य है परन्तु दूसरा अनित्य है। क्रिया और क्रियावान् के तीसरे जोड़े में दोनों ही अनित्य ही हैं। अवयव तथा अवयवी में कभी दोनों ही अनित्य होंगे तो कभी दोनों में से कोई एका जैसे घट तथा कपाल यहाँ पर दोनों ही अनित्य हैं, परन्तु दो परमाणुओं से जब

द्व्यणुक उत्पन्न होता है तो वहाँ पर अवयव तो नित्य हैं परन्तु अवयवी अनित्य है। इसी प्रकार गुण तथा गुणी की भी स्थिति है। कदाचित् घट तथा घटरूप के प्रसंग में दोनों ही अनित्य हैं। कदाचित् दोनों ही नित्य हैं जैसे जल के परमाणु का रूप जल के परमाणु में हमेशा रहता है, यहाँ पर जल का परमाणु तथा जल के परमाणु का रूप दोनों ही नित्य हैं। कदाचित् एक नित्य है तथा दूसरा अनित्य जैसे आत्मा तथा आत्मा के गुण ज्ञानादि के प्रसंग में गुणी आत्मा तो नित्य है परन्तु उसका गुण ज्ञानादि अनित्य है। इन समस्त स्थलों पर सम्बन्ध नित्य है या अनित्य इस प्रकार से प्रश्न करने पर यदि सीधे-सीधे उत्तर दिया जाये कि सम्बन्ध नित्य है, तो इस उत्तर को किस सीमा तक सही माना जा सकता है? दो नित्यों के मध्य एक अनित्य सम्बन्ध तो सम्भव है जैसे आत्मा तथा मन का संयोग अनित्य होता है क्योंकि वह क्रिया से उत्पन्न होता है। परन्तु दो अनित्यों के मध्य का सम्बन्ध नित्य है, या एक नित्य तथा एक अनित्य के मध्य का सम्बन्ध नित्य है यह स्वीकृति विचित्र प्रतीत होती है, नितान्त असंगत सी प्रतीत होती है।

मीमांसकों के नित्यसम्बन्ध विषयक विशेष विचार शब्द तथा अर्थ के सम्बन्ध तक ही सीमित रहे हैं। मीमांसकों के समक्ष भी इसी प्रकार की समस्या उपस्थित थी। मीमांसक शब्द तथा अर्थ के सम्बन्ध को नित्य मानते हैं। न केवल मीमांसक ही अपितु वैयाकरण भी शब्द तथा अर्थ के सम्बन्ध को नित्य मानते हैं। मीमांसकों के मत में शब्द तथा अर्थ के मध्य एक नित्य सम्बन्ध को स्वीकार करने में कोई असुविधा नहीं है क्योंकि उनके मत में शब्द भी नित्य है, अर्थ भी नित्य है तथा उनके मध्य का सम्बन्ध भी नित्य है। परन्तु नैयायिक के मत में समवाय को नित्यसम्बन्ध किस रूप में स्वीकार किया जा सकता है, इसमें अवश्य समस्या प्रतीत होती है।

समस्याओं के दार्शनिकों द्वारा प्रस्तुत समाधान का मूल्यांकन

शब्दार्थसम्बन्ध की नित्यता के प्रसंग में ऊपर उठायी गयी समस्या को शबर ने मीमांसासूत्रों पर अपने भाष्य में इस प्रश्न को उठाया है कि किस प्रकार से अनित्य शब्द का अनित्य अर्थ के साथ नित्यसम्बन्ध सम्भव है?¹⁰ मीमांसकों ने इस समस्या से बचने के लिए एक बहुत सरल मार्ग आविष्कृत कर लिया। उन्होंने तीनों को ही नित्य मान लिया। मीमांसकों के मत में शब्द ध्वन्यात्मक नहीं है बल्कि अनित्य ध्वनि के द्वारा नित्य शब्द व्यङ्ग्य होता है। इसी कारण ध्वनि के भिन्न-भिन्न होने पर भी राम शब्द का दस बार उच्चारण कर पाना सम्भव होता है। अन्यथा प्रत्येक उच्चारण में शब्द भिन्न हो जायेगा फिर एक ही शब्द का दस बार उच्चारण किस प्रकार से सम्भव होगा? नैयायिकों का सिद्धान्त ही है कि प्रत्युच्चारणं शब्दाः भिद्यन्ते, शब्द प्रत्येक उच्चारण में भिन्न हो

जाते हैं। मीमांसक कहता है कि शब्द ध्वनि रूप नहीं है बल्कि ध्वनि से व्यक्त होनेवाला नित्य शब्द है। इसी प्रकार मीमांसकों ने शब्द की शक्ति भी व्यक्ति में नहीं मानी अपितु नित्य जाति में स्वीकार की। अब हम देख सकते हैं कि जो प्रश्न उपस्थित हुआ था उस प्रश्न का बहुत ही सरलीकरण करते हुए मीमांसकों ने उसका समाधान कर दिया। अब वह प्रश्न उनके सिद्धान्त पर उपस्थित ही नहीं होता है क्योंकि उनके यहाँ शब्द भी नित्य है, शब्द का अर्थ भी नित्य है और उनके बीच का सम्बन्ध भी नित्य है। तीनों ही नित्य हैं। अब मीमांसकों से यह नहीं पूछा जा सकता कि दो अनित्यों के मध्य किस प्रकार से नित्यसम्बन्ध सम्भव है? क्योंकि उनके यहाँ तो शब्द तथा अर्थ का सम्बन्ध दो नित्यों के बीच का एक नित्य सम्बन्ध है।

परन्तु नैयायिक क्या कहेंगे? उनको तो समवाय को नित्यसम्बन्ध के रूप में स्वीकार ही करना है। समवाय को जिस रूप से परिभाषित तथा युक्ति से सिद्ध किया गया है उसके अनुसार समवाय नियम से नित्यों के मध्य ही हो यह नहीं हो सकता। गुण तथा गुणी के मध्य, अवयव तथा अवयवी के मध्य, क्रिया तथा क्रियावान् के मध्य और जाति तथा व्यक्ति के मध्य भी समवाय को स्वीकार किया जाता है, तथा इनमें अनेक में दोनों ही सम्बन्धी अनित्य हैं तो किसी में एक सम्बन्धी अनित्य है। परन्तु उपर्युक्त प्रश्न तो उसी प्रकार से असमाहित रहा कि किस प्रकार से दो अनित्यों के मध्य का सम्बन्ध या एक अनित्य तथा नित्य के मध्य का सम्बन्ध नित्य हो सकता है? मीमांसकों की तरह नैयायिक इस प्रश्न का समाधान नहीं कर सकते।

परन्तु मीमांसकों के समाधान को इस प्रकार से देखना तनिक शीघ्रता होगी। मीमांसा की परम्परा में शब्द तथा अर्थ के बीच के सम्बन्ध के लिए जिस पद का प्रयोग किया गया है, वह पद है औत्पत्तिका। जैमिनि ने शब्द तथा अर्थ के मध्य के सम्बन्ध को औत्पत्तिक शब्द के द्वारा अभिहित किया है— औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सह सम्बन्धः।¹¹ मीमांसासूत्र के व्याख्याकारों ने इस औत्पत्तिक शब्द का अर्थ कर दिया नित्या। इस मीमांसासूत्र पर भाष्य लिखते हुए शबर सीधे-सीधे कहते हैं कि औत्पत्तिक इति नित्यं ब्रूमः। औत्पत्तिक का अर्थ है नित्या। परन्तु यह समझ में नहीं आता है कि उत्पत्ति शब्द से निष्पन्न औत्पत्तिक का अर्थ नित्य किस प्रकार से हो सकता है? औत्पत्तिक शब्द का अर्थ तो यदि कुछ होना चाहिए तो इसका अर्थ उत्पत्तिसम्बन्धी ही होना चाहिए क्योंकि उत्पत्ति शब्द से ही औत्पत्तिक शब्द निष्पन्न होता है। इसी सूत्र पर यदि शबर की आगे की पंक्तियों का भी अवलोकन किया जाये तो हमको सुस्पष्टतया पता चलता है कि शबर को क्या अभिप्रेत रहा होगा, तथा इसी के आधार पर नैयायिकों के यहाँ नित्यसम्बन्ध की अवधारणा भी स्पष्ट हो जाती है। शबर कहते हैं कि उत्पत्ति का अर्थ है भावा। परन्तु

उत्पत्ति का अर्थ भाव किस प्रकार से हो सकता है? उत्पत्ति शब्द का अर्थ भाव तो है नहीं, तो इसका समाधान देते हैं कि लक्षणा के द्वारा उत्पत्ति शब्द का अर्थ भाव होता है। आगे भी वे कहते हैं कि शब्द तथा अर्थ का सम्बन्ध अवियुक्त है, ऐसा नहीं हो सकता है कि शब्द तथा अर्थ उत्पन्न पहले हो जाते हों और उनका सम्बन्ध बाद में होता हो।¹² शबर के इस वक्तव्य को दृष्टि में रखें तो ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि शबर का यह वक्तव्य शब्द तथा अर्थ के नित्यत्व तथा अनित्यत्व दोनों से निरपेक्ष है। शब्द तथा अर्थ के नित्यत्व को स्वीकार करने पर भी उनके मध्य का सम्बन्ध नित्य हो सकता है तथा उन दोनों के अनित्य होने पर भी इनके मध्य का सम्बन्ध नित्य हो सकता है। शबर के अनुसार नित्यसम्बन्ध का अर्थ है अवियुक्त सम्बन्ध। बाद के दार्शनिकों को लगा कि शब्द की नित्यता के साथ-साथ शब्दार्थ के नित्यता की स्वीकृति स्वीकार करते हुए अधिक सुसंगति के साथ सूत्रों की व्याख्या की जा सकती है तथा सिद्धान्त अधिक सुसंगत रीति से परिष्कृत किये जा सकते हैं। इसी कारण मीमांसकों ने शब्दार्थसम्बन्ध की नित्यता को प्रतिपादित करने के लिए शब्दार्थ की नित्यता का मार्ग पकड़ा। यद्यपि शब्दार्थ की नित्यता को स्वीकार किये बिना भी शब्द तथा अर्थ के सम्बन्ध की नित्यता को व्यवस्थापित किया जा सकता था।

इन प्रश्नों का समाधान वैयाकरण भी देते हैं। वैयाकरणों ने दोनों ही रीतियों से समाधान प्रस्तुत किया है क्योंकि इन विषयों को लेकर वे बहुत आग्रही नहीं हैं। कम से कम पतंजलि तो बिलकुल भी आग्रही नहीं हैं। पतंजलि पहले तो मीमांसकों की तरह कहते हैं कि शब्द भी नित्य है, अर्थ भी नित्य है तथा उन दोनों का सम्बन्ध भी नित्य है सिद्धे अर्थे सम्बन्धे चेति¹³। सिद्ध शब्द यहाँ पर नित्य का पर्याय है, इस बात को पतंजलि स्वयं आगे की पंक्तियों से स्पष्ट करते हैं।¹⁴ स्फोटात्मक शब्द नित्य है तथा आकृत्यात्मक अर्थ भी नित्य है।¹⁵ इस कारण शब्द, अर्थ तथा शब्दार्थसम्बन्ध तीनों की ही नित्यता सम्भव होती है। यदि शब्द तथा अर्थ की नित्यता बन गयी तो उनका सम्बन्ध भी नित्य होगा, इसमें कोई भी असुविधा नहीं है। यद्यपि आकृति की नित्यता की बात करें तो क्या हम आकृति की नित्यता की बात ब्रह्म या आत्मा की नित्यता के समान कर सकते हैं? नहीं कर सकते हैं क्योंकि आत्मा की नित्यता को देखा जाये तो वह ध्रुव, कूटस्थ, अविचाल्य, उपजन, अपाय तथा विकार से रहित, उत्पत्ति तथा वृद्धि से रहित, अव्यययोगी होने के रूप में समझ में आती है। परन्तु इस प्रकार की नित्यता आकृति के ऊपर लागू नहीं की जा सकती है। आकृति यानी जाति की उत्पत्ति, विनाश के बारे में बात करने का कोई अर्थ नहीं है। इसी प्रकार आकृति का अपाय तथा विकार से राहित्य

आदि बताना भी निरर्थक है। वस्तुतः तो यह सम्भव ही नहीं है। इस कारण आकृति की नित्यता को स्थापित करने के लिए पतंजलि नित्यता को एक अन्य अर्थ ही दे देते हैं। वह भी नित्य है जिसमें तत्त्व का विनाश नहीं होता, यानी कि आकृति की नित्यता उस अर्थ में नहीं है जिस अर्थ में आत्मा की नित्यता है। आत्मा नित्य है, ब्रह्म नित्य है। यदि हम प्रदीप व्याख्या के लेखक कैयट के शब्दों पर ध्यान दें तो उसके अनुसार आत्मा तथा ब्रह्म की नित्यता वास्तविक नित्यता है। जबकि आकृति की नित्यता वास्तविक नित्यता नहीं है। नित्यता के दो अलग-अलग प्रतिमान हैं। एक प्रतिमान आत्मा या ब्रह्म पर लागू होता है, वही पारमार्थिक प्रतिमान है। दूसरा प्रतिमान है जो कि आकृति पर लागू होता है, जो कि सचमुच में व्यावहारिक प्रतिमान है। इसी प्रतिमान को हमने ऊपर तृतीय प्रतिमान के रूप में ग्रहण किया है। कैयट कहते हैं कि जाति के असत्य होने पर भी तत्त्वतः लोकव्यवहार का आश्रय लेते हुए जाति के नित्यत्व को सिद्ध किया जा रहा है।¹⁶ कैयट का यह निरीक्षण बहुत ही महत्वपूर्ण है। वैयाकरण सिद्धान्त के अनुसार आकृति और जाति पर्याय हैं। इसके अतिरिक्त जाति असत्य है, प्रज्ञप्तिस्त है। वस्तुतः जाति है नहीं। जाति केवल प्रतीत होती है, हमारी बुद्धि में भासित होती है। इस कारण सचमुच में जाति के नित्यत्व तथा अनित्यत्व का प्रश्न बेमानी है, निरर्थक है। परन्तु व्यावहारिक दृष्टि से उस आकृति की नित्यता को भी हम स्वीकार कर लेते हैं क्योंकि जाति या आकृति में उसके तत्त्व का विनाश नहीं होता है।¹⁷ परन्तु पतंजलि की विशिष्टता है कि द्रव्य को भी अर्थ मानते हुए शब्दार्थसम्बन्ध की नित्यता को व्यवस्थापित करते हैं। वे इस पक्ष में कहते हैं कि यदि अर्थ को अनित्य माना जाये तो भी सिद्धे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धे की व्याख्या की जा सकती है क्योंकि इस पक्ष के अनुसार हमको यह मानना होगा कि सिद्धे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धे का अर्थ यह नहीं है कि सिद्धे शब्दे अर्थे तत्सम्बन्धे च। बल्कि इसका अर्थ होगा कि सिद्धे शब्दे अर्थसम्बन्धे च। यानी प्रथम विकल्प के अनुसार शब्द, अर्थ तथा उनके सम्बन्ध इन तीनों की ही नित्यता को स्वीकार किया जाता है। परन्तु द्वितीय विकल्प के अनुसार शब्द तथा अर्थ के साथ शब्द के सम्बन्ध की नित्यता को स्वीकार किया जाता है। इस कारण पतंजलि सिद्धान्त प्रस्तुत करते हैं कि अर्थवान् शब्दों का अर्थ के साथ नित्य सम्बन्ध है।¹⁸ पतंजलि के इस विवेचन के सन्दर्भ से हमको मीमांसा तथा न्याय इन दोनों ही दृष्टियों का समर्थन प्राप्त होता है। पतंजलि दोनों ही सिद्धान्तों का विवेचन करते हैं। यद्यपि प्रथमोच्चरित होने का कारण शब्द, अर्थ तथा इनके सम्बन्ध की नित्यता का पक्ष उनको अभीष्ट है, ऐसा संकेत भी देते हैं। परन्तु न्याय मत से उनका कोई विरोध है, ऐसा संकेत नहीं देते। यहाँ तक कि वहाँ पर वे कुछ अन्य उदाहरणों को भी प्रस्तुत करते

हैं, जिनका सन्दर्भ ग्रहण करने से न्याय सिद्धान्त की व्याख्या अधिक सुसंगत हो सकती है। व्यवहार में नित्यप्रहसित, नित्यप्रजल्पित आदि शब्दों का प्रयोग भी हम करते हैं। नित्यप्रहसित का अर्थ होता है हमेशा हँसते रहनेवाला तथा नित्यप्रजल्पित हमेशा बात करते रहनेवाला। यद्यपि पतंजलि इस विचार को इस प्रश्न के उत्तर के रूप में प्रस्तुत करते हैं कि जब जिस शब्द का अर्थ सन्दिग्ध नहीं है, ऐसा शब्द नित्य शब्द हमारे समक्ष उपलब्ध है, तो सन्दिग्धार्थक सिद्ध शब्द का प्रयोग करने की क्या आवश्यकता थी? इसका उत्तर पतंजलि यह देते हैं कि ऐसा नहीं है कि नित्य शब्द का अर्थ एकदम से असन्दिग्ध हो, उसके अर्थ के विषय में भी मतभेद है। जैसे कि आभीक्ष्ण्य के अर्थ में भी नित्य शब्द का प्रयोग होता है। जैसे नित्यप्रहसित, नित्यप्रजल्पित आदि शब्दों के प्रयोग के स्थल में।¹⁹ यह आभीक्ष्ण्य भी वस्तुतः अवियुक्तता के अभिप्राय से ही प्रयुक्त है। हंसने, बोलने की बारम्बारता से उनकी अवियुक्तता ही प्रतीत होती है। परन्तु पतंजलि के इस वक्तव्य से एक मार्ग तो हमारे समक्ष खुल ही जाता है। इसी प्रकार के अन्य शब्द भी हैं। नित्यसम्बन्ध के विषय में विचार करने के प्रसंग में ही यदि हम नित्यकर्म के परिप्रेक्ष्य में भी विचार कर लें तो उचित होगा। नित्यकर्म शब्द का प्रयोग तो बहुधा होता है, परन्तु सम्भवतः नित्यसम्बन्ध के विषय में जिस प्रकार से दार्शनिक विचार करते हैं, उस प्रकार से नित्यकर्म पर विचार नहीं किया जाता है। सम्भवतः यह इस कारण हुआ कि यह अवधारणा विशिष्टतया मीमांसा दर्शन में ही विचारित होती है। अन्य दार्शनिक इस अवधारणा पर विचार भी नहीं करते हैं, तथा यदि करते भी हैं तो बहुत ही संक्षिप्त। नैयायिक जिस प्रकार से नित्यसम्बन्ध को स्पष्ट करते हैं, तथा उस पर नित्यता की परिभाषा लागू करते हैं क्या कर्म पर भी उसी प्रकार से नित्यता की परिभाषा लागू हो सकती है? कर्म की नित्यता किस प्रकार की हो सकती है? क्या हम नित्यकर्म शब्द का प्रयोग नहीं करते? अवश्य करते हैं। सम्भवतः हम सब में अधिकांश लोगों ने कर्म की नित्यता के विषय में विचार ही नहीं किया हो। कर्म जो नितान्त अनित्य है, उसको कोई भी नित्य नहीं मान सकता। इस स्थल में नित्य शब्द अनिवार्यता के अर्थ में प्रयुक्त हुआ है। इस कारण नित्यसम्बन्ध में नित्य शब्द किस अर्थ में प्रयुक्त हुआ है, इसको विचार में रखना चाहिए। वस्तुतः कर्म की नित्यता को प्रतिपादित करने के लिए भी अवियुक्तता को ही आधार के रूप में लिया जाता है। इस सन्दर्भ में गीता के एक श्लोक का सन्दर्भ भी लिया जा सकता है जहाँ पर नित्यजात तथा नित्यहत शब्द का प्रयोग प्राप्त होता है। अथ चैनं नित्यजातं नित्यं वा मन्यसे हतम्, इस पंक्ति में इसी का सन्दर्भ लिया गया है। शरीर को ही आत्मा मानने पर वह शरीर नित्यजात तथा नित्यहत है क्योंकि वह जब भी पैदा

होता है नवीन ही होता है, तथा जब भी पैदा होता है, मरता भी है, किसी कारण से विनष्ट होता ही है।

सम्बन्ध की नित्यता का अन्य वस्तुओं की नित्यता से भेद

वस्तुतः सम्बन्ध के साथ जब हम नित्य शब्द का प्रयोग करते हैं तो सम्बन्ध की नित्यता हमको उस अर्थ में स्वीकार्य नहीं होती जिस अर्थ में आत्मा या आकाश की नित्यता स्वीकार्य होती है। यद्यपि नैयायिक इन दोनों में कोई अन्तर नहीं करता। दोनों के लिए समान रूप से एक ही प्रकार की नित्यता को ही लागू करता है। वह नित्यता है प्रागभाव का प्रतियोगी न होते हुए ध्वंस का प्रतियोगी न होना। नित्यता की यह परिभाषा आत्मा और सम्बन्ध इन दोनों पर समान रूप से लागू हो जाती है।

नित्यता के विवेचन के प्रसंग में न्यायसूत्रकार ने एक बहुत ही मनोरंजक विचार प्रस्तुत किया है। नित्यसम्बन्ध के विषय में विचार करते हुए उस पर भी एक दृष्टि डालना उचित जान पड़ता है। न्यायसूत्रकार अनित्यता को नित्य मानने का प्रस्ताव रखते हैं। पूर्वपक्ष यह है कि सभी वस्तुएँ अनित्य हैं उत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मक होने के कारण। इसके उत्तर में न्यायसूत्रकार प्रतिवाद करते हैं कि सब कुछ अनित्य नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि ऐसी स्थिति में तो अनित्यता ही नित्य हो जायेगी।²⁰ भाष्यकार वात्स्यायन इसकी व्याख्या करते हैं कि सबकी अनित्यता है तो यह भी विचार करना आवश्यक होगा कि अनित्यता अनित्य है या नित्य? यदि सबकी अनित्यता नित्य है तो अनित्यता की ही नित्यता हो जाती है, फलतः सब कुछ अनित्य नहीं रहता। यदि अनित्यता अनित्य है तो इसका अभिप्राय यह निकलता है कि अनित्यता हमेशा नहीं है, उसके न होने के कारण सब कुछ नित्य होगा।²¹ वस्तुतः यह उत्तर सदुत्तर नहीं है। इसी कारण अन्त में निष्कर्ष के रूप में यह प्रस्ताव लाया जाता है कि न तो सब कुछ नित्य ही हो सकता है और न तो सब कुछ अनित्य ही हो सकता है। यथोपलब्धिव्यवस्थान्याय का आश्रय ग्रहण करते हुए यही मानना उचित होगा कि जिसकी उत्पत्ति या विनाश प्रमाण से उपलब्ध होता है वह तो अनित्य है, परन्तु जिसकी उत्पत्ति या विनाश प्रमाण से उपलब्ध नहीं होता है वह नित्य है।²² इस विवेचन में अनित्यता की नित्यता की बात विचित्र है। अनित्यता एक अवधारणा है, उस अवधारणा की नित्यता की बात उसी प्रकार से नहीं की जा सकती है जिस प्रकार से अन्य वस्तुओं की अनित्यता की बात की जा सकती है। वस्तुतः इसी सन्दर्भ को हमको सम्बन्ध के परिप्रेक्ष्य में ही ध्यान में रखना चाहिए। सम्बन्ध की नित्यता अन्य वस्तुओं की नित्यता की तरह नहीं हो सकती है।

मीमांसक यद्यपि समवाय सम्बन्ध को नहीं स्वीकार करते हैं, इस कारण अवयव तथा अवयवी और इसी प्रकार से अन्य जोड़ों के मध्य नित्य सम्बन्ध को स्वीकार करने का प्रश्न उपस्थित नहीं होता। परन्तु आकृति तथा व्यक्ति को मीमांसकों ने भी नित्यसम्बद्ध माना है। इस कारण आकृति तथा व्यक्ति के मध्य मीमांसकों को भी नित्यसम्बन्ध स्वीकार करना ही पड़ेगा। शबर सुस्पष्टतया कहते हैं कि आकृति तथा व्यक्ति नित्यसम्बद्ध हैं²³ यह भी ध्येय है कि मीमांसकों के अनुसार आकृति तथा व्यक्ति के मध्य समवाय सम्बन्ध स्वीकार्य नहीं है। आकृति शब्द से जाति का ही अभिधान किया जाता है। इस कारण जाति तथा व्यक्ति के मध्य किस प्रकार से नित्यसम्बन्ध सम्भव हो सकेगा? यह प्रश्न मीमांसकों के लिए अधिक समस्याजनक होगा। इसका कारण यह है कि कुमारिल के अनुसार जाति व्यक्तिगत है, नित्य है, प्रत्यक्षज्ञान की विषय है तथा व्यक्ति से भिन्न भी है तथा अभिन्न भी।²⁴ व्यक्ति से अभिन्न जाति को नित्य मानना किस प्रकार से उचित हो सकता है जब व्यक्ति अनित्य है। घट पटादि के स्थल में व्यक्ति की नित्यता तो स्वीकार की ही नहीं जा सकती। स्वयं नारायण ही अपने ग्रन्थ मानमेयोदय में सुस्पष्ट रूप से कहते हैं कि सम्बन्ध का अनित्यत्व सम्बन्धी की अनित्यता के आधार पर हुआ करता है²⁵ समस्या का समाधान करने के लिए मीमांसकों ने जाति को भी सर्वगत मान लिया।²⁶ जाति का व्यक्ति से नित्यसम्बन्ध किस प्रकार से सम्भव हो सकता है इस प्रश्न के विषय में स्वयं प्रस्तुत युक्ति को भी मीमांसकों ने पूरी तरह से संज्ञान में नहीं लिया कि सम्बन्धी की अनित्यता होने पर सम्बन्ध की नित्यता किस प्रकार से हो सकती है? इसका उत्तर इस रूप में प्रस्तुत कर देने का प्रयास किया गया कि यदि दोनों ही सम्बन्धी अनित्य होंगे तभी सम्बन्ध अनित्य होंगे। जाति रूप सम्बन्धी की नित्यता होने के कारण जाति तथा व्यक्ति के सम्बन्ध को भी नित्य मान लिया गया। ऐसा लगता है कि शबर द्वारा दिखाये गये मार्ग का परवर्ती मीमांसकों ने संज्ञान नहीं लिया। निश्चित ही शब्दार्थसम्बन्ध की नित्यता को संरक्षित करने के लिए शब्द, अर्थ तथा शब्दार्थसम्बन्ध इन तीनों की ही नित्यता जिस प्रकार से मीमांसक स्वीकार करते हैं, उस प्रकार से जाति तथा व्यक्ति के मध्य के सम्बन्ध की नित्यता को स्थापित करने के लिए मीमांसकों ने प्रयास नहीं किया।

समवाय सम्बन्ध एक नित्यसम्बन्ध

नैयायिकों ने भी समवाय की नित्यता को स्वीकार करते हुए लगभग शबर द्वारा प्रदर्शित मार्ग ही पकड़ा। जब नैयायिकों ने कहा कि समवाय एक नित्यसम्बन्ध है तो उसमें यही भावना कार्य कर रही थी। यह कहने का अभिप्राय मात्र इतना था कि ऐसा नहीं होता है कि नित्यसम्बन्ध के स्थल पर सम्बन्ध के दोनों ही सम्बन्धी पहले से अस्तित्व में आ

चुके हों, उसके बाद उनका सम्बन्ध होता हो, जैसे कि घट तथा पट के संयोग सम्बन्ध के साथ होता है। घट तथा पट दोनों ही अस्तित्व में आ चुके हैं और हम अपने हस्तादिव्यापार के द्वारा घट तथा पट का सम्बन्ध करा देते हैं, घट का पट से संयोग करा देते हैं। नित्यसम्बन्ध समवाय के साथ ऐसा नहीं हो सकता है। हम शबर के शब्दों को उधार लेकर कह सकते हैं कि गुण तथा गुणी, अवयव तथा अवयवी, क्रिया तथा क्रियावान्, जाति तथा व्यक्ति, नित्यद्रव्य तथा विशेष के बीच में जो सम्बन्ध है वह सम्बन्ध अवियुक्त होता है, उस सम्बन्ध को हम वियुक्त नहीं कर सकते हैं। यद्यपि इन स्थलों में कुछ अन्तर भी दिखता है। अवयव अवयवी के विना भी दिखता है, अनुभव में आता है। इसी प्रकार किसी विशिष्ट गुण के विना भी द्रव्य उपलब्ध होता है तथा बाद में वह विशिष्ट गुण उत्पन्न हो जाता है। इसी प्रकार से क्रिया के विना भी द्रव्य अनुभव में आता है परन्तु बाद में क्रिया की उपलब्धि होती है। परन्तु इन सब स्थलों में उनकी ही उपलब्धि पहले होती है, जो अधिकरण के रूप स्वीकार किये जाते हैं। अवयवी अवयव के विना उपलब्ध नहीं हो सकता है। गुण गुणी (द्रव्य) के विना उपलब्ध नहीं हो सकता है। क्रिया क्रियावान् (द्रव्य) के विना उपलब्ध नहीं हो सकती। इसी प्रकार से जाति भी व्यक्ति के विना उपलब्ध नहीं हो सकती। इनका इस प्रकार से आपसी सम्बन्ध है कि वे अकेले नहीं प्राप्त होते हैं। इसी अवियुक्तता को नैयायिकों ने समवाय को अयुतसिद्धों के मध्य का सम्बन्ध बताते हुए स्वीकार किया है। जब नैयायिक कहते हैं कि जिन दोनों में से एक अविनश्यत् अवस्था में रहते हुए दूसरे पर आश्रित होकर ही रहता है वे दोनों अयुतसिद्ध हैं,²⁷ तो वस्तुतः यह व्याख्या शबर के मत का ही अनुसरण करती दिखती है। नैयायिक यह भी नहीं कहते हैं कि दो नित्यों के मध्य का सम्बन्ध नित्य ही होता है। जैसा कि हम पूर्व में ही देख चुके हैं नित्य आत्मा तथा नित्य मन का संयोग अनित्य होता है। इस कारण सम्बन्धियों की नित्यता किसी भी प्रकार से सम्बन्ध की नित्यता का निर्धारण नहीं कर सकती। सम्बन्धियों के नित्य होने पर भी सम्बन्ध अनित्य हो सकता है तथा इसके उलट सम्बन्धियों के अनित्य होने पर भी सम्बन्ध नित्य हो सकता है।

व्याकरण की दृष्टि से नित्यसम्बन्ध का अभिप्राय तथा उसकी न्याय मत में संगति
 नित्यसम्बन्ध का अर्थ क्या है? यदि इस प्रश्न पर व्याकरण की दृष्टि से विचार किया जाये तो चूँकि नित्यसम्बन्ध शब्द दो शब्दों के समास से सिद्ध हुआ है। इस कारण यह विचार करना होगा कि किस प्रकार से इन दोनों पदों का समास किया जा सकता है। चार प्रकार से समास किया जा सकता है—नित्ययोः सम्बन्धः नित्यसम्बन्धः, दो नित्यों का सम्बन्ध

नित्यसम्बन्ध कहा जायेगा। इसमें द्वित्व अविवक्षित है, उसका तात्पर्य दो से अधिकों के मध्य होनेवाला सम्बन्ध ही नित्यसम्बन्ध कहा जाता है। दूसरे प्रकार से समास किया जा सकता है कि नित्यस्य सम्बन्धः नित्यसम्बन्धः, यानी नित्य का सम्बन्ध नित्यसम्बन्ध कहा जायेगा। इसमें यह अर्थ निकलता है कि नित्यप्रतियोगिक जो सम्बन्ध है उसको नित्यसम्बन्ध कहा जायेगा। तीसरे प्रकार से समास किया जा सकता है कि नित्ये सम्बन्धः नित्यसम्बन्धः। इस पक्ष में यह अर्थ निकलता है कि नित्यानुयोगिक जो सम्बन्ध है उसको नित्यसम्बन्ध कहा जायेगा। चौथे प्रकार से समास किया जा सकता है कि नित्यश्चासौ सम्बन्धः नित्यसम्बन्धः। इस पक्ष में यह अर्थ निकलता है कि जो सम्बन्ध नित्य है उसको ही नित्यसम्बन्ध कहा जायेगा। विचारणीय यह है कि इन में से किस अर्थ को लिया जाये? प्रथम पक्ष में सम्बन्ध की नित्यता तभी सम्भव हो सकती है, जब दोनों ही सम्बन्धियों की नित्यता हो, यदि दोनों ही सम्बन्धियों की नित्यता नहीं हो तो सम्बन्ध की नित्यता नहीं हो सकती? द्वितीय पक्ष में जिस सम्बन्ध का प्रतियोगी नित्य होगा, उसी सम्बन्ध की नित्यता हो सकती है। तृतीय पक्ष में जिस सम्बन्ध का अनुयोगी नित्य होगा, उसी सम्बन्ध की नित्यता हो सकती है। द्वितीय तथा तृतीय पक्ष में इतना अन्तर है कि द्वितीय में प्रतियोगी की नित्यता के आधार पर सम्बन्ध की नित्यता बनती है तो तृतीय में अनुयोगी की नित्यता के आधार पर सम्बन्ध की नित्यता बनती है। चतुर्थ पक्ष में सम्बन्ध की नित्यता सम्बन्धियों की नित्यता के विना भी हो सकती है। यह एक विशिष्टता है। इसी चतुर्थ पक्ष को आधार बना कर नैयायिक सम्बन्ध की नित्यता को स्वीकार करते हैं। यानी सम्बन्धियों की नित्यता पर सम्बन्ध की नित्यता आधारित नहीं है। सम्बन्धियों के अनित्य होने पर भी सम्बन्ध के नित्य होने में कोई समस्या नहीं है।

सन्दर्भ एवं पाद टिप्पणी:

¹ सम्बन्धो नास्ति तत्त्वतः।

² ध्रुवं कूटस्थमविचाल्यनपायोपजनविकार्यनुत्पत्त्यवृद्ध्यव्यययोगि यत्तन्नित्यमिति। महाभाष्य परपशाह्निक पृ.53।

³ तदपि नित्यं यस्मिंस्तत्त्वं न विहन्यते। वहीं

⁴ तत्र यदुत्पद्यते तदुत्पत्तिधर्मकम्, यच्च भूत्वा न भवति आत्मानं जहाति निरुध्यत इत्यनित्यम्। वात्स्यायन भाष्य 1-1-36

⁵ किं अनित्यं नाम? यस्य कदाचिद्भावस्तदनित्यम्। उत्पत्तिधर्मकमनुत्पन्नं नास्ति विनाशधर्मकं च विनष्टं नास्ति। वात्स्यायन भाष्य 4-1-25

⁶ द्रष्टव्य तर्कसंग्रह न्यायबोधिनी

⁷ प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वं ध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वञ्च अनित्यत्वम्।

⁸ नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यतेऽसतः। गीता 2-16

⁹ इसके लिए गदाधर भट्टाचार्य द्वारा प्रणीत शक्तिवाद द्रष्टव्य है।

- ¹⁰ उक्तं नित्यः शब्दार्थयोः संबन्ध इति. तदनुपपन्नम्, शब्दस्यानित्यत्वात्. विनष्टः शब्दः, पुनरस्य क्रियमाणस्यार्थेनाकृतकः संबन्धो नोपपद्यते। शाबरभाष्य 1-1-6
- ¹¹ औपत्तिकस्तु शब्दव्यार्थेन सह सम्बन्धस्तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशोऽर्थाव्यतिरेकश्चार्थेऽनुपलब्धे तत् प्रमाणं बादरायणस्यानपेक्षत्वात्। मीमांसासूत्र 1-1-5 ये पूरा सूत्र है।
- ¹² उत्पत्तिर्हि भाव उच्यते लक्षणया। अवियुक्तः शब्दार्थयोर्भावः सम्बन्धो, नोत्पन्नयोः पश्चात् सम्बन्धः। वहीं शाबरभाष्य
- ¹³ महाभाष्य पश्यशाह्निका
- ¹⁴ नित्यपर्यायवाची सिद्धशब्दः। वहीं
- ¹⁵ आकृतिर्हि नित्या। वहीं
- ¹⁶ अन्यत्वेऽपि तत्त्वतो लोकव्यवहाराश्रयेण जातेर्नित्यत्वं साध्यते। वहीं, प्रदीप व्याख्या
- ¹⁷ आकृतावपि तत्त्वं न विहन्यते। वहीं, महाभाष्य
- ¹⁸ नित्यो ह्यर्थवतामर्थैरभिसम्बन्धः। वहीं
- ¹⁹ आभीक्ष्येऽपि वर्तते। तद्यथा नित्यप्रहसितो नित्यप्रजल्पित इति। वहीं
- ²⁰ नानित्यतानित्यत्वात्। न्यायसूत्र 4-1-26
- ²¹ यदि तावत्सर्वस्यानित्यता नित्या, तन्नित्यत्वान्न सर्वं अनित्यम्। अथानित्या तस्यां अविद्यमानायां सर्वं नित्यं इति। वात्स्यायन भाष्य 4-1-26
- ²² यस्योत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्वं उपलभ्यते प्रमाणतस्तदनित्यम्, यस्य नोपलभ्यते तद्विपरीतम्। वात्स्यायन भाष्य 4-1-28
- ²³ आकृतिर्हि व्यक्त्या नित्यसंबद्धा। शाबरभाष्य 1-1-33
- ²⁴ जातिर्व्यक्तिगता नित्या प्रत्यक्षज्ञानगोचरा।
- भिन्नाभिन्ना च सा व्यक्तेः कुमारिलमते मता।। मानमेयोदय पृ. 233
- ²⁵ सम्बन्धनित्यत्वनिबन्धनं सम्बन्धानित्यत्वमपि। वहीं पृ.232
- ²⁶ तत्र यत् तावत् पृष्टं सामान्यं सर्वगतं व्यक्तिगतं वेति तत्र पक्षद्वयमपि कक्षीकुर्मः। वहीं पृ.235
- ²⁷ ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्ये एकमवनिश्यदपरावस्थितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ। तर्कभाषा समवायनिरूपण

सन्दर्भग्रन्थसूची—

गीता, गीताप्रेस गोरखपुर

तर्कभाषा, केशवमिश्र, बदरीनाथशुक्लकृत हिन्दीव्याख्यासहित, मोतीलाल बनारसीदास, दिल्ली, 1968

तर्कसङ्ग्रह, अन्नम्भट्ट, नीलकण्ठीदीपिकासहित, खेमराज श्रीकृष्णदास, मुम्बई 1954

न्यायदर्शनम्, गौतमप्रणीत न्यायसूत्र, , वात्स्यायनभाष्य, उद्योतकरप्रणीत वार्तिक, वाचस्पतिमिश्रप्रणीत तात्पर्यटीका सहित, सम्पादक-अमरेन्द्रमोहनतर्कतीर्थ, तारानाथन्यायतर्कतीर्थ, मुंशीराम मनोहरलाल प्राइवेट लिमिटेड, दिल्ली, द्वितीय संस्करण, 1985

महाभाष्य, पतञ्जलि, कैयटप्रणीत प्रदीप, नागेशभट्टप्रणीतप्रदीपोद्योत, भट्टोजिदीक्षितप्रणीत शब्दकौस्तुभ, गुरुप्रसादशास्त्रिविरचित अभिनवराजलक्ष्मीव्याख्यासहित, सम्पादक नन्दकिशोरशास्त्री, प्रतिभाप्रकाशन, दिल्ली, 2001

मानमेयोदय, नारायण, सी कुन्हन राजा, एस एस सूर्यनारायण शास्त्री प्रणीत आङ्ग्लानुवाद सहित, अङ्ग्यार पुस्तकालय, मद्रास 1975

मीमांसासूत्र, जैमिनि, शाबरभाष्यसहित https://sa.wikisource.org/wiki/शाबरभाष्यम्/प्रथमोऽध्यायः/प्रथमः_पादः

दिनांक 29-06-2021 को सन्दर्भित

आचार्य,

दर्शन एवं धर्म विभाग,

काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय, वाराणसी

sacchitmishra@gmail.com

Naturalization of Epistemic Values

Gopal Sahu

Epistemology, the theory of knowledge, is one of the core areas of philosophy. Epistemology is the philosophical study of the definition, nature, kinds, justification, and limitation etc. of knowledge. The philosophical study of knowledge uses reasoning in the form of arguments and counter-arguments to theorise about knowledge. The philosophical theorisation of knowledge consists in defining epistemic notions with necessary and sufficient condition, providing procedure for how we should acquire knowledge and formulating criteria for the evaluation of knowledge claims. Epistemology so characterized, makes it a normative study of knowledge. By normative, it is usually meant that epistemological questions such as whether a belief is justified or rational, is an *evaluative* question. To say that a belief is *justified* is to say that it is *good, correct, or permissible*, to hold it from an epistemic point of view.¹ Many philosophers regard epistemology as being normative in respect of being *prescriptive* as well, i.e., telling us how we *should* form our beliefs, so that there is no possibility of error. This connects with the idea, popular within epistemology, that the business of epistemology is to offer useful advice, and so as having “an important ameliorative dimension.”² The normativity of epistemology keeps its autonomy in terms of both its methods and its subject matter, independent of the non-philosophical study of knowledge. Therefore, the philosophical questions epistemologists ask such questions as “what is knowledge?”, “is knowledge even possible?”, etc. is prior to and independent of the non-epistemological questions such as, how do you know X? Is knowledge of X possible? The central question of epistemology is how to account for the normativity of epistemology.

Much of traditional philosophical theorization about central epistemic notions, such as knowledge, justification, evidence, and so on, has been carried out *a priori*: careful reflection, rather than empirical investigation, is taken to be the proper method to arrive at accurate understanding of the true epistemological principles and criteria. This kind of theorization on knowledge can be called as Traditional Epistemology (TE). Descartes, who is widely

regarded as “the founder of modern epistemology”³, is a representative case of TE. According to Descartes the safe way to show how we ought to conduct ourselves epistemically in order to achieve knowledge and avoid error is to “start again right from the foundations”⁴ of science, i.e., to legitimate the foundations of inquiry *per se*. His strong foundationalism designed to rule out the possibility of error is based on the very logical possibility of global error, made possible through his Demon hypothesis thought experiment. He has tried to establish the “foundation” through careful *a priori* reflection on his own ideas and the method of doubt: one should “hold back [one’s] assent from opinions which are not completely certain and indubitable”⁵, and treat as false anything that could possibly be false. At the foundation are beliefs which are ‘clearly and distinctly’, and other beliefs are inferred from these foundational beliefs. Such a foundation, according to Descartes will provide the normative base of knowledge. Only a few current practitioners of TE endorse Descartes’ arguments that there is a foundation of knowledge and we can know it *a priori* and that knowledge is infallible. TE is concerned with skeptical worries unduly and unprofitably. Moreover, it relies too much on “armchair”, speculative and *a priori* theorizing and totally ignores the conditions in which knowledge is actually produced and/or shared.

- Naturalized Epistemology (NE) is an attempt to redress the perceived shortcomings of TE in accounting for the normativity of knowledge. NE, coined by W. V. O Quine⁶, is a philosophical approach to the theory of knowledge that assumes knowing as a natural process and argues that the methods, results and theories of natural sciences should be used to understand the knowledge and account for the normativity of epistemology.⁷ Since Quine’s NE, there have been varieties of NE.⁸ NE is presented as an advanced and opposite of the traditional theory of knowledge. Quine argues that epistemology should be regarded as continuous with, or even part of, natural science.
- Quine’s version of naturalized epistemology casts serious doubt about the fruitfulness of traditional philosophical study of knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge. The doubt is raised in light of the long history of failure of philosophers to find a satisfactory answer to the problems of radical scepticism, more particularly, to Cartesian and

Humean scepticism.⁹ But also, because of the attempts and failures to reduce mathematics to pure logic by logical positivists or philosophically sympathetic to them. Quine concludes that studies of scientific knowledge concerned with meaning or truth fail to achieve the Cartesian goal of certainty. The failures in the reduction of mathematics to pure logic imply that scientific knowledge can at best be defined with the aid of less certain set-theoretic notions. Even if set theory's lacking the certainty of pure logic is deemed acceptable, the usefulness of constructing an encoding of scientific knowledge as logic and set theory is undermined by the inability to construct a useful translation from logic and set-theory back to scientific knowledge. If no translation between scientific knowledge and the logical structures can be constructed that works both ways, then the properties of the purely logical and set-theoretic constructions do not usefully inform understanding of scientific knowledge.¹⁰ On Quine's account, attempts to pursue the traditional project of finding the meanings and truths of science philosophically have failed on their own terms and failed to offer any advantage over the more direct methods of psychology.

- Quine also rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction and emphasizes the holistic nature of our beliefs.¹¹ Since traditional philosophic analysis of knowledge fails, those wishing to study knowledge ought to employ natural scientific methods. Scientific study of knowledge differs from philosophic study by focusing on how humans acquire knowledge rather than speculative analysis of knowledge. According to Quine, this appeal to science, to ground the project of studying knowledge, which itself underlies science, should not be dismissed for its circularity since it is the best option available after ruling out traditional philosophic methods for their more serious flaws.

Having had no hope in the possibility of first philosophy, Quine shifts his philosophical base to science. If knowledge acquisition is a natural phenomenon commonly found in human and animal world, it is his firm conviction that acquisition and justification of knowledge can be studied in a scientific manner. Philosophical enquiry is to be conducted with the aim of establishing unified science where epistemology becomes a chapter in science. In order

to achieve this end, he adopts the behavioristic psychology as the method of studying language and concepts in philosophy and science. Proposing new hypothesis, deriving observation categorical, falsifying or verifying the occasion sentences, experimentation, prediction, modifying the backlog theory, etc. are all part of the scientific activities leading to advancement in knowledge. When philosophy and science are merged indistinguishably, that is called epistemology naturalized.

When epistemology is naturalized, it studies a natural phenomenon as well as a physical human subject. This human subject can be studied experimentally by controlling certain parameters like any other natural object. The relation between the meager input and the torrential output would remain the same as is the case with natural science. That is to say, the issue of how evidence relates to a theory and how theory of nature transcends any available evidence remains the same.¹²

Speaking of his theory of truth, Quine states that he is a realist when it is the matter of truth. In Quine's programme of naturalism truth becomes immanent. It is not transcendental; there is no higher tribunal for truth according to Quine. However, that does not reduce truth to merely redundant and disquotational in nature. Because, truth is always purposive. Thus speaking of truth, Quine says "we choose to pursue truth conducive to our well-being and that of other deserving people, and truths that gratify our curiosity about the world."¹³ He says that in his naturalism 'true' is accepted as a second order predicate within science. He says "when we find to our surprise an accepted sentence was not true, this is on a par with finding our surprise that light rays are not straight. I am a realist about truth in whatever sense I am realist about light rays and straightness."¹⁴

Quine draws our attention to a remarkable feature of our use of the truth predicate. When a scientific theory is displaced by further research, we do not say that it had been true but became false. We say that it was false, all the way. This is the kind of realism he subscribes to. Quine remarks; "Such is the scientific method: interrogation of nature in a cosmic true-false test. Man proposes, nature disposes."¹⁵

Quine's naturalism is criticized on the ground that it robs off the normative aspect of epistemology and philosophy. The naturalism, which is so heavily dependent on the evolutionary principle of similarity and the immanence theory of truth cannot but be the

mere description of the process in which knowledge is in *fact* acquired and sustained than the prescriptive activity of how knowledge *should* be acquired and justified. However, Quine says that this fear is unfounded because normativity can be preserved in naturalized epistemology. He elaborated three main normative characteristics of naturalized epistemology. First, he claims that the principle of empiricism itself provides the normativity to naturalized epistemology by “counselling us to mistrust soothsayers and telepathists,” because “empiricism is both a rule of scientific method and a scientific discovery.”¹⁶ It is natural science that tells us that our information about the world comes only through impacts on our sense organs. As it grows, understanding and deriving technology have become the goal of science though prediction retains its importance. Test of a good science would still be checkpoints in sensory prediction.¹⁷ However, prediction is not considered to be normative by Quine.¹⁸ In *The Web of Beliefs*, Quine has listed five virtues of a scientific hypothesis: conservatism, generality, simplicity, refutability and modesty. He says:

A hypothesis may appeal to us by virtue of some analogy or symmetry, or linking up some known laws. I see all this as the domain of normative naturalist epistemology: the norms of plausibility or subjective probability. It is the domain of statistical theory and, at a less technical level, the homely percepts of conservatism and simplicity.¹⁹

Secondly, he says that his elaboration of natural sciences provides the natural setting to study epistemology only. The study of the relationship between evidence and theory still remains the primary goal of epistemology. Quine says that it is possible to address epistemic issues without getting into the details of neural mechanism and other details which belong to the naturalistic setting. “For epistemology remains centered as always on evidence, and meaning remains centered as always on verification; and evidence is verification.”²⁰ Once we go beyond observation sentences, it ceases to have any clear applicability to any single sentence. Quine does not want to discard non-observational sentences from science as is done by logical positivists.

Thirdly, naturalized epistemology is heavily involved in developing heuristic devices. It has to find rational mechanism to conjecture and frame scientific hypotheses. This is considered to be one of the normative functions by Quine. He writes “normative naturalized epistemology tangles with margin of error, random deviation, and

whatever else goes into the applied mathematics of statistics.”²¹ It is part of the language game of science in contrast to other good language games such as fiction and poetry, that preserve normativity of knowledge enterprise. Quine offers an account of the source of normativity in naturalized epistemology as a historically constructed one: historically contingent, but not arbitrary. This position is very much compatible with epistemic relativism, the view that standards of epistemic rationality or norms are relative to scientific practices. Quine has shown that this is the best possible way to make sense of our epistemic values in naturalization of knowledge.

Epistemology plays a normative role in generating and propagating knowledge in all areas. The generation and propagation of knowledge is a very natural cognitive process and it needs to be studied empirically like any other natural cognitive processes. But, such an empirical study of knowledge, which Quine says as Naturalised Epistemology, should both preserve and explain the normative character of our epistemic practises. But, it is the normative characteristic of epistemology that prevents epistemology that resists its naturalisation. Quine has not only understood the problem of traditional problem of epistemology but also offered a solution of it through his naturalised epistemology. To conclude, we can say that Quine has very effectively accounted for source and content of epistemic norms in naturalized epistemology by combining norm and fact very creatively in his naturalized epistemology.²²

Notes and References:

- 1 Chisholm, R., 1977, *Theory of Knowledge*, 2nd edition, New York: Prentice Hall. Chisholm calls “justified” a “term of epistemic appraisal”.
- 2 Kitcher, Philip, 1992, “The Naturalists Return”, *Philosophical Review*, 101(1), p. 64.
- 3 Sosa, Ernest, 2003, “Epistemology: Does it Depend on Independence?”, in Erik J. Olsson (ed.), *The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer*, Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 23–30.
- 4 Descartes, René, 1988, “*First Meditation*”, in *Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings*, translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, with an Introduction by John Cottingham, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1641], p 17.
- 5 *Ibid.*

- 6 Quine, W.V.O., 1969, "Epistemology Naturalized" in *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 69–90.
- 7 Naturalism in epistemology has a long history. But it is only relatively recently that it has gone by just that name and received so much focused attention. As in other areas of philosophy, questions concerning naturalism's merits are central to recent epistemological debate.
- 8 There are three noteworthy distinctions within naturalized epistemology: a) Replacement Naturalism (TE should be abandoned and replaced with natural science), b) Cooperative Naturalism (TE can benefit from the natural science) and c) Substantive Naturalism (TE is natural science).
- 9 *Epistemology Naturalized*, p. 70.
- 10 *Epistemology Naturalized*, p. 71.
- 11 See, Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Jan., 1951), pp. 20-43
- 12 *Epistemology Naturalized*, p. 70.
- 13 Quine, W. V.O., "Responses" (henceforth *Responses*), *Inquiry*, 37, 1994, pp. 498.
- 14 *Responses*, p. 497.
- 15 *Responses*, p. 500.
- 16 Barrett, R. and R. Gibson (eds.), *Perspectives on Quine*, Basil Blackwell, USA, 1990, p. 229. Also see Quine, W. V.O., *Pursuit of Truth* (revised edition) (henceforth *PT*), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1995, p. 21.
- 17 *PT*, p. 21.
- 18 *PT*, p. 22.
- 19 *Responses*, p. 503.
- 20 *Epistemology Naturalized*, p. 71. Also see, *PT* pp. 1; 21.
- 21 *PT*, p. 20.
- 22 An earlier version of the paper was presented in UN College of Science and Technology, Adaspur, Cuttack, Odisha on January 6, 2019. I am thankful to the participants who have contributed to the paper through their comments and quarries.

Professor,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Allahabad, Prayagraj
drgopalsahu@gmail.com

निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष की स्वतंत्रता पर शास्त्रीय दर्शनों की स्थिति-एक सिंहावलोकन

अरविन्द विक्रम सिंह

प्रायः सभी भारतीय दार्शनिक सम्प्रदायों में प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान के सविकल्पक और निर्विकल्पक भेद को स्वीकार किया गया है। यहां हमने सविकल्पक और निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष की मान्यता को लक्षित कर विभिन्न दार्शनिक सम्प्रदायों की मान्यताओं को स्पष्ट करने का प्रयास किया है। ज्ञान की प्रामाण्यता को लेकर विभिन्न सम्प्रदायों में प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान की भिन्न-भिन्न धारणाएँ रही हैं। कुछ सम्प्रदायों के अनुसार केवल निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान ही प्रामाणिक है। कुछ अन्य सम्प्रदायों के अनुसार केवल सविकल्पक ज्ञान ही प्रामाणिक है व कुछ सम्प्रदाय निर्विकल्पक एवं सविकल्पक दोनों को ही प्रामाणिक ज्ञान मानते हैं।

प्रथम कोटि में समाविष्ट बौद्ध व वेदान्तियों के अनुसार निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान ही प्रामाणिक है। द्वितीय कोटि में आने वाले व्याकरणविदों के अनुसार केवल सविकल्पक ज्ञान ही प्रामाणिक है। वस्तुवादियों के अनुसार निर्विकल्पक और सविकल्पक दोनों प्रकार के ज्ञान को ज्ञान की कोटि में रखा जा सकता है। यद्यपि मीमांसा, सांख्य व न्याय के अनुसार सविकल्पक और निर्विकल्पक दोनों ज्ञानों को प्रामाणिक ज्ञान की रेणी में रखा जा सकता है तथापि निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान के स्वरूप के विषय में भाट्ट मीमांसा, सांख्य तथा प्रभाकर एवं न्याय वैशेषिकों में कुछ मतभेद हैं।

यहां सविकल्पक व निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान की सर्वमान्य धारणा को समझना आवश्यक है। *विकल्प्यते-विशिष्यते वस्तु येन स विकल्पः तेन सहित सविकल्पम्* अथवा *विकल्पयति वस्तु यत् तद् विकल्पकम् तेन सहित सविकल्पकम्*। इन व्युत्पत्तियों के अनुसार सविकल्पक शब्द का अर्थ है- विशेषण-युक्त वस्तु को ग्रहण करने वाला ज्ञान। जिस ज्ञान में विशेषण, विशिष्य व संबंध का ज्ञान होता है, उस ज्ञान को सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष कहा जाता है। न्याय दर्शन में सविकल्पक ज्ञान की तीन परिभाषायें दी गई हैं-

1. सप्रकारक ज्ञान सविकल्पकम्। प्रकार (विशेषण) सहित ज्ञान को सविकल्पक कहते हैं।
2. नामजात्यादि योजना सहितं ज्ञान सविकल्पकम्। नाम जाति आदि की योजना के सहित जो ज्ञान होता है उसे सविकल्पक कहते हैं।¹
3. अभिलाप - संसर्ग योग्य प्रतिभासे सविकल्पकम्। संसर्ग (सम्बन्ध) योग्य विषय का कथन जिस ज्ञान के द्वारा होता है, उसे सविकल्पक कहते हैं, क्योंकि इसी ज्ञान के आधार पर अन्य मनुष्यों के साथ व्यवहार किया जाता है।

विकल्पयेभ्यो-विशेषणेभ्यो निर्मुक्तं निर्विकल्पकम् –इस व्युत्पत्ति के अनुसार विशेषणविहीन वस्तु के स्वरूप को ग्रहण करने वाला ज्ञान निर्विकल्पक कहलाता है। जिस ज्ञान में विशेषण एवं संबन्ध का अवगाहन नहीं होता, किंतु वस्तु के स्वरूप मात्र का अवबोध होता कहै, उसे निर्विकल्पक कहा जाता है। इसका उदाहरण *बाल-मूकादि विज्ञान सदृश निर्विकल्पकम्* ² इस प्रकार दिया जाता है।

न्याय दर्शन के चिंतकों द्वारा प्रत्यक्ष के वर्गीकरण को विस्तार से समझाया गया है। न्याय के मतानुसार प्रत्यक्ष के दो मुख्य भेद होते हैं – (1) नित्य प्रत्यक्ष (2) अनित्य प्रत्यक्ष। इस मत में ईश्वरीय ज्ञान को नित्य माना गया है। ईश्वर को सर्वदा सभी वस्तुओं का ज्ञान रहता है। अतः उसे सर्वद्रष्टा कहा गया है। उसका इस प्रकार का देखना ही नित्य प्रत्यक्ष है। अपने ज्ञान के लिये ईश्वर को किसी अन्य प्रकार के ज्ञान की आवश्यकता नहीं होती है। ईश्वर के अतिरिक्त सभी को इन्द्रियादि के माध्यम से ज्ञान होता है। अतः उसे अनित्य प्रत्यक्ष कहा जाता है। अनित्य प्रत्यक्ष सविकल्पक और निर्विकल्पक भेद से दो प्रकार का होता है।

सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष भी दो प्रकार का होता है – लौकिक प्रत्यक्ष व अलौकिक प्रत्यक्ष।³ लौकिक प्रत्यक्ष छः प्रकार का होता है— चाक्षुष, त्वक्, घ्राणज, रासन, श्रावण और मानस। अलौकिक प्रत्यक्ष भी तीन प्रकार का होता है – सामान्यलक्षण, ज्ञानलक्षण व योगज। वैशिष्ट्य का अवगाहन करने वाला ज्ञान सविकल्पक कहलाता है। विशिष्ट ज्ञान में सामान्य रूप से नाम, जाति, गुण एवं क्रिया इन चार विशेषताओं को ग्रहण किया जाता है। इस प्रकार कई लोग सविकल्पक को ज्ञान का लक्षण मानते हैं। यह ज्ञान विषयबोधक शब्द से जाना जाता है। अतः, *अभिलापसंसर्गयोग्य प्रतिभासं सविकल्पकम्*, इस प्रकार से भी इसका लक्षण दिया जाता है। जैसे— अयं गौः गौत्व, गौ शुक्लः एवं गौः गच्छति, इस प्रकार, सविकल्पक ज्ञान में नाम, जाति, गुण एवं क्रिया इनका समावेश किया जा सकता है। इसी प्रकार केला पीला है आदि सभी ज्ञान सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष के उदाहरण हैं। इन ज्ञानों में विशेषण, विशेष्य तथा उनके संबंध का अवगाहन होता है। यह सविकल्पक ज्ञान मानव के समस्त क्रियाकलापों एवं व्यवहारों का मूल है। सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष के छः भेद है – चाक्षुष, त्वक्, घ्राणज, रासन, श्रावण तथा मानस। इनमें से प्रथम पांच को बाह्य तथा अंतिम मानस प्रत्यक्ष को आंतरिक कहा जाता है।

वैशिष्टयानवगाहि ज्ञान को निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष कहा गया है। इसमें विशेषण-विषेष्य व संबंध का ज्ञान नहीं होता है। यद्यपि निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान अपनी अनुभूत वस्तु में किसी प्रकार के विशेषण, विशेष्य एवं संबन्धादि का अवगाहन नहीं करता है तथापि वस्तु के स्वरूप मात्र को विषय करता है। निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान में वस्तु के स्वरूप का बोध होने पर भी, उसका विषय बोधक शब्द से अभिलाप, व्यवहार नहीं होता। अतः इस ज्ञान का परिचय “बाल मूकादि सदृशं निर्विकल्पकम्” कहकर दिया गया है। वस्तुतः निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान में वस्तु का जिस रूप में ग्रहण किया जाता है, उस रूप में शब्द द्वारा

प्रतिपादन संभव नहीं हो पाता। इस ज्ञान में कुछ है इस रूप में वस्तु का अविभास होता है।

न्याय-मत

यद्यपि सविकल्पक— निर्विकल्पक भेद का वर्णन न्यायसूत्र व न्यायभाष्य दोनों में नहीं मिलता तथापि प्रशस्तपादभाष्य में “आपतित स्वरूपालोचनमात्रम्” “स्वरूपालोचनमात्रम् प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम्” एवं “आलोचनमात्रम् प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम्” आदि पदों का अर्थ बाद के टीकाकारों ने निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष के रूप में किया है। प्रशस्तपाद के आलोचनमात्र पद से निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष का कुछ आभास माना भी जा सकता है। किंतु वार्तिककार को ये दोनों भेद उक्त संज्ञाओं द्वारा निर्दिष्ट न सही लेकिन किसी न किसी रूप में अवश्य मान्य थे। वार्तिककार ने दिङ्नाग के प्रत्यक्ष लक्षण की आलोचना करते समय प्रत्यक्ष को स्पष्ट रूप से द्विविध (सामान्य—विशेषाकारवत्) माना है।¹⁴ इससे यही सिद्ध होता है कि वार्तिककार भी सविकल्पक और निर्विकल्पक दोनों भेदों को मानते थे। किंतु न्यायवार्तिक में सविकल्पक और निर्विकल्पक नाम से स्पष्ट विवेचन न होने के कारण यह तथ्य विद्वानों की दृष्टि में न आ सका। तात्पर्यटीकाकार वाचस्पति मिश्र की धारणा है कि भाष्यकार एवं वार्तिककार ने प्रत्यक्ष सूत्र की व्याख्या करने पर द्विविध प्रत्यक्ष का जो निरूपण नहीं किया है, उसका कारण यह नहीं है कि उनको इसके भेदों का ज्ञान नहीं था, अपितु उन्होंने इस विचार को इतना सरल माना कि उसे स्पष्ट करने की आवश्यकता नहीं समझी। तात्पर्य टीकाकार प्रत्यक्ष सूत्र में प्रयुक्त व्यवसायात्मकम् पद से सविकल्पक और अव्यपदेश्य पद से निर्विकल्पक अर्थ निकालते हैं।

इसके पूर्व भाष्यकार एवं वार्तिककार व्यवसायात्मक पद का प्रयोजन संशय का निराकरण मानते थे, किंतु तात्पर्यटीकाकार के मत में अव्यभिचारि पद के द्वारा भ्रम के साथ-साथ संशय का भी निराकरण हो जाता है। संशय ज्ञान भी व्यभिचारि होता है। इस प्रकार अव्यपदेश्य पद का प्रयोग प्रत्यक्ष के निर्विकल्पक प्रकार का सूचक है। तात्पर्य टीकाकार स्वयं को प्रत्यक्ष के निर्विकल्पक एवं सविकल्पक प्रकार वाले नाम का उद्भावक नहीं मानते हैं। वे तो इसे न्यायसूत्र की नई व्याख्या के रूप में स्वीकार करते हैं। निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान में विषय के भेद का ज्ञान नहीं होता है, जैसे दूर से देखे जाने वाले पदार्थ के विषय में हम यही कह सकते हैं कि कुछ दिखाई दे रहा है। यही ज्ञान निर्विकल्पक कहलाता है। निर्विकल्पक में विशेष का ज्ञान नहीं होता है।

जयन्त भट्ट का मत है कि प्रत्यक्ष के ये दोनों भेद प्रामाणिक है। अन्तर यही है कि निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष में पदार्थ का ज्ञान शाब्दिक अभिव्यक्ति आदि से परे होता है, जबकि दूसरे में उन सभी से युक्त होता है।¹⁵ दोनों में द्रव्य, गुण, क्रिया, जाति का ग्रहण होता है। प्रथम में पदार्थ के साथ उनका संबंध दिखाई नहीं पड़ता, जबकि द्वितीय में होता है।

सांख्य-मत

सांख्य-दर्शन में भी प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान दो प्रकार माना गया है— आलोचन (निर्विकल्पक) तथ सविकल्पक। जिस समय विषय के साथ इन्द्रिय का संयोग होता है, उस समय विषय का जो आलोचन होता है, वह निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष कहलाता है। प्रत्येक ज्ञानेन्द्रिय द्वारा जो ज्ञान उत्पन्न होता है, वह आलोचन कहलाता है। यह इन्द्रियों की विषयाकार वृत्ति मात्र है। सांख्य दर्शन के अनुसार यह ज्ञान वस्तुतः इन्द्रियगत स्थूल अस्मिता का परिणाम है। इस अवस्था में वस्तु केवल इन्द्रिय गोचर होती है। वह मन को प्रस्तुत नहीं होती। यह वह अवस्था है जब मन की उपस्थित विषय पर संकल्पादि क्रिया प्रस्तुत नहीं होती। उस समय हमें वस्तु की केवल प्रतीति मात्र होती है कि कुछ है किंतु उसके प्रकार का ज्ञान नहीं होता। जैसे यह वस्तु विशेष घट है या पट है, नीला है या काला? यह ज्ञान शब्द द्वारा भी प्रकट नहीं किया जा सकता, क्योंकि यह आलोचन नाम, जाति के समान है। जिस प्रकार गूंगा व्यक्ति अपने अनुभव को शब्दों के माध्यम से बोलकर प्रकट नहीं कर सकता उसी प्रकार निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान को भी शब्दों के माध्यम से प्रकट नहीं किया जा सकता।

द्वितीय प्रकार का ज्ञान सविकल्पक है। यह मन की क्रिया होने के बाद की स्थिति में उपस्थित होता है। इन्द्रियों द्वारा लाये गये संकेतों को मन संश्लेषित करता है कि यह पदार्थ घट विशेष है, इसमें वह विशेषक गुण है तथा इसमें यह विशेष क्रिया रहती है। इस ज्ञान में तीनों विशेषणों का समावेश होता है — नाम, गुण और क्रिया। इस प्रकार वैशिष्ट्य का अवगाहन करने वाला ज्ञान सविकल्पक कहलाता है।

मीमांसा मत

मीमांसकों ने प्रत्यक्ष के दोनों भेदों को माना है। वैसे मीमांसा शास्त्र में सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष की संकल्पना का समावेश कुमारिल ने किया है। कुमारिल के मतानुसार निर्विकल्पक में सभी तत्वों का ज्ञान अभेदात्मक रूप से होता है। वह एक आलोचन मात्र है, जिसकी तुलना नवजात शिशु या गूंगे के बोध से की जा सकती है। निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष में सामान्य या विशेष किसी भी गुण का ज्ञान नहीं होता। वैयाकरण मत का खण्डन करते हुये कुमारिल यह भी कहते हैं कि पदार्थों का बोध मौखिक अभिव्यक्ति के बिना भी हो सकता है। कुमारिल के मतानुसार सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष में वस्तु के ज्ञान के साथ-साथ ही असमान पदार्थों से उसके भेद का ग्रहण हो जाता है। पदार्थ के सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष में उस वर्ग को जिससे यह सम्बद्ध है और नाम जिसे वह धारण करता है स्मरण करते हैं और तब उन्हें प्रत्यक्ष के विषय मूल पदार्थ के साथ जोड़ते हैं। यदि वर्ग तथा विषय सर्वथा अज्ञात हो तब स्मरण नहीं किया जा सकता। इसलिये निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष के अस्तित्व को स्वीकार करना आवश्यक है। पार्थसारथि के अनुसार निर्विकल्पक में पदार्थ व उनकी अनेक विशेषताओं का भेद रहित ग्रहण

होता है और सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष में पदार्थ के साथ-साथ जाति, द्रव्य, गुण, क्रिया व नाम का भी ग्रहण होता है।⁶

प्रभाकर का यह कहना है कि निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष में सामान्य व विशेष से युक्त शुद्ध वस्तु के स्वरूप मात्र का ग्रहण होता है। निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष अन्य पदार्थों की स्मृति से रहित होता है। यह प्रत्यक्ष की आरंभिक चेतनात्मक स्थिति है। निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष वर्गगत लक्षणों तथ विशिष्ट लक्षणों, दोनों का बोध कराता है, लेकिन क्योंकि अन्य समान पदार्थ उस समय तक बोध के क्षेत्र में प्रविष्ट नहीं होते, इसलिये दृष्ट पदार्थों के बोध का उनके वर्ग विशेष के बोध से संबंध स्थापित नहीं हो पाता। कोई पदार्थ, अन्य पदार्थों की तुलना में हो, जिससे कि वह अलग लक्ष्य किया गया है, व्यक्ति रूप में ग्रहीत होता है किन्तु जब यह किसी वर्ग विशेष के सदस्यों के समान कुछ विशिष्ट लक्षणों को लिये हुये देखा जाता है, तो इसके विषय में यह ज्ञान होता है कि वह किसी विशेष वर्ग का सदस्य है।⁷ यद्यपि निर्विकल्पक रूप में जिसका बोध हुआ है, वह भी वस्तुतः किसी वर्ग का एक व्यक्ति है। परन्तु उसके यथार्थ स्वरूप का ज्ञान तब तक नहीं हो सकता, जब तक कि उसका सम्बन्ध उसके वर्ग के अन्य सदस्यों के साथ नहीं जोड़ा जाता। प्रभाकर का मत है कि सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष का रूप मिश्रित है, इसके अवर स्मृति का रूप निहित रहता है। किन्तु स्मृति का अंश उस पदार्थ से संबंध नहीं रखता, जिसका कि प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान हुआ है, बल्कि उन अन्य पदार्थों से रखता है जिनके साथ इनकी समता है।

प्रभाकर बौद्धों के इस मत पर आक्षेप करता है कि निर्विकल्पक में स्वलक्षण वस्तु का ग्रहण होता है, क्योंकि इसमें पदार्थ की जाति आदि का भी ग्रहण होता है। शंकर के मत के प्रति भी प्रभाकर ने अपना विरोध प्रकट किया है। शंकर के मतानुसार निर्विकल्पक में केवल सामान्य मात्र का ग्रहण होता है, जबकि प्रभाकर के अनुसार इसमें स्वरूप का भी ग्रहण होता है। प्रभाकर के मत पर भी यह आक्षेप लगाया जाता है कि निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान में सामान्य व विशेष गुणों का ग्रहण होता है पर उनके परस्पर भेद का ग्रहण नहीं यह कैसे? इस आक्षेप के समाधान में प्रभाकर कहते हैं कि यह आवश्यक नहीं है कि दो पदार्थों के ज्ञान में उनके परस्पर भेद का भी ग्रहण हो।

गागा भट्ट का मत—भाट्टचिन्तामणि के तर्कपाद में प्रत्यक्ष के सविकल्पक, निर्विकल्पक ये दो भेद स्वीकार किये हैं। गागा भट्ट ने विशेषण विशेष्य से रहित ज्ञान को निर्विकल्पक माना जाता है। इन्द्रिय और अर्थ के सन्निकर्ष से निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान में सामान्य पदार्थ ही दिखाई देता है जो अलग-अलग नहीं है। कुछ आचार्यों का मानना है कि निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान में यह कुछ है ऐसा प्रतीत होता है। अश्व को देखने पर पहले देखे गये अश्व के कारण अश्व की प्रतीति होती है। निर्विकल्पक का यही रूप कुमारिल को भी मान्य है।⁸ गागा भट्ट “अन्ये” कहकर अन्य दार्शनिकों के मत को व्यक्त करते हैं कि विशिष्ट ज्ञान वाले सविकल्पक ज्ञान की विशेषण ज्ञान के बिना उत्पत्ति असंभव है।

अतः यह अनुमानगम्य है। इसी प्रसंग में उन्होंने “केचित्” कहकर एक दूसरा मत भी दिखलाया है कि विशिष्ट ज्ञान में तो विशेष तथा विशेषण से इन्द्रिय तथा अर्थ का सन्निकर्ष ही कारण बनता है। अतः विशिष्ट ज्ञान होने में केवल विशेषण ज्ञान हेतु नहीं बनता।⁹

वस्तुतः इन्द्रिय सन्निकर्ष से प्रथम क्षण में निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान ही होता है। सविकल्पक ज्ञान निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान के पश्चात् होता है। जैसे—समुद्र में आने वाला जहाज दूर से काला दिखाई देता है। जैसे—जैसे वह निकट आता है, हमें जहाज का अनुमान होता है। इस प्रकार सविकल्पक ज्ञान को प्रत्यक्ष नहीं कहा जा सकता है। क्योंकि यह सीधा ज्ञान नहीं है अपितु दो ज्ञानों का समूह होने से अनुमिति या उपमिति के समान है— उदाहरण के लिये, “जब हम तथ्य या प्रत्यक्ष की बात करते हैं तो वस्तुतः यह पूर्णतः अकेला या व्यक्तिगत ज्ञान नहीं होता। हम कह सकते हैं कि अमुक स्थान पर पानी बहता है। किन्तु यह एक ज्ञान का परिणाम नहीं है। इस प्रकार का ज्ञान करने के लिये अनेक ज्ञान चाहिये। पूर्व ज्ञान के आधार पर हम जानते हैं कि हम कुतुबनुमा को देख रहे हैं और उसका मुख उत्तर की ओर है। इस कारण साधारण प्रत्यक्ष भी आंतरिक ज्ञान व अनुमान का मिश्रण है और हम इन दोनों को मिलाते हैं। यह हमारे बहुत सारे प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञानों के गलत होने के कारण है।¹⁰

पार्थसारथि मिश्र के मत में सर्वप्रथम पदार्थ का इन्द्रियों के साथ सम्पर्क होने पर सब प्रकार के संबंधों से विहीन पदार्थ का जो बोध होता है, वह निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष है। तब तक गुणी तथा गुणों में और सामान्य तथा विशिष्ट लक्षणों में भेद मालूम नहीं होता। यदि निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान न होता तो सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष भी न होता, क्योंकि सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष गुणयुक्त पदार्थ तथा उसके गुणों के पारस्परिक सम्बन्ध का बोधक है और इस प्रकार के सम्बन्ध का बोध निर्भर करता है, संबंधों के पूर्व पक्षों पर। यह परिभाषा नीलकण्ठ की परिभाषा के समान प्रतीत होती है। पार्थसारथि के समान इन्होंने भी सविकल्पक में पदार्थ के द्रव्य, गुण, जाति, क्रिया, नाम का समावेश किया है।

अतः निष्कर्ष रूप में कहा जा सकता है कि कुमारिल व प्रभाकर ने प्रत्यक्ष के इन दोनों प्रकारों को प्रामाणिक माना है। दोनों इन्द्रिय—विषय—सन्निकर्ष से उत्पन्न होते हैं अतः दोनों यथार्थ हैं।

वेदान्त मत

वेदान्त दर्शन में निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान को प्रामाणिक ज्ञान स्वीकार किया गया है। लेकिन इसका लक्षण सबसे भिन्न है। निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान उपनिषदों के महावाक्यों में भाग—त्याग लक्षणा के द्वारा उत्पन्न विशुद्ध ब्रह्म स्वरूप मात्र को ही ग्रहण करता है। वेदान्त दर्शन के अनुसार अनाधिगत और अबाधित विषय को ग्रहण करने वाला ज्ञान ही प्रामाणिक स्वीकार किया गया है।

वेदान्त के अनुसार, प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान दो प्रकार का है— सविकल्पक और निर्विकल्पक। विकल्प को विषय करने वाले ज्ञान को सविकल्पक कहते हैं। यहां विकल्प का अभिप्राय वैशिष्ट्य से है। “वैशिष्ट्यावगाहि ज्ञान सविकल्पकम्

“¹¹ इस प्रकार सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष का लक्षण किया गया है। जैसे— मैं घट को जानता हूँ, यहां पर लक्षण—वैशिष्ट्यावगाहि ज्ञान है तथा लक्ष्य—सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष है। “वैशिष्ट्यावगाहि ज्ञान” इतना लक्षण करने का तात्पर्य यह है कि इससे लक्षण में अतिव्याप्ति दोष नहीं आता। यदि केवल वैशिष्ट्यावगाहि इतना ही लक्षण कर दिया जाता है तो वह लक्षण इच्छा इत्यादि में भी घटित हो जाता। क्योंकि इच्छा का भी विषय विशिष्ट ही होता है। इसीलिये लक्षण में अतिव्याप्ति के निवारण हेतु ज्ञान पद को जोड़ना पड़ा। केवल ज्ञान इतना ही लक्षण किया जाय तो भी अतिव्याप्ति हो जाती है। इसलिये वैशिष्ट्यावगाहि विशेषण लगाना आवश्यक हो गया।

इसके विपरीत जिस ज्ञान में संसर्ग का अवगाहन नहीं होता है उसे निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष कहते हैं। जैसे— सोऽयं देवदत्तः, तत्वमसि आदि वाक्यों से उत्पन्न ज्ञान। यहाँ सोऽयं देवदत्तः में देवदत्त तो एक ही है, तो संसर्ग किनके मध्य होगा। अतः यहां संसर्ग की आवश्यकता नहीं पड़ती।

अब नैयायिक यह प्रश्न करते हैं कि निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान शब्द जन्य कैसे हो सकता है? हमें वृद्ध देवदत्त और बालक देवदत्त का ज्ञान इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष से होता है और वह देश व काल को भी निर्देशित करता है। जबकि शब्द से उत्पन्न ज्ञान में ऐसी विशेषता नहीं पायी जाती। वेदान्ती का उत्तर है कि हमारा सोऽयं देवदत्तः से तात्पर्य केवल देवदत्त से है, जो अभेद ज्ञान से पता चलता है कि वृद्ध देवदत्त और बालक देवदत्त एक ही हैं न कि दो। यहां हमें इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष की आवश्यकता नहीं पड़ती।¹² यहां तत् से तात्पर्य सच्चिदानन्द ब्रह्मादि से तथा त्वम् पद का अर्थ अल्पज्ञ विशिष्ट जीव से है। इन दोनों में चैतन्य तो स्वस्पतः एक ही रहता है किन्तु उपाधि भेद के फलस्वरूप उसमें भिन्नता लक्षित होती है।¹³ अतः तत् एवं त्वम् पदार्थ से बोधित ब्रह्म एवं जीवानुगत शुद्ध ब्रह्म को बताने में ही श्रुति का तात्पर्य है। द्वितीय सोऽयं देवदत्तः इस लौकिक उदाहरण में वाक्य से उत्पन्न ज्ञान का विषय सन्निकृष्ट है। वेदान्त के अनुसार उस ज्ञान में बाहर निकली अन्तःकरण की वृत्ति को स्वीकार किया गया है। इस तरह इस वाक्य जन्य ज्ञान को विषय के सन्निकृष्ट विषय को उद्देश्य कर अन्तःकरण की वृत्ति बाहर निकलती है। इस सिद्धान्त के फलस्वरूप देवदत्तावच्छिन्न चैतन्य एवं वृत्त्यावच्छिन्न चैतन्य का अभेद होता है। अतः सोऽयं देवदत्तः इस वाक्य जन्य ज्ञान में प्रत्यक्ष प्रयोजकत्व बताया गया है।

विशिष्टाद्वैत वेदान्तः

सविकल्पक और निर्विकल्पक दोनों प्रकार के प्रत्यक्षों का प्रमाणत्व निर्विशेष वस्तु में नहीं हो सकता। प्रमा विशेष विषयक होती है, अतः निर्विकल्पक का विषय भी सविशेष ही होगा क्योंकि सविकल्पक अवस्था में अनुभूत वस्तु के विशिष्ट प्रतिसंधान का कारण निर्विकल्प है। जब निर्विकल्प में विशेष की अनुभूति न होगी जब तक उसका प्रतिसंधान भी असंभव होगा।

किसी विशेष से वियुक्त पदार्थ के ग्रहण को निर्विकल्पक कहते हैं किन्तु सभी विशेषों से रहित पदार्थों का कभी ग्रहण नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि किसी न किसी विशेष को लेकर ही "इदमित्थम्" के रूप से सभी प्रतीतियां जन्म लेती हैं— यह और ऐसा तथा यह सभी ज्ञानों का आधार है। यदि त्रिकोणादि आकृति या संस्थान "इत्थम्" को प्रतीति का लक्ष्य है। तात्पर्य यह है कि निर्विशेष की जब विषयता ही असंभव है तो उसका निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष भी नहीं हो सकता।

एक जाति वाले द्रव्यों में प्रथम पिण्ड के ग्रहण को निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष कहते हैं— प्रथमतः गाय देखना निर्विकल्पक है। द्वितीय, तृतीय पिण्ड दर्शन सविकल्पक कहलाता है। प्रथम ग्रहण में गोत्वादि जाति की अनुवृत्ताकारता प्रतीति गोचर नहीं हो पाती, अतः यह निर्विकल्पक है। दूसरा— विकल्प न मिलने के कारण प्रथम पिण्ड ग्रहण निर्विकल्पक है, सविकल्पक इसलिए नहीं है कि संस्थानरूप जात्यादि का ग्रहण नहीं होता। वस्तुतः जात्यादि इन्द्रियग्राह्य तत्त्व हैं और उनके अग्रहण का प्रश्न ही नहीं उठता। द्रष्टव्य है कि इस दर्शन में दो या दो से अधिक सजातीयों के होने पर ही विकल्प बनता है, एक वस्तु व्यक्ति निर्विकल्पक है, अतः उसका भी ज्ञान निर्विकल्पक माना गया है परन्तु एक व्यक्ति में जात्यादि विशेषण प्रत्यक्ष रहते हैं, अतः व्यावृत्त वस्तुबोध उसका भागी है, केवल अनुवृत्ति या अनुमति हेतु द्वितीयादि सजातीय की अपेक्षा रहती है। कुमारिल ने सामान्य व विशेष में भेदाभेद की व्यवस्था दी है जिसका प्रत्याख्यान करते हुये रामानुज ने कहा है कि सविकल्पक और निर्विकल्पक में सामान्य और विशेष का भेदाभेद असंगत है क्योंकि "इदमित्थम्" की प्रतिपत्ति में यह और ऐसा अंशों का ऐक्य प्रतीति में कैसे जा सकता है? गाय का सास्नादि विशिष्ट संस्थान विशिष्ट रूप "इत्थम्" भाग है और "द्रव्य" इदं भाग है। इन दोनों का एकत्व प्रतीति से बहिर्भूत है।

निर्विकल्पक अवस्था में ही प्रतीति गोचर वस्तु सभी सजातीयों से अथवा विजातियों से व्याकुल होकर ही प्रतीति होती है। इदम् इत्यम् की प्रतीति से व्याकुल स्वरूप लेती है। जिसमें गोत्वादि संस्थान विशिष्ट की विशेषता होती है। जहां भी विशेषण—विशेष्य भाव की प्रतीति होती है वहां सामान्य व विशेष में अत्यन्त भेद व्यक्त रहता है।

मेघनाद सूरि ने कुछ अंतर से विशिष्टाद्वैत सम्मत निर्विकल्पक को परिभाषित एवं उदाहरित किया है परन्तु मूल स्थापना में तात्विक अंतर नहीं है। उनके अनुसार—

उस अर्थावच्छेदक ज्ञान को निर्विकल्पक कहते हैं जो घटादि के कतिपय घटत्वादि विशेषणों से विशिष्ट हो किन्तु अनुवृत्ति धर्म का उल्लेख न हो, जैसे— प्रथम नेत्र सम्पात से जनित ज्ञान। स्पष्ट है कि व्यावृत्ति रहित निर्विकल्पक यहां मान्य नहीं है किन्तु उसमें अनुवृत्ति का भास नहीं होता। भिन्नता उदाहरण में देखी जाती है— क्या द्वितीयादि नेत्र सम्पात द्वारा उसी पिण्ड को बार—बार देखने से अनुवृत्ति संभव है? उसके लिये द्वितीयादि पिण्डों का देखना आवश्यक है। मेघनाद सूरि ने यह अंतर अपना कर प्रत्यभिज्ञा में अनुवृत्ति सिंह की है कि मीमांसा दर्शन में निर्विकल्पक वस्तु का अवभासक

माना गया है परन्तु जात्यादि धर्म से रहित वस्तु मात्र का प्रतिभास असंगत है। अतः किसी विशेषण से विशिष्ट रूप में ही सभी वस्तुओं का ज्ञान होता है अन्यथा द्वितीयादि प्रत्ययों में प्रत्यभिज्ञा की व्याख्या नहीं हो सकती और प्रत्यभिज्ञा के बिना अनेक विशेषणों से विशिष्टता का बोध असम्भव है। प्रथम नेत्र संयोग में शीघ्रता अथवा अवधान आदि के कारण अनुवृत्ति ज्ञान न होने तथा अनेक विशेषणों से विशिष्ट बुद्धि के अनुदय के कारण निर्विकल्पक व्यवहार किया जाता है क्योंकि विकल्प विविध कल्पना का नाम है। यहां अनुवृत्ति को प्रसंगानुकूल दो प्रकार का लिया गया है— एक पिण्ड के जात्यादि धर्मों को अन्य पिण्ड में और एक ही पिण्ड में उन धर्मों के कालान्तर में। प्रथम से सजातीयता तथा द्वितीय से प्रत्यभिज्ञा पर्यन्त व्याप्त नहीं माना जा सकता, अतः श्रीभाष्यकार प्रथम पिण्ड के प्रथम दर्शन का अभिप्राय रखते हैं। अतः रामानुज ने अन्यत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञा की व्याख्या करते हुये निर्विकल्पक की व्यवस्था दी कि निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष में भी सविशेष वस्तु की ही प्रतीति होती है। अन्यथा सविकल्पक में यह वही की प्रत्यभिज्ञा की अनुपपत्ति होगी जिसमें पूर्वानुभूत प्रकार से विशिष्ट बोध होता है।¹⁴ गोत्वादि जातियां वस्तु संस्थान रूप होती हैं, अतः निर्विकल्पक दशा में भी संस्थान विशिष्ट वस्तु की ही इत्यं या ऐसी ही प्रतीति होती है। द्वितीयादि प्रत्ययों में वस्तु के अनेक विशेषण ज्ञात होकर सविकल्पक के विषय बनते हैं। यहां यह तथ्य सर्वथा नवीन है कि निर्विकल्पक में विषयीभूत संस्थान की सविकल्पक में प्रत्यभिज्ञा होती है। इस प्रकार सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष स्वस्पतः प्रत्यभिज्ञा है। यह पिण्ड इस संस्थान वाला है इस प्रकार की अनुभूत वस्तु विषयक प्रत्यभिज्ञा को अनुवृत्ति बुद्धि कहते हैं।¹⁵ श्रीभाष्य के प्रथम पिण्ड के ग्रहण का अर्थ मेघनाथ सूरि ने पिण्ड का प्रथम ग्रहण लिया है।

वैयाकरण मत

अन्य ज्ञानों की तरह ही प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान को भी शब्दों के द्वारा ही अभिव्यक्त किया जाता है। इस विषय में नैयायिकों का मत है कि उपर्युक्त विचार में निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष की बात की जाती है तो वहां पर इस बात को कुछ सीमा तक उचित माना जा सकता है, लेकिन पूर्णतः नहीं। सविकल्पक ज्ञान में ज्ञान विशेषण-विशेष्य और प्रकार को लेकर उत्पन्न होता है लेकिन इस ज्ञान का भी पूर्ववर्ती अर्थात् हेतु निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान शब्द संसर्ग शून्य है और उससे उत्पन्न कार्य अर्थात् सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान शब्दानुविद्ध है। अतः यह कभी भी नहीं स्वीकार करेंगे कि शब्दों के माध्यम से ही ज्ञान संभव हो पाता है। निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान में जो कुछ भी अनुभव होता है वह अपने आप को प्रदर्शित करता है। इस प्रकार यदि उसे भी शब्दानुविद्ध मान लें तो भ्रम और यथार्थ में भेद किस तरह करेंगे? शब्द और अर्थ में कोई तादात्म्य संबन्ध नहीं होता है कि अमुक नाम से अमुक वस्तु का ही बोध होगा क्योंकि जगत् अनन्त है और उसे सीमित पदों में बांधा नहीं जा सकता है। इस प्रकार से नैयायिक यह सिद्ध करना

चाहते हैं कि बौद्धिक जगत् और व्यवहारिक जगत् दोनों अलग-अलग स्वतंत्र अस्तित्व रखते हैं।

नैयायिकों के समान ही मीमांसक भी यही मत है कि समस्त ज्ञान को शब्दों के माध्यम से अभिव्यक्त करना न्यायसंगत नहीं है। कुमारिल ने यथार्थ (विषय) में शब्द स्वरूप की विशेषता को अस्वीकार किया है व उनका स्वमत है कि शब्द, अर्थ व ज्ञान तीनों की अलग-अलग सत्ता है और उनको अभिव्यक्त करने के लिए शक्ति-संबंध की आवश्यकता पड़ेगी। इस मत के समर्थन में उन्होंने न्यायभाष्यकार वात्स्यायन को उद्धृत किया है कि न्याय भाष्य में अव्यपदेश्यम् पद अर्थात् जिसे शब्दों के माध्यम से व्यक्त नहीं किया जा सकता है, उनका मानना है कि सविकल्पक ज्ञान में मात्र संज्ञा-संज्ञि-भाव ज्यादा होता है। इस प्रकार से यह विदित होता है कि इन दोनों पदों का प्रयोग करके वात्स्यायन यह दिखाना चाहते थे कि न केवल निर्विकल्पक अपितु सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष को भी बिना शब्दों के माध्यम से अभिव्यक्त किया जा सकता है। यहां तक कि वे लोग प्रत्यक्ष ही नहीं अपितु अनुमिति और शब्द-बोध में भी शाब्दोपरकता स्वीकार नहीं करते हैं। इस प्रकार से शब्द, अर्थ और ज्ञान तीनों की अलग-अलग सत्ता है।

वाक्यपदीय के ब्रह्म काण्ड की वृत्ति का उदाहरण देते हुये मीमांसक कहते हैं कि यदि इस ग्रंथ को भर्तृहरि की ही रचना मानी जाये तो यह कहना उचित है कि भर्तृहरि भी निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष को स्वीकार करते हैं। उन्होंने इस पद को अविकल्पक पद की संज्ञा दी है। उन्होंने यह भी स्वीकार किया है कि ज्ञान सर्वप्रथम अविकल्पक ही होता है। यह ज्ञान शुद्ध वस्तु विषयक (स्वलक्षण) होता है। इस उदाहरण से यह बात स्पष्ट हो जाती है कि भर्तृहरि सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष को ही नहीं अपितु निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष को भी ज्ञान मानते थे। इस प्रकार से यह कहना उचित नहीं प्रतीत होता है कि ज्ञान केवल सविकल्पक ही होता है। सविकल्पक ज्ञान की शब्दानुविद्धता- प्रायः यह प्रश्न उठाया जा सकता है कि केवल सविकल्पक ज्ञान को ही ज्ञान मानने वाले वैयाकरण किस प्रकार से निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान को ज्ञान मान सकते हैं? यह कहना कि ज्ञान वह है जो केवल और मात्र केवल शब्दों के द्वारा ही होता है और साथ ही उसे निर्विकल्पक भी मानना क्या स्व-व्याघाती नहीं होगा? और यदि यह मान लिया जाय कि निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष को भी शब्दों में बांधा जा सकता है तो निर्विकल्पक और सविकल्पक ज्ञान में भेद किस आधार पर किया जा सकता है? भर्तृहरि इन प्रश्नों का समाधान करते हुये कहते हैं कि उपर्युक्त जो भी समस्यायें उत्पन्न हुई हैं वे शब्द विषयक धारणाओं के अंतर के कारण उत्पन्न होती हैं। मीमांसक और नैयायिक दोनों ध्वनि और उससे निर्दिष्ट वस्तु को ही शब्द मान लेते हैं। इसी वजह से वह शब्द और अर्थ के तादात्म्य को स्वीकार नहीं करते। उनके अनुसार शब्द और अर्थ में तादात्म्य स्वीकार कर लिया जाय तो (रज्जु में सर्प का ज्ञान) भ्रम आदि का निर्धारण करना कठिन हो जाता है। जब हम कहते हैं कि यह सर्प है तो सर्प तो आरोपित सत्ता होती है। इसलिये शब्द और अर्थ में तादात्म्य स्थापित नहीं किया जा सकता। नैयायिक यह कभी

भी नहीं स्वीकार कर सकते हैं कि सविकल्पक ज्ञान दीपक की तरह है जो अपने साथ-साथ अन्यो को भी प्रकाशित करता है और एक बार भी सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष की शब्द प्रकाश्यता को स्वीकार करने का अर्थ है निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष की भी शब्द प्रकाश्यता को स्वीकार करना व इससे शब्दाद्वैतवाद की स्थापना हो जाती है। इसी कारण नैयायिकों ने शब्द और अर्थ की अलग सत्ता को स्वीकार किया है। ज्ञान को शब्दानुविद्ध न माना जाये ऐसा तभी सम्भव है जब निर्विकल्पक के साथ-साथ सविकल्पक ज्ञान को भी शब्द संसर्ग-शून्य माना जाय। इस मत के विपरीत वैयाकरणों का मत है कि बौद्धिक जगत् के बिना व्यवहारिक जगत् पंगु है। हम शब्दों के माध्यम से वस्तु को पुकारते हैं वह चाहे उस समय वहां पर हो या न हो। यह बात हमारे स्वसंवेदन से सिद्ध है। जगत् विकल्पात्मक है अतः यह एक तथ्य है कि अर्थ सदैव शब्द से अलग ही उपलब्ध होता है। यदि शब्द स्वरूप की उपलब्धि न हो तो अर्थ की उपलब्धि हो ही नहीं सकती। इस तरह से यह सिद्ध होता है कि बुद्धिगत अर्थ (विकल्पात्मक -अर्थ) ज्ञान का स्वरूप नहीं बल्कि तात्त्विक रूप से शब्दमय ही होता है। इसी वजह से वह शब्द स्वरूप से संभिन्न उत्पन्न होता है।

निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान में शब्दानुविद्धता:

वैयाकरण मत में, निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान का बोध भी शब्दों के माध्यम से ही होता है। भर्तृहरि का मानना है कि शिशु, मूक, आदि का ज्ञान भी शब्दानुविद्ध ही होता है। नवजात शिशु भी हाथ-पांव चलाता है, शब्द उत्पन्न करता है और यह शब्द वाग्-यंत्र के द्वारा ही उत्पन्न होता है। बच्चा जब कुछ सीखता है उससे पहले भी वह न जाने कितनी क्रियायें कर चुका होता है और इन सभी क्रियाओं को संपादित करने हेतु ज्ञान का होना आवश्यक है। इसे भी किसी भाषा विशेष के रूप का ही ज्ञान माना जाना चाहिये। नैयायिक आदि, बालक के ज्ञान को शब्द संस्पर्श शून्य मानते हैं और यह बात साधारण अनुभव में भी सिद्ध होती है। लेकिन भर्तृहरि का मत है कि यदि बालक का ज्ञान शब्द सभेद से रहित होता है तो उसके द्वारा विभिन्न क्रियाओं का संपादन नहीं होता। क्योंकि इस प्रकार की जितनी भी हरकते हैं। वे शब्द पर आश्रित पायी जाती है। अतः जब बालक किसी कार्य का सम्पादन करता है तो उसकी भी कर्तव्य विषयक प्रतिपत्ति आवश्यक रूप से शब्द पूर्वक ही होनी चाहिये।

वैयाकरणों का कहना है कि चूंकि नैयायिक वाणी के वैखरी रूप को शब्द मानते हैं अतः उन्हें बालकादि के ज्ञान की शब्दानुविद्धता समझ में नहीं आयेगी। बच्चा बिना ज्ञान के क्रिया नहीं करता। अतः इससे यह सिद्ध होता है कि बालक के अंदर ज्ञान का प्रकाश पहले से ही है। इस ज्ञान के प्रकाश का होना शब्द की सत्ता का पूरक है क्योंकि हमारे अनुभव में जितना भी ज्ञान का विकसित रूप होता है वह सभी शब्दों के माध्यम से ही पाया जाता है। हाँ, यह बात स्वीकार करनी पड़ेगी कि बच्चे में यह ज्ञान भावना के रूप में होता है।

शब्द भावना पहले से रहने के कारण ही बालक शब्द, अर्थ और ज्ञान तीनों का उचित अवसर पर प्रयोग कर पाता है वरना ऐसा कभी भी संभव नहीं हो सकता था। बालक जब वृद्धोपदेश के द्वारा शब्द सुनता है तो उस शब्द का उच्चारण करने का प्रयास उसके द्वारा किया जाता है। इस प्रक्रिया में विशिष्ट प्रकार से विशिष्ट परिस्थितियों में प्राण-वायु का उदीरण करता है व उस स्थान पर प्राणवायु का अभिघात करता है तब जाकर कहीं शब्द निष्पादन की सम्पूर्ण प्रक्रिया घटित होती है। भर्तृहरि का मत है कि इस प्रक्रिया के घटित होने की प्रथम शर्त यही है कि बालक में शब्द भावना पहले से विद्यमान हों। वस्तुतः शब्द ग्रहण व उसके उच्चारण की प्रक्रिया बड़ी सूक्ष्म है। हमारी बाह्य प्रक्रिया एक साधन मात्र है लेकिन यदि बालक को भाषा प्रयोग करने वाले वातावरण से भी दूर रखा जाता है तो भी वह कुछ प्रयत्नों के द्वारा शब्दोच्चारण करने लगता है। इस बात से यह बात और अधिक प्रबल होती है कि बालक में शब्द भावना पहले से ही मौजूद रहती है और वह अपने अनुकूल परिस्थिति प्राप्त करते ही शब्द निष्पत्ति का आधार बन जाती है। इस शब्द भावना का आदान-प्रदान संभव नहीं है। यह आज्ञानिक है। बाह्य साधन जैसे – उपदेश आदि तो केवल छिपी हुई प्रतिभा को उजागर करते हैं।

इस प्रकार से वैयाकरण यह सिद्ध करना चाहते हैं कि चूंकि कोई भी व्यक्ति सर्वप्रथम बच्चे द्वारा किये गये करण-विन्यास आदि की शिक्षा उसे नहीं दे सकता तथा ऐसी अवस्था में प्रतिपुरुष अनादि शब्द भावना को यदि न स्वीकार किया जाय, तो बच्चे द्वारा सर्वप्रथम प्रयुक्त करण-विन्यास आदि की अन्य कोई संतोषजनक भावना दिखाई नहीं देती। अतः अनादि-शब्द भावना मानना आवश्यक है।

इस प्रकार से यह बात स्पष्ट हो जाती है कि शब्द, अर्थ और इनके सम्बन्धों से सर्वथा अपरिचित बालक का भी ज्ञान शब्दानुविद्ध ही होता है।

सविकल्पक तथा निर्विकल्पक में भेद

निर्विकल्पक अवस्था में वस्तु का ज्ञान होता है लेकिन उसके सामान्यादि का ज्ञान नहीं होता। वाक्यपदीय में इस बात को स्वीकार किया गया है, लेकिन ऐसा मानने से यह नहीं निगमित होता है कि निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान शब्दानुविद्ध नहीं होता है। यहां पर ज्ञान से उत्पन्न शब्द और अर्थ का तादात्म्य होता है। अर्थ-स्वरूप शब्द स्वरूप से कदापि अलग नहीं हो सकता। जगत् में जो भी विषय है उनका ज्ञान शब्दानुविद्ध होने से शब्द प्रदत्त ही पाया जाता है। शब्द स्वप्रकाशक है जबकि विषय पर-प्रकाश्य है। शब्द के द्वारा ही विषय प्रकाशित होता है। दूसरे शब्दों में, शब्दानुबेध से रहित ज्ञान, ज्ञान कहलाने का अधिकारी नहीं है।

हमारे साधारण अनुभव से भी यह सिद्ध है कि ज्ञान में जो कुछ भी भासित होता है, वह सदैव शब्दरूप से उपरक्त रहता है। यदि उस अनुभव से हम

शब्द स्वरूप को अलग करके देखने का प्रयत्न करें तो हम पायेंगे कि हमारे ज्ञान में कुछ भी भासित नहीं होता। अर्थात् ज्ञान का प्रकाश ही नहीं होता। इस प्रकार से यह निगमित होता है कि हमारा ज्ञान तत्त्वतः शब्दात्मक है। इस शब्द रूपता के अभाव में ज्ञान, ज्ञान ही नहीं रहता। इस प्रकार यदि निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष को ज्ञान माना जाये तो उसमें भी वाग्रूपता होनी चाहिये। अन्यथा वह अर्थ-प्रकाशक नहीं हो सकता, भले ही वह प्रकाश्य अर्थ, जाति, आदि अविकल्पिक शुद्ध वस्तु स्वरूप मात्र क्यों न हों। यदि ज्ञान वस्तु स्वरूप मात्र का भी प्रकाश रहता है, तो यह संभव नहीं है कि वह शब्द संभेद से शून्य हो। अतः नैयायिकों का यह कथन वैयाकरण की दृष्टि से उचित नहीं ठहरता कि ज्ञान की प्रकाशिता स्वभावतः स्वतः ही है, शब्द – कृत नहीं। सविकल्पक ज्ञान के अतिरिक्त अन्य सभी ज्ञानों को अनुविद्ध करने वाला शब्द एक अविशिष्ट शब्द होता है। उस अवस्था में शब्द-भावना होते हुये भी, प्रयोजन के न होने से, वृत्ति लाभ नहीं कर पाती। इस कारण इस अवस्था में वस्तु का प्रकाश विशेषण संबंध से रहित होता है।

बौद्ध मत

धर्मेन्द्रनाथ शास्त्री के मत में दिङ्नाग ही वे प्रथम विद्वान हैं जो निर्विकल्पक व सविकल्पक में मौलिक भेद करते हैं। दिङ्नाग से पूर्व ईश्वरकृष्ण की सांख्यकारिका में प्रयुक्त हुये आलोचनमात्र शब्द को श्री शास्त्री इन्द्रिय व्यापार में प्रथम अभेदीकृत ग्रहण के लिये प्रयुक्त हुआ मानते हैं। यह प्रथम अभेदीकृत ज्ञान इन्द्रिय व्यापार द्वारा मनस् के सम्मुख प्रस्तुत किया जाता है। मनस इस अभेदीकृतज्ञान को विभेदीकृत करता है। इसी के आधार पर बाद में वाचस्पति मिश्र कारिका की टीका में निर्विकल्पक एवं सविकल्पक का भेद करते हैं। श्री शास्त्री कहते हैं कि ईश्वरकृष्ण वस्तुतः इस भेद से अनभिज्ञ थे। इस विवाद की विस्तार से चर्चा किये बिना हम यहां यही कहना चाहेंगे कि ईश्वरकृष्ण निर्विकल्पक एवं सविकल्पक नामों से भले ही अपरिचित रहे हो, किंतु दोनों ज्ञानों के भेद ज्ञान से अपरिचित रहे हों ऐसा कहना उनके प्रति अन्याय करना होगा। आलोचनमात्र ज्ञान ही जो प्रथम, अस्पष्ट व अभेदीकृत होता है मनस द्वारा भेदीकृत स्पष्ट ज्ञान में परिवर्तित किया जाता है। इस दृष्टि को सुनिश्चित निर्विकल्पक व सविकल्पक के भेद की प्रारंभिक अवस्था माना जा सकता है। यह सही है कि दिङ्नाग ही वह पहले विद्वान हैं जो दोनों ज्ञानों में गुणात्मक भिन्नता के साथ-साथ मौलिक भिन्नता करते हैं। उनके अनुसार दोनों दो भिन्न ज्ञान हैं और ऐसा नहीं है कि निर्विकल्पक ही सविकल्पक में परिवर्तित हो जाता है। निर्विकल्पक व सविकल्पक में न अस्पष्टता-स्पष्टता का क्रमिक भेद है और न सम्बन्धहीनता-सम्बन्धता का भेद है अपितु दोनों मौलिक है एवं स्वरूपतः एक दूसरे से भिन्न हैं निश्चय ही ऐसा भेद करने वाले वे भारतीय दर्शन के प्रथम दार्शनिक कहे जा सकते हैं। वस्तुतः दिङ्नाग का यह मौलिक भेद भी बौद्धों के पूर्ण परिवर्तन के सिद्धान्त से ही प्रेरित है। उनके अनुसार

निर्विकल्पक ही स्वलक्षण को ग्रहण करता है और स्वलक्षण ही सत् है। अतः निर्विकल्पक ही प्रामाणिक प्रत्यक्ष है। सविकल्पक नाम व जाति से युक्त होने के कारण कल्पना की श्रेणी में ही रखा गया है।

सविकल्पक की प्रामाणिकता को लेकर नैयायिक एवं बौद्धों में गहरा मतभेद रहा है। इस मतभेद का मूल आधार है नैयायिक का जाति (सामान्य) को व्यक्ति की ही भांति सत् मानना और बौद्धों का व्यक्ति को सत् तथा नाम, जाति, आदि को कल्पना मानना।

नव्य-न्याय के प्रतिपादक गंगेश सविकल्पक व निर्विकल्पक का भेद बहुत स्पष्ट रूप से करते हैं। वे निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान में व्यक्ति के साथ जाति का भी उपस्थित होना मानते हैं, किन्तु दोनों यहां विशेषण-विशेष्य भाव से संबंधित नहीं होते हैं। इसके विपरीत सविकल्पक सप्रकारक ज्ञान है जिसमें व्यक्ति और जाति व नाम विशेष-विशेषण भाव से संबंधित होते हैं। बौद्ध निर्विकल्पक में व्यक्ति या स्वलक्षण के साथ जाति की उपस्थिति को अस्वीकार करते हैं। निर्विकल्पक न केवल सभी प्रकार के संबंधहीनता की स्थिति है अपितु नाम व जाति से भी रहित है। निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान, नाम, जाति व संबंध रहित वर्तमान क्षण को ही ग्रहण करता है। वाचस्पति मिश्र ने अत्यन्त सुंदर ढंग से नैयायिकों एवं बौद्धों के निर्विकल्पक-सविकल्पक विवाद को प्रस्तुत किया है। नैयायिकों का मत है कि जाति अवास्तविक नहीं है जैसा कि बौद्ध मानते हैं अपितु वास्तविक है तथा व्यक्ति में ही जाति रहती है। इन्द्रिय सम्वेदन द्वारा व्यक्ति के ग्रहण के साथ-साथ जाति को भी ग्रहण किया जाता है। निर्विकल्पक में व्यक्ति और जाति विशेषण - विशेष्य मात्र संबंध से रहित ग्रहण होते हैं पर वस्तु को देखकर उससे संयुक्त नाम का स्मरण हो जाता है। फलस्वरूप प्रथम क्षण का विशेषण-विशेष्य भाव रहित निर्विकल्पक उत्तर क्षण में विशेषण विशेष्य भाव युक्त सविकल्पक में परिवर्तित हो जाता है। बौद्ध प्रत्युत्तर में कहते हैं कि वे ही विषय जो कि शब्दों के साथ संयुक्त रहते हैं, शब्द का स्मरण कराते हैं शब्दों के साथ संयुक्त रहने वाले विषय जाति है, व्यक्ति या स्वलक्षण नहीं। अतः शब्दों द्वारा जाति का ही ग्रहण होता है व्यक्ति का नहीं। व्यक्ति का ग्रहण तो इन्द्रियों द्वारा ही होता है। यदि शब्दों द्वारा वास्तविक विषय ग्रहण होता तो अग्नि नाम लेने से ही उष्मा लगती। अतः सविकल्पक शब्द युक्त जाति को ग्रहण करता है जो कि अवास्तविक शब्द युक्त जाति को ग्रहण करता है जो कि अवास्तविक है और निर्विकल्पक स्वलक्षण को जो कि वास्तविक सत् है। स्वलक्षण एक अविभाज्य इकाई है और नाम जात्यादि गुण उस पर आरोपित है। इस आरोपण का कारण अनादि संस्कार है। वाचस्पति मिश्र नैयायिकों का पक्ष रखते हुये कहते हैं कि व्यक्ति तथा जाति दोनों ही वास्तविक ईकाइयां हैं और दोनों मिलकर सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष को उत्पन्न करते हैं। शब्द वस्तु से अलग रहता हुआ भी वस्तु को अपनी शक्ति के रूप में (स्ववाच्यतया संसर्गण) सम्बन्धित हुआ संकेतित करता है। शब्द व वस्तु दोनों एक ही इन्द्रिय से ग्रहण नहीं होते। जात्यास्मरण और इन्द्रिय स्पर्श दोनों मिलकर सविकल्पक को

उत्पन्न करते हैं। वस्तु के साथ इन्द्रिय सन्निकर्ष के प्रथम चरण में सहकारी कारण स्मृति के अभाव में सविकल्पक ज्ञान का प्रादुर्भाव हो जाता है। बौद्ध इससे सहमत नहीं होते। वे कहते हैं कि सविकल्पक ज्ञान में नाम-स्मरण एक मानसिक घटना है जो कि विकल्प का ही अंग है। सविकल्प में मूल को उस स्थिति की स्मृति जिस स्थिति में वस्तु के साथ नाम का सम्बन्ध स्थापित हुआ था। सविकल्पक में अत्यन्त महत्वपूर्ण भूमिका निभाती है। यह स्मृति मानसिक ही तो है। वैसे नैयायिक इसे प्रत्यभिज्ञा कहते हैं और प्रत्यभिज्ञा को प्रत्यक्षवादी विशिष्ट प्रकार मानते हैं किन्तु इसे पूरी तरह मानसिक घटना मानते हुए प्रत्यक्ष का अंग नहीं मानते हैं। बौद्धों के अनुसार प्रत्येक सविकल्प में भूत का सन्दर्भ अवश्यमेव रहता है। प्रत्यभिज्ञा व प्रत्यक्ष में भेद यही है कि प्रत्यभिज्ञा में भूत के अनुभव की चेतना रहती है जो वाणी में अभिव्यक्त होती है। अतः प्रत्येक सविकल्पक प्रत्यभिज्ञा सवभाव वाला होता है। इसलिए इसमें मानसिक "घटक" की अन्तरगता अपरिहार्य हो जाती है। इसी कारण बौद्ध सविकल्पक को कल्पना की श्रेणी में रखते हैं। इसी कठिनाई को ध्यान में रखते हुए वाचस्पति मिश्र प्रत्यक्ष की परिभाषा में संशोधन करते हैं कि जो कुछ इन्द्रिय उत्पन्न ज्ञान की सीमा में आता है वह प्रत्यक्ष का विषय है न कि केवल इन्द्रिय सम्पर्क में आने वाला विषय ही प्रत्यक्ष है।¹⁶ पर बौद्ध सविकल्पक को प्रत्यक्ष नहीं मानने में दृढ़ता से टिके रहते हैं। इस सम्बन्ध में इनके विचार सुस्पष्ट हैं और उनकी मूल दार्शनिक धुरी क्षणिक वाद पर आश्रित हैं। वे तो स्पष्ट रूप से कहते हैं कि जो विषय अपने प्रथम क्षण में उत्पन्न नहीं कर सकेगा क्योंकि दोनों ही क्षणों में इन्द्रिय स्पर्श तो विद्यमान हैं साथ ही अर्थ – क्रिया-कारित्व के आधार पर यह भी कहा जा सकता है कि विषय में यह योग्यता होगी तो प्रथम क्षणों में निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान के साथ ही सविकल्पक ज्ञान उत्पन्न हो जाता जो नहीं होता है। दोनों ही नितान्त भिन्न ज्ञान हैं। नाम जात्यादि से भिन्न होने के कारण निर्विकल्पक ही प्रमाणिक प्रत्यक्ष है। यही स्वलक्षण को ग्रहण करता है तथा सविकल्पक नामजात्यादि से युक्त होने के कारण कल्पना की कोटि में रखा जाना चाहिए। सविकल्पक का विषय प्रमाणिक नहीं होने के कारण स्वयं सविकल्पक ज्ञान भी प्रमाणिक नहीं है। उपर्युक्त मत को स्वीकार कर लेने पर यह प्रश्न होता है कि क्या प्रत्यक्ष निर्विकल्पक का ही होता है? हम जिसे शुद्ध प्रत्यक्ष या ज्ञान की संज्ञा देते हैं क्या वह निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष ही है? लेकिन प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान के लिए विषय को न मानना ठीक नहीं प्रतीत होता क्योंकि ज्ञान का आलम्बन तो बाह्य ही है। ज्ञान अपने साथ-साथ अपने विषय का भी प्रकाशन करता है। ज्ञान का धर्म ही प्रकाशन है। प्रकाशन के लिये वस्तु की सत्ता व उसका ज्ञान दोनों अनिवार्य है। यदि यह पूछा जाये कि प्रकाशित करने से तात्पर्य क्या है? इस प्रश्न पर भामती में वाचस्पति मिश्र ने प्रकाशित करने का अर्थ विषय के प्रकाशन से लिया है। अर्थात् जिसकी सहायता से विषय के स्वरूप को बताया जा सके। ज्ञान का कार्य उपदेश या मार्ग दिखाना है।

सन्दर्भ एवं पाद टिप्पणी:

1. जिसमें वस्तु की स्वरूप की प्रतीति के साथ-साथ उसके नाम, जाति आदि का भी भान होता है, उसे सविकल्पक कहते हैं। जैसे—घटः, पटः आदि की प्रतीति के साथ उनके नाम, जाति, आदि का भान होने से, साधारणतः हमारे व्यवहार में आने वाले सभी ज्ञान सविकल्पक के उदाहरण हैं। —तर्कभाषा, पृ. 46
2. वहीं, पृ. 47
3. वहीं, पृ. 52
4. एवंज्ञानमपिसामान्यविशेषाकारवततस्यविशेषाकारेणानिमिधानं सामान्याकरेणात्वभिधानमेव। यदि च विशेषकारेणानभिधानं यत् तल्लक्षण प्रत्यक्षस्य न केवल प्रत्यक्षस्य त्रैलोक्यस्यैतल्लक्षणमिति। —न्यायवार्तिक 1-1-4
5. जयन्त भट्ट कृत न्यायमंजरी व न्यायवार्तिक—तात्पर्य टीका 1-1-4
6. निर्विकल्पकमनेकाकारं वस्तु समुग्धं गृह्णाति, सविकल्पकंत्वेकैकाकारं जात्यादिकं विविच्य विषयीकरोति। —शास्त्र दीपिका, पृ. 114
7. निर्विकल्पेन सामान्यविशेषौ द्वौ वस्तूनि प्रतिपाद्यमानेनापि तयोर्भेदोग्रहीतुं न शक्यते, समाहितमनस्को विषयान्तरानुसंधानशून्य इन्द्रियसंयुक्तं वस्तु साक्षादुपलभत इति स्वसंविदेवात्र प्रमाणम्।— प्रकरणपंजिका, पृ. 54
8. निर्विकल्पक बोधेमपि नाक्षं केवल कारणम्। तत्पारम्पर्यजाते वा रूढिः स्यात् पड्जादिवत्। —श्लोक वार्तिक, पृ. 175
9. विशिष्ट ज्ञानरूप सविकल्पकस्य विशेषण ज्ञानं विनोत्पत्य संभवादनुमानगम्यमित्यन्ये।— तर्कपाद, पृ. 16
10. वहीं, पृ. 16
11. वेदान्त परिभाषा, पृ. 77
12. वहीं, पृ.77
13. वहीं, पृ. 80
14. वेदार्थ संग्रह—पृ. 49—50
15. वहीं, पृ. 189
16. यद एवं इन्द्रियजस्य ज्ञानस्य गोचरस तत् प्रत्यक्षकं, न तु इन्द्रिय सम्बद्धम्। —न्याय वार्तिक तात्पर्य टीका, पृ. 118

आचार्य,

दर्शनशास्त्र विभाग,

राजस्थान विश्वविद्यालय, जयपुर

arvindphilrajuniv@gmail.com

Towards an Intercultural Language

Anthony Savari Raj and Okechukwu Anthony Ezenne

Abstract

Language does not use only conceptual terms, which can be empirically verifiable (or falsifiable), but also words that are symbols able to express the collective experience of a people, therefore able to acquire many different meanings. An important distinction between terms and words, therefore, becomes necessary. The reduction of words to terms, as it has happened, for example, in modern science, has led to a transformation of language. Once the language has been transformed, all the rest follows as a consequence. It is here, a recovery of a symbolic way of experience and expression becomes vital for an intercultural language and interculturality.

Introduction

One of the novelties of our time seems to be the meeting of cultures and peoples which we have been greatly witnessing, as never before.¹ This of course prompts us to inquire into the possibility of an intercultural language, and the role and power of words in this enterprise.

At the outset it appears that an intercultural language does not or cannot exist, a *lingua universalis* as the XVIIIth European century hoped when it was enthusiastic with the discovery of a universal scientific methodology, of a *mathesis universalis*.²

However, what appears possible and even desirable is our intercultural response to the new situation, and we would like to make in this paper a few submissions as part of this response.

A. Sign and Symbol

1. Words are Symbols, and not merely Signs

As a basis of our reflections, we would like to highlight first the idea that the human words are more than signs and they are far more than concepts. Words are basically symbols and polysemic, and not monolithic.³

Words are different from technical terms which are directly verifiable (or falsifiable) in a universal conceptual system, as for instance, in the modern science. As the intercultural philosopher, R. Panikkar states: "Word conceals inasmuch it reveals, vice versa, it reveals only insofar as it conceals. And only by making one aware that it conceals does it reveal itself."⁴ As it will become clear below, this statement of Panikkar indeed implies that no word can be reduced to a one-to-one meaning.

Words cannot be reduced fully to terms – as terms can be fully determined, with a fixed and constant meaning.⁵ Sign may be explained, verbalized or fully objectified through concepts. But symbols are evocative of a deeper realm and these evocations can never be fully explained or verbalized.

In this context, we may just make a mention that classical Indian philosophy of language, for example, debates on where the sense lies, whether in the word, or in the phrase or in the syllable, or in the intonation, or in the gesture, or in the intention, and so on. Word is the fourfold reality formed of speaker, audience, content and material sound. That is, word involves the fourfold activity of the speaker, spoken to, spoken about and spoken with. Words are truly symbols, and not merely signs.

2. Modern Science and its Reduction of Words to Terms

However, it is our contemporary experience that the dominant modern scientific worldview seems to interpret and reinterpret the basic symbols of human cultures as mere signs. Of course, the power and merits of the scientific vision is obvious, but it also seems to be excessively reductionistic, monocultural and even without much imagination, as if *homo sapiens* were synonymous with *homo technologicus* or *homo symbolicus*.⁶

Triggered by a sense of reductionism, modern science has changed the meaning of words, appearing thus as perverse.⁷ It has perverted, to begin with, the very name of 'science', which meant *scientia* –i.e., identification, liberating communion with the thing known. It implied the threefold activity by which man becomes a human being: to know, to will and to perform – i.e., to discern, to make the right choice, and to put into practice. Knowledge indeed has saving power. But modern science is a mere calculus, with no element of love whatsoever.⁸

Or again, the world means for science the scientific cosmos, though in reality "the Kosmos is not only the scientific cosmos; the mathematical method is not the only way to approach reality."⁹

This means that the world comes across differently to different cultures and, therefore, no culture or no discipline is sufficient in capturing the mystery of life or reality single handedly.

Further, time, for instance, is no more a constitutive dimension of being, but it is interpreted as a measurable quantity in the relation between space and fastness; light is no more a metaphor of the divine, but it is a wave-like oscillation; intelligence is no more a spiritual self-consciousness, but something that can be artificially “created”; space is no more the ether (*aither, ākāśa*) shining and revealing the void and absence, but it is a distance between material points. Human being is no more an emanation of the mystery of the reality, but a developed monkey; science is no more *scientia, gnosis, jñāna*, the act by which human being identifies himself/herself with what he/she knows, but it is the control and prevision/prediction of the behavior of the observable things and so on.¹⁰ Once the language has been transformed, all the rest follows as a consequence. As for example, there has been a need for certain groups to introduce the sense of “sin” so as to talk about the necessity of redemption. We have here the political problem of the language: “masters” dictate the meaning of the words.

It is in this context of the reduction of words to terms, and in the context of the need of the words to become words again, we submit below some aspects of an intercultural response.

B. Intercultural Response

1. Human Invariants and Cultural Universals

The first is as regards a sharp distinction that needs to be made between what we may call human invariants and cultural universals.

Human invariants are those human acts in which humans participate collectively and commonly irrespective of the clime or time they belong to. For instance, all of us are born, we eat, sleep, love, hate and die. But the meaning, interpretation that may be given to each of these human acts is going to be culturally different. The interpretation will be culturally specific, tinged and coloured by the ground or culture from which the interpretation is offered. We may have a holistic perspective, but a global or universal perspective is never going to be possible, as long as we are humans.¹¹

This distinction is important to understand, for example, words such as, technology and technique. Technology, by its sheer

dynamism, power and allurement, appears to be neutral and universal, reaching all corners of the earth, blowing even faster than the wind.¹² The traditional cultures seem to kneel down before the dominating technological culture, to receive its blessings. But what is important to note is that while technology may be universalizable due to its alluring and dynamic nature, it is not yet universal. It is much less a human invariant. Instead, technique (*technē*) may be human invariant, as all cultures have invariably developed a way, a commerce to deal with the world, of which technology is just one powerful expression.

2. Homeomorphic Equivalents

Secondly, there is an urgent need to consider and work out homeomorphic equivalents¹³ as intercultural efforts should go beyond mere translation. Even in translation, it is not sufficient, for instance, to know how to translate “God”, “duty” and so on in Sanskrit, but we should also know how to render *brahman*, *dharma* and *āyus*, for example, in Italian, Chinese or Bantu of Africa. Then we will immediately realize the complexity inherent in every tradition.

Dharma in Buddhism is not equivalent of *dharma* in Hinduism; And we believe, the word *ātman*, with its meanings which include body, I, self and God, does not have a unique equivalent in western languages. The Japanese *basho* does not correspond to our place, *topos*; German *geist* is not synonymous with English mind, nor with French *esprit*.¹⁴ The African *ubuntu* is not same as the western idea of human. Therefore, to discover the “homeomorphic equivalents”, we have to know the respective context, which in whatever way are shared, in the myths of different cultures.

The two words *Brahman* and God, for instance, are not exactly equivalent. Nor are they synonymous with *Chi-Ukwu* in the Igbo African belief system. They are homeomorphic, in the sense that each of them stands for something that performs an equivalent function within the respective system.

3. Mutual Fecundation

Thirdly – and this is our last submission, our intercultural effort also calls for a mutual learning and fecundation.

Interculturality refers not only to words and expressions, but also to *contents of meaning* and *forms of thought* that mutually influence each other. The word “religion” expresses for many a religious institution. If we know that also *dharma* deals with something that

is part of the religious ambit, perhaps these words may enrich each other. Hence *religio* will benefit of the connotation of *dharma* and vice versa. In this sense a mutual fecundation between the cultures in contact may be established. We may also think, for example, a mutual fecundation between human rights and *dharma*.¹⁵ Human rights may serve as an external stimulus to *dharma* traditions, to rediscover and ameliorate the rights of the human; all the same, *dharma* may serve as an external stimulus to the human rights traditions to rediscover and imbibe a sense of the cosmic duty.

Thus, “the *right* to be human and the *duty* to be cosmic”, may well serve as a cross-cultural value for/in our global times. This implies indeed a mutual openness and is not possible without our confidence in the *spirit*, which indeed forms an intermediary space for the renewal of the cosmic and human. It is here, we may perhaps evoke and profit from the crucial insights from the animistic thinking of African traditions.

4. Intercultural Communication: An African-Caribbean Way

The intercultural way of thinking can give birth to a new spirit where the dialogues are plural and consistent with the general *modus operandi* of our global coexistence. For this reason, there is a need for universality of language which can be extrapolated from the mirage of global modernity. So instead of having assumptions about how language affects our awareness we should see it as a medium of communication.

African philosopher Wiredu affirms the existence of cultural universals as a trend in African philosophy by coming to terms with the existence of particulars that are relative. The falsification argument put forward by Wiredu states that: “suppose there were no cultural universal, then intercultural communication would be impossible. But there is intercultural communication. Therefore, there are cultural universals.”¹⁶

Towards a synthesis of unifying principles, the role of intercultural language is to bring into being what Jennifer Vest calls a *New Dialogic*.¹⁷ This concept of *New Dialogic* encapsulates questions of value to humanity without being constrained by any fixed amalgamation of coalesced concepts. The *New Dialogic* will also dispel the false dichotomy of cultural universals and particulars, as they together refer to ‘aspects’ of the same thing; where universals refer to the common properties, while particulars refer to the unique things. Similarly, to illustrate further paradigmatic thoughts

from African and Caribbean scholars such as Paget Henry, Lewis Gordon and Tunde Bewaji who have been all preoccupied with such intellectual engagement in connection to discoursing philosophy through cultures, shifting the geography of reason and finding philosophy where it has been overlooked. The interesting dimension in this new way has laid the foundation for future critique of our cultural and political assumptions.

Notes and References:

¹From the cultural view-point, we may distinguish five moments in the encounter between cultures: isolation and ignorance, indifference and distain, condemnation and conquest, coexistence and communication, convergence and dialogue. For an elaborate presentation of these moments, cf. R. Panikkar's Inaugural Address at the II International Congress of Intercultural Philosophy, modified version of which is found in *Unterwegs Zur Interkulturellen Philosophie*, ed. Raul Fronet-Betancourt, IKO-Verlag Interkulturellen Kommunikation, Frankfurt 1998, pp. 20-42.

² *Lingua universalis* (universal language) may refer to a hypothetical or historical language spoken and understood by all or most of the world's population. The prompting for universal language probably came from the discovery of a universal scientific methodology (*mathesis universalis*: in Latin, *mathesis* (science of learning) and *universalis* (universal)). It is a hypothetical and universal science modeled on mathematics envisaged by Descartes and Leibniz, among a number of more minor 16th and 17th century philosophers and mathematicians.

³ Such sign has one-to-one meaning, whose meaning can be determined and expressed through a term and whose meaning is universally true and conceptualized. For an example, H₂O is a term signifying water with a universal meaning. But a word is more than a term; it is polysemic, as, for example, the word water having many meanings in different contexts. In this sense, the word "water" is a symbol, and is not merely a sign or a concept.

⁴R. Panikkar, "The Silence of the Word: Non-Dualistic Polarities," *Cross Currents* (Summer-Fall 1974), p. 157.

⁵Cf. R. Panikkar, "Words and Terms," *Archivio di Filosofia*, 1980, pp. 117-33.

⁶ The fundamental difference between *homo sapiens* (wise human) and *homo technologicus* (technological human) is that the former integrates the element of wisdom and the spirit, while, the latter functions merely at the level of a technical know-how and rationality. Wisdom has to do with our sensitivities as much as our intellection.

⁷Cf. R. Panikkar, "Ecosophy," *New Gaia*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Michigan: Eco-Philosophy Centre, Winter 1995), p.4.

⁸ What is meant here is that modern science needs, a method of quantification and experimentation – and thus external control –, which does violence to life with a mechanistic cosmology and a mechanical approach.

⁹R. Panikkar, *The Rhythm of Being. The Gifford Lectures* (New York: Orbis, 2010), p. 388.

¹⁰For these considerations, Cf. R. Panikkar's Inaugural Address at the II International Congress of Intercultural Philosophy, modified version of which found in *Unterwegs Zur Interkulturellen Philosophie*, ed. Raul Fronet-Betancourt, IKO-Verlag Interkulturellen Kommunikation, Frankfurt 1998, pp. 20-42.

¹¹For an insightful discussion on cultural universals, particularly from an African perspective, cf. K. Wiredu. *Cultural Universals and Particulars*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996).

¹² Cf. David J. Hawkin (ed.), "Introduction," *The Twenty First Century Confronts its Gods. Globalization, Technology and War*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), pp. 3-25.

¹³ "Homeomorphism is not the same as analogy: it represents a functional equivalence discovered through a topological transformation." R. Panikkar, *The Intrareligious Dialogue*. Indian Edition. Bangalore: Asian Trading Corporation, 1984, p. 31.

¹⁴ Cf. R. Panikkar's Inaugural Address at the II International Congress of Intercultural Philosophy, modified version of which found in *Unterwegs Zur Interkulturellen Philosophie*, ed. Raul Fronet-Betancourt, IKO-Verlag Interkulturellen Kommunikation, Frankfurt 1998, pp. 20-42.

¹⁵ Cf. R. Panikkar, "Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?" *Interculture 82* (Janvier-Mars 1984), pp. 28-47. Also, Cf. Anthony Savari Raj, "Universalizing the Human Rights or Humanizing the Cosmos?: Theorizing a Mutually Fecundating Knowledge" in *Knowledge, Theorizing and Rights: Renegotiating the Connectives*. Ed. Pius V. Thomas, Siliguri: Salesian College Publications, 2015, pp. 83-98.

¹⁶K. Wiredu. *Cultural Universals and Particulars* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp 21-22.

¹⁷Cf. J. L. Vest, "The Promise of Caribbean Philosophy: How it Can Contribute to a 'New Dialogic' in Philosophy." *Caribbean Studies* 33 (2005): 3-34.

Works Cited:

Hawkin, David J. (ed.), "Introduction," *The Twenty First Century Confronts its Gods. Globalization, Technology and War*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004, pp. 3-25.

Panikkar, R, "The Silence of the Word: Non-Dualistic Polarities," *Cross Currents* (Summer-Fall 1974), pp. 154-71.

Panikkar, R, "Words and Terms," *Archivio di Filosofia*, 1980, pp. 117-33.

Panikkar, R. *The Intrareligious Dialogue*. Indian Edition. Bangalore: Asian Trading Corporation, 1984.

Panikkar, R, "Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?" *Interculture 82* (Janvier-Mars 1984), pp. 28-47.

Panikkar, R, "Ecosophy," *New Gaia*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Michigan: Eco-Philosophy Centre, Winter 1995), pp.2-7.

Panikkar, R Inaugural Address at the II International Congress of Intercultural Philosophy, modified version of which found in *Unterwegs Zur Interkulturellen*

Philosophy, ed. Raul Fronet-Betancourt, IKO-Verlag Interkulturellen Kommunikation, Frankfurt 1998, pp. 20-42.

Panikkar, R. *The Rhythm of Being. The Gifford Lectures*. New York: Orbis, 2010.

Savari Raj, Anthony, "Universalizing the Human Rights or Humanizing the Cosmos?:"

Theorizing a Mutually Fecundating Knowledge" in *Knowledge, Theorizing and Rights: Renegotiating the Connectives*. Ed. Pius V. Thomas, Siliguri: Salesian College Publications, 2015, pp. 83-98.

Vest, J. L. "The Promise of Caribbean Philosophy: How it Can Contribute to a 'New Dialogic' in Philosophy." *Caribbean Studies* 33 (2005): 3-34.

Wiredu, K. *Cultural Universals and Particulars*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996, pp 21-22.

Anthony Savari Raj
Professor of Philosophy,
Department of Arts,
Manipal University Jaipur &
ICCR Chair of Indian Studies, DLLP,
The University of the West Indies Mona Campus, Jamaica
ansraj65@gmail.com

Okechukwu Anthony Ezenne
Assistant Lecturer,
Department of Language, Linguistics and Philosophy,
The University of the West Indies Mona Campus, Jamaica
oezenne@yahoo.com

Concept of *Duḥkha* in Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism: A Comparative Study

Apree Datta

All the philosophical systems of thought in India (except Cārvākas) have a common soteriological goal to recoil, from the philosophically glorified prospect of dispelling suffering. Liberation (*mokṣa*) is, for them, ultimately desirable (*śreyas*). There are so many philosophical positions, challenging the desirability of liberation. There is an important point of philosophical discussion regarding the objective validity of the general hypothesis or observation about life that it is full of suffering. It is commonly observed that there are two types of philosophical positions regarding desirability of *mokṣa*. According to the 'liberation-obsessed philosopher', the world that appears to us, is so painful, though we do not feel it to be so and moreover we have feeling like 'the inevitable mixture of pain offers the best combination with pleasure we can aspire for'. Again, the 'liberation-averse' philosophers find *saṃsāra* as enjoyable. Even they have incorrigible beliefs of their own hedonistic feeling about *saṃsāra*.¹ It is suggested that suffering is not only a term but it is a matter of deep philosophical investigation.

The present paper attempts to focus upon a comparative study between the Advaitins and the Buddhist philosophers. In the first section I shall discuss the concept of suffering from both the Buddhist and Advaita points of view and try to give a textual exposition of the various types of suffering. In the last section of this paper the main point of discussion will centre round a comparative estimate of the concept of suffering between the Buddhists and the Advaitins.

I

It is commonly assumed that both Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism have a soteriological aim in the cultural tradition of India. Both of these systems of thought are academically presented to us as a systematic metaphysic which has a religious underpinning. Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta are primarily concerned with the question of liberation (*mokṣa*). Their metaphysics, epistemology, psychology and practical spiritual disciplines are related to this

fundamental soteriological concern of Buddhism and Advaita. Both these traditions in the philosophical culture of India have emphasized upon this problem of human life of the sorrowful cycle of birth and death (*saṃsāra*) and the promise of liberation as well as describing the nature of the state of *mokṣa* to be attained.

Man's participation in this world reflects the duplicities of the world, which is conditioned by pairs of opposites, such as suffering and happiness. Sometimes he endeavors to forget the very existence of suffering in life by floating himself in the sea of happiness. Man seeks to make the best situation in life and by that he tries to alleviate suffering. If suffering is considered to be the basic fact of experience, then it implies an ambiguous and self-contradictory character of life. Man's ignorance and his participation in the process of life makes him unaware of his real existence. We cannot consider suffering as an essential nature of our own. Now let us follow some arguments from *Laghuvāsudevamananam*,² where Śrī Vāsudeva Yatīndra has lucidly narrated his thought enriched with high philosophical insights about suffering. Śrī Vāsudeva Yatīndra has aptly offered several arguments in favor of the view that the fact of suffering cannot be considered as an essential nature of human existence. In the ordinary empirical world, the *jīva* is found to be in bondage due to suffering (*duḥkha*), birth (*janma*), action (*karma*), aversion and attachment (*rāgdveṣādi*). It is logically clear from the sequence or order of these causes of bondage that suffering comes from birth; birth arises from action and action from attachment and aversion. The fourth and fifth chapter (*caturtha, pañcama varṇaka*) are concerned about the first four causes out of which suffering occurs.³

It is argued that if suffering be essential to the *jīva* there will arise question regarding permanent existence of it. If suffering becomes essential nature of *jīva* then there will be no room for getting rid of it. No one will be happy in life. In that case, nobody will even try to attain cessation of suffering. No volitional effort or *satkarmayogadhyāno'pāsaneṣu (sāghanacatuṣṭayādi)* will be feasible in this regard. For that reading and teaching of the *Vedaśāstra-s* and *purāṇa-s* etc. will be futile and meaningless.⁴

It is further argued that if suffering is considered to be natural to the human beings, then why should one not try to make himself free from it? We cannot consider anguish to be an essential attribute of human existence. An object ceases to exist if its essential characteristic is vanished. Or, an object no longer exists if

its essential nature is destroyed. If the *svarūpa* of existence is annihilated who will remain to attain the *puruṣārtha-s*?⁵

Moreover, it is argued that how is it logically justified to assert that the essential nature of an object is itself related to the object (*svarūpa*)? The nature of molasses (*guḍa*) is to provide sweetness. If sweetness vanishes from molasses, the molasses can no longer exist. Likewise, if suffering is the essential nature of the *jīva*, its removal leads to the annihilation of the *ātman* itself. The Upaniṣadic philosophy maintains that the *ātman* has neither origin nor destruction.⁶

It is again maintained that the *jīva* attains happiness or bliss by some virtuous deeds (*utkr̥ṣṭa karmopāsanayogaiśca*) and happiness also disappears when the effect of these deeds is removed. Likewise, if freedom is something produced by certain action, then it is also subject to decay. If freedom is said to be something produced, it loses its eternity and thereby it becomes impermanent. This fact will contradict the claim made by the Vedas such as *na punarāvartate* (if one attains liberation, he never becomes subject to rebirth). It will also result in self-contradiction of the Vedic claim about the *ātman* as *akhaṇḍam, adbhūtam, ānanda svarūpam*.⁷

Again, it is echoed in the theme of the text *Laghuvāsudevamananam* that if suffering were the natural characteristic of the *jīva*, it would have been the object of experience in deep sleep (*susupti*), inactivity (*tuṣṇimbhāva*) and the state of contemplation (*samādhi*). This, as a matter of fact, does not happen. From the above discussion it is clear to us that suffering is not an essential attribute of the *jīva* and it is only an accidental (*āgantuka*) experience. The *jīva* as such is blissful and he comes to experience suffering only when he gets associated with body. There is a generally accepted notion that “*yatra yatra śarīraparigrahastatra tatra duḥkham*”. At this point an important question will arise from a practical point of view that who experiences suffering in life? It may be commonly replied that the person with sufficient wealth and a so-called affluent person never face suffering in their life.

It is commonly conceived that the suffering lies only in the case of absence of affluence or in the absence of wealth. But philosophically, people with affluence or wealth may have faced misery in life due to attack by enemies, fear of losing property, wealth and dynasty, having fear of losing nearest ones like spouse, offspring, old age and so on. Fear of losing affluence or wealth and dynasty may be a cause of suffering for a king or a wealthy person in a specific case. The oft-heard saying, that people have illusory

fantasy in making use of the sentences like “some people are always happy”. So, the question remains what is the cause of misery of wealthy people and kings? In that case, is embodiment a cause of misery? ⁸

Assuming body itself is the cause of suffering of the enlightened person who has *nityānitya vastuviveka* (capability to make discrimination between the eternal object and transient object). Due to assuming body or embodiment, even the enlightened person has to suffer because of thirst, hunger, illness etc.⁹

Assuming body is the cause of suffering. Even the *ātmavit* is not free from suffering because of their assuming body. They are equally subject to hunger, thirst and any other biological and psychological need. The point of divergence between the common people and the *ātmavit* lies in their attitude towards external world. The *ātmavit* realize the existence of suffering only at the mental level. For them suffering cannot touch the self as such, which is pure Existence, Bliss and Consciousness. In case of common people, the attitude is just reverse of that of *ātmavit*. He begins to consider mistakenly his body to be the self and he calls himself as ‘I am man’, ‘I am poor’, ‘I am ascetic’ and so on. The ordinary people think that this external world is absolutely real and his experience of happiness and pain is equally real. Even the Devas are not beyond the domain of misery because they are also troubled with quarrels and they are scared of returning back to the earth when the result of their once performed virtuous deeds are exhausted. So, the Devas are also subject to suffering as they assume body.¹⁰

But what is the cause of assuming the body (*śarīraparigraha*)?

It is assumed that the human body comes into existence only when the five-fold elements are conglomerated with the past karmic efficiencies. The five elements are not sufficient causes for the production of bodies. Even sperm and egg by themselves do not suffice to produce a body. Sometimes, sperm and ovum come in touch with each other but unfortunately, they fail to produce an embryo. These male and female reproductive cells become capable of producing body only when they are combined with *karma*. So, *karma* is the only reason that account for the occurrence of body. *Karma* is the instrumental cause and five gross elements are the material cause of body. *Karma* becomes reason to produce body, only when it becomes capable of producing suffering and

enjoyment of the fruits of all the sinful and virtuous deeds once performed respectively. No *karma* goes in vain, without producing its result. This is reflected in the following classical scripture: '*avaśyam anubhoktavyam kṛtaṁ karma śubhāśubham n'ābhuktaṁ kṣīyate karma kalpa-koṭi -śatairapi*'.¹¹

Lord Buddha attempted to explain suffering in his own philosophical framework. Some may argue regarding the fact of suffering that how can the existence of God be consistent with the problem of evil. They question why God allows human beings to suffer if he is considered as a benevolent principle. A way out of getting rid of such a difficult question is, that God has created human beings with free will, by virtue of that he is free to make any choice or to take any decision. So, suffering is caused by the choices humans make. When Siddhartha left his palace where he used to live, the three people he observed were an old man, sick person and a dead person. From the observation of these three cases, he came to believe that people suffer in life. So, suffering is an integral part of life. Different schools of philosophical thought, expound their own view about the essence of truth. The truth Buddha taught was discovered by himself through his own philosophical insight. As a religious teacher Buddha used to teach the Four Noble Truths, which he had acquired by direct penetrative insight. The Four Noble Truths are as follows: i) *dukkha saccā* (The Truth of Suffering)

ii) *samudāya saccā* (The Truth of the Origin of Suffering)

iii) *nirodha saccā* (The Truth of the Cessation of Suffering)

iv) *māgga saccā* (The Truth of the Path leading to the Cessation of Suffering)

For the sake of removal of suffering one must have true apprehension of suffering, for which the cause of suffering is essentially to be known. In order to attain cessation of suffering, an apprehension about what really causes extinction of suffering, is necessary. Without right knowledge about the practical means to attain salvation, the cessation of suffering is not possible. So, it is indispensable to have the knowledge of the Four Noble Truths. The first Noble Truth deals with the truth of suffering which is described in the '*Dhammacakkappavattana sutta*', in terms of various modalities of suffering, as underneath:

i) New becoming(rebirth) (*jāti dukkha*)

ii) Getting old (old age) (*jarā dukkha*)

iii) Death (*maraṇā dukkha*)

- iv) Sorrow (*śoka dukkha*)
- v) Lamentation (*parideva dukkha*)
- vi) Physical pain (*dukkha*)
- vii) Grief (*domanassa*)
- viii) Despair (*upāyāsa*)
- ix) Association with hateful ones
- x) Separation from loved ones
- xi) Not getting what one wants
- xii) The conglomeration of five grasping or clinging elements¹²

Jāti dukkha:

Jāti dukkha means the dissolution of *nāma* and *rūpa* at the last moment of experience and after death. The first moment of production of new existence is caused by *kamma*. The first genesis is viewed as a connecting link with the past life in the initial formulation of new *nāma* and *rūpa*. If this formation occurs in a mother's womb, then there will have womb's conception (*gabbhaseyaka paṭisandeha*).¹³

Jarā dukkha:

Jarā dukkha means suffering due to ageing. Decay and ageing come to exist in the conglomeration of *nāma* and *rūpa* in a particular existence. The fact of losing or failing memory becomes noticeable, only when old age is taken place. The normal physiological ageing continues throughout the life very silently, but it becomes prominent only when one advances into old age. There is a continuous change which is always happening subtly in physical appearance. These changes always signify the ageing.

Jarā or ageing is mainly concerned about the *thiti* or stagnant moment of the conglomeration of *nāma* and *rūpa*. Due to ageing the loss of vital energy occurs in the entire system of the body, such as impairment of hearing and losing of eyesight and impairment of the tactile, auditory and gustatory sense organ, impairment of cognitive capacity etc. These inabilities as a whole give rise to both mental and physical suffering. As *jarā* is the cause of both mental and physical suffering, so it is considered as *dukkha*.

Maraṇā dukkha (Death as suffering):

Death is considered as the extinction of *nāma* and *rūpa*. *Nāma* and *rūpa* are in function from the time of conception in womb. *Buddha Vacana*, '*sabbe byayanti maccuno*', states that all mortals are in fear of death and decay. Death can take place from different causes like violence, deadly diseases, and natural causes. Philosophically death

is the dissolution of *nāma* and *rūpa*. Death is abandoning the present existence and present body or the present is very fearful and that is why, every mortal being is crippled with fear of impending death. The phenomenon of death has been categorized under the list of suffering as death is dreadful and fearsome in nature.

Soka dukkha (Sorrow as suffering):

Soka or sorrow is characterized with the worrying and it is felt only when one is bereaved or grieved of near ones such as parents, spouse, offspring, relatives or friends. Even *soka dukkha* can occur in life from any kind of distressful disastrous situation. *Dukkha* occurs from loss of relatives, robbery, epidemics, natural calamity like flood, earthquake and storm and any kind of misfortune is technically known as *nātivayasana*. *Dukkha* because of destruction of property or loss of any worldly possession is caused by action taken by Government or ruler, theft, robbery or fire disaster which, is technically called *bhogavyasana*. Deterioration or degeneration in morality is called *silavyasana*. Suffering caused due to dismantling of the Right View, is called *ditṭhivayasana*. Suffering that occurs due to worsening of health condition and expectancy of life is technically known as *roga vayasana*. In simpler words, *soka* is *domanassa vedanā* or feeling of discomfort. Sometimes people become overwhelmed by distressful situation in life and this kind of sorrow results in deadly diseases and ultimately lead to 'premature ageing' and death. Since *soka* itself is the basis for all kinds of physical pain, it is termed as *dukkha*.

Parideva dukkha:

When suffering takes place due to lamentation, it is called *parideva dukkha*; such suffering is caused by loud weeping or wailing of one person on the loss of near ones. Lamented person resides in such a distressful situation that he proclaims the merits and virtues of the lost thing and the dead person respectively. However, such bitterly wailing and unmindful proclamations give rise to both mental and physical discomfort. That is why, *parideva* is considered as *dukkha* in Pali Buddhist Canon.

Dukkha:

Dukkha refers to any kind of physical discomfort such as feeling of aches or pains in different parts of body and overall sense of discomfort occurring in the body. These physical pains are truly intrinsic suffering and that is why, they are termed as *dukkha dukkha*. Every living being, run for the safety and security of themselves because they all are scared of getting physical pain.

That is why, *vyādhi* falls under the category of *dukkha*. Physical pain or bodily pain is, sometimes, followed by mental distress. So, physical suffering becomes the cause of mental suffering.

***Domanassa* :**

Domanassa refers to mental agony such as mental discomfort, sadness, fear and anxiety. All mortal beings are quite exposed to this type of suffering and that is why they fear it. *Domanassa* is not only concerned with our mental state, but it also affects our body a lot. When one is extremely overwhelmed with grief, he or she refuses to take food and sleeps for days on end, and as a result, it results in impairment of health and ultimately leads to death. *Domanassa* cannot touch *anāgāmī* and *arhats*.

***Upāyāsa*:**

Upāyāsa is characterized as despair. It is a kind of resentment caused by extreme mental agony, when one is affected by loss of nearest ones or *nātivyašana*. *Upāyāsa* is caused by intense burning of the mind and physical pain associated with it. So, people consider this *upāyāsa* or the state of despair as a frightful *dukkha*.

***Appiyehi sampayog dukkha* (Suffering from association with the hateful things):**

Suffering is caused by the association with unloving persons or connection with unpleasant objects or undesirable situations. A person reacts when he meets with any disagreeable, unbearable and undesirable situation and that reaction creates a mental disturbance and physical discomfort as well. Any connection with the unpleasant and undesirable situation is the cause of both mental and physical distress.

***Piyehi vippayogo dukkha* (Suffering due to separation from the beloved):**

Suffering or *dukkha* takes place because of separation from the beloved. However, separation from the loved ones can take place due to death or by other means. This kind of suffering can occur due to dispossession of one's treasured possessions. This dispossession itself gives rise to a mental agony. It is dreadful suffering or *dukkha* as it creates various mental discomfort or afflictions.

***Ichchitlābha dukkha* (Suffering due to not getting what one desires):**

Dukkha or suffering occurs due to not obtaining what one desires. Sometimes suffering can occur out of desire for some desires like 'we were not subject to death', 'we were not subject to misery and

lamentation etc.' These desires cannot be obtained by mere wishing and not getting what one desires causes mental dissatisfaction and pain. So, these unfulfilled wishes or desires are considered as *dukkha*. In this case, the object of desire is not only concerned about *nibbāna*, which is beyond birth, ageing and death, but it includes the worldly possessions such as wealth.

Pancupādānakkhandā dukkha (Suffering from the upadanakkhandā) :

The last eleven types of suffering or *dukkha*, beginning with *jāti dukkha* to *icchitalābha dukkha* occurs only because of *upādānakkhandā*. *Upādānakkhandā* is translated in Sanskrit as *upādāna skandha*. *Upādāna skandha* is considered as aggregate of grasping or clinging. The aggregate of *skandha*-s forms the object of grasping or clinging and these are called *upādāna skandha*. These five *upādāna skandha*-s are as:

- i) *rūpa* (form)
- ii) *vedanā* (feeling)
- iii) *saṃjñā* (perception)
- iv) *saṃskāra* (mental disposition)
- v) *viññāna* (consciousness)
- vi) All sentient beings cling to their body and consider it as 'I', 'my body', 'permanent' etc. That is why, the conglomeration of the five *upādāna skandha*-s is called the aggregate of grasping or clinging. The mental states are made up of *saṃskāra* and *viññāna*. These are also grasped and considering them as 'I', 'my mind' etc. So, the mental states are also included in the aggregate of grasping. This is how attachment occurs in the *rūpa skandha*.

II

This section deals with a brief comparative study of these two systems of thought regarding concept of suffering. The concept of suffering appears to be one of the most cogent ideas in the two systems, with some differences between them. In the development of metaphysical thought, so far as available literature concerns, the Buddhist philosophy seems to have taken the lead. The philosophy of Advaita Vedānta contains the central teaching of the Upaniṣads and constitutes the inner approach to the philosophical problem of suffering for all the systems of thought in Indian tradition. It might be pointed out that the influence of the Buddhists on the Advaita

thought is prominently observed in the philosophical literature of Ācārya Gauḍapāda.¹⁴

It is observed that getting rid of suffering is the *summum bonum* of both Advaitins and Buddhist philosophers. The metaphysical presupposition of both these schools of thought is the cessation of suffering. For the Advaitins, the cause of suffering is *ajñāna* (nescience) whereas, for the Buddhists, *avidyā* (ignorance) is the cause of suffering. The doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāḍavāda*) is accepted as a cardinal doctrine in the Buddhist philosophical framework to explain the cause of suffering.¹⁵ The doctrine of interdependent origination shows that old age, death and all the sufferings of phenomenal existence occur in dependence upon certain conditions and in absence of these conditions, suffering does not exist. The entire philosophical thought for the Buddhists is dependent upon the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpannatva*. The fact of dispelling ignorance leads to the cessation of suffering for both these systems of thought. But, their way or procedure of eradicating ignorance is different. But a pertinent philosophical question remains in our mind, that is, is the state of liberation, a state of positive happiness? This question has two aspects: speculative and practical. The Advaita Vedāntins may have adopted the position of positive joy. According to the Advaitins, the soul really feels an intense happiness and eternal bliss when it is released from the bondage of mundane world. Eternal bliss is the very essence of his being which is veiled by ignorance. This is the speculative aspect of the need of liberation. The practical aspect is that it is appropriate for those who are really hankering for the eternal bliss. The ultimate goal of the Vaiṣṇavites is the uncompromising craving for nothing but the love of God (*bhakti*). It is also observed in the *Upaniṣads* that a person with the capacity of discriminating desires for the immortality (*amṛtatvānī*).¹⁶ This view may be looked upon as the positive aspect of liberation.

But this scenario for the Buddhists is quite different. Eternal bliss or happiness is not the essence of the being, for the Buddhists. According to this position, liberation in reality brings no happiness over and above complete cessation of suffering. It is observed in the *Avadāna śataka* that Buddha has illustrated so many beautiful stories to explain the fact of sorrowful aspect of life. This suffering is due to inveterate ignorance. The realization of the Four Noble Truths leads to the eradication of ignorance and that ultimately leads to the cessation of suffering (*nirvāṇa*). Both of these systems

of philosophical thought have focused upon the fact of suffering. But their thoughts differ regarding soteriological techniques.

The concept of suffering, in general, requires an explanation to the question 'why do we want to get rid of this shackled life and also want to get freedom from this predominantly sorrowful life?' Some soteriological techniques might be approached to this deep philosophical question from the Nyāya point of view. Gautama in the *Nyāya-sūtra* has offered a step-by-step procedure by means of which one individual can attain liberation.¹⁷ We suffer because we relate ourselves to the fact that at any point of time we have to suffer as a part of life, as we sometimes enjoy some happy moments. We are sometimes, even indifferent about trying to get rid of suffering.¹⁸ But an ontological question remains unanswered: what is it really like to be liberated? No scriptures, testimonies are sufficient to answer it. No one can convey the exact feeling of being liberated. It is very difficult to define in terms. It may be the state of absolute absence of pain or may be an ecstatic feeling of endless joy (*nirantara ānanda*).

Before ending, a brilliant analysis of suffering, may be mentioned in the passing, leaving it open to be discussed by fellow researchers at a different place. Uddyotakara has given an ornamental exposition of suffering in his *Nyāyavārttika*. According to Uddyotakara *duḥkha* is existent as intermingled with *sukha*.¹⁹ He has made a classification of twenty-one types of suffering and happiness is one of them.²⁰

Notes and References:

¹ . Arindam Chakrabarti, Is Liberation (*mokṣa*) pleasant?, *Philosophy East West*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 167-182

² . Swami Tapasyananda in the preface to *Laghuvāsudevamananam* pointed out that '*Laghu Vāsudevamananam* is the condensation of a larger treatise *Vāsudevamananam* attributed to Vasudeva Yati who is said to have lived some three centuries back on the banks of the Narmada. But nothing definite is known about this stage. Nor is the text of his treatise now available... *Laghu Vāsudevamananam* is indeed a *vade mecum* of Advaitic metaphysics.'

Laghuvāsudevamananam, Ed. By Subrahmanya Sastri, with extensive Introduction by R. Krishnaswamy Aiyar, Published by Sriranga Śrīvāṇīvilāsamudrāyantrālaya, Madras, 1928

-----with Hindi translation by Thanesh Chandra Upreti, Dakshinamurti Math, Varanasi, 2002

----- English Translation by Swami Tapasyananda, Sri Ramakrishna Math, Mylapore, Madras, 2006

3. *idānīmasya jīvasya duḥkhaṃ na janma ca karma ca rāgadveṣādi cābhimānaścāvivēkaścājñānaṃ cetyeteṣu pūrvapūrvāṃ pratyuttarottaṃ hetuḥ; tatra duḥ khādicatuṣṭayaṃ caturthapañcamavarṇakayorvicāryate. Laghuvāsudevamananam*

4. *svābhāvīkamiti cedanekadoṣāḥ santi. tatkathamiti cet. asya jīvātmāno duḥkhaṃ svābhāvīkaṃ cedduḥkhanivṛttiḥ kadācidapi na syāt; sukhamapi kasyāpi na syāt; duḥkhanivṛtyai sukhamāptyai ca kasyāpi karma na syāt; satkarmayogadhyānopāseṇeṣu kasyāpi prayatno na syāt; vedaśāstrapūrāṇāni ca vyarthāni syuriti jāñhi. Laghuvāsudevamananam*

5. *nanu duḥkhaṃ svābhāvīkamastu tannivṛtyai ca prayatnaṃ karotviti cet ; kadācidapyetanna sambhavati, svābhāvīkasya svasvarūpatvāt. svasvarūpanāśārthaṃ ko vā prayatnaṃ kuryāt? svasvarūpanāśo sati puruṣārthamākkāḥ syāt? Laghuvāsudevamananam*

6. *Laghuvāsudevamananam* has cited so many *mantra*-s from the *Upaniṣads* like *Kaṭhōpniṣad* in order to support the view that the *ātman* is eternal and indestructible.

svābhāvīkameva svasvarūpaṃ kathamiti cet. guḍasya madhuraguṇaḥ svabhāvaḥ. tasya madhuraguṇasya nāśe bhavitavye guḍasyaiva nāśo bhavet. tathā jīvātmano duḥkhaṃ svābhāvīkaṃ cedduḥkhanāśe bhavitavya ātmasvarūpanāśa eva syāt. ātmano nāśo nāsti avināśi nitya iti ca "avināśi vā area'yamātmā (Vṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad)" "kāśavatsarvagataśca nityaḥ", na jāyate, mṛyate vā vipaścinnāyaṃ kutaścinnā vabhūva kāścit / ajo nityaḥ śāśvato'yaṃ purāṇo na hanyate hanyamāneśarire // (Kaṭhōpniṣad) ityādi śrutayo vadanti Laghuvāsudevamananam

7. *evaṃ ca sati sarvajīvanām tatkālika muktīm vinā punarjanmarahitā muktirna syāt. kiṃ ca mokṣasya janyatve anityatvamapi syāt. 'na ca punarāvartate' iti mukternityatvapratipādakaśruteḥ. Laghuvāsudevamananam*

8. *nanu loke rājādīnāmapi śarīraparigraheṇa duḥkhamasti veti cet; astyeva, teṣāmapi satrupīḍayā rājyabhāreṇa dhanadhānyakṣayeṇa strīputrādīmarāṇe na jarādīnā svamaraṇena ca duḥkha darśanāt. loke 'kecitsukhena vartante' iti vyavahāro vṛthā moha eva mohenāpi duḥkhasya sukhatva vyavahāraḥ kathamiti cet. Laghuvāsudevamananam*

9. *tarhi vivekānāmapi śarīraparigrahā duḥkhamasti veti cet, teṣāmapipāsādīnā śītoṣṇādīna vyādhinā sarpavṛścikavyāghrādīna ca duḥkhamastyaiva. Laghuvāsudevamananam*

10. *tarhi vivekayavivekinoḥ ko viśeṣa iti cet, tayorvāhyavyāpāreṇa. viśeṣābhāve'apyāntara vyāpāreṇa viśeṣo'sti, yo viveki sa mahātmā 'sakalamapi duḥkhamantaḥkaraṇasyaiva nātmanaḥ saccidānanda svarūpasvātmano'ṅṛta jaḍa duḥkhasvarūpāntaḥ karaṇa dharmairāṇumātramapi sambandho nāsti' iti śrutiyaktyanubhavairvicārya jñātvā tiṣṭhati /..... yo'viveki sa dūrātmātvāmasvarūpamavicārya dehādīkamevātmānaṃ matvā' anātmadharmānātmānyāropyātmadharmāmśca saccidānanda anātmānyāropeyaivamanyonyādhyāsaṃ kurvan 'ahaṃ devaḥ', 'ahaṃ śūdra', 'ahaṃ brāhmaṇaḥ'..... Ityādi prakāreṇa jātivarṇāśramābhīmāni tiṣṭhati Laghuvāsudevamananam*

11. *nanu śuklaśoṇitarūpeṇa pariṇatānāmeva bhūtānām śarīrakāraṇatvena vivakṣitatvāttāddr̥śānyeva śarīrasya kāraṇamiti na vaktavyam, vyarthaśuklaśoṇiteṣu śarīrotpattyadarśanāt. Tasmātkarmasahitānyeva śarīrasya kāraṇāni. pañcabhūtānām deśakālādīnām ca sarvasādhāraṇatvāttattatkarmavaicitryameva śarīravaicitryahetuḥ, yathā mṛdādīnām sādharmaṇatve'api kulālavayāpāravaicitryameva ghaṭādikāryavaicitryahetuḥ. yathā dr̥ṣṭante ghaṭādermṛdupādānakāraṇam kulālavayāpāro nimittakāraṇam, evaṁ dārṣṭāntike'api śarīrasya pañcikṛtabhūtānyupādānakāraṇam tattatkarma nimittakāraṇam. Tasmādbhogapradakarmani sati śarīraparigrahaḥ, yathā jāgratsvapnayoḥ karmaṇo vidyamanāvāccharīrāprāptiḥ. Karmābhāve śarīrābhāvaḥ, yathā suṣuptou karmābhāvēccharīrābhāvaḥ. kim ca yathā mṛdī satyāmapī kulālavayāpārābhāve ghaṭotpattyābhāvaḥ, tathesvarasṛṣṭeṣu pañcabhūteṣu satsvayātmajñānena karmasu naṣṭeṣu tasya jñāninaḥ śarīraṁ notpadyate. Laghuvāsudevamananam, Caturthavarṇakam, pp. 33-34*

12. *idaṁ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukhaṁ, ariyasaccham, jātipi dukhā, jarāpi dukhā, maraṇamapi dukhaṁ, soka parideva dukkha domanassupāyāsapi dukkha, appiyeḥi, sampayog dukkho, piyeḥi vippayogo dukkho. yaṁpiccaṁ na labenti, tampi dukkhaṁ saṁkhitte na pañcupādāṇakkhandā dukkhā. Dhammacakkappavattanasutta, Translated by U Ko Lay, SukhiHotu Dhamma Publication, Malaysia, 1998*

13. If we go through various Buddhist scriptures, we will find that the first moment of genesis surely constitutes *jāti*. This *jāti* is a new existence. There exists no suffering at the primary moment of existence. *jāti* itself is considered as suffering since the very first genesis of life is served as a ground for existence of physical suffering later on. For further clarification, suffering can be further divided into seven categories- *dukkha dukkha, viparināma dukkha, saṁkhāra dukkha, paticchanna dukkha, apaticchanna dukkha, pariyāya dukkha, nippariyāya dukkha*

14. '...Gauḍapāda, therefore, must have approached the Upaniṣads themselves from the side of the *Vijñānavāda*, which might have appeared as the best metaphysical system of time, nearest to the Upaniṣadic teaching'. P.T. Raju, An Unnoticed Aspect of Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍukya Kārikās, *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, July-October 1945, Vol. 26 No. 3/4, pp. 192-200,

15. N.A. Sastri, Nāgārjuna's Exposition of Twelve Causal Links, *Bulletin of Tibetology*, July, 1968, Vol.5 No. 2, pp. 5-27

16. *Parāñci khāni vyatṛṇat svayambhūstasmātparāñpaśyati nāntarātman/ kaściddhīraḥ pratyagātmānaikaṣṭadāvṛttacakṣuramṛtattvamichhan./ / Kāthopaniṣad 2.1.1. , Eight Upaniṣads (With the Commentary of Śaṁkarācārya), Tr. by Swami Gambhirananda, Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta, 1957*

17. *Duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānāmuttarottarāpāye tadānantarāpāyādapavargaḥ.1.1.2.*

Nyāya-sūtra, Gautama's Nyāyasūtras (with Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya) (Tr.), Ganganath Jha, Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1939

18. *Duḥkhatrayābhighātājñānāsā tadabhighātake hetau/ dr̥ṣṭesā'pārthā cennaikāntatyantato'bhāvāt/ 1. Sāṁkhya kārika, The Sāṁkhya kārika of Īśvaraḥṛṣṇa, Radhanath Phukan, Firma KLM, Calcutta, 1960*

19. *Kasmāt punarayaṁ hātā sukhaduḥkhe jahāti, na punaḥ sukhamaḍḍāya duḥkhaṁ jahātīti? Vivekahānasyāśakyatvāt. Vivekahānamaśakya kartum. Ataḥ sukhāmupabhoktukāmena duḥkhamapi bhoktavyam. Duḥkhaṁ vā jihāsatā sukhāmapi hātavyam, saviṣānnavaditi. Sukhaṁ duḥkhamanuṣaktamanādeyamiti.*

Anuṣaṅgo'vinābhāvaḥ, yatraikaṃ tatretaraditi. Samānanimittatā vānuṣaṅgaḥ, yāni vā sukhasādhanāni nānyeva duḥkhasādhanānīti. Samānādhāratā vānuṣaṅgaḥ, yena sukhamupalabhyate tena duḥkhamapīti. Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara (Ed.), Anantalal Thakur, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1997

²⁰. Cf. Arindam Chakrabarti, Is Liberation (*mokṣa*) pleasant?, *Philosophy East West*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 167-182

Assistant Professor,
Department of Philosophy,
Kazi Nazrul University, Asansol, Paschim Bardhaman
apree.datta@knu.ac.in

The Notion of Alterity in an Anterior Lineage of Philosophers: Reflections on Hegel and Sartre

Jitendra Chandolia

Abstract

The following lines explore certain views of Hegel and Sartre on the problem of Other and investigate how both these prominent philosophers try to refute solipsism and secure the ontological ground for existence of Other. These philosophers, while making the Other a fundamental part of I, present to us a relation of fundamental conflict between these two. The article tries to put forward an approach, which secures the other while establishing a relation of communication rather than conflict. Doing so, it is hoped that we shall be able to undertake a backward journey down the path of history of philosophy and delineate, the roots of the concept of alterity, in a lineage of philosophers that does not directly take on the problem. It may also be mentioned, that although alterity or otherness popularly has been a notion that has to do with cultural and social dynamics, my concern here will be more with the depiction of the ontological and epistemological aspect of the notion of alterity or otherness.

Keywords: Self-consciousness, Other, Desire, Conflict, Communication

Main Text

1. Hegel: I-Other Conundrum

The relation between I and Other, has occupied a prominent place in the history of philosophy. My self-consciousness, which is given to me by direct intuition, is the cogito- the indubitable, the bed rock of all knowledge. From cogito, Descartes arrives at his knowledge of the certain world. However, cogito ends in a kind of solipsism, as there is no place for the Other in such world. God is the guarantor of the consciousnesses of the Other. The assertion here does not mean that Descartes is a metaphysical solipsist but only that

without the existence of a God he would end in an epistemological solipsism.

Kant is another great thinker who dives deeper into the domain of self-consciousness. He shows that without an I, no secure foundation of knowledge is possible. To doubt I is to question the very possibility of knowledge. If we are to believe that knowledge itself is possible, then we must accept an I. The very possibility of knowledge implies a knower. Self-consciousness in Kantian notion is 'transcendental unity of pure apperception'. All objects are objects of such self-consciousness - they have been constituted by my consciousness and are unified by my consciousness. The Other, then, is nothing but a constitution of my I. I is what is necessary and supreme, the thing of significance; the object is merely a thing for me. Here is our famous Copernican revolution: understanding makes nature. It is thus self-consciousness which rules over the natural reality it has constructed. Everything is an object in my consciousness.

But here lies a problem. The reality which I have constructed includes not only inanimate objects but also Others who claim to be self-conscious¹. It is necessary to point out that this doesn't mean that the subject literally creates an object. My epistemic limits make it impossible for me to know Other as a rational agent as I know Other only as an appearance. The question that arises at once is this: Is the Other merely an object, an object for self-consciousness? Hegel points out that Kantian idealism poses a fundamental conflict between theoretical reason and practical reason. Practical reason is the source of categorical imperative, which requires us to treat humanity in every person as an end, never as a means. The moral law dictates that no person should be treated as a thing or an object, as a means to be used towards the fulfilment of my ends. Now if, theoretical reason implies that I have constructed all experience, including the objects of experience, what then could be wrong with using my objects as means to my ends? Kant saves himself from this conflict by introducing the unknown thing in itself, noumenal sphere; my self-consciousness only constructs the phenomenal realm of appearance. Kant may argue that Others are a part of the noumenal realm and must be treated as, ends in themselves.

The stage at this moment is set for a direct confrontation with the problem of Other. Hegel explicitly talks about self-consciousness and Others and the relation that unfolds between the two. Hegel establishes the Other as the core of the concept of subjectivity. It

should be noted here that the idea of Other varies from thinker to thinker, but in all of them, one ingredient remains unmuted, that the self develops through Other. Hegel is very much opposed to the notion of two worlds, a dichotomy in which Kant takes refuge so that he does not end in solipsism. He says that “behind the so-called curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner world, there is nothing to be seen unless we go behind it ourselves”.² Hegel rejects the notion of a thing in itself which is unknown because we ourselves have constructed it. Such construction of ours is nothing but an empty abstraction, an abstract concept of an object, of a total emptiness – whose only filling is appearance. As the noumenal is as much a construction as the phenomenal.³ The problem remains unsolved in Kant as to why I shouldn’t treat objects as means to my ends? Like Kant, Hegel also agrees that we must presuppose a unified self. We must construct it. Here arises a problem: if the self is a construction, can we consider it as real? In Hegelian thought, we construct reality; in other words, our recognition of a thing makes that thing real. The self-consciousness constructs itself, but the self-consciousness is not the only architect of itself. The ‘I’ is also an appearance for Others and hence a part of it is constructed by Others. What if the Other subject considers me only an object of its self-consciousness? Hegel’s answer to the problem is that reality of my-self, requires the recognition of an Other self-consciousness. “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and because of the fact that, it so exists for an Other; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.”⁴ If self-consciousness is to be self-certain, real, more than Hume’s notion of flow of ideas, the self must at the very least be recognized by Others. The Other, then becomes radically immanent. My ‘self’ is dependent on Other for recognition. Without this Other, I cannot exist as an independent unified self. The Other then, becomes part of my essence. The self, i.e., the ‘transcendental unity of pure apperception’ which constructs all reality, as such, cannot exist without the Other. As Robert C. Solomon explains, “Human existence is primordially a matter of mutual recognition and it is only through mutual recognition that we are self-aware and strive for the social meanings in our lives”.⁵ But this recognition is not without conflict. A struggle for recognition is implied in self-consciousness. There are two opposing tendencies in self-consciousness; on one hand, the moment when the self and the Other come together, which makes self-consciousness possible and on the Other hand the moment of difference which arises when my ‘self’ becomes conscious of the Otherness of Other selves

compared to oneself. One may ask here that why a struggle when a being encounters the Other.

The answer lies in Hegel's analysis of desire. That desire exists is a fact. As Kojève says, desire always brings us back to ourselves out of absorption in the object. When one says "I want that object", the emphasis is on the 'I want', and not on the 'object'. My desire is what is important, the object only a means to it. The object is nothing but an object of my desire, an object within my self-consciousness.⁶ Also in satisfying desire, we often negate the object we desire. If we desire food, we want to consume it. We transform Otherness into oneness, difference into identity. In negating the object, we feel assured of our 'selves', our identity. But during the very same time the desire affirms the self and negates the Other, it also does the very opposite, it affirms the Other and denies the self. Desire's attempt to negate the Other does not easily succeed, objects resist desire.⁷

In this way, desire establishes the independence of Other. It tells us about the resistance and difficulty of having the Other. By negating the Other the 'I' achieves self-certainty. So, desire desires the existence of Other as much as its negation. Since the I cannot annihilate the Other, the self-consciousness decides that Other must negate itself, which can be achieved by defeating the Other. The question that occupies us next is: How do we rise above this conflict and have consciousnesses which is capable of granting each of us solid recognition in order to have stable selves?

Hegel's solution to this problem is cultural consciousness. Consciousness must not be understood as individual consciousness; we must move to cultural consciousness. We must accept that the I and Other are essentially part of a larger consciousness- we are members of a single community. We will be driven from individual consciousness to cultural consciousness, and will find that the recognition from institutions such as family, law, state and religion forms us. These institutions recognize my 'self', reduce conflict pertaining to plurality of self-consciousnesses. Ultimately, we rise even above this and we need absolute. Only then will we achieve the sort of recognition that will have enough scope and substance to give us solid reality and secure self-certainty without heteronomy.

2. Sartre: Inevitability of Conflict amongst points of self-consciousness

Sartre's existentialist phenomenology underscores, the instability at the heart of consciousness as its fundamental character. Sartre starts with criticism of realism and idealism with respect to the problem of existence of the Other. For Sartre, both realism and idealism lead to solipsism. Sartre praises Hegel for acknowledging the role of negation in the positing of the Other and the double reciprocal relation of exclusion that operates in a field of plural consciousnesses. Sartre notes that Hegel seems to avoid solipsism by making my conscious being dependent on the Other, such that to doubt the Other is to doubt myself.⁸ Yet Sartre criticizes Hegel for his "epistemological and ontological optimism", the tendency to abstraction which overlooks the fact that "to refute solipsism.... my relation to the Other is first and fundamentally a relation of being to being, not of knowledge to knowledge."⁹

Sartre paints his picture of human reality by using the cogito as his starting point. For Sartre human reality is a for-itself whose ontological character is nothingness, the power of negating, questioning or denying. His solution to the problem of the Other locates itself in the notion of the ontological instability of human reality. The Other's existence for Sartre is a pre-ontological necessity. The difference between man and an object is the man's existential capacity to 'look' at me. This for- itself looks at me and turns me into an object. The Other, then, is the condition of existence of all Other consciousness. The for-itself discovers a being before him, the Other- the monstrous for-itself that is not my for-itself. I organize the world around me and the Other organizes the world around him. So how, in my being, do I relate to him? I encounter the Other and I feel naked as I am an object under the gaze of the Other. I feel seen and defenseless before a being like me who is yet not me, a freedom that is not my freedom. This feeling of being defenseless, of being in danger under the Other's gaze, is intimate with the permanent structure of my being-for-Others.¹⁰ According to Sartre, "in experiencing myself as an unrevealed objectness I experience the inapprehensible subjectivity of the Other directly, and with my being."¹¹

The reaction to Other's look can take form of fear, pride and shame. These emotions uniquely reveal the Other, not as probable object in my world but as lived by me. To explain 'look', Sartre gives us the example of Pierre, the jealous watcher at the keyhole; suddenly he

feels himself looked at; someone is coming; he freezes; instead of the impassioned mediator of all-absorbing situation, he becomes a spy. He is degraded to an object, a puppet with a role, the nasty role of sneak. Pierre acquires a 'character': a man who doesn't trust. He is degraded through the upsurge of Other whom his shame reveals.¹² Fear, too reveals the Other directly, it transforms the world which I inhabit into a world of Other in which I am a victim. I am no longer myself but the target in his sight. Thus, the Other reveals himself by robbing me of my freedom: it is suddenly his freedom I have to live in, not in mine. That is why, Sartre follows Gide in saying that the Other plays the devil's part. The revelation of the Other is the loss of freedom, the fall of the self into the Other's world. In pride on the other hand, one seems to assert oneself. I rise against Others and have glory in my being. Others appear as spectators of my success. For Sartre pride is opposite of shame. It is the assertion of my free existence against the Other's freedom. It is the superior look against the falling Other. But this is not permanent, it results in confrontation where one is the winner and the other a loser. Also, for Sartre, pride is necessarily associated with bad faith. It is bad faith because it allows the illusion of objectification to creep into my self-consciousness.¹³ It is the sacrifice of the in-itself for for-itself. Also, for Sartre, pride is a relation between I and Other-in-general, and not between I and a concrete Other. Sartre discovers here that although I want to be myself, there is an Other, who will not let me be myself. Common sense argues against solipsism because the Other is concretely given to me. A bond of internal negation connects me with the Other, without the Other I can't have a thought about myself. In this sense Sartre sees the Other as a myself. Such a gaze, such second consciousness makes me ontologically uneasy. Uneasiness arises because I grasp the terror of my existence in the context of a presence that is not my presence. Such ontological terror shakes me out of my solipsist cocoon and I apprehend myself as the metamorphosis of the being-for-Others.¹⁴

For Sartre the relation between I and Other is always of conflict which manifests itself in different emotions such as shame, fear, pride etc., the relation is not that of harmony. Though I have to be myself alone, there is, against me, an Other who will not let me be – because he would be, instead. Such conflict, for Sartre is the ground of all community: language becomes a form of seduction, love becomes an alteration between sadism and masochism, solidarity becomes class struggle.¹⁵

3. Conclusion and Afterword

Both of these prominent philosophers, who have enriched the notion of Otherness, present before us a philosophy which rests on 'conflict' as the fundamental relation between I and Other. In Hegelian analysis, the relationship starts with a conflict resulting in a death struggle, which results in a relation of master and slave. Sartre's picture of being also establishes a relation which can't be of harmony- "Other is hell". My self-consciousness ends either in a collective consciousness stripping me of 'individuality' as is the case with Hegel or it alters between a relation of domination and subjugation in which the for-itself turns into in-itself. In both the cases we are presented with an Other which terrorizes us.

But cannot communication be more fundamental than conflict. If not more fundamental, does it not reside with conflict as an original relation between I and Other. Merleau-Ponty makes an important criticism that Sartre creates a hostile environment for the objectifying look. What is decisive, is communication.¹⁶ If communication is as basic as conflict in the encounter between I and Other, then it can also be considered as a philosophical argument for the existence of the Other. We may at this juncture take Hegel's analysis of desire negating the desired as an instance. In the example of food, the food is negated, but here we fail to see the nature of desire on which the outcome of desire depends. I negate the food because of the very nature of desire, i.e., hunger demands it. But is not the desire to communicate also a desire which by its very nature is not annihilating but a desire for union, of being understood, a desire which does not seek objects to rule but which seeks Other for-itself rather than Other in-itself to fulfill its creative outburst. It is a desire which wants to know, learn and impart at same time. In Hegel we see that the desire affirms the self by negating the object and affirms the object by negating the self. But desire of communication affirms the self by affirming the object instead of negating it. In communication the for-itself is not turned into in-itself as the for-itself communicates his own constructions rather than demolishing the constructions of the Other.

The look which one for-itself directs at Other for-itself can carry meaning of conflict only if the conflict itself is a desire for communication. At Other's end the look is not primarily meant for intimidation. The objectivization of Other is a consequent not antecedent.¹⁷ The I objectivizes the Other not because of the fact

that this is its fundamental mode of being; the objectivization rather occurs due to lack of proper communication and understanding. The for-itself finds itself as alienated and this intimidation is a reaction to the futility of existence magnified by the ontological terror of a universe which appear to exist without any reason and escapes any attempt of rationalization. So, the conflict is a cry of despair, an appeal for communication. Conflict arises with the Other due to miscommunication when one thinks that the Other is not willing to communicate, and the grip of conflict keeps getting tighter with more miscommunication. Perhaps all the plural units of self-consciousness are like Leibnitz's monads, except that they are not windowless but waiting for someone to climb the window.¹⁸

Notes and References:

¹Philip J. Kain, "Self-consciousness, the Other and Hegel's dialectic of recognition: Alternative to postmodern subterfuge", *Philosophy and Social Criticism* (Sage Journals) Volume:24 issue:5 Pg. 105-126

² Ibid.

³ Ibid

⁴ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) Pg. 111 (hereafter PhS)

⁵ Robert C Solomon, *Continental Philosophy Since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self*, Oxford, 1988

⁶ A. Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, trans. J.H. Nichols, Jr Pg. 3-7

⁷ PhS, Pg. 112

⁸ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, Part III, Ch.1, Sec.II, Pg. 321

⁹ Ibid, Pg. 329

¹⁰ Ibid, Sec.IV, Pg. 358

¹¹ Ibid, Pg. 361

¹² Marjorie Grene, Sartre and the Other, *Proceedings and addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, Vol. 45, American Philosophical Association, Pg. 22-41

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ Ada Agada, "Sartre's Phenomenologico-Existentialist Solution to the problem of the Existence of the Other", *International Journal of Philosophy and Religion* 3(1), Pg. 57-64

¹⁵ Grene, Sartre and the Other

¹⁶ Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. C. Smith, (London: Routledge, 1995), Pg. 360

¹⁷ Ada Agada, Sartre's Phenomenologico-Existentialist Solution to the problem of the Existence of the Other.

¹⁸ I express my heartfelt gratitude to the two anonymous referees whose review and comments helped me enrich the contents of the write-up and to my teacher Dr. Anubhav Varshney for his encouragement. The suggestion to give a more detailed analysis of Descartes and Kant, by one of the referees, could not be honored, as that would have been outside the scope of this write-up, for the simple reason, that any piece of research can by no means be exhaustive. However, I shall try to discuss and reflect on the views of Descartes and Kant, at another place. Also, such remarks that sprout from a purely analytic position, may not be completely just to a problem that also involves issues that are outside analytical philosophy.

Research Fellow,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Rajasthan, Jaipur
jitendrachandolia18@gmail.com

The Tremendous Three: International Publications of P. T. Raju, Daya Krishna and Biswambhar Pahi

Priyedarshi Jetli

Underneath is list of papers, published in international research journals, by three philosophers who graced the department at Jaipur, Prof. P. T. Raju, Prof. Daya Krishna and Prof. Biswambhar Pahi.

P. T. Raju

1. P. T. Raju (1934). The Treatment of Morality in Mr. Campbell's Scepticism and Construction. *International Journal of Ethics* 44 (4):454-458.
2. P. T. Raju (1934). The Hegelian Absolute and the Individual. *Philosophy* 9 (35):336 - 342.
3. P. T. Raju (1940). Coherence and the Moral Criterion. *Ethics* 50 (2):206-218.
4. P. T. Raju (1941). The Reality of Negation. *Philosophical Review* 50 (6):585-601.
5. P. T. Raju (1947). The Western and the Indian Philosophical Traditions. *Philosophical Review* 56 (2):127-155.
6. P. T. Raju (1949). The State of Philosophical Studies in India. *Philosophy* 24 (91):342 - 347.
7. P. T. Raju (1951). Existence: An Epistemological Study. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 12 (2):265-277.
8. P. T. Raju (1951). Critical Humanism: An Indian Viewpoint. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 32 (3):259-269.
9. P. T. Raju (1952). The Development of Indian Thought. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 13 (1/4):528-550.
10. Raju, P. T. (1952). Intuition as a Philosophical Method in India. *Philosophy East and West* 2(3): 187-207.
11. Raju, P. T. (1953). India's Culture and Her Problems. *Philosophy East and West* 3(3): 271-275.
12. P. T. Raju (1954). The Principle of Four-Cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy. *Review of Metaphysics* 7 (4):694 - 713.
13. Raju, P. T. (1954). The Concept of the Spiritual in Indian Thought. *Philosophy East and West* 4 (3):195-213.

14. Raju, P. T. (1955). Idealisms: Eastern and Western. *Philosophy East and West* 5 (3): 211–234.
15. Raju, P. T. (1955). Idealistic Thought of India: Reply. *Philosophy East and West* 5(3): 275–279.
16. P. T. Raju (1956). Philosophical Trends and Activities in Twentieth-Century India. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 10 (37):266-284.
17. P. T. Raju (1957). Being, Existence, Reality, and Truth. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 17 (3):291-315.
18. P. T. Raju (1958). Actuality. *Journal of Philosophy* 55 (16):661-673.
19. Raju, P. T. (1959). Religion and Spiritual Values in Indian Thought. *Philosophy East and West* 9 (1/2): 38-40.
20. Raju, P. T. (1959). Feigl on Intuition. *Philosophy East and West* 8 (3/4):149-163.
21. P. T. Raju (1962). Die Struktur des Ich-Bewußtseins. *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* 16 (4):519 - 532.
22. Raju, P. T. (1962). Existence, Finite or Infinite. *Philosophy East and West* 12(3): 241–250.
23. P. T. Raju (1963). The Nature of the Individual. *Review of Metaphysics* 17 (1):33 - 48.
24. Raju, P. T. (1963). Comparative Philosophy and Spiritual Values: East and West. *Philosophy East and West* 13(3): 211–225.
25. P. T. Raju (1964). What Is Reason? *International Philosophical Quarterly* 4 (2):173-182.
26. Raju, P. T. (1964). Indian Epistemology and the World and the Individual. *Philosophy East and West* 14(3/4): 311–332.
27. P. T. Raju (1975). Being: How Known and How Expressed. *International Philosophical Quarterly* 15 (2):161-179.
28. P. T. Raju (1976). Being, Becoming, and Essence. *Idealistic Studies* 6 (1):33-48.
29. P. T. Raju (1978). Self and Body: How Known and Differentiated. *The Monist* 61(1): 135-155.
30. P. T. Raju (1990). Transcendence and Historicity In the Self As Ātman. *Idealistic Studies* 20 (3):203-229.

Daya Krishna

1. Daya Krishna (1957). Law of Contradiction and Empirical Reality. *Mind* 66:250-257.
2. Daya Krishna (1958). Some Consideration of Morris Lazerowitz's "The Structure of Metaphysics" *Mind* 67:236-243.
3. Daya Krishna (1958). The Nature of Value Judgements. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 36 (1):18 - 24.
4. Daya Krishna (1961). "Lying" and the Compleat Robot. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 12 (August):146-149.
5. Daya Krishna (1961). The "Synthetic a Priori": Some Considerations. *Philosophy* 36 (137):211 - 215.
6. Daya Krishna (1964). On the Distinction between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences and the Humanities. *International Social Science Journal* 16(4): 513-523.
7. Daya Krishna (1965). Three Conceptions of Indian Philosophy. *Philosophy East and West* 15 (1):37-51.
8. Daya Krishna (1965). Adhyāsa: A Non-Advaitic Beginning in Śāṅkara Vedānta. *Philosophy East and West* 15 (3/4):243-249.
9. Daya Krishna (1966). Three Myths About Indian Philosophy. *Diogenes* 55:89-103.
10. Daya Krishna (1968). Is Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhya Kārikā Really Sāṅkhyān? *Philosophy East and West* 18 (3):194-204.
11. Daya Krishna (1969). The Active and the Contemplative Values. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 29 (3):414-422.
12. Daya Krishna (1970). Alienation, Positive and Negative. *Diogenes* 72:39-55.
13. Daya Krishna (1971). A "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy" and the Nature of Society. *American Sociological Review* 36(6): 1104-1107.
14. Daya Krishna (1973). The Concept of Revolution: An Analysis. *Philosophy East and West* 23 (3):291-297.
15. Daya Krishna (1976). Science, Technology and Values. *Diogenes* 24:29-40.

16. Daya Krishna (1977). Culture. *International Social Science Journal* 29(4): 651–670, 677.
17. Daya Krishna (1982). God and Human Consciousness. *Diogenes* 30:1-10.
18. Daya Krishna (1985). God and the National State. *Diogenes* 33:91-100.
19. Daya Krishna (1986). Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be. *Diogenes* 34 (136):58-69.
20. Daya Krishna (1993). Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Indian Philosophy. *Asian Philosophy* 1993: 69-82.
21. Daya Krishna (1999). Drei Mythen über die indische Philosophie. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 47 (4):633-642.

Biswambhar Pahi

1. Biswambhar Pahi (1966). On Non-Existence of Finite Characteristic Matrices for Some Implication Calculi. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 31(4): 682.
2. R. C. Applebee and Biswambhar Pahi (1968). Some Results on Generalized Truth Tables. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 33(4): 636.
3. Biswambhar Pahi (1968). Restricted Extensions of Some Implication Calculi. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 33(4): 643.
4. Biswambhar Pahi and Ralph C. Applebee (1970). An Unsolvable Problem Concerning Implicational Calculi. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 11 (2):200-202.
5. Biswambhar Pahi (1971). Restricted Extensions of Implicational Calculi. *Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* 17 (1):11-16.
6. Biswambhar Pahi (1971). Full Models and Restricted Extensions of Propositional Calculi. *Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* 17 (1):5-10.
7. Ralph C. Applebee and Biswambhar Pahi (1971). Some Results on Generalized Truth-Tables. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 12 (4):435-440.
8. Biswambhar Pahi (1971). Note of Full Models of Propositional Calculi. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 36(2): 363.

9. Biswambhar Pahi (1972). A Theorem on the Interrelationship of Axiom Systems for Implicational Calculi. *Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* 18 (8-11):165-167.
10. Biswambhar Pahi (1972). A Method for Proving the Non-Existence of Finite Characteristic Models for Implicational Calculi. *Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* 18 (8-11):169-172.
11. Biswambhar Pahi (1972). Maximal Full Matrices. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 13 (1):142-144.
12. Biswambhar Pahi (1973). Necessity and Some Non-Modal Propositional Calculi. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 14 (3):401-404.
13. Biswambhar Pahi (1974). On the Non-Existence of Finite Characteristic Models for Some Classes of Implicational Calculi. *Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* 20 (8-12):113-119.
14. Biswambhar Pahi (1974). Result on Axiom Systems for Propositional Calculi. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 39(2): 382-382.
15. Biswambhar Pahi (1974). Jankov Theorems for Some Implicational Calculi. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 39(2): 391-391.
16. Biswambhar Pahi (1975). Jankov-Theorems for Some Implicational Calculi. *Mathematical Logic Quarterly* 21 (1):193-198.

Consolidated Chronological List

1. Raju, P. T. (1934). The Treatment of Morality in Mr. Campbell's Scepticism and Construction. *International Journal of Ethics* 44(4): 454-458.
2. Raju, P. T. (1934). The Hegelian Absolute and the Individual. *Philosophy* 9(35): 336-342.
3. Raju, P. T. (1940). Coherence and the Moral Criterion. *Ethics* 50(2): 206-218.
4. Raju, P. T. (1941). The Reality of Negation. *Philosophical Review* 50(6): 585-601.
5. Raju, P. T. (1947). The Western and the Indian Philosophical Traditions. *Philosophical Review* 56(2):127-155.

6. Raju, P. T. (1949). The State of Philosophical Studies in India. *Philosophy* 24(91): 342–347.
7. Raju, P. T. (1951). Existence: An Epistemological Study. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 12(2): 265–277.
8. Raju, P. T. (1951). Critical Humanism: An Indian Viewpoint. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 32(3): 259–269.
9. Raju, P. T. (1952). The Development of Indian Thought. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 13 (1/4): 528–550.
10. Raju, P. T. (1952). Intuition as a Philosophical Method in India. *Philosophy East and West* 2(3): 187–207.
11. Raju, P. T. (1953). India's Culture and Her Problems. *Philosophy East and West* 3(3): 271–275.
12. Raju, P. T. (1954). The Principle of Four-Cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy. *Review of Metaphysics* 7(4): 694–713.
13. Raju, P. T. (1954). The Concept of the Spiritual in Indian Thought. *Philosophy East and West* 4 (3): 195–213.
14. Raju, P. T. (1955). Idealisms: Eastern and Western. *Philosophy East and West* 5 (3): 211–234.
15. Raju, P. T. (1955). Idealistic Thought of India: Reply. *Philosophy East and West* 5(3): 275–279.
16. Raju, P. T. (1956). Philosophical Trends and Activities in Twentieth-Century India. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 10(37): 266–284.
17. Raju, P. T. (1957). Being, Existence, Reality, and Truth. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 17(3): 291–315.
18. Krishna, Daya. (1957). Law of Contradiction and Empirical Reality. *Mind* 66: 250–257.
19. Krishna, Daya (1958). The Nature of Value Judgements. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 36(1): 18–24.
20. Krishna, Daya (1958). Some Consideration of Morris Lazerowitz's "The Structure of Metaphysics" *Mind* 67: 236–243.
21. Raju, P. T. (1958). Actuality. *Journal of Philosophy* 55(16): 661–673.
22. Raju, P. T. (1959). Religion and Spiritual Values in Indian Thought. *Philosophy East and West* 9 (1/2): 38–40.
23. Raju, P. T. (1959). Feigl on Intuition. *Philosophy East and West* 8 (3/4): 149–163.

24. Krishna, Daya (1961). "Lying" and the Compleat Robot. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 12 (August): 146-149.
25. Krishna, Daya (1961). The "Synthetic a Priori": Some Considerations. *Philosophy* 36 (137): 211-215.
26. Raju, P. T. (1962). Die Struktur des Ich-Bewußtseins (The Structure of I-Consciousness). *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* 16(4): 519-532.
27. Raju, P. T. (1962). Existence, Finite or Infinite. *Philosophy East and West* 12(3): 241-250.
28. Raju, P. T. (1963). The Nature of the Individual. *Review of Metaphysics* 17(1): 33-48.
29. Raju, P. T. (1963). Comparative Philosophy and Spiritual Values: East and West. *Philosophy East and West* 13(3): 211-225.
30. Krishna, Daya (1964). On the Distinction between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences and the Humanities. *International Social Science Journal* 16(4): 513-523.
31. Raju, P. T. (1964). What Is Reason? *International Philosophical Quarterly* 4(2): 173-182.
32. Raju, P. T. (1964). Indian Epistemology and the World and the Individual. *Philosophy East and West* 14(3/4): 311-332.
33. Krishna, Daya (1965). Three Conceptions of Indian Philosophy. *Philosophy East and West* 15(1): 37-51.
34. Krishna, Daya (1965). Adhyāsa: A Non-Advaitic Beginning in Śāṅkara Vedānta. *Philosophy East and West* 15(3/4): 243-249.
35. Krishna, Daya (1966). Three Myths About Indian Philosophy. *Diogenes* 55: 89-103.
36. Pahi, Biswambhar (1966). On Non-Existence of Finite Characteristic Matrices for Some Implication Calculi. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 31(4): 682
37. Applebee, R. C. and Pahi, Biswambhar (1968). Some Results on Generalized Truth Tables. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 33(4): 636.
38. Pahi, Biswambhar (1968). Restricted Extensions of Some Implication Calculi. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 33(4): 643.
39. Daya Krishna (1968). Is Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhya Kārikā Really Sāṅkhyan? *Philosophy East and West* 18 (3):194-204.

40. Krishna, Daya (1969). The Active and the Contemplative Values. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 29(3): 414–422.
41. Pahi, Biswambhar and Applebee, Ralph C. (1970). An Unsolvable Problem Concerning Implicational Calculi. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 11(2): 200–202.
42. Krishna, Daya (1970). Alienation, Positive and Negative. *Diogenes* 72: 39–55.
43. Pahi, Biwambhar (1971). Restricted Extensions of Implicational Calculi. *Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* 17(1): 11–16.
44. Pahi, Biswambhar (1971). Full Models and Restricted Extensions of Propositional Calculi. *Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* 17(1): 5–10.
45. Applebee, Ralph C. and Pahi, Biswambhar (1971). Some Results on Generalized Truth-Tables. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 12(4): 435–440.
46. Pahi, Biswambhar (1971). Note of Full Models of Propositional Calculi. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 36(2): 363.
47. Krishna, Daya (1971). A “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy” and the Nature of Society. *American Sociological Review* 36(6): 1104–1107.
48. Pahi, Biswambhar (1972). A Theorem on the Interrelationship of Axiom Systems for Implicational Calculi. *Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* 18(8-11): 165–167.
49. Pahi, Biswambhar (1972). A Method for Proving the Non-Existence of Finite Characteristic Models for Implicational Calculi. *Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* 18(8-11): 169–172.
50. Pahi, Biswambhar (1972). Maximal Full Matrices. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 13(1): 142–144.
51. Pahi, Biswambhar (1973). Necessity and Some Non-Modal Propositional Calculi. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 14(3): 401–404.
52. Krishna, Daya (1973). The Concept of Revolution: An Analysis. *Philosophy East and West* 23(3): 291–297.
53. Pahi, Biswmbhar (1974). On the Non-Existence of Finite Characteristic Models for Some Classes of Implicational Calculi. *Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* 20 (8-12):113-119.

54. Pahi, Biswambhar (1974). Result on Axiom Systems for Propositional Calculi. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 39(2): 382–382.
55. Pahi, Biswambhar (1974). Jankov Theorems for Some Implicational Calculi. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 39(2): 391–391.
56. Pahi, Biswambhar (1975). Jankov-Theorems for Some Implicational Calculi. *Mathematical Logic Quarterly* 21(1): 193–198.
57. Raju, P. T. (1975). Being: How Known and How Expressed. *International Philosophical Quarterly* 15(2):161–179.
58. Krishna, Daya (1976). Science, Technology and Values. *Diogenes* 24: 29–40
59. Raju, P. T. (1976). Being, Becoming, and Essence. *Idealistic Studies* 6 (1):33-48.
60. Krishna, Daya (1977). Culture. *International Social Science Journal* 29(4): 651–670, 677.
61. Raju, P. T. (1978). Self and Body: How Known and Differentiated. *The Monist* 61(1): 135-155.
62. Krishna, Daya (1982). God and Human Consciousness. *Diogenes* 30: 1-10.
63. Krishna, Daya (1985). God and the National State. *Diogenes* 33: 91-100.
64. Krishna, Daya (1986). Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be. *Diogenes* 34(136): 58–69.
65. Raju, P. T. (1990). Transcendence and Historicity In the Self As Ātman. *Idealistic Studies* 20(3): 203–229.
66. Krishna, Daya (1993). Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Indian Philosophy. *Asian Philosophy* 1993: 69–82.
67. Krishna, Daya (1999). Drei Mythen über die indische Philosophie. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 47(4): 633–642.

Ex. Adjunct Professor,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Mumbai, Mumbai
pjetli@gmail.com

Prof. R. S. Bhatnagar – A Tribute: A Thinker on the Long Wave of Reason and Reflection

Melapalayam Rajagopalan Venkatesh

“Two things fill the mind with ever new increasing admiration and awe, the more often we steadily reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. I do not seek or conjecture either of them as if they were veiled obscurities or extravagances beyond the horizon of my vision; I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence.”-

Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*

Immanuel Kant opened us to two difficult worlds simultaneously, the 'phenomena' and the 'noumena'. This famous quote from the great German philosopher keeps rebounding on and off; more recently, it bounced back on December 21, 2020, coinciding with the winter solstice to be precise, in a year that re-discovered the truth of the maxim, 'home is the world', thanks to the Covid-19 novel coronavirus pandemic.

Astronomers and the world at large that evening were witness to a grand, once-in-a-400-year rare astronomical event, the 'great Saturn-Jupiter conjunction', in a throwback as it were to the Italian astronomer Galileo's era when he discovered the four moons of Jupiter and a 'strange oval' encircling Saturn.

Scientists who put their telescopes to the sky called it the 'great conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter' because, observing from the Earth, these two planets appear to look closest on a straight line in the night sky, at the long-end of a shrinking 'angle of convergence'. Dr. E. Ebenezer Chellasamy, Head of the Solar Observatory at Kodaikanal in South Tamil Nadu, one of the oldest in the country, which tracks solar movements and such astronomical events, said that they had opened up its oldest telescope for people to have a glimpse of this rare event. In reality, the distances between these two planets of the solar system does not decrease even an inch, he explained. But as we are seeing them from the Earth, the 'angle of convergence' or 'visibility' gets shorter and shorter until it appears to be the shortest on December 21, 2020.

This phenomenon recently recurred roughly after 400 years and it would take another 800 years for the 'great conjunction' of these two planets to be visible in similar close proximity in the night sky, Dr. Ebenezer, the scientist of the Indian Institute of Astrophysics, under which Kodaikanal Solar Observatory comes, elaborated. It is a beautiful sight to watch as the two planets appear as shining heavenly neighbours, on a straight line as it were.

On that day, star-gazers could, watching these two planets through a telescope, see the duo seem to be in hugging closeness, though in reality they are far apart as very distant planets. Yet, people got a feel of the world without- 'things in space-time' on the one hand and the life of the human mind or consciousness on the other. The 2020 winter solstice thus unwittingly turned the focus on some of the fundamental issues in Philosophy, even without people being actually aware of it!

Prof. Rajendra Swaroop Bhatnagar, former professor of philosophy at the University of Rajasthan, who passed away in Jaipur on Wednesday, November 6, 2019, if alive today, would have seized this sky-window, this great planetary conjunction to re-articulate the core concerns of philosophy: knowledge and opinion, affirmation and negation, good and evil, logical necessity and the radical contingency of humdrum human existence, and so on.

To many of his students of philosophy, including the writer of these lines, his death came as a deep, personal loss. The reflective flame in Prof. Bhatnagar, whose long association with the Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, gently wafted out at 86 after a brief illness, his family said. But the pain of his last moments remains unknowable. It is about the bridge between life and death that every individual has to cross at some point. His meditations on 'death' at various levels was a pointer to his trying to grasp this mystery as well. He was suffering from a lung infection and was admitted to a hospital in Jaipur, but the infection spread to other parts and the end came.

Much of Rajasthan may be a desert, but the flowers of 'creative philosophizing' nurtured by the great contemporary Indian philosopher, late Prof. Daya Krishna and others, always bloomed and smelt sweet in the University Philosophy Department at Jaipur. For all the turbulence of the external world, many believe Jaipur is still a 'pink city'. For Daya Krishna greatly adored and practiced what may be termed the 'larger fellowship of the human spirit', allowing the young crowd in particular to question and perpetually

revisit 'received wisdoms', both East and West, texts fundamental to human progress.

Along with the likes of an array of splendid post-independent Indian thinkers like Arindam Chakraborty, Ramchandra Gandhi, Govind Chandra Pande, Sibajiban Bhattacharya, M. P. Rege, R. C. Dwivedi, Mukund Lath, to K. J. Shah, Prof. R. S. Bhatnagar was part of Daya Krishna's 'Jaipur Experiment'. That dialogue encouraged people to think creatively, re-open vistas with a fresh mind, without being bogged down by dogma, reverence and the like, yet launching fruitful interactions between diverse traditions.

As a professor of philosophy, Bhatnagar, born on January 1, 1933, formally retired from the department in 1992, but his "long association" with it and its philosophical activities stretched to five decades. "He was associated with its every single activity till his last breath," recalled Prof. Arvind Vikram Singh, the present head of the Philosophy department in the University of Rajasthan.

Hailing from Uttar Pradesh, Bhatnagar was a product of the University of Allahabad. He did his doctoral research under Prof. R. N. Kaul, on *Hegel in the Light of Existentialism*. He started teaching in the University of Allahabad in the mid-1950s, then moved on to Banasthali Vidyapeeth, in rural Rajasthan near Jaipur. That institution was started by Pandit Hiralal Shastri way back in 1935, after giving up a very lucrative civil service, inspired by Gandhi's ideas of *Swaraj* and rural reconstruction. Prof. Bhatnagar later joined the department at University of Rajasthan, in 1970.

An excellent scholar in Greek philosophy, philosophy of science, early Continental philosophy, it was later in his life that Bhatnagar started studying the classical Indian texts, recalled Prof. Singh in a telephonic conversation from Jaipur. "He (Bhatnagar) was a great philosopher; his translation of Plato's *Republic* in Hindi, titled, *Nagriki: Platone Ki Politiya Ka Hindi Anuvada* is a classic in itself. It is a huge contribution to understanding comparative philosophical perspectives. Prof. Bhatnagar's Hindi translations of other Dialogues of Plato like *Theaetetus*, *Meno* and *Symposium*, are also to be published soon. "They will enrich the understanding of Greek philosophy in India," said Prof. Singh, adding, his "seminal ideas on philosophy of mind, is encapsulated in his unpublished work *Our Minds*. Prof. Bhatnagar's commitment to intellectual rigour was total; he learnt Greek even at an advanced age, recalled Dr. Shail Mayaram, Professor at the Centre for Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) Delhi, while paying rich tributes to him.

At the sprawling, lovely Rajasthan University campus when I happened to be there as JRF during the academic year 1983-84, with the lofty Auroville (Jhalana) hills in the backdrop- the range of colours of flowers in early spring was a real magic. Prof. Bhatnagar in his Socratic demeanour, was prompt at any seminar, speeding up the tidy-looking campus roads on his well-served scooter. One great quality with Daya Krishna as a philosopher and teacher was that he would let students/faculty say whatever they wished to say on the topic in discussion. Prof. Bhatnagar's interventions, in his soft tone, were always instructive and insightful, even hard criticisms couched in halting, courteous language. He believed harsh language does not win arguments and till the very end, Prof. Bhatnagar remained that way.

Author of scores of scholarly papers in a range of subjects in philosophy in national and international journals, one major work Prof. Bhatnagar was associated with Prof. Daya Krishna as the 'editor' of the *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research* (JICPR), was in compiling the 'Author and Subject Index' of JICPR, that ran into several volumes, during 1983-1993. Apart from writing papers for and editing important texts like *Philosophy, Society and Action (Essays in honour of Professor Daya Krishna)*, Prof. Bhatnagar was also involved in the project of indexing of *Agenda for Research, Indian and Western Philosophy*¹.

One of his more recent philosophical works that saw the light of day in 2016 was, *Aspects of Life: An Invitation to Think* (published by Partridge India, A Penguin Random house company). The many-sidedness of Bhatnagar's philosophical passion comes to the fore in that work in addressing issues, that confront our mundane and exalted planes of existence, like conflict in values, by applying the concepts of philosophy to help resolving the dilemmas of *Dharma Sankat*. It is a work wrapped in human warmth, the philosopher's covenant with understated humour, the occasional ironic potshots that shows up the mirror to us and gives cross references to diverse philosophical traditions, making it a rich, refreshing read for the NextGen in particular.

In one of his seminal papers, *On Concepts*², he so finely unwinds, with a tooth comb as it were, the different types of concepts fundamental to structure of thought itself, namely concepts that 'organises our experience', and evaluative concepts like 'duty', 'utility' and so on. "A life of concepts is characterised by numerous dimensions; they make experience intelligible. Of course, they make

a lifeblood of thinking (itself). They get busy even with themselves,” Prof. Bhatnagar writes. In another perceptive paper, *On the Notion of Right*, he argues that rights are intrinsic to being a ‘person’ in any society; at the same time “rights do involve an inter-personal space for their fulfilment,” underscoring the importance of the ‘other’ in any social change situation. The deep influence of Immanuel Kant on Prof. Bhatnagar’s thinking is seen in such papers.

On a personal note, it was Prof. Bhatnagar who prodded me to write a monograph on two remarkable contemporary Indian philosophers, Ramchandra Gandhi and Daya Krishna, after their demise within a span of a few months in 2007. It came out as a small book, titled, *A Gandhi and a Socratic Gadfly- In Memory of Two Indian Philosophers*. In my acknowledgements, I had expanded his name as ‘Ranjit Singh Bhatnagar’ instead of ‘Rajendra Swaroop Bhatnagar’. On seeing the first copy of the book, he promptly called me up from Jaipur and with a hearty laugh, quipped: “Venkatesh, you have made me a lion!” I could not figure out for a moment what he meant, until he explained the error. We then tried to manually correct it here in Chennai in as many copies as possible!

A year after Prof. Bhatnagar's death, I recently came across a fascinating paper, critiquing one of his earlier papers, *Many Splendored Negation*, by Prof. C. D. Sebastian, Philosophy Group, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT, Bombay (published in the Journal of the Indian Council for Philosophical Research, July 25, 2020).

Dwelling on late Professor Bhatnagar's reflections on 'negation' - "there is no language without symbols like No, Not, None,"- a seminal speech-act that is at the heart of thought and being, Sebastian unfolds the profound dimensions in Bhatnagar's cogitations on that subject, impacting epistemology, ontology and ethics. We make and unmake ourselves and our world in a dialectical process that works through our innate capacity to 'negate', 'refute', 'render invalid' or even 'destroy' ideas and objects of this world. Even the idea of 'death', for late Prof. Bhatnagar, "which could be the negative in its most feared form," has a "positive effect on the Soul force in its commitment to live well and die well," as Sebastian says. Nagarjuna's Śūnyavāda represents the very epitome of what 'negation of negation' could lead to in making one see that 'being' and 'nothingness' are two sides of the same coin, just as Nagarjuna saw no difference between *saṃsāra* and

nirvāṇa. At the level of the individual, saying 'No' is the very hallmark of personal freedom.

Prof. Sebastian in analysing and assessing this complex "dialectics of Negation" that Prof. Bhatnagar struggled with, argues that taken to its logical end, Prof. Bhatnagar's treatise "is not complete unless one takes into consideration 'Negation' as an integral part of Philosophizing in India, whether it is the Buddhist tradition or any other tradition." There is also a more compelling phenomenology of the mind when people come to terms with the "Reality of Death" and the "inner courage" to take it. For Prof. Bhatnagar, this implies a certain 'moral realism' like in Kant's 'Critique of Practical Reason', as it involves an individual effort, an act of personal will, to cultivate this 'courage' as a moral value. That again seems to me to reinforce the deep influence of Kant on Prof. Bhatnagar- the continuing relevance of the two-track engagement, the starry heavens above and the moral law within. Prof. Sebastian, though, in paying tributes to Prof. R. S. Bhatnagar, sees his meditations on 'death' as resonating well with the Buddhist approach to 'death'. "To live well, is perhaps to learn to die well," as Prof. Sebastian says quoting Prof. Bhatnagar, which also chimes with ways of Theravada Buddhism. His reflections on 'death', are in part insights that flow from the way Prof. Bhatnagar had come to terms with suffering in his life.

With great trepidation, I once asked him about the growing 'Hindu nationalism' in the country. A politically very agile Prof. Bhatnagar was in his last years very concerned about it, that the Gandhi-Nehru framework of independent India was falling apart. In a response to this writer several months before his demise, Prof. Bhatnagar said, "the essence of religions, whichever denominations it might have, is in the notions of 'holiness', 'purity', 'charity'; the 'mantras', if I may call them so, help and not fight assimilation, not destruction, help harmony and peace, not dissension. And if I may add, love, not hate is the proper guide for the folks of today. With love. RSB."

On hindsight, in the face of the recent astronomical event of the 'great conjunction' of the two planets Jupiter and Saturn, that touching reply was a gentle caution to us against misreading of similar ideas or perceptions in any historical tradition. Philosopher Gilbert Ryle would have termed such errors as 'category mistake'. In a life of sustained, decades-long introspection, there are no full

stops. Such was the journey of reflection and suffering of R S Bhatnagar.³

Notes and References:

¹ The work is two-volume compendium of research problems and questions, formulated by Daya Krishna, edited by Prof. R. S. Bhatnagar, with an introduction by Prof. Yogesh Gupta; published from Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan

² JICPR April-June 2006

³ This Tribute is a modified, updated version of an earlier article I had written after Prof. Bhatnagar's demise, for the Deccan Chronicle, Chennai, 11th November 2019.

Senior Correspondent,
Deccan Chronicle, Chennai
venkatdc.2015@gmail.com