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# **SAMŚAYA EVAM PRAMĀ**

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*The present volume is dedicated to*  
***Late Dr. Ramesh Chandra Sharma***  
*(1939-1998)*

*Revered Guru and Supervisor of mine*  
*-Arvind Vikram Singh*  
*General Editor*



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## About *Samśaya Evam Pramā*

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The nature, conditions, limits and validity of knowledge are perennial issues of contemplation in epistemic debates. In both Indian and Western Epistemology, epistemologists right since the beginning have deliberated upon 'what knowledge is not' and 'what knowledge is'. As such knowledge and its anti-thesis, both are equally important in epistemic discussions. *Samśaya* or Doubt has been in both East and West, a catalyst to initiate philosophical reflection on the nature of knowledge.

In Nyāya, *Samśaya* is one of the 16 categories and how and why it affects the analyses of *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, and *pramā* has been a hot topic for classical and subsequent scholars. In Mīmāṃsā, later Vedānta, later Buddhism, *śaṅkā*, its nature and its implications for the possibility and impossibility of knowledge has a long history of reflection. Thus in order to understand the nature of *pramāṇa* and *pramā*, an understanding of *apramā* and its most important category *samśaya*, is imperative. Equally important is the need to understand the relationship between these two.

In order to understand the relationship between knowledge and its anti-thesis, knowledge and doubt, one yet again needs to have a survey of the classical debates and issues in 'theory of knowledge' as it developed from Greek to Analytical traditions. How doubt ignited the philosophical enquires in Greek and Modern Philosophy, could be seen in the thoughts of Plato, Pyrrho and Rene Descartes and his

methodic skepticism. Hume's revolutionary topsy-turvyng the entire flair of epistemic discussion in modern philosophy, whereby he categorically terms 'universal and necessary' and factual knowledge an impossibility, is indubitably a milestone in the history of Epistemology. It would be an ad-nauseam repetition to state here that how Kant's slumber was broken by such devastating doubt of Hume and how he endeavors to show the possibility of certain knowledge.

In Contemporary Epistemology, G. E. Moore's response to skepticism and Wittgenstein's analysis of 'knowledge and certainty' is a reopening of the debate and dialectic between doubt and knowledge. A. J. Ayer's detailed analysis of doubt, gives another dimension to the debate. Gettier's problem and the reflection over the relationship between knowledge and belief resurged the attempts to understand the structure of knowledge with its essential conditions and also with the pivotal question: 'is certainty essential for knowledge?'. Needless to mention a large tribe of epistemologists in 20<sup>th</sup> century, had for its solitary objective: counter-replying the skeptics. Similarly the third condition of knowledge, i.e., justification has undergone huge range of variegated treatment in Contemporary Epistemology and new avenues like Virtue Epistemology have developed as such.

It follows therefore that the history of debates regarding the nature of knowledge and its relationship to doubt is a complex one, and one that opens a cascade of related



problems. This ordains an analysis of knowledge with its associate notion-doubt. This also mandates an understanding of the various perspectives on the issue, which sprouted in the more than two millennia long history of Epistemology.

A profitable study of classical texts in Indian Epistemology, thereby re-opening certain lost debates related to the problem, could be restarted in order to understand the issue. The discussion in Indian Epistemology could be complemented through a cross cultural enquiry by infusing the rich insights available in Greek and Analytical traditions. Similarly the problems as discussed in Western Theory of Knowledge could be better understood, resolved or dissolved by absorbing the Indian perspective.

In order to delineate the history of debates and dialectic between these two pertinent ideas of Epistemology, namely knowledge and doubt or *pramā* and *samśaya*, the idea of a *jñānayajña* (conference) on *Samśaya Evaṃ Pramā, Doubt and Knowledge- Indian and Western Perspectives*, was conceived. Attempts were made in the conference to understand the relationship between knowledge and doubt or *pramā* and *samśaya*; reflections were also made upon certain other pivotal questions of Epistemology.

The present volume consists of some of the papers presented in the International Conference on *Samśaya Evaṃ Pramā, Doubt and Knowledge- Indian and Western Perspectives*, sponsored by Indian Council of Philosophical

Research and UGC, organized by Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, from 15<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> March 2019. Resource persons/paper-presenters from China, New Zealand, U.S.A. and more than fifteen states of India, participated in the conference. Over 40 papers were read in the conference and more than ten papers were received in addition to the above.

The paper of Prof. Ernest Sosa, eminent philosopher and father of Virtue Epistemology, Rutgers University, U.S.A. and undoubtedly one of the most important epistemologists of last century, is the talk that he delivered as the keynote address of the conference. Prof. Sosa's paper, *The Telic Normativity of Epistemology*, summarizes his celebrated notion of Virtue Epistemology with the five main components of a telic theory, namely- attempt, success, competence, aptness, achievement. As per his views, "the normativity of knowledge is a special case of such telic normativity".

The paper by Prof. J. L. Shaw, Victoria University, New Zealand, *Knowledge and Doubt: Some Contemporary Problems and their Solutions from an Indian Perspective*, discusses the intricacies of Nyāya concept of cognition and draws its parallels in the Analytic Tradition. Prof. Shaw elaborates certain technical terms of Navya-Nyāya such as *sambandha*, *viśeṣya*, *viśeṣaṇa*, etc. and relates these to certain concepts in Bertrand Russell. He concludes by underscoring that the very notion of doubt presupposes certain knowledge (as in Nyāya) and thus certain

knowledge is possible. Prof. P. K. Mukhopadhyay, in his paper, *On the Possibility of Philosophy*, presents a broad overview of how doubt has been the greatest foe as well as the greatest friend of the philosopher. Presenting the intersections and differences between the two traditions, on ‘doubt’ and ‘knowledge’, his paper reveals how doubt plays an important role in making philosophy possible.

The article by Prof. Raghunath Ghosh entitled, *Can Doubt be considered as a Witch (piśācinī)?*, distinguishes between logical doubt and psychological doubt, in order to evaluate the famous remark by Udayana. The paper emphasizes that it is psychological doubt which is deplorable, logical doubt on the other hand is conducive and essential in the furtherance of philosophical debates. He gives a detailed exposition of the treatment by Nāgārjuna to 'doubt' in *Vaidalyaprakaraṇam* and also how thinkers in Nyāya tradition, from Gotama to Udayana perceive doubt. Prof. Ghosh gives a brilliant overview of the relation between *samśaya* and *pramā* in Indian Philosophy and explains how *samśaya* has a vital role in genesis of *pramā*. The paper by Prof. Dilip Kumar Mohanta, through a textual exposition of the first twenty sūtras of *Vaidalyaprakaraṇam*, elaborates how Nāgārjuna pulverizes the epistemic categories of Nyāya and how an epistemological relativism is his import. The article also elaborates the sūtras of *Vaidalya* on *Samśaya* and the contentions of Nāgārjuna on *samśaya* as a category.

Prof. B. Agarwala introduces the notion of conative doubt and its resolution as in *Bhagvadgītā*. He presents Kṛṣṇa as ‘destroyer of doubt’ through ‘knowledgeable resolve’ (*jñāna*). Prof. Agarwala gives a textual as well as a hermeneutic treatment to the notions of *jñāna*, *saṃśaya*, *praśna*, *deha*, *dehī*, *matrāsparśa*, etc. Prof. Ambika Datta Sharma presents a detailed textual treatment of the problem of *prāmāṇya* in Buddhist tradition. Harping upon thinkers like Dharmakīrti, Śāntarākṣita, Kamalaśīla, the author explains the Buddhist position with great rigor. He gives a nuanced exposition of the intra-systemic development in the Buddhist tradition on the issue and beautifully terms the Buddhist view on *Prāmāṇyavāda* as *Sandarbhā-Saṃvedī-Prāmāṇyavāda*. Dr. Arun Kumar Mishra, in his paper, *Samśaya-Sūtra Kī Vyākhyā-Tantrāgat Vicalana Aur Samānatantṛī Bhinnatā*, presents a detailed analysis of the interpretations of *Samśaya-sūtra* by Vātsyāyana, Udyotkara, Vācaspati Mīśra, Udayanācārya and Śaṅkara Mīśra. He highlights how in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, subsequent scholars made deviation and variation by the virtue of their creativity and how Nyāya tradition differed from Vaiśeṣika on this league.

The paper by Prof. V. N. Sheshagiri Rao, gives a textual analysis of the notion of *jñāna* in *Bhāmatī* and elaborates the Advaitic distinction between *vṛtti* and *swarūpa jñāna*. Prof. Proyash Sarkar’s paper, *A Case for Indirect Doxastic Voluntarism*, through an analysis of Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vedāntin positions, examines the issue, whether beliefs are under direct control of human volition or not. He develops

a case for Indirect Doxastic Voluntarism and thus tries to defend the normativity of cognition in Nyāya. As per the argument delineated by him, we have “indirect control over our beliefs, which in its turn, creates a space for normativity in Nyāya epistemology”. Prof. Dipayan Pattanayak gives an overview of the *vaitaṇḍā* tradition in Indian Philosophy and summarizes the four major lines of arguments by Nāgārjuna in his anti-epistemology. Dr. Pattanayak shows how *pramāṇa-prameya* dichotomy could be safeguarded and how Nyāya logicians reveal the hollowness of *Vaitaṇḍika* position. Dr. Arnab Kumar Mukhopadhyay contextualizes certain questions of Philosophy of Mathematics on a cognitive basis. He elaborates the key tenets of Philosophy of Mathematics in Principia Mathematica and Russell’s treatment of number as ‘class’. Presenting the issue as in Bhāskara’s *Līlāvati*, Dr. Mukhopadhyay highlighted how the Līlāvatikāra’s position is a better account of ‘knowledge of mathematical truths’ than the Western paradigm. Dr. Saroj Kanta Kar, tries to offer an understanding of the fundamental reason behind Nāgārjuna’s rejection of epistemic categories in *Vaidalyaprakaraṇam* and *Vigrahavyavartini*. Dr. Kar opines that it were the noumenal and spiritual motives of Nāgārjuna that led him to reject the realist position. The former of us and Dr. Manish Sinsinwar in our paper have tried to present the views of Prof. Biswambhar Pahi on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of knowledge. We have reflected on his reformation of the traditional view and its epistemic implications.

The following papers presented in the conference, are included in the XXVIII.I<sup>st</sup> volume:

1. On Certain Knowledge-R.S. Bhatnagar
2. Skepticism, Doubt and Knowledge-P. R. Bhat
3. On Knowledge And Certainty-Hari Shankar Upadhyaya
4. Skepticism, Rule-following and Knowledge of Language-Nirmalya Narayan Chakraborty
5. Role of Skeptic Hypotheses in Revising Epistemic Presumptions-Sreekala M. Nair
6. Is Wittgenstein a Rule-Following Skeptic?-Gopal Sahu
7. Hume on Probability: A Review-Abha Singh
8. Some Cases of Non-Conceptual Knowledge in Indian Epistemology-Arvind Vikram Singh and Manish Gothwal
9. The Notion of Primitive Certainty in Ludwig Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty'-Ahinpunya Mitra
10. Knowledge as Justified True Belief: Gettier's Problem and his aspirations-Pratibha Sharma
11. Experience, Knowledge and the Space of Reasons-Manoj K. Panda
12. Davidson on Self-Knowledge and Externalism-Pragyanparamita Mohapatra
13. The Notion of 'Appropriative Epistemology' and Epistemic Justice-Anubhav Varshney, Bheeshm Narayan Singh and Megh Goswami

14. *Vaidalyaprakarana* and Epistemological Skepticism of Nāgārjuna-Bijoy Sardar
15. Jayarāsi's Polemic against Perception as an Epistemic Tool-Debopama Bose
16. Śrīharṣa's Rebuttal Arguments Against *Pramāṇavādins*-Saheb Samanta
17. Does Skepticism Necessarily Imply the Denial of Certainty?: Reconstructing Kantian Response-Pinaki Sarkar

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It is obligatory for us to register our gratitude to all the people behind the conference and the publication of this issue. We are thankful to the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, MHRD, New Delhi and University Grants Commission for the financial assistance for the conference and digital printing of this issue. We are also indebted to the authorities of University of Rajasthan, Jaipur for their support and cooperation. It is an overwhelming feeling to recall the response from scholars of international repute for the event. Prof. Sosa obliged us by delivering his talk in wee hours of the morning; it was a lifetime experience to have him in our midst. Prof. J. L. Shaw has been inspiring and guiding us ever since. Prof. P. K. Mukhopadhyay, Prof. R. N. Ghosh, Prof. D. K. Mahanta, Prof. Rajaneesh Kumar Shukla, Prof. N. N. Chakraborty, Prof. Ambika Dutta Sharma, Dr. Arun Mishra and others encouraged and supported in every possible way. We owe an insurmountable debt to all the scholars

who participated in the conference; a word on the academic worth of their paper will surely be an act of impudence. The presence of Prof. Biswambhar Pahi, Prof. R. S. Bhatnagar, Dr. K. L. Sharma, Prof. V. S. Shekhawat, Prof. Kusum Jain, Prof. Yogesh Gupta, throughout the conference—from dawn to dusk—was a life-breath of resilience and inspiration for us; their legacy is what we seek to revive. We are also thankful to the faculty members of the department, Dr. R.P. Sharma, Dr. Manish Sinsinwar, Sri Manish Gothwal, Dr. Vinita Nair and teachers from other departments, for their support and cooperation. A word of gratitude is also due, to the non-teaching staff of the department and the printers of the present volume. We are also full with gratitude towards our family members, Sri Bechan Singh, Smt. Shail Kumari, Smt. Anuradha Singh, Amitesh Singh, Ayushi Singh, Sri Kishore Varshney, Smt. Leena Varshney, Abhinn Varshney, for providing us enough support, energy and leisure, without which the present task could not have been accomplished. In the end it is imperative to put on record that in a way the conference was largely a student organized event; it was an impossibility for us to have conceived about it without the tireless support of our students. Megh Goswami, Hemant Sharma, Bheeshm Narayan Singh, Sameer Kumar, Dharmपाल Garhwal, Jitendra Chandolia, Uroosa Tanzeem worked day and night for the event; we are thankful to all our students and research scholars.



Any academic worth that is found in the present volume, is due to the scholars who have made contribution to it and all flaws and imperfections are owned by us.

Arvind Vikram Singh  
Anubhav Varshney  
Editors



**Ernest Sosa**

- A. All achievements are bound to be attempts that succeed, but the converse is false. Success by luck rather than competence need not be achievement. However, there are many ways in which a successful performance can be lucky without falling short in the slightest as an achievement.
- B. Achievement requires success that is *apt*: through competence rather than luck. This emerges from a review of telic theory's five main phenomena: *attempt*, *success*, *competence*, *aptness*, *achievement*.
- C. When generalized to all attempts, of whatever sort, that is an account of the telic normativity of attempts as attempts, in terms of their accuracy, adroitness, and aptness.

And there is a connection with credit of a certain sort, *telic* credit, where a success is thus “creditable” to someone if it is *attributable* to them, without necessarily importing any more substantive axiological standing. A shot that constitutes a “perfect” murder may be an excellent shot,

one thus creditable to its agent, while constituting an abominable crime, not to his *moral* credit.

- D. Surely the archer deserves full credit so long as his arrow is *in fact* unaffected by wind on the way to the target, no matter how likely a spoiler gust may have been.

That being so, it emerges that the relevant “situation” is not a *modal* property of the spatio-temporal volume involved. Success in hitting the target across the relevant space is quite unlikely at that time, despite our archer's excellent skill and shape. What makes success so unlikely is the high risk (by hypothesis) of a spoiler gust. However, so long as no spoiler gust *in fact* comes along, our archer enjoys the complete competence required for creditable, apt success.

- E. Apt performance, including apt epistemic performance, is not dependent on how safely one *possesses* relevant competence. This applies to all three sorts of competence: first, the (innermost) skill; second, the skill plus the required inner shape; third, the skill and shape, in turn, plus the required situation. None of these varieties of competence need be *safely* in place. The safety that *does* seem required for apt performance, including apt judgment and belief, is rather the SSS-relative safety constituted by the fact that one is (actually, however luckily) SSS-competent enough, so that, if one tried *when thus SSS-competent*, then one would likely enough succeed.

**F.** Here again are the five main ideas of our account: they are those of *attempt*, *success*, *competence*, *aptness*, and *achievement*.

Archery not only provides an example of a telic triple-a normativity constituted by those five ideas. It also shows how achievement comes in degrees within two dimensions. One dimension is that of the apt shot, accurate *because* adroit. The other is that of the *fully* apt shot, where the agent aims not just at accuracy but at aptness and succeeds through competence in this more complex endeavor.

**G.** If a shot is too risky, it is ill-advised. A shot can attain quality *in the specific regard of being well selected*. A well selected shot can thus rate higher in that regard than one that falls short through pertinent negligence or recklessness.

A dimension of second-order evaluation of Diana's shot thus involves more than its aptness, its success through (first-order) competence. Also relevant is whether the attempt is well selected so as to avoid recklessness, and even negligence.

**H.** When successfully enough guided that way, an attempt rises to the level of the *fully apt*. Nothing short of this will suffice for *achievement full well*. If an attempt succeeds aptly without being fully apt, there is an element of relevant luck in its success. Its aptness is not secured through the guidance of the agent's second-order competence. It is thus lucky that the agent

succeeds aptly. And this sort of luck reduces or blocks credit to the agent for their success, as it reduces or blocks credit to the agent for the aptness of their success.

- I. Going beyond virtue theory in general, here is a main thesis of virtue *epistemology*:

*that the normativity of knowledge is a special case of such telic normativity.*

Knowledge is thus a central sort of epistemic achievement. Here we find the traditional issues of skepticism, and other issues of the nature, scope, and value of knowledge.

Gettier cases may now be seen as ones in which the epistemic agent falls short either because their pertinent belief falls short of aptness altogether, or because it falls short of *full* aptness.

- J. An alethic affirmation might be just a guess, as when a contestant tries to affirm the correct answer to a quiz show question. But an oncologist would aim not just to guess but to affirm competently, indeed *aptly*. Only an alethic affirmation can amount to a judgment, which it can do only if it aims not just at truth but also at aptness. This yields the following hierarchy.

Saying: of “p”

Affirmation: saying that p

Alethic affirmation: endeavor (attempt) to get it right by affirming that p

Judgment: endeavor (attempt) to get it right *aptly* by alethically affirming that p

- K.** In the domain of action in general, not just epistemic action, we find a “forbearance” that amounts to *intentional omission*. Here two varieties can be distinguished through the following formulation:

*Forbearing from X’ing in the endeavor to attain an aim A.*

- Where might parentheses go into that formulation?  
Here are two options:

*Narrow-scope:* (Forbearing from X’ing) in the endeavor to attain a given aim A.

*Broad-scope:* Forbearing from (X’ing in the endeavor to attain a given aim A).

- L.** When one faces judgmentally a question whether p, one deliberates on whether to affirm alethically (positively or negatively) or suspend (intentionally omitting alethic affirmation). Judgment on whether p would require aiming for *apt* alethic affirmation. So, competent pursuit of that aim would require aiming to affirm only if one (likely enough) would affirm aptly. One puts oneself in the appropriate shape and situation and approaches the question with the required skill so that

one affirms only if one would do so aptly. That is part of what proper inquiry involves; one must aim to satisfy that conditional. And this is half of our biconditional objective: to affirm (positively or negatively), on the question whether  $p$ , if and only if one would thereby affirm aptly. (In abbreviated form, the objective is: to affirm re  $\langle p \rangle$  iff one would affirm aptly.)

**M.** A desirable level of human knowledge is the *fully apt alethic affirmation*. That is a further dominant aim of inquiry. When we inquire, we adopt certain subsidiary aims in the endeavor to attain our dominant aims. Such knowledge is thus a (telic) norm of inquiry; it constitutes a desirable sort of success in inquiry. It thus provides a (main) norm of judgment, whether public or private. And it is thus not only a norm of *judgment*, but also a norm of *suspension*.

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Notes:

- <sup>1</sup> This was the keynote address to the International Conference on *Samśaya Evaṃ Pramā, Doubt and Knowledge-Indian and Western Perspectives*, organized by Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, from 15<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> March, 2019. Prof. Sosa obliged us by presenting the key tenets of Virtue Epistemology, in his talk.

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# Knowledge and Doubt: Some Contemporary Problems and their Solutions from an Indian Perspective<sup>1</sup>

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**J. L. Shaw**

## **Abstract**

One of the aims of this paper is to discuss the Nyāya concept of knowledge, although there is no separate word for the Western concept of knowledge. But, there are certain conditions which will justify and guarantee the truth of a cognition, and thereby the cognizer will be able to discriminate between true and false cognitions. Since justification is a property of true cognition, not a property of cognition or belief in isolation, this concept will throw light on contemporary discussions of knowledge as Justified True Belief (the JTB thesis), and thereby solve the age-old problems of knowledge, including the Gettier and post-Gettier counter-examples.

In order to achieve the above goals, this paper deals with the Nyāya concept of cognition, including the distinction between qualificative and non-qualificative cognition, which has affinity with Russell's distinction between 'knowledge by acquaintance' and 'knowledge by description', although the Nyāya avoids both scepticism and solipsism.

I shall also mention the Nyāya concept of relation as well as the Nyāya concept of causation, as causation is used to

explain all types of knowledge, namely perceptual, inferential, analogical and verbal. Moreover, causation is used to specify the causal conditions for cognitions, the causal conditions for false cognitions, the causal conditions for true cognitions, and the causal conditions which will guarantee or justify the truth of a cognition.

In this context, I shall also demonstrate how to explain a false cognition or belief without postulating the existence of the non-existent, and thereby falsify Russell's claim that no one has succeeded in explaining a false belief "without postulating the existence of the non-existent."

I shall also mention the Nyāya conception of doubt, as it rests on certainty. This is how the universal scepticism can be avoided. Some of the technical terms of the Nyāya philosophers will also be discussed in this paper for the perspicuous presentation of the Nyāya standpoint.

## **Introduction**

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how Indian philosophy can contribute to the discussion of shared problems with Western philosophy, and especially how Indian philosophy and Western philosophy can derive insights from each other.

There are several ways of introducing Indian philosophy and all of them are required at some stage or the other, although some of them may not appear to be useful to Western philosophers<sup>2</sup>.

- 1) To translate the texts from the original sources into English, or to write commentaries with translation;
- 2) To compare Indian philosophy with some trends of Western philosophy, ancient or modern, such as comparison of Advaita Vedānta with Hegel or Bradley, or existentialist's conception of 'angst' (anxiety) with Buddhist conception of *duḥkha* (suffering);
- 3) To demonstrate the relevance of Indian philosophy with respect to certain shared problems or questions, especially the contemporary problems of epistemology and philosophy of language.

Since this paper focuses on the latter approach, I would like to focus on the following questions:

- 1) How to suggest new or better solutions to some of the epistemological problems of contemporary philosophy;
- 2) How to suggest solutions to some age-old or unsolved problems of Western philosophy;
- 3) How to add new dimensions to Western philosophy.

The first section of this paper deals with some of the technical terms for the perspicuous presentation of the Nyāya view. The second section deals with the sources of knowledge, focussing on the Nyāya conception of perception, inference, analogy and testimony. In this

context, I shall mention a) the causal conditions of perceptual, inferential, analogical, and verbal cognitions; b) the causal conditions of their falsehood; c) the causal conditions of their truth, and d) the causal conditions which will guarantee or justify their truths.

In the third section, I shall deal with the Nyāya conception of false belief or cognition, which does not postulate the existence of the non-existent, and thereby falsifies Russell's claim that no one has succeeded in explaining a false belief without postulating 'the existence of the non-existent'.

The fourth section deals with the Nyāya conception of doubt and the classification of dubious cognitions into four types. Since a dubious cognition rests on certainty, it does not lead to universal scepticism. Hence, if you doubt something, then you have assumed something else with certainty.

In my concluding remarks, I shall mention that the Nyāya techniques would not only solve some epistemological problems of the contemporary philosophers, but also suggest solutions to some age-old problems of Western philosophy. Moreover, some of their discussions or views would add new dimensions to Western philosophy.

## Section-1

### Some technical Terms

The Nyāya has drawn a distinction between qualificative (*svavikalpaka*) and non-qualificative (*nirvikalpaka*) cognitions. The Nyāya concept of qualificative cognition can be expressed by the form ‘aRb’. A qualificative cognition involves at least three elements, namely, a qualificand (*viśeṣya*), a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), and a qualification relation (*viśeṣya- viśeṣaṇa-sambandha*), which relates the latter to the former. According to the Nyāya, the possibility of qualificative perception cannot be explained without postulating non-qualificative perception. Let us consider the qualificative perception of a flower, which is atomic in nature. This cognition has three elements, namely, a particular flower which is a substance (*dravya*), floweriness which is a class-character (*jāti*), and the relation of inherence (*samavāya sambandha*), which relates the latter to the former in the ontology of the Nyāya. Since the perceptual cognition of a relation presupposes the cognition of its relata, the cognition of the inherence relation in this case presupposes the cognition of both the particular flower and the floweriness. These relata are cognized in a non-qualificative perceptual cognition. Now the following points are to be noted in this context:

- i) Since only the qualificand and the qualifier of an atomic qualificative perceptual cognition are cognized in a non-qualificative perceptual cognition, they are not cognised as qualificand or qualifier.

They are cognised as such without any mode of presentation.

- ii) The objects of a non-qualificative cognition cannot be cognised by expressions. Hence a non-qualificative cognition cannot be generated by an expression. For example, the expression ‘a flower’ will not generate a cognition of a flower which is not qualified by a property.
- iii) Regarding the truth of a non-qualificative cognition, the Navya-Nyāya philosophers claim it to be neither true nor false. This is due to the fact that both true and false cognitions presuppose qualificand-qualifier relations. Since there is no qualificand-qualifier relation in a non-qualificative cognition, it is outside the scope of true and false.
- iv) Since it is a causal condition of perceptual qualificative cognition, it is always immediately prior to it. When a sense-organ is related to its objects, the initial cognition which is due to this contact is non-qualificative. Thereafter, a qualificative cognition is generated.
- v) Since it has been postulated to give an account of qualificative perceptual cognition, it is also considered as perceptual in character. The objects of non-qualificative cognition, such as the particular flower and floweriness in the above example, are cognised as being related in a qualificative

cognition, such as, the flower qualified by floweriness in the relation of inherence. Hence the objects of non-qualificative cognition are public, not private sense-data.

Therefore, the Nyāya view does not lead to relativism, phenomenalism, or solipsism. For this reason the problems of the supporters of sense-data theory in contemporary philosophy do not arise in the Nyāya philosophy.

From the above discussion it follows that a qualificative cognition has the form ‘*aRb*’. If we consider a non-atomic qualificative cognition, such as, a flower is red, then it will be described in the following way:

The cognition in which the property of being the qualificand (*viśeṣyatā*) residing in a flower is limited by (*avacchinna*) floweriness, but determined by (*nirūpita*) the property of being the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇatā*) residing in the red colour, which is limited by redness and the relation of inherence (*samavāya*).

Now let us explain the Nyāya conception of relation, as anything can play the role of a relation, and the distinction between the relation limited by and the relation determined by.

$R$  is a relation if and only if  $(\exists x) (\exists y)$  (It is due to  $R$  that  $x$  appears as the qualificand and  $y$  as the qualifier in the cognition  $xRy$ ), and  $(\exists x) (\exists y)$  (It is due to  $R$  that there is a unified or qualified object, or fact  $xRy$ ), where ‘ $x$ ’ and ‘ $y$ ’ range over entities of the Nyāya system.

It is to be noted that in this definition the  $x$  and the  $y$  of a cognition need not be the same as the  $x$  and the  $y$  of a fact. If the cognition is true, then the  $x$  and the  $y$  of it would be the same as the  $x$  and the  $y$  of the fact  $xRy$ .

The limiter-limited relation (*avacchedaka-avacchinna*) relation is *usually* defined in the following way, as there are exceptions:

$x$  is limited by  $y$  if and only if (i) both  $x$  and  $y$  are properties, (ii)  $x$  is a relational property, and (iii) the property  $y$  is a mode of presentation of the object where the relational property  $x$  resides.

The determiner-determined relation (*nirūpya-nirūpaka-sambandha*) may be stated in the following way:

$x$  is determined by  $y$  if and only if  $x$  and  $y$  are relational properties of correlatives.

As mentioned before, a qualificative cognition has the form ‘ $aRb$ ’, where  $a$  is the qualificand (*viśeṣya*),  $b$  is the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), and  $R$  is the qualification relation (*viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-sambandha*). The qualificand-qualifier category is used to differentiate the qualificand from other objects in



terms of the qualifier. If  $R$  is a mode of presentation of  $b$ , which happens in almost all cases, then  $b$  is called ‘*prakāra*’ (‘relational qualifier’). Hence *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-sambandha* cannot be equated with *viśeṣya- prakāra-sambandha*. Again, they cannot be equated with the pairs *anuyogī – pratiyogī* (first term – second term), *ādhāra – ādheya* (substratum – superstratum), *uddeśya – vidheya* (subject – predicate).

The Nyāya has postulated several relational properties which signify the roles of objects, especially in epistemic contexts. The Nyāya also emphasises the direction of the relation for the explanation of the meaning of a sentence as well as for semantical analysis.

The relation of cognition (*jñāna*) to the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) is called ‘*viśeṣyatā*’ (‘the property of being the qualificand’), the relation of cognition to the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) is called ‘*viśeṣaṇatā*’ (‘the property of being the qualifier’), and the relation of cognition to the relation (*samsarga*) is called ‘*samsargatā*’ (‘the property of being the relation’). The relation of cognition to the relational qualifier (*prakāra*) is called ‘*prakāratā*’ (‘the property of being the relational qualifier’).

As regards the ontological nature of these properties, there is no unanimity among the Nyāya philosophers. Barring the question of their ontological status, they are very useful for drawing epistemic distinctions, including the distinction between true and false cognitions. Let us consider the cognition of the brown table or the table is brown. The

relation of cognition to the table which is the qualificand is *viśeṣyatā*, the relation of cognition to the brown colour is *viśeṣaṇatā*, and the relation of cognition to the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) is *saṃsargatā*. But the relation of cognition to the brown colour presented under the mode of the relation of inherence is *prakāratā*. It is to be noted that both the table and the brown colour are presented under the modes of tableness and brownness respectively. So we have altogether two objects, namely, the table, the particular brown colour, and the relation of inherence, two property-limitors (*avacchedaka dharma*), and three relational properties of being the objects of this cognition (*viśayatās*). The Nyāya claims that they are related in the following ways:

- 1) The property of being the qualificand residing in the table is limited by tableness.
- 2) The property of being the qualifier residing in the brown colour is limited by brownness.
- 3) The property of being the qualifier residing in the brown colour is also limited by the relation of inherence.
- 4) The property of being the qualificand residing in the table is determined by the property of being the qualifier residing in the brown colour.

- 5) The property of being the qualifier residing in the brown colour is determined by the property of being the qualificand residing in the table.
- 6) The property of being the qualification relation (*samsargatā*) residing in the inherence relation is determined by the property of being the qualifier residing in the brown colour.
- 7) The property of being the qualifier residing in the brown colour is determined by the property of being the qualification relation residing in the brown colour.

The first three relations are called ‘limitor-limited’ (*‘avacchedaka-avacchinna’*), but the remaining four are called ‘determiner-determined relations’ (*‘nirūpya-nirūpaka-sambandhas’*). It is to be noted that the above seven relations are present both in a true as well as in a false cognition. In other words, if the cognition of the table is brown is false, then also these relations are present. But when the cognition is true, it is related to the fact or the qualified object (*viśiṣṭa-viśaya*). Hence it is related to the fact the table being brown. This relation of the cognition to the qualified object is called *‘viśiṣṭa-viśayatā’* (‘the property of being the qualified object’).

It is to be noted that the *viśiṣṭa-viśayatā* resides in the whole which includes the qualificand, the qualifier and the relation. Hence it is not something over and above these three entities. If a qualificative cognition is represented by

$aRb$ , then the cognition of  $R$  which relates  $b$  to  $a$ , in addition to cognising  $a$  as the qualificand and  $b$  as the qualifier, will amount to the cognition of the qualified object (*viśiṣṭa-viśayatā*). As mentioned before, the function of a relation at epistemic level is to make one object as qualifier of another. Hence, in this case,  $b$  is cognised as the qualifier of  $a$ . Another function is to make a fact or a qualified object. In the case of a false cognition, the former function is present, but not the latter with respect to the same  $a$  and  $b$ , although it relates two other objects elsewhere or elsewhen. But in the case of a true cognition both the functions are present with respect to the same items.

When we put a book on the table, a new fact occurs, and the novelty of this fact is explained in terms of the novelty of the conjunction relation of the book to the table. But in the case of a false cognition, this novelty is missing, as a previously cognised relation makes one the qualifier of another.

So far we have explained the relation of a cognition to its objects, and the relation among the objects. Now let us point out the relation of objects to the cognition. In our above example, the relation of the table to the cognition is called '*viśeṣyitā*'. This relation is the converse of the property of being the qualificand (*viśeṣyatā*). The relation of the brown colour to the cognition may be called '*viśeṣaṇitā*', which is the converse of *viśeṣaṇatā*, although this term has not been used by the Nyāya philosophers. The

relation of the inherence relation to the cognition is *saṃsargitā*, which is the converse of the property of being the qualification relation (*saṃsargatā*). And the relation of the brown colour under the mode of the relation of inherence to the cognition is *prakāritā*, which is the converse of *prakāratā*. The relation of the table being brown, which is a qualified object, to the cognition is *viśiṣṭa-viśayatā*, which is the converse of *viśiṣṭa-viśayatā*.

As the properties residing in the objects of cognition are related to each other by the determiner-determined relation (*nirūpya-nirūpaka sambandha*), so are the properties of a cognition which are due to relations of the objects to the cognition. Hence *viśeṣyitā* is determined by *viśeṣanītā*, and the latter by the former. Again, *saṃsargitā* is determined by *viśeṣanītā*, and the latter by the former. Similarly, *prakāritā* is determined by *viśeṣyitā*, and the latter by the former.

As in a true cognition the relation of cognition to its qualified object is *viśiṣṭa-viśayatā*, similarly the relation of the qualified object to the cognition is *viśiṣṭa-viśayatā*. As the *nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvāpanna-viśayatās* (the objects related to each other by determiner-determined relation) explain the unity of the objects of a cognition, similarly *nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvāpanna-viśayatās* (the elements of a cognition related to each other by determiner-determined relation) explain the unity of the elements of a cognition. As *viśayatās* are related to each other by the determiner-determined relation and the *viśayatās* are also related to

each other by determiner-determined relation, so are the relations between *viṣayatās* and their respective *viṣayitās*. That is to say, the relation of *viśeṣyatā* to *viśeṣyitā*, and its converse, the relation of *viśeṣaṇatā* to *viśeṣaṇitā* and its converse, the relation of *samsargatā* to *samsargitā* and its converse, the relation of *prakāratā* to *prakāritā* and its converse, as well as the relation of *viśiṣṭa-viṣayatā* to *viśiṣṭa-viṣayitā* and its converse, are all determiner-determined relations. In a true cognition all of them will hold good, but in a false cognition the last one will not hold good, as the cognition is not related to the qualified object. In our above example, the cognition would be related to the table being brown by the relation of inherence if it is true, but not otherwise.


By introducing the determiner-determined relation (*nirūpya-nirūpaka-sambandha*) at different levels, the Nyāya emphasises not only the unity of the cognitive situation, but also explains the difference between a true and a false cognition.

It is to be noted that in the definition of truth, the Nyāya philosophers have used the terms *viśeṣyakatva* (the property having the converse of the qualificand at cognitive level) and *prakāraakatva* (the property having the converse of the relational qualifier at cognitive level). I think this is due to the fact that these terms emphasise reference to the objects of cognition, although they are due to relations of objects to the cognition. It is to be noted that the Nyāya philosophers have not used the term “*viśiṣṭa-viṣayatā*” in


their definition of truth, although it is present in a true cognition.

The following diagrams will represent the points mentioned in this section.


### 1. Objects of qualificative cognition




### 2. Relation of cognition to objects



### 3. Relation of objects to cognition




### 4. Relation among the objects of cognition





## 5. Relation among the elements of cognition



### Section-2

#### A) Sources of knowledge

As regards sources of valid cognition or knowledge, all the systems of Indian philosophy have emphasized perception. In this context it is to be noted that there is a substantial difference of opinion among the different schools of Indian philosophy regarding the sources of knowledge.

For the Cārvāka (a type of materialist) philosophers, perception is regarded as the only source of valid cognition.

The Bauddha and the Vaiśeṣika philosophers accept both perception and inference as sources of knowledge. The Sāṃkhya, Rāmānuja and Bhāsarvajña accept perception, inference, and verbal testimony.

The Nyāya accepts perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony. But the followers of the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā accept presumption (*arthāpatti*) in addition to the four sources accepted by the Nyāya.

The followers of the Kumārila Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita Vedānta accept non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) in addition to the previous five sources of knowledge.

The followers of the Purāṇas accept two more, namely, entailment (*sambhava*) and tradition (*aitihya*). The followers of the Tantra accept gesture and posture (*ceṣṭā*) in addition to the eight other sources of knowledge.

The Jaina philosophers have accepted two more sources of valid cognition, namely, the use of a type of counterfactual conditional (*tarka*), and memory (*smṛti*).

Since the Nyāya philosophers do not accept presumption as a source of valid cognition, it is reduced to agreement in absence type of inference (*vyatirekī-anumāna*). Similarly, non-apprehension is reduced to perception, entailment to inference, tradition to verbal testimony, and gesture (or posture) to inference.

But *tarka* is not reduced to an inference. It gives rise to an inference and thereby becomes auxiliary to an inference. Similarly, memory is not reduced to some other source of valid cognition. But the truth of a memory-cognition depends upon the truth of a previous apprehension which is

derived from perception, inference, comparison, or verbal testimony.

## **B) The Nyāya on Knowledge**

The Nyāya philosophers have discussed the conditions or causal conditions of cognition, conditions of a true cognition, conditions of a false cognition, and conditions which justify the truth of a cognition. The causal conditions involved in the process are not exclusively internal. Hence some conditions are external.

### **1) Perception**

The Nyāya claims that there are both a set of positive and a set of negative causal conditions of perception. The perceiver (the self), the internal sense-organ (*manas*), the external sense-organs (such as eyes), the objects of perception, the sense-object contact, etc., are positive causal conditions. In addition to these causal conditions, there are certain negative causal conditions. In this context it is to be noted that the Sāṃkhya<sup>3</sup> philosophers have mentioned the following negative causal conditions of perception, some of which have been accepted by the Nyāya:

- (a) Not being too far (*atidūratābhāva*);
- (b) Not being too close (*atisāmīpyābhāva*);
- (c) Absence of loss of sense-organs, such as deafness, blindness, etc. (*indriyanāsābhāva*);

- (d) Not being inattentive (*mano 'navasthānābhāva*);
- (e) Not being too subtle (*sūkṣmābhāva*);
- (f) Not having intervening objects such as wall, screen, etc. (*vyavadhānābhāva*);
- (g) Not being overshadowed (or covered) by a more powerful object (*abhibhavābhāva*), e.g., during the day, stars are not visible as they are overshadowed by the rays of the sun;
- (h) Not being mixed up with similar objects (*samānābhihārābhāva*), e.g., rain water cannot be perceived in a lake or a river separately as it is mixed up with similar objects.

But the Nyāya philosophers have not treated all of them as negative causal conditions.

They would consider only (a), (b), (g) and (h) as negative causal conditions. The remaining four will be considered positive. Therefore the third one will be normal sense-organs instead of absence of loss of sense-organs. The fourth one will be attentive instead of not being inattentive, and the fifth one having some magnitude (*mahatva*) instead of not being too subtle. The sixth one is to be rejected as negative on the ground that the sense-object contact is a positive causal condition. Hence the Nyāya philosophers would consider only (a), (b), (g) and (h) in the above list as negative.

In the case of an ordinary perceptual cognition sense-organs are special instrumental causes (*karāṇas*), and the sense-object contact is the operation (*vyāpāra*). The technical terms ‘*karāṇa*’ and ‘*vyāpāra*’ may be defined in the following way:

- (i)  $x$  is a *vyāpāra* (operation) of the effect  $E$  iff  $(\exists y)$  ( $y$  is a cause of  $E$  and  $x$  is a cause of  $E$ , but  $x$  is due to  $y$ ).
- (ii)  $x$  is a *karāṇa* (special instrumental cause) of the effect  $E$  iff  $x$  is a causal condition,  $x$  is related to the locus of  $E$  through an operation, and it is considered as a cause due to this relation only.<sup>4</sup>

Let us consider the following example of the Nyāya philosophers:

The floor has a pot. In this case our visual sense-organ is the special instrumental cause, and the contact between the visual sense-organ and the floor is the operation. Since our sense-organ is related to the floor, it is also related to the pot which is on the floor. Since the cognition that the floor has a pot is due to a sense-organ, it is considered as perceptual. In this case the objects of cognition such as the floor, the pot and the relation of conjunction are related to the cognition. Hence the cognition is also related to all these items. The cognition will be related to these items even if it is false. Hence in terms of the relation between these items and the cognition alone we cannot draw the distinction between a true and a false cognition. When a perceptual cognition is true, our sense-organ is related to the qualified object. In the above example, our visual sense

organ is not only related to the floor, but also to the floor that is qualified by a pot on it.

Hence the cognition generated by this process will be related to the qualified object or the fact. The relation of the cognition to the fact is called '*viśiṣṭa viśayatā*,' which is a relational property of the object of cognition. The cognition is characterized by the converse of this relational property, which is called '*viśiṣṭa viśayitā*'. Thus a true perceptual cognition presupposes certain additional conditions.

A false perceptual cognition could be due to a defect (*doṣa*) or an inappropriate causal condition (*kāraṇavaigunya*). A defect (*doṣa*) is the negatum of a negative causal condition of a true perceptual cognition, but an inappropriate causal condition (*kāraṇavaigunya*) is the weakness of a positive causal condition of a true perceptual cognition such as a defective visual sense organ or the absence of a positive causal condition of a true cognition such as blindness or loss of a visual sense organ. So a visual perception could be false due to distance (*dūratva*), which is the negatum of a negative causal condition of a true cognition. Similarly, it could be false due to weakness of the visual-sense organ or due to the absence of the visual sense organ.

In our above example, if the cognition is true, then it is related to the floor, the pot, the relation of conjunction, and the qualified object, i.e., the floor qualified by a pot on it. The causal conditions of this perceptual cognition would include the relation of the visual sense organ to these items. But, in addition to these relations of the cognition to its

objects, the Nyāya philosophers have accepted the relation of the cognition to universal floorness and the relation of the cognition to universal potness. Now the question is, what is the need for these additional relations?

In this context it is to be noted that some contemporary epistemologists claim that identification and discrimination are necessary for knowledge. On Goldman's theory, if *S* knows that *p*, then *S* can discriminate the truth of *p* from relevant alternatives. In his system these alternatives are counterfactual. But his theory cannot explain why a person, say Smith, is able to discriminate the truth of *p* from relevant alternatives, but another person, say Jones, is not able to discriminate the truth of *p* from relevant alternatives. The Nyāya can explain this phenomenon in terms of the relation of Smith's cognition to the universal floorness and the universal potness which are limitors of a floor and a pot respectively.

Since Smith's sense-organ is related not only to the floor and the pot, but also to their limitors, his cognition is related to these limitors as well. Since the cognition of limitors can explain our ability to discriminate, there is a need for these limitors in epistemic contexts. This is how the Nyāya solves the problems of Goldman as well as the post-Gettier counterexamples to the JTB thesis.

## 2) **Inference**

Similarly, in the case of an inference,<sup>5</sup> the Nyāya philosophers have discussed the causal conditions of an

inferential cognition (*anumiti*), the causal conditions of its truth or falsehood, and the causal conditions which justify the truth of an inferential cognition or the ability to discriminate. An inference, according to the Nyāya, has three terms, namely, *sādhya* (probandum), *pakṣa* (locus of inference), and *hetu* (probans, or reason). The term *sādhya* refers to what is to be inferred. The term *pakṣa* refers to the locus of inference where there is some doubt about the presence of *sādhya*. The term *hetu* refers to the reason by means of which the *sādhya* is inferred in the *pakṣa*. In this context it is to be noted that an inference for others, according to the Nyāya, involves five members, which are related to each other by the relation of relevance. Relevance is a relation between the contents of expressions or sentences *via* some questions.<sup>6</sup>

Let us consider the following inference for others:

Thesis (*pratijñā*): The mountain has a fire.

Reason (*hetu*): Because of smoke.

Example (*udāharaṇa*): Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen, etc.

Application (*upanaya*): The mountain has smoke which is pervaded by fire.

Conclusion (*nigamana*): Therefore, the mountain has a fire.

This inference has the following form:

Thesis (*pratijñā*): *a* is *G*.



Reason (*hetu*): Because of *F*.

Example (*udāharaṇa*): Wherever there is *F*, there is *G*, as in *b*, etc.

Application (*upanaya*): *a* has *F* which is pervaded by *G*.

Conclusion (*nigamana*): Hence *a* is *G*, or *G* is present in *a*, where *a* is the locus of the inference (*pakṣa*), *F* is the probans, *G* is the probandum, *b* is the locus where *G* is known to be present (*sapakṣa*).

According to the Nyāya each of the sentences in an inference for others is an answer to a question and each of them except the last one will give rise to a question. Moreover, each of them is used to generate a cognition in the hearer. Since a self-contradictory sentence such as '*a* is both *G* and not *G*' cannot generate a cognition, it cannot be used either as a premise or conclusion of an inference.

An inferential cognition, according to the Nyāya, has certain instrumental causal conditions (*nimitta-kāraṇas*) such as *parāmarśa* (operation), *vyāpti jñāna* (cognition of invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum), and *pakṣatā* (a special relational property of the locus). An inferential cognition (*anumiti*) is usually defined in terms of *parāmarśa* (operation). *Parāmarśa* (operation) is the cognition of the property of being the pervaded which appears as the qualifier of the probans which is present in the locus (*vyāpti-prakāra-pakṣadharmatā-jñāna*). In other words, an inferential cognition of the form '*a* is *G*' is derivable from the

cognition of the form ‘ $a$  is  $F$  which is pervaded by  $G$ ’, where  $a$  is the locus,  $F$  is the probans, and  $G$  is the probandum. The latter is a causal condition of the former. But the truth of the inferential cognition does not depend on this causal condition. Hence the truth of the cognition  $a$  is  $G$  does not depend on the cognition of  $a$  is  $F$  which is pervaded by  $G$ . The truth depends on the fact that the locus which is cognized in the operation is characterized by the probandum.

Now the question is whether a true inferential cognition would assume the status of knowledge. In this context it is to be noted that a false operation such as ‘the mountain has fog which is pervaded by fire’ might lead to the true inferential cognition ‘the mountain has fire.’ Since the occurrence of a false cognition can be prevented by a true one, the occurrence of the above false operation can be prevented by the true cognition that fog is not pervaded by fire. If the occurrence of the operation is prevented, then the occurrence of the inferential cognition which is due to this operation would also be prevented. In other words, if a person knows that fog is not pervaded by fire, then he would not use this operation to infer that the mountain has fire. For this reason the Nyāya would claim that the above true inferential cognition does not have the status of knowledge. In other words, if the inferential process which leads to a true cognition contains a false cognition, then the true inferential cognition does not have the status of knowledge.

The Nyāya philosophers have also discussed our ability to discriminate in the case of inferential cognition. Consider the following inference:

- (a) Wherever there is blue smoke, there is fire.
- (b) The mountain has blue smoke.
- (c) Therefore, the mountain has fire.

In this inference the conclusion follows from the premises, and both the conclusion and the premises are true. Now the Nyāya raises the question whether the cognition expressed by the sentence ‘wherever there is blue smoke, there is fire’ is such that the property of being the pervaded residing in blue smoke which is signified by the expression ‘wherever’ is limited by blue smokeness or by smokeness only. In other words, the question is whether the property of being the pervaded is presented under the mode of blue smokeness (i.e. blueness and smokeness) or under the mode of smokeness. If it is presented under the mode of blue smokeness, then the person, who has inferred the mountain has fire from the above two premises, would not be able to infer the same conclusion from the cognition of ‘the mountain has black smoke.’ On the contrary, if he/she would have inferred ‘the mountain has fire’ from ‘wherever there is smoke, there is fire, and the mountain has smoke’, then he/she would be able to infer ‘the mountain has fire’ from the observation of black smoke as well. This is due to the fact that the mode of presentation of the property of being the pervaded signified by the expression ‘wherever’ is smokeness, not blue smokeness. Since the property of

being the pervaded residing in any smoke, blue or black, is limited by smokeness, the cognitions expressed by sentences such as ‘wherever there is blue smoke, there is fire,’ and ‘wherever there is black smoke, there is fire’ would be true. In other words, if the property of being the pervaded is cognized under the mode of smokeness, then it reveals an ontological property of smoke, blue or black. Hence the cognition of smoke as qualified by smokeness, not as qualified by blue smokeness, gives us a guarantee for making similar inferences. Therefore, a person is able to infer fire from any smoke, blue or black, if he/she has cognised the property of being the pervaded under the mode of smokeness. Hence the Nyāya not only emphasizes our ability to discriminate in the case of inference, but also explains this ability in terms of the cognition of certain properties. In this case, it is the cognition of the limiter of the property of being the pervaded which resides in the probans.

### 3) Analogy or comparison

Now let us discuss the causal conditions of analogical cognition (*upamiti*). In an analogical cognition (*upamiti*), we cognise the property of being the referent of an expression (*vācyatva*) in its referent. Hence it takes the following form:

- (A)  $y$  is the referent of ‘ $x$ ’ under the mode  $y$ -ness, where ‘ $x$ ’ is the expression and  $y$  is its referent.

An analogical cognition presupposes the cognition of the following sentence:

- (B) That which is similar to  $z$  is the referent of 'x', where  $z$  is the referent of the term 'z' which is different from 'x', and the cogniser already knows the referent of 'z', but not the referent of 'x'.

Moreover, an analogical cognition presupposes a perceptual cognition, which is described by the following sentence:

- (C) This is similar to  $z$ .

Let us illustrate with an example of the Nyāya philosophers:

- (a) That which is similar to a cow is the referent of the word 'gavaya'.  
(b) This is similar to a cow.  
(c) *Gavaya* is the referent of the word 'gavaya'.

In this example, (c) is the analogical cognition (*upamiti*). It presupposes the understanding of the meaning of the sentence (a), which the cogniser might have heard from someone else or read in a book. Here (b) represents the perceptual cognition. The inherent and the similar-to-inherent causes would be the same as other types of cognition. In our above example, the special instrumental cause (*karana*) would be the cognition of similarity with a cow in the animal, which is being perceived. This cognition would give rise to the memory-cognition of (a). Hence the *memory cognition* of (a) would be the operation (*vyāpāra*) of the analogical cognition (*upamiti*). In this

analogical cognition *gavaya* which is the referent of the word 'gavaya' is cognised under the mode *gavayaness* (*gavayatva*), not under the mode of *thisness* or *being similar-to-a cow*. For this reason, according to the Nyāya philosophers, it cannot be reduced to an inferential cognition (*anumiti*).

Here also there are four sets of conditions for the analogical cognition. One set of conditions will define the analogical cognition. In our example, the perceptual cognition of similarity with a cow is the special instrumental cause (*karana*), and the memory cognition of that which is similar to a cow is the referent of the word 'gavaya' is the operation (*vyāpāra*). The analogical cognition would be true if we have cognised similar to a cow in the referent of the word 'gavaya'. But if we have not cognised similarity with a cow, then the analogical cognition would be false. In addition to the causal conditions for the truth of the analogical cognition, the Nyāya postulates *gavayatva* as the mode of presentation of *gavaya*, which gives us guarantee for its truth. Hence, it gives us the ability to discriminate in other cases. The property of being the qualificand residing in the perceptual cognition, and the property of being the qualificand residing in the analogical cognition are limited by *gavayatva*, although they are determined by different properties of being the relational qualifier (*prakāratā*).

#### 4) Verbal cognition or Testimony

With respect to a verbal cognition (testimony) also, the Nyāya philosophers have discussed its causal conditions,

the causal conditions of its truth or falsehood, and the causal conditions which justify its truth.

The chief instrumental cause (*karaṇa*) of the cognition of the meaning of a sentence is the cognition of the words contained in it, and the operation of this cognition is the memory-cognition of the referents of the words. According to the Nyāya, the cognition of the meaning of a sentence, as distinct from the cognition of the meanings of its parts, lies in cognizing the relation of the referent of its second term to that of its first term. Hence, the cognition of the meaning of the sentence ‘a flower is red’ lies in cognizing the relation of a red colour to a flower.

If the sentence is true, then it would generate a true cognition, and the cogniser would apprehend the relation which holds between a red colour and a flower. If the sentence is false, then it would generate a false cognition, and the cogniser would apprehend a relation which does not hold between that red colour and the flower, but which holds between some other objects such as between a red colour and a table. Now the question is whether a true cognition generated by a true sentence has the status of knowledge. On this point the Nyāya claims that it would be a case of knowledge if the true sentence is uttered or inscribed by an *āpta* (a trustworthy person). A person is an *āpta* iff (a) he/she has a true cognition of what he/she says, (b) he/she selects the appropriate expressions to convey his/her true cognition, (c) he/she is not lying, and (d) his/her sense-organs which are causal conditions for

utterance or inscription do not suffer from any defect or weakness.

Hence a true cognition generated by the utterance of an *āpta* has justification. Therefore, it has the status of knowledge.

From our above discussion it follows that knowledge is justified true cognition or belief, provided justification is a qualifier of true cognition or belief. A true cognition is justified by certain perceptual causal conditions, or by certain inferential causal conditions, or by an analogical causal condition, or by certain verbal causal conditions. Hence, the Nyāya technique for justifying a true cognition may be used for interpreting or explicating the meaning of the word 'knowledge'. In Western philosophy justification, belief and truth are not related in the way they are related in the Nyāya philosophy. It is similar to saying that 'there is a person with a red iron mask in this room' is true by virtue of the fact that there is a person in this room and there is an iron mask in this room and there is a red object in this room. This is due to the fact that they are not related to each other as qualifier-qualificand. But in the Nyāya philosophy truth is the qualifier of cognition, and justification is the qualifier of truth.

From the above discussion it also follows that the Nyāya philosophers have treated justification as a qualifier of a true belief or cognition. The causal condition for the truth of a perceptual cognition is the contact of our sense-organs with the qualificand which is qualified by the relational



qualifier. In the case of an inferential cognition, it is due to the cognition of the *hetu* pervaded by the *sādhya* in the locus of inference which is qualified by the *sādhya*. In the case of an analogical cognition, it is due to the cognition of similarity in the referent of the word. In the case of a verbal cognition, it is due to the cognition of appropriate relation (*yathārtha-yogyatā-jñāna*) between the referents of the terms that have occurred in the sentence. In their explanation of sources of valid cognitions, they have mentioned why certain true cognitions or beliefs have justification. Moreover, the Nyāya explains the ability to discriminate an object or a set of objects in terms of the cognition of limitor(s). This explanation will allow us to solve some problems of contemporary Western philosophy, including the Gettier and the post-Gettier problems or counter-examples and explain the ability to discriminate.

The Nyāya theory of meaning may be used to explain the difference in meaning between the members of the following pairs of sentences:


- (1) Brutus killed Caesar.
- (1') Caesar was killed by Brutus.
- (2) John gave a book to Tom.
- (2') Tom received a book from John.
- (3) John sprayed paint on the wall.
- (3') John sprayed the wall with paint.
- (4) Bees are swarming the garden.

- (4') The garden is swarming with bees.
- (5) The speeches preceded a buffet luncheon.
- (5') A buffet luncheon followed the speeches.
- (6) The audience liked the overture.
- (6') The overture pleased the audience.<sup>7</sup>

Contemporary philosophers of language are concerned with the problem whether transformation preserves the meaning of a sentence. Western philosophers such as Chomsky, Katz, Fodor, Fillmore, Postal and Jackendoff are concerned with this problem, but there is no unanimity among their views as they have not yet developed a comprehensive theory to deal with this problem. According to some linguists such as Fillmore (6) and (6') are synonymous, but not according to others. Hence Western philosophers are either guided by intuitions or by a theory which has limited application. On the contrary, the Nyāya theory of relation and meaning can explain why the members of the above pairs of sentences do not have the same meaning. Since the direction of the relation is part of the meaning of a sentence, the meaning of (1) cannot be identified with that of (1'). Similar will be the case with the remaining pairs of sentences in the above list. Hence the Nyāya theory of meaning will throw some light on the contemporary discussion of synonymity and meaning. This is how I would like to demonstrate the relevance of the Nyāya philosophy.

In this context, I would also like to mention the atomistic as well as the holistic nature of understanding the meaning of a molecular or complex sentence. In the case of atomistic understanding, first we understand the meanings of embedded sentence(s) or complex expressions which have occurred in a sentence. Then we understand the meaning of the entire sentence. But in the case of holistic understanding we apprehend simultaneously the meanings of the embedded complex expression(s) and the molecular sentence. Let us consider the nature of the cognition generated by the sentence ‘The table has a red book’. The question is whether we first apprehend the relation of a particular red colour to a book, and then apprehend the relation of the red book to the table. For the sake of simplicity consider ‘the table’ as one term. According to the atomistic understanding the cognition of the relation of the red book to the table follows the cognition of the relation of the red colour to the book. But according to holistic understanding, we cognise both the relations simultaneously.

### Holistic Understanding



Let us explain the nature of the cognition corresponding to this sentence. In this cognition the table is the qualificand, the book is the qualifier, and the red colour is the qualifier of the book. For the sake of simplicity, we are not considering the modes of presentation of the qualificand and the qualifiers of this cognition. In this cognition the book is the relational qualifier in relation to the table, and it is also a qualificand in relation to the red colour. Since the table is the qualificand, it has the property of being the qualificand (*viśeṣyatā*). The red colour has the property of being the relational qualifier (*prakaratā*). But the book has both the property of being the qualificand and the property of being the relational qualifier. It is to be noted that these relational properties specify the ways objects are related to this cognition. Now the question is how these relational properties are related to each other. In this cognition the property of being the qualificand (*viśeṣyatā*) residing in the table is determined by (*nirūpita*) the property of being the relational qualifier residing in the book, and vice versa. Similarly, the property of being the qualificand residing in the book is determined by (*nirūpita*) the property of being the relational qualifier residing in the red colour, and vice versa. Now the question is whether the properties of being the qualificand and the relational qualifier residing in the book are related to each other. If they are independent properties, then we cannot draw the distinction between (a) and (b).

(a) The table has a red book.

(b) The table has a book, and that book is red.

In order to draw the distinction between them the Nyāya claims that in (a) the property of being the relational qualifier (*prakāratā*) and the property of being the qualificand (*viśeṣyatā*) residing in the same book are related to each other by the relation of limiter-limited (*avacchedya-avacchedaka-sambandha*). In other words, the property of being the qualificand is the mode of the presentation of the property of being the relational qualifier, and vice versa. But this is not the case with (b). Hence, in (b) they are not related to each other by the relation of limiter-limited. In a holistic understanding we cognise the relation of the red colour to the book and the relation of the book which is red to the table simultaneously. But in an atomistic understanding first we cognise the former relation, and then we cognise the latter relation.

It is to be noted that the Nyāya has drawn a fine-grained distinction between (a) and (b). This distinction has been explained in terms of higher-order properties residing in the properties of being the qualificand and the relational qualifier. Since the classical symbolic logic cannot draw this type of fine-grained distinction, the Nyāya technique will add a new dimension to Western philosophy.

### **Section-3**

#### **Belief**

In this context, I shall discuss the Nyāya conception of belief, as in contemporary philosophy knowledge is defined

in terms of justified true belief. Since there is no proposition in the Nyāya as distinct from a sentence, beliefs are considered true or false. It is to be noted that belief is a doubt-free cognition. The Nyāya concept of doubt does not lead to scepticism, as a dubious cognition rests on certainty. Moreover, the Nyāya discussion of belief suggests solutions to some problems of belief in the Western philosophy.

I shall also mention the view of Russell, as he claims that no one has succeeded in explaining a false belief without postulating the existence of the non-existent.

Russell, in *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, claimed that in a belief-sentence, such as ‘Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio’, there are at least two verbs.

Here the verbs ‘believes’ and ‘loves’ have occurred as genuine verbs, and the verb in the subordinate clause seems to relate Desdemona to Cassio; but in fact it does not do so. He says,

This is what constitutes the puzzle about the nature of belief. You will notice that wherever one gets to really close quarters with the theory of error one has the puzzle of how to deal with error without assuming the existence of the non-existent.<sup>8</sup>

Now the question is how to explain the nature of this belief without postulating non-existent love as an entity, which will relate Desdemona to Cassio. Moreover, Russell

claimed that 'loves' should be treated as a verb. This requirement leads to the rejection of his earlier view proposed in *The Problems of Philosophy*,<sup>9</sup> where this sentence has been analysed as a four-place relation between Othello, Desdemona, loves, and Cassio. Hence it takes the form:

B (Othello, Desdemona, loves, Cassio).

Since the verb 'loves' in this sentence is on a par with the terms 'Desdemona' and 'Cassio,' this analysis does not fulfil one of the above requirements of Russell.

In spite of these shortcomings, I think, Russell's great contribution lies in the view that what occurs in a belief-sentence is not a proposition, but the constituents of a proposition, and in his suggestions that a satisfactory theory of belief should not postulate non-existent objects and should not reduce the verb in the subordinate clause to a term. In the context of our discussion of the Nyāya we shall see how the Nyāya philosophers have avoided the shortcomings of Russell's theory and at the same time followed the suggestions of a satisfactory theory of belief.

Let us begin with the Nyāya analysis of this sentence. It is to be noted that in this case we are not talking about Desdemona or Cassio, but about the belief state of Othello, which is related to the self by the relation of inherence in the ontology of the Nyāya. In the content of this belief there are three major elements, namely, Desdemona, Cassio, and the relation of love (loving relation).

Desdemona is the qualificand, Cassio is the qualifier, and love is the qualification relation. The relation of the mental state of Othello to Desdemona is the property of being the qualificand (*viśeṣyatā*) residing in Desdemona, to Cassio is the property of being the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇatā*) residing in Cassio, and to the relation of love is the property of being the qualification relation (*samsargatā*) residing in love.

As a belief mental state is related to its objects, so are objects related to the belief state. Hence the relation of Desdemona to this belief is the converse of *viśeṣyatā*, i.e., *viśesyitā*, the relation of Cassio to this belief is the converse of *viśeṣaṇatā*, i.e., *viśesanitā*, to introduce a technical term, and the relation of love to this belief is the converse of *samsargatā*, i.e., *samsargitā*.

Now the question is, how can the belief state of Othello be related to the relation of love which does not exist between them? If there is no such relation, then the converse of it cannot characterise the belief-state of Othello. Now the Nyāya claims that the belief-state of Othello is related to a real relation of love, for example, between John and Janet, which is real elsewhere or else when. Since this relation is real elsewhere, and the belief state is related to this relation, it is characterised by the converse of this qualification relation. It is to be noted that here also the relation performs both the functions. It relates John to Janet, as John loves Janet, and makes Desdemona the qualificand and Cassio the qualifier. For this reason, the relation has not been reduced to a term. This is how the Nyāya has avoided the



postulation of non-existent entities in their explanation of false beliefs or cognitions.

## Section-4

### Doubt

Regarding doubt, the Nyāya claims that a dubious cognition rests on certainty. A dubious cognition has the form ‘Is  $x$   $F$  or  $G$ ?’, where  $x$  is the property-possessor,  $F$  and  $G$  are mutually incompatible properties.

Since the Nyāya claims that belief is a doubt-free cognition, I would like to discuss the Nyāya conception of dubious cognition. Moreover, the Nyāya analysis or conception of doubt may also solve some problems of Western philosophy or add a new dimension to Western philosophy, as the Nyāya claims that a dubious cognition rests on certainty and discusses the causal conditions of different types of doubt.

Since  $F$  and  $G$  are mutually incompatible, one of them may be the absence of the other. Hence it may be stated as ‘Is  $x$   $F$  or not  $F$ ’. As regards the number of alternatives in a dubious cognition, such as ‘Is it a stump or a human being?’, there is some difference of opinion among the Nyāya Philosophers. But all of them have accepted the thesis that there are at least two mutually incompatible alternatives in a dubious cognition. It is to be noted that a dubious cognition cannot be identified with a question. A question presupposes the cognition of one of the

alternatives. For example, the question ‘Is it a stump?’ presupposes the cognition of stump only. But a dubious cognition presupposes the cognition of both the alternatives. Moreover, in a question, there is desire to know; but not in a state of doubt, although there may be desire to know afterwards.

From the Nyāya conception of doubt it also follows that there is certainty about the property-possessor in a dubious mental state. Hence the dubious cognition of the form ‘Is  $xF$  or  $G$ ’ presupposes certainty with respect to  $x$ . Therefore, we do not doubt the existence of  $x$ . The property-possessor may be an object of doubt in another mental state, where it is one of the alternatives. Hence a doubt presupposes certainty or rests on something which is free from doubt.

When I doubt the colour of the table in the mental state ‘Is the table brown or red?’, I do not doubt the existence of the table. Again, when I doubt the existence of the table, I presuppose something else. For example, consider a mental state of doubt ‘Is there a table or a bed in this room?’ In this case, I presuppose the existence of the room. Hence there cannot be universal doubt, even if there is doubt about any specific thing or set of specific things. Moreover, there is no dubious mental state without presupposing something certain. Hence the Nyāya concept of doubt rules out universal scepticism. We may doubt almost *anything*, but not *everything*, and every dubious state has some element of certainty.

The Nyāya has classified doubts into four types depending upon the causal conditions of their origins. One of them is due to the observation of some common property or properties of the referents of ‘*F*’ and ‘*G*’, and the non-observation of any specific or unique property of the referents of ‘*F*’ and ‘*G*’. Consider again, for example, ‘Is it a stump or a human being?’ The observation of common properties, such as identical or similar heights and widths, will give rise to the memory-cognitions of the alternatives that are causal conditions of a dubious cognition.

The second type of dubious cognition is due to the observation of an uncommon property. An uncommon property is something which is known to be not present in the known alternatives. For example, ‘Is sound eternal or non-eternal?’ In this case, soundness is known to be not present in both eternal objects such as the soul and in non-eternal objects such as a pot. If this type of doubt is expressed in the form ‘Is  $x$ *F* or *G*?,’ then one of the causal conditions of this type of doubt is that *x*-ness or the property of being *x* is not known to be present in the known examples of *F* or *G*.

The third type of dubious cognition is due to the understanding of the meanings of the words which have occurred in contradictory or contrary sentences. This type of doubt will arise in those who are not committed to one of the alternatives or who do not have certain cognition of one of the alternatives. Consider now, for example, the dubious state ‘Is mind physical or spiritual?’ or ‘Is soul eternal or

non-eternal?’ The Vedāntins claim that the soul is eternal, but the Buddhists claim it to be non-eternal. If a person is not committed to one these views, or convinced by the arguments of the Vedāntins or the Buddhists, then he/she will doubt whether the soul is eternal.

The fourth type of doubt is due to doubt about the truth of a cognition, as in the doubt ‘Is the cognition of a chair in this room true or false?’ This doubt implies doubt about the presence of a chair in this room. In other words, doubt about the truth of a cognition would give rise to doubt about the content of this cognition. Hence a higher type of doubt would imply a lower type of doubt if these doubts are arranged in a hierarchical order. Here too the Nyāya discussion of doubt can also be integrated with the mainstream of Western philosophy and answer some of its questions about doubt.

### **Concluding Remarks:**

From the above discussion it follows that the views of Nyāya philosophers would suggest solutions to the following problems of Western philosophy:

- 1) Since justification is a property of a true belief or cognition, not a property of belief or cognition in isolation, the Gettier or the post-Gettier counterexamples to the JTB thesis are not applicable to the Nyāya view.

- 2) It can solve the problems of Goldman, as the cogniser has the ability to discriminate both in perceptual and inferential cognitions.
- 3) It avoids the contemporary sense-data theory of perception, which leads to scepticism or solipsism. This is due to the fact that the objects are apprehended without the mediation of tertiary entities, such as sense-data or images.
- 4) Since objects are causal conditions of perception, the brain-in-a-vat argument of contemporary philosophers and the evil demon argument of Descartes are not applicable to the views of the Nyāya philosophers.
- 5) It falsifies the claim of Russell that no one has succeeded in explaining the nature of a false belief without postulating the existence of the non-existent.
- 6) Since the relevance condition for any inference, valid or invalid, has been emphasised, the following valid inference of Western logic is not treated as an inference in the Nyāya logic:

P and not P,

Therefore, Q.

This is due to the fact that it violates the relevance condition as well as certain epistemic conditions for

understanding the meaning of a sentence. As a result, we cannot derive  $2+2=4$  from it is raining and not raining, which is valid in classical symbolic logic. Since the Nyāya logic has emphasized the relevance condition, it might throw some light on contemporary discussion on relevant logic. Since it deals with the preventer-prevented relation at epistemic level and the ways a cognition can be prevented, it will throw some light on epistemic logic as well.

- 7) Since the meaning of a sentence lies in the relation as well as in the direction of the relation of the referents of the terms of a sentence, transformationally equivalent sentences do not have the same meaning. Hence, the sentence 'Brutus killed Caesar' does not have the same meaning as the sentence 'Caesar was killed by Brutus'. Hence our discussion not only answers the question of Frege on this topic, but also throws further light on contemporary philosophy of language, as linguists or philosophers, such as Chomsky, Katz, Fodor, Fillmore and Jackendoff, are concerned with the question whether transformation preserves the meaning of a sentence.
- 8) Regarding the nature of understanding the meaning of a complex sentence, the Nyāya philosophers have discussed atomistic as well as holistic understanding. Moreover, they have interpreted holistic understanding in terms of higher order properties. This discussion would also add a new

dimension to Western philosophy, as there is no logic for it.

- 9) Since a dubious cognition rests on certainty, it goes against universal scepticism. Moreover, the explanation of different types of dubious cognitions in terms of their causal conditions would also add a new dimension to Western philosophy.

This is how I tried to demonstrate the relevance of Indian philosophy to contemporary Western philosophy.

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#### Notes and References :

- <sup>1</sup> The talk of Prof. J. L. Shaw was the keynote (from Indian perspective) for the International Conference on *Samsāya Evaṃ Pramā, Doubt and Knowledge-Indian and Western Perspectives*, organized by Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, from 15<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> March, 2019.
- <sup>2</sup> J.L. Shaw, *The Collected Writings of Jaysankar Lal Shaw: Indian Analytic and Anglophone Philosophy*, Bloomsbury, London, 2016, pp 1-3.
- <sup>3</sup> Purnachandra Vedāntacūñcu, *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and *Tattva-Kaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra, with Bengali translation and commentary, first published in 1901, West Bengal Book Board, 1983, pp. 66-8.
- <sup>4</sup> For a more comprehensive discussion on causality, see J. L. Shaw, *Causality: Sāṃkhya, Bauddha and Nyāya*, Punthi Pustak, Calcutta, 2005.
- <sup>5</sup> For a more comprehensive discussion on inference, see J. L. Shaw, *The Collected Writings of Jaysankar Lal Shaw: Indian Analytic and Anglophone Philosophy*, Bloomsbury, London, 2016.

- <sup>6</sup> For a discussion on relevance, see *The Collected Writings of Jaysankar Lal Shaw: Indian Analytic and Anglophone Philosophy*, Bloomsbury, London, 2016.
- <sup>7</sup> J. Fodor, *Semantics: Theories of Meaning in Generative Grammar*, Thomas Y. Cromwell Company, New York, 1977, pp. 90-2.
- <sup>8</sup> B. Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', *Logic and Knowledge*, edited by R. C. Marsh, Allen & Unwin, London, 1977, p. 225.
- <sup>9</sup> B. Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 73, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980, p. 73.

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## On the Possibility of Philosophy

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We propose to speak on the possibility of philosophy. The consideration which led us to this choice is that the discussion of this topic can provide us with a proper context – the context of discussing in a connected and meaningful way – the subjects like *Samśaya*, *Pramā*, and the like.<sup>1</sup> Alternatively described our chosen context is Skepticism. Let us for the present agree to use the expression “knowledge” for *pramā* and “doubt” for *samśaya*. So it may be found that the themes under reference belong to the domain of epistemology. That epistemology or, as many view it, first philosophy involves essential reference to skepticism can be gathered or verified from the literature of modern or contemporary European philosophy (or epistemology). There, one is likely to find assertions like “theory of knowledge is primarily an exercise in skepticism”.<sup>2</sup> However, skepticism is not a matter of concern exclusively of the modern and contemporary European philosophers or epistemologists. Besides the form of skepticism which these philosophers discuss is not the only form which skepticism has or takes. The contemporary Euro-American philosophers and epistemologists are primarily concerned with what may be called modern (forms of) skepticism which doubts or

denies that we can know the external world or other minds or the (human) past. As an abiding concern of philosophers of all time and all cultures skepticism is not restricted to only these three doubts. The literature of the Classical Greek Philosophy from the Pre-Socratic era and that of the systematic Indian Philosophy from more than two thousand years ago testifies to the truth of this remark. The scope of different forms of skepticism is different. Accordingly the modern skepticism may be viewed as the mitigated form or version of skepticism. In the history of Classical European and Indian Philosophy one meets with absolute or unrestricted skepticism also which doubts the possibility of knowledge as such including philosophical knowledge or philosophy. One should not immediately dispose of such skepticism as absurd since it denies the patent fact that we have experience and we could not live or talk if we did not have it. For no sensible skeptic denies the possibility or reality of belief (*jñāna*<sup>3</sup>); he only doubts or denies the knowledge claim we tend to make implicitly or explicitly in favour of many, if not all, beliefs that we have or can have. The absolute skepticism doubts or denies the possibility of knowledge (roughly *pramā* or *pramāṇa*); it doubts or denies the claim that there is or can be a belief which may be counted as knowledge. The reason may be that the skeptics think that no belief that we have or can have satisfies or can satisfy the definition or description which a thing must satisfy if it is to be considered a case of knowledge.<sup>4</sup> It may not be necessary or correct to ascribe to even the skeptics of Europe or India of the classical age the belief that it is false or doubtful that there could be any

indubitable belief or that even truths of logic or mathematics or analytic statements are dubitable. On the contrary the famous contemporary American philosopher, who has forcefully argued that even the truths of logic and mathematics are revisable and hence is not necessarily true is not certainly a skeptic. Be that as it may, according to the sensible skeptics of classical or modern period it is at least doubtful that there could be any factual belief which was true or an instance of knowledge. What follows is that Philosophy or Indian Philosophy in its standard sense is not and cannot be possible; it cannot be a body of (factual) knowledge nor can it give us synthetic knowledge or *tattvajñāna*.

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So far skepticism has been found to be opposed to philosophy. It does not allow philosophical enterprise to take off. And yet philosophy is there. Moreover history of skepticism is as old as that of philosophy.<sup>5</sup> How to understand this mystery, if it is a mystery? Careful consideration convinces us that philosophy owes its origin, continuity and growth to skepticism or to interaction with it. It is a myth that philosophy originated in man's lazy wonder. It originated when certain adverse or negative forces (represented by the *nāstikas*, *samśayavādīns*, *vaitāṇḍīkas*, skeptics etc.) challenged the world view of a people and threatened the very foundation of their culture and society. Philosophy emerged as man's (the *āstika* people's) response to such challenge. The relevant sense of meeting the skeptic's challenge is not indulging in,

dreaming or wishing that there is no skeptic or lazily ignoring them. Meeting the skeptics as the philosophers, understand their challenge rationally and theoretically defending the cherished world view of the people concerned and preventing the skeptics or the *nāstikas* from destabilizing the entire fabric of the personal, family and social life of the people concerned. Philosophers put up such resistance to skepticism. This makes philosophy a rational and theoretical enterprise which is extremely useful and relevant in all ages. For the skeptical thought never gets fully eliminated from society rather it continues to spread its seductive influence on unsuspecting men. Philosophers are, not only, not men of this sort but they also have won up the responsibility of freeing society of the menace of skepticism.

What is more important for us to note here is that philosophy also owes its rational character to skepticism. Further this character and history of it, distinguishes systematic philosophy and does not allow it to become merely edifying philosophy which often tends to become a form of mysticism. This account of philosophy, which is informed by the classical Indian thought and culture, should be contrasted with the view of philosophy of a famous American philosopher according to whom when it is the question of what preserves and promotes our society we should remember: *Sophia* yes, *philosophia* not necessarily.<sup>6</sup> Anyway, skepticism (*samśayavāda*), if not *samśaya* also, is thus the greatest friend and enemy of philosophy (*darśana*). It is so, in so far as *darśana* (Indian

Philosophy) and also philosophy in the view of many thinkers is a pursuit of knowledge (*pramā*) or better of reasoned truth (*nirṇaya*). *Tattvajñāna* in this sense is what the *dārśanikas* (the Indian philosophers of the classical age) aspire for.

Whatever may be true about lay doubt (mere *saṁśaya*) or wonder on the one hand and the otherwise indifferent (*udāsīna*) knowledge (*yathārtha niścaya*) on the other as well as the relation between the two, it is not without reason that philosophy or epistemology is an exercise in skepticism. Doubt (*saṁśaya*) involved in the theory and practice of skepticism is closely related to philosophy as a rational and socially relevant enterprise.

It is oversimplification to say that skepticism consists in the attempt at just invalidating philosophy or making it impossible whereas philosophy is the uncommon trait of a few strange individuals who are obsessed with the thought of scoring triumph over doubt and disbelief. Skepticism is itself a philosophical theory; at least it will be so understood here. It is also not the case that philosophy is just a name for the faith or disposition of a few trusting individuals, that knowledge and philosophy are possible. Philosophy is indeed a quest for truth but it is more than that the pursuit of reasoned truth. Philosophy is not just an exercise in skepticism. Rather it consists in the exercise in rationality on the part of philosophers who are realist <sup>7</sup>. This cautious formulation is informed by the need to acknowledge that skepticism is also a philosophical theory or position.

Though the two are related yet doubt (or *saṁśaya*) and Skepticism (or *saṁśayavāda*) are not the same thing; they are different. We need some more clarification as to the sense in which we do or should understand the expressions like *saṁśaya* and *pramā*. When translated respectively as doubt and knowledge and one takes epistemology to be the context of discussion, it may be thought that *saṁśaya* and *pramā* are two of the many different propositional attitude(s). Such risk is quite common when we use two different languages or conceptual frameworks. However there is reason to believe that in Indian philosophy, particularly in the Nyāya school of Indian philosophy *saṁśaya*, etc. are not necessarily understood as propositional attitude. These are not usually taken as dispositions. On the other hand though *saṁśaya* (doubt), *pramā* (knowledge), *bhrama* (error or false belief) etc. are taken as cognitive episodes yet their discussion in Nyāya does not make Nyāya a mere system of psychology. When Nyāya discusses *saṁśaya*, *pramā* etc. the thrust of the discussion is how cognitive states figure individually or as related to each other in the scheme of different possibilities which a certain cognitive state (*jñāna*)<sup>8</sup> has or can have. The four possibilities are true (*pramā*), false (*bhrama*), neither and both. Unlike what we usually think an erroneous cognitive state (normally a perceptual error) falls not into the second category of *bhrama*; rather it belongs to the fourth category ‘both *pramā* and *bhrama*’ – it is partly an error and partly knowledge. What about *saṁśaya*? One thing is certain it is different from *pramā*. So far it is not true (*apramā*). But it is not a case of *bhrama* or false belief

either. *Pramā* and *apramā* are mutually exclusive. *Samśaya* is indeed a case of *apramā*. But *apramā* and *bhrama* are not the same thing. Is there any cognitive state which is neither true nor false? The right answer is in the affirmative. The characteristic of such cognitive states is that they can be causally related to cognitions that are true or false but they do not bear epistemic or logical relation to cognitive states that are true or false. There does not obtain among them epistemic-logical or ontological opposition (*pratibadhya-pratibandhaka-bhāva-sambandha*). For better and clearer understanding, cognitive states are first divided into two classes: definitive (*niścaya* or *niścayātmaka*) and non-definitive. The first class is exhausted by knowledge (*pramā*) and error (*bhrama*). *Samśaya* belongs to the class of non-definitive cognitive state; as such it is neither *pramā* nor *bhrama*. There are other cognitive states which are like *samśaya* in this respect.

Keeping in mind what has just been said we should try to understand skepticism. An act of doubt is *samśaya* but skepticism is *samśayavada* – a certain theoretical stand or position (and not doctrine)<sup>9</sup> which advocates doubt or disbelief (*samśaya*) of a certain sort. Skepticism or a skeptic doubts or denies<sup>10</sup> the legitimacy of man's claim to have knowledge. By this, is sometimes understood that a skeptic doubts or denies the claim of a man (whether a philosopher or not), that at least some of our beliefs are indubitable.<sup>11</sup> When skepticism is construed as the denial (*pratiśedha*) of knowledge claim it is more vulnerable to the decisive attack of the opponents, say the realists. This

denial is neither *saṁśaya* (doubt) nor is it necessarily a case of *pramā*. It may be a case of *bhrama* (false belief) or *viparīta niścaya*. When their subject is the same, *saṁśaya* gets removed as much by the corresponding *pramā* as by *bhrama*. Both are cases of *niścaya* or definitive belief which alone has truth value- true or false. But *saṁśaya* is neither true nor false as it is not a form of *niścaya*. It is *apramā* (not knowledge) but not *bhrama* (definitive false belief) either. For it is not a state of definitive belief.

Skepticism can be of many different types and their scope is not the same. The scope of absolute skepticism is greater or wider than that of say the mitigated skepticism. The scope of the classical skepticism covered ‘knowledge’ (*pramā/pramāṇa*) as such (perhaps excluding the exceptions like truths of logic or mathematics). If the central concern of skepticism is to doubt or deny the possibility of knowledge, that of philosophy is to justify and legitimize man’s claim that knowledge is attainable. This amounts to claiming that skepticism is false or that its truth (soundness) is doubtful. Thus doubt (if not denial which is epistemologically a stronger position) is central to both skepticism and philosophy; often people do not note this. Again some of those who note this think that doubt does not and cannot bear the same relation to both skepticism and philosophy. Philosophy and skepticism are opposed to each other. The truth however is that as a rational enterprise, as an exercise in rationality, philosophy involves doubt in its very constitution or structure. As such, doubt should be held to be one of the conditions of rational



inquiry and hence of philosophy.<sup>12</sup> There is a broad agreement about the conception of philosophy and rationality in the two cultures – Indian and Euro-American. However there are differences in details, depth and clarity so far as the relation of doubt to philosophy (*darśana*) and skepticism is concerned. In other words there seem to be some important differences between the European and Indian philosophical traditions, when it comes to the conception of philosophy (*darśana*), skepticism (*samśayavāda*) and their relation to doubt (*samśaya*).

It needs to be noted that however central to philosopher's concern it might be, the issue of skepticism is external to philosophy. Philosophy cannot even begin without successfully meeting skepticism. But for all that philosophy does not end with doubting its possibility. On the other hand there is hardly anything more in skepticism than doubting. Normally skeptics do not have any positive thesis (of their own) to defend. Their only agenda is to challenge – doubt or deny – the knowledge claim<sup>13</sup> which philosophers are inclined to make. Philosophy proper – actual philosophizing – begins only after skepticism is overcome. For example before disproving skepticism philosopher cannot begin to discuss the internal questions, like how many accredited sources of knowledge are there or what is the criterion or criteria of knowledge. One cannot start asking or answering these internal questions before one has good reason to believe that philosophy or knowledge is possible or that doubt in their possibility can be overcome.<sup>14</sup> Skeptics doubt or deny that there is or can

be any acceptable criteria of knowledge *pramā* or that they doubt or deny the legitimacy of all actual (or possible) criteria or definitions of knowledge. The debatable issue is whether it can be *proved* that there is knowledge – *pramā* or *pramāṇa*<sup>15</sup>. The issue involved is *prāmāṇyasiddhi* (*siddhi* of the *prāmāṇya* of *pramāṇa*), that is proving that the alleged *pramāṇa* (true belief) is really a case of knowledge.

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What has just been said shows that doubt is central to skepticism but not to philosophy. What is central to philosophy and or philosophizing is the strong belief and confident hope that philosophy is possible. However, it is more accurate to say that certain doubt is also integral to philosophizing or even to philosophy though philosophy begins with doubt and ends with knowledge – knowledge which results from the successful pursuit of it. Skepticism begins as well as ends with doubt. To put it differently in case of philosophy doubt is methodological and not systemic. Nonetheless the particular doubt in question almost defines philosophy in so far as it is a self-reflective theoretical enterprise. Though in this sense philosophy does and must entertain doubt about the possibility of philosophy yet what still explains the continuity of the philosophical enterprise is that philosophers never cease to remain sanguine that the pursuit of knowledge would come to bear fruit if not necessarily to a totally successful end. Against the background of what has just been said we can make sense of skepticism as a philosophical theory.

Otherwise the expression “philosophy of skepticism” or “skepticism is a philosophical theory” would have been dismissed as instances of oxymoron. Something similar is the case with the familiar expressions like “Nominalist’s theory of universal” or “Atheist’s view of God”.

The authentic practice on the part of philosophers (in general) – the philosophical enterprise or philosophizing – seems to entail a belief (*jñāna*) in the possibility of philosophy (or of philosophical knowledge). However as a self reflective theoretical discipline philosophy is committed to investigate into the possibility of philosophy or knowledge itself<sup>6</sup>, which in its turn entails that it entertains doubt in the possibility of knowledge. It follows that even if there were in fact none who actually doubted or denied the possibility of knowledge as such or of certain particular kind of knowledge, philosophy is committed to entertaining doubt about the possibility of knowledge (though not to denying this possibility). In other words the philosophers admit that the doubt that we may not attain knowledge is at least a theoretical possibility.

Some may think that it follows from what has just been said that the very concept of philosophy is inconsistent. Two beliefs that it entails – or the two beliefs that follows from the very nature of the subject – the belief in the possibility of knowledge and the belief in the possibility of doubting this possibility – conflict. Actually however, philosophy incorporates skepticism in the sense of a theoretical possibility of doubting as otherwise it cannot show through critical examination that such doubt is

ultimately untenable. And till this is shown philosopher's *hope* that philosophy and / or knowledge are / is possible, cannot become a reasoned conviction. Philosophical pursuit is not the pursuit of just knowledge or truth but reasoned truth. In the vocabulary of Indian philosophy there are two expressions *Pramā* (knowledge) and *Nirṇaya* (reasoned truth). *Nirṇaya* results from rational and critical examination, which the philosophers (*dārśanikas*) practice. Even when skeptics are found to perform rational critical examination their purpose is to establish the negative thesis that it is not beyond doubt (even if it is not false or *bhrama*) that knowledge and philosophy are possible. Realists or philosophers conduct critical examination to defend certain positive thesis. Even when a philosopher argues to disprove certain position, say the position of the skeptic, he does so to indirectly defend his own positive thesis that philosophy and or knowledge is possible.<sup>17</sup> Even if there is not or there had not been any person who doubted or denied the possibility of knowledge, philosophy would still discuss skeptical doubt. To put it simple, philosophy would lose its character of being a self reflective and rational inquiry if it did not admit (its obligation to demonstrate that we can have knowledge, by showing that it cannot be reasonably doubted or denied that we can have it) the possibility of doubting that there could be knowledge or philosophy. As already said such acceptance of skepticism on the part of philosophy is a methodological stance. Unless one accepts skepticism provisionally one cannot demonstrate that skepticism cannot stand the test of reason. And till we do that, the possibility of skepticism would continue to haunt

ordinary men as well as philosophers. Philosophy or philosophizing entails methodological skepticism<sup>18</sup>, which is perfectly compatible with the assertion or thesis that knowledge or philosophy is possible. And at least this particular piece of knowledge confirms beyond doubt that knowledge is possible or that skepticism is an untenable position. When we understand skepticism in this way we become convinced that skepticism itself is a philosophical ‘theory’ at least in the sense that it is implied in the very enterprise of philosophy.

The pertinent question is how exactly skepticism figures in the methodological stance of philosophy. Does it figure as a form of doubt (*samśaya*) or denial of a sort (*viparītanīścaya* or *bhrama* which is different from both *samśaya* and *pramā*). The weaker formulation of skepticism as a particular form of doubt (*samśaya*) renders it more difficult to disprove. The corresponding stronger formulation in terms of denial (*pratiṣedha*) is easier to reject. Where a denial is a case of *bhrama* the corresponding assertion is a case of *pramā*. Both these are forms of definitive (*nīścayātmaka*) belief or cognitive state (*jñāna*).

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It may be asked, is a debate or dialogue between a philosopher and a skeptic possible. And if it is not possible, then how the conflict between the skeptic and the philosopher can be resolved? Resolution in some other way or resolution of any kind may not be appropriate, to say the least, in the present context. On the other hand the

resolution of this conflict, solution of the external question under reference, is the beginning of philosophy. However, there does not seem to be any possibility of the dialogue in question. The philosopher remains convinced that knowledge is possible, nay knowledge has already been obtained and the skeptic remains equally unconvinced that knowledge could be possible. In order that there could be authentic debate and dialogue, each party must be convinced or unconvinced about certain matter. But the conviction or the non-conviction should not be a morbid one. Just as morbid curiosity cannot lead to a stable and acceptable result, so also morbid conviction cannot ensure authentic dialogue or debate. On the other hand only an authentic dialogue or debate bears real fruit. If the philosopher finds that the skeptic's doubt (or denial) is idle or the skeptic finds that the philosopher's conviction is a mere lazy hope then no authentic dialogue can begin or no resolution of the conflict can be reached. If the situation turns out to be such then the philosopher is defeated. For, he will win if only the skeptic is defeated. The skeptic will be defeated in the required sense only if dialogue takes place and the philosopher succeeds in showing that the doubt or denial in the possibility of knowledge is indefensible. But such a dialogue is not feasible in so far as there is no common platform for the skeptic and the philosopher to engage in an authentic dialogue.

It will be a cheap and contrived victory if the philosopher uses to his own advantage, the disadvantage which the skeptic suffers for being the opponent in the debate. As

shown by Quine the opponent in a (certain) debate does not even get to formulate his position without violating the requirement of consistency. In other words in the very act of expressing his denial<sup>19</sup> the opponent contradicts himself. Sometimes the paradoxical situation of the opponent, here the skeptic, is put in this way. Unless the skeptic admits knowledge or philosophy as the subject of denial he cannot formulate his denial or the negative position: there is no such thing as philosophy or knowledge. Some Naiyāikas have formulated the position in this way. Nobody can reasonably say or show that there is no knowledge (*pramā*) unless this particular piece of cognition is a case of *pramā*. So nobody can deny *pramāṇa* or knowledge as such. At the most one can deny or doubt the possibility of certain particular case of an alleged *pramāṇa*<sup>20</sup>. We will see later on (in the second part of this paper) that the Naiyāikas formulate the position of the skeptic in this way: beliefs claimed to be knowledge or perception etc. which are alleged to be *pramāṇa* are not really so. Thus they avoid the temptation of securing a fake or contrived victory.

For the present, we would like to suggest that there seems to be at least two ways to overcome or bypass the impasse in which the skeptic and the philosopher find themselves, when they attempt to resolve their conflict by initiating authentic dialogue or debate. First, we stop viewing the dialogue in question between two historical persons or thinkers; one of them (the philosopher) is situated within philosophy while the other (the skeptic) stands outside that realm. Let us view or imagine the proposed dialogue as a

dialogue between two notional or logical persons who are situated within philosophy and representing two opposite theses. In other words it is a debate of a philosopher with himself. This happens in cases like critical thinking or *manana* in which a man argues with himself. The debate between the skeptic and philosopher is a debate of the philosopher with himself. The philosopher anticipates the opposite thesis and posits a person as a skeptic to represent the rival thesis. The very nature of philosophy, properly understood, provides room for such dialogue within philosophy and between a skeptic philosopher and a realist (non-skeptic) philosopher. A non-skeptic philosopher anticipates the criticisms – doubts and denials – which his counterpart, the skeptic philosopher may bring against him. The other way out of the impasse in question is to note that men are not born as philosopher; rather the philosophers are born as man. Both the skeptic outside philosophy and the philosopher are inhabitants of a common world – the common-sense world of ordinary men. Ordinary men share a large body of beliefs and practices. The common world as given, is constituted by or is reflected in these beliefs and practices. That these beliefs are there, as our common inheritance, is neither doubted nor denied by any one of the two parties in the debate. Using this as the *shared platform* the skeptics and philosophers can engage in debate or dialogue. They disagree about the status of these beliefs. The skeptics (the *saṁśayavādīns* or the *vaitaṇḍīkas*) hold that these beliefs or *jñāna* are not (and perhaps cannot be) cases of knowledge proper (that is, *pramā* or *pramāṇa*). The philosophers on the other hand hold that at least some



of these beliefs are cases of knowledge proper. As already shown, both these views owe their origin in the shared common sense or ordinary beliefs and practices. It might seem too naïve, if we suggest that the large body of shared beliefs of ordinary common men do not incorporate the belief that at least some of these beliefs are true. It is to be admitted that the large body of common sense beliefs, also include the beliefs that there are true beliefs as well as false beliefs. Ordinary natural language contains its own meta-language. Similarly the body of common sense beliefs, contains critical judgments on these beliefs. How can then the skeptic, who begins by accepting commonsense, hold that there is not or cannot be any true belief or knowledge? Common experience does not provide any take off point for the unrestricted or universal skepticism. It will be in order if we clarify the matter a little more.

Common man is intuitively<sup>21</sup> aware that not only we have a large body of shared beliefs but also this body includes the belief that some of our beliefs are true and some of our beliefs false. Not only beliefs are given but also 'knowledge' and 'error' are given. So far no common man is or can be a skeptic. Skepticism is a theoretical stance which consists in admitting and advocating some general thesis, such as say, no belief is or can be true or at least no belief can be knowledge. This is not a common sense belief, but nonetheless it is a generalization, on the basis of common sense or ordinary belief, that at least some of our beliefs are false – or that they are not knowledge proper. The skeptic detects the implication of such commonsense belief which

ordinary men fail to notice. Thus skepticism is not a matter of commonsense or intuitive experience but theorization on, and certain generalization on the basis of, commonsense. So far it is a theory or theoretical stance. However, it is not an ordinary empirical theory or a formal one. It is a philosophical theory based on interpretation, elaboration, examination and rational development of some commonsense experience and belief. To be more precise skeptic starts by accepting the commonsense belief that some of our beliefs are false. There are perceptual errors or false beliefs. Given that there are (some) false beliefs, the argument proceeds, no belief can be trusted. Therefore no belief is true or that there is no knowledge. Knowledge claim, that we make in favour of some belief, is unjustified. Thus 'argument from illusion' is said to lead to skepticism, if not in the sense of doubt or denial of knowledge, as such, then at least of the knowledge claim in favour of the thesis which the supporters of physicalism advocate.

## II

Before we proceed further we may take a few examples of skepticism and debate between the skeptic and the philosopher from the philosophical literature of India. We will take a brief note of how the realist philosophers of the Nyāya School responded to mainly the skeptics of Buddhist school.

Philosophers of the Cārvāka School advocate limited skepticism; their thesis is *nānumānam pramāṇam*<sup>22</sup> that is, knowledge claim in support of inferential (and some other)

belief is unfounded. These thinkers are realist and philosopher (and not skeptic) in respect of perceptual belief and they hold that perceptual beliefs alone constitute knowledge proper. Their position is known as *pratyakṣaikapramāṇavāda* which contends that the knowledge claim in favour of perceptual beliefs *alone* is justified. Only perceptual beliefs are or can be *pramāṇa* (pramā). Udayanācārya, of the Nyāya School of Philosophy, before Gaṅgeśa rejected this limited skepticism of the Cārvākas. A part of his argument is that one cannot doubt or deny knowledge as such.<sup>23</sup> Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra* and Vātsyāyana in his gloss on this text discussed another case of limited skepticism (this time of the Bauddhas) which contends that there is no perceptual knowledge or *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*; the so called perception is a case of inference. The argument of these skeptics puts forth that a perception is *anumāna*; if and in so far as it is alleged to be a *pramāṇa* or a case of knowledge then the belief in question should turn out to be a case of inference.<sup>24</sup> Take another case. Vātsyāyana begins his *Nyāyabhāṣya* by responding to unlimited or absolute skepticism of some Bauddhas who appear to doubt or deny knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as such. The very first sentence of Vātsyāyana's commentary on *Nyāyasūtra* reads "... *arthavat pramāṇam*". Here he asserts by way of responding to the *samśayavādīns* (perhaps of some Bauddha School of thought) who advocate unrestricted skepticism. Vātsyāyana says that *pramāṇa* (like perception, inference and so on) which is alleged, by the skeptic, to lack the character of a *pramāṇa*, does have the character which a thing must have

if it is to be really and actually a case of *pramāṇa* or knowledge proper. The character in question is ‘to be related to the object it reveals (knows) by the relation of ‘non-discrepancy’ (avyabhicāritva). *Arthavyabhicāritva* (being non-discrepantly related to the object known) is the defining mark of a *pramāṇa* and perception, etc (which are accepted in the Nyāya School to be *pramāṇa*) have this character. The point of the Nyāya philosopher is that the skeptic is wrong when he says that there is no *pramāṇa*. This last assertion amounts to doubting or denying (either or both) that there is knowledge (a belief which is true etc.) or that there is any accredited source of knowledge. The Sanskrit expression *pramāṇa* is understood to mean one or the other of these two things according to the context.

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The realist philosophers of the Nyāya School responded to the skeptics of the Buddhist school; the lineage of debate between the two is long. The response of the two realist schools of India namely the earlier Mimāṃsā School and later day Navya-nyāya school, to skepticism, could be compared in developing an understanding of the issue. Realism in Indian philosophy broke new grounds and made real advances, which demand a careful analysis. Thus the discussion in context of the themes of *Samśaya* and *Pramā*, could be turned into the study of the development of Indian philosophy, particularly Indian realism, over the centuries.

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**Notes and References :**

- 1 There may be many other such contexts as well.
- 2 Ayer, A. J.
- 3 We will show later that the word belief is not the accurate translation of the expression *jñāna* when it occurs in the literature of Nyāya philosophy.
- 4 In the literature of Indian philosophy, the Vaitaṇḍika (skeptic of a sort) of different schools of Indian philosophy like Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta, critically examined the definitions of *pramāṇa* that a philosopher does or can offer and showed that all these definitions are unacceptable.
- 5 We find evidence of skeptical thinking even in the Veda.
- 6 Quine
- 7 Unlike the skeptic, these philosophers believe that knowledge and philosophy is possible. It is in this sense we say philosophers are realist, meaning non-skeptic.
- 8 It seems to be more accurate to translate the word *jñāna* as cognitive state rather than as belief. *Samśaya* is a *jñāna* but not a belief in the standard sense. Similarly (a) *nirvikalpāka pratyakṣa* is indeed an instance of *jñāna* but it is not an example of belief in the usual sense. When we do not take into consideration all the four possibilities noted here (but restrict the possibilities to only two – *pramā* and *bhrama*) we tend to translate *jñāna* as belief and *pramā* as knowledge. We ourselves have done so in some of our works. However it is more accurate to translate *jñāna* as cognitive state and belief as *niścaya* or *niścayātmaka jñāna*. A *niścayātmaka jñāna* like belief has only two possibilities. It is either true or false. But a cognitive state or *jñāna* can belong to both the class of

*pramā* and *bhrama* or to none of these two classes. A cognitive state which realizes the possibilities ‘both’ or ‘none’ is *apramā* but not necessarily *bhrama*. In philosophy we need to be careful so that we do not to confuse *apramā* with *bhrama*. *Samśaya* or doubt is *apramā* but not *bhrama* in the usual and standard sense in which the Naiyāyikas use the expression.

- 9 Skepticism should not better be construed as a doctrine of doubt.
- 10 In the literature of Indian philosophy, like Nyāya, there is discussion about (who are called) *vaitaṇḍikas* as well as of those who are called *samśayavādīns*. *Vaitaṇḍika* stands as rejectionist in relation to the doctrines that different philosophers advocate from their respective positions. When a certain philosopher, unlike a *vaitaṇḍika*, rejects the position of a rival philosopher, his rejection contributes at least indirectly to defending or justifying his own position. Since he has a position of his own and has need to defend it against his rivals his approach and attitude is positive. He is not just a rejectionist. A *Vaitaṇḍika* has *no position* of his own (to defend). He does not and cannot have a positive agenda. He is just a rejectionist. Sometimes in his eagerness to reject certain position, a *Vaitaṇḍika* unscrupulously makes use of deceptive and pseudo arguments.
- 11 People who hold the sort of belief in question, that is the belief which skeptics doubt or deny will be referred to as realists. Realism has many different senses; for example, those who hold the view which the phenomenologists reject are also sometimes called realist.
- 12 Critical philosophical inquiry called by different names like *vicāra*, *manana*, *nyāyacarcā* and so on has *samśaya* as a precondition. *Samśaya* is said to be the *purvāṅga* of *vicāra*.
- 13 The scope of Skepticism can be broadened to include the doubt or denial of certain other possibility claims as well– the claim say that man can ensure through his own effort, the attainment of life’s

- highest and best fulfillment.
- 14 In one's own case and shown to be unsound when a different person entertains the sort of doubt in question.
- 15 As hinted earlier the word knowledge is not the exact synonym of *pramā*, whereas under certain grammatical analyses the word *pramā* and *pramāṇa* mean the same thing.
- 16 Those who take a practical attitude may argue that philosophical enterprise does not need to initiate, investigation into the possibility of knowledge and its positive outcome, in order to start philosophizing. The test of pudding is in the taste. Just begin philosophizing and see if it succeeds. However if philosophizing is a case of *niṣkampa pravṛtti*, then prior certainty of its possibility is necessary.
- 17 With the realist doubting the possibility of knowledge, or the *samśaya* in question, is more a methodological stance than systemic position.
- 18 There are many other familiar forms of methodological doubt, such doubt that there could be any indubitable truth.
- 19 Situation is little better for the opponent, if he chose to doubt the tenability of the proponent's position instead denying it.
- 20 As Udayana says *na pramāṇye virodhataḥ*.
- 21 He does not have a theory of knowledge and hence he does not have theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of knowledge. He does not have a criterion to distinguish knowledge from false belief.
- 22 This formulation is found in Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.
- 23 *Na pramāṇye virodhataḥ, Nyāyākusumañjali* 1/17.

- 24 *Nyāyasūtra* 2/1/31. This is not exactly what some European idealists contend. According to them, all inferences are developed perception and all perceptions are incipient inference. See B. Blanshard's *The Nature of Thought*.

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## Can Doubt be considered as a Witch (piśācinī)?

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**Raghunath Ghosh**

### I

The present paper considers the statement of Udayana in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* regarding the status of doubt in philosophy. In fact, doubt or *saṁśaya* is taken by the opponents like Nāgārjuna, etc. as a non-entity. Some of the opponents consider it as having a negative impact. In the *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* the Divine Teacher affirms that doubt as such is to be taken as a devil having negative impact on others in the following verse- ‘*saṁśayātmā vinaśyati*’ i.e., an individual having dubious state of mind is ruined. In the following an effort will be made to highlight the reasons given by the opponents in favour of negative attitude towards doubt. Ultimately it will be shown that doubt is not a devil having a negative impact, but it is part and parcel in philosophical exercise and growth following the line of Udayana who emphatically declares- ‘*na hyevam sati śaṁkāpiśācyavakāśamāsādayati.*’<sup>1</sup>

### II

The theory of skepticism in Indian Philosophy is called *saṁśayavāda*. Though doubt or *saṁśaya* has been accepted by most of the schools of Indian Philosophy, there are certain thinkers who are said to be absolute skeptics.

Among these thinkers Jayarāśi and Śrīharṣa are in the first water. Jayarāśi had challenged all the epistemological and metaphysical findings of Indian Philosophy and refuted all of them. To him no feature of certitude (*niścaya*) can be maintained with regard to the epistemological and metaphysical standpoints of the philosophers. He had given a hair-splitting analysis to refute the definitions of valid cognition (*pramā*) and means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). He himself denied providing any valid definition and a theoretical account of the world in response to the views of the opponents. Jayarāśi had neither justified the faultlessness of any instrument of cognition nor put forward any thesis of his own. His main objective was to show the inconsistencies and lack of clarities in others' position. He had introduced the concept of *satlakṣaṇa* (real defining characteristic) as the determinant of the faultlessness of the *pramāṇa*-s. The term *satlakṣaṇa* of *pramāṇa* means its capacity of being devoid of doubt and error (*samśaya-viparyaya-rāhitya*). To Jayarāśi the valid cognition has been defined by the cognitivists as 'non-erroneous' (*avyabhicārī*). But how is the non-erroneous character known? It may be said that a piece of cognition may be taken as non-erroneous if it is produced by a set of causal factors which are non-defective in nature.<sup>2</sup>

The Sanskrit rendering of the term 'doubt' is *samśaya*, which is enumerated as one of the forms of *apramā* (improper cognition), the definition of which is given by Viśvanātha as cognition characterized by the contrary properties of positivity and negativity belonging to a single

object (*Ekadharmika-viruddha-bhāva-abhāva-prakāraḥ* *jñānam saṁśayaḥ*).<sup>3</sup> The knowledge of the common properties remaining in two objects becomes the cause of doubt. The height etc. being common between trunk of a tree and a man, give rise to a dubious cognition in the form: ‘whether this is a trunk of a tree or a man’ (*sthāṇurvā puruṣo vā*). The common cognition of both trunk of a tree and a man is the cause of doubt. In the like manner, after apprehending the property of soundness (*śabdatva*) in a sound which is different from eternity or non-eternity one can have doubt in the form-‘whether sound is eternal or non-eternal’ (*śabdo nityo vā anityo vā*). Though a word being uttered can give rise to cognition touching two alternatives (*koṭīdvaya*) yet doubt has to be taken as a mental phenomenon (*kintu tatra śabdena koṭi-dvayam janyate, saṁśayastu mānasa eveti*). In the same manner, it can be said that on the event of the doubt of validity (*prāmāṇya-saṁśaya*) of cognition there arises the doubt of the object and the doubt of the pervaded (*vyāpya-saṁśaya*) generates the doubt of the pervader (*vyāpaka-saṁśaya*). Moreover, it has been admitted by the Naiyāyikas that the cognition of the possessor of the properties (*dharmi-jñāna*) and the contact of the sense-organ with the possessor of property (*dharmi-indriya-sannikarṣa*) are the causes of doubt. Though the word through which something is known dubiously yet words do not have the capacity of generating doubt. But though two alternatives come to our mind through the instrumentality of a word yet doubt is said to be a mental phenomenon.

Gotama has defined doubt as follows. Doubt is nothing but a conflicting judgment regarding the precise character of an object. It originates from the recognition of properties common to many objects or of properties uncommon to any of the objects, from the conflicting testimony, and from irregularity of perception and non-perception. From this definition it can be presumed that there are five kinds of doubt arising from different causes. First, it may arise from the recognition of common properties (*samāna-dharma-upapatti*). Seeing an object in dim light it is not possible for us to ascertain whether it is a man or trunk of a tree on account of the fact that the common properties like tallness etc. belong to both the objects. Secondly, the recognition of properties not common (*aneka-dharma-upapatti*) may sometimes be cause for doubt. As for example, after hearing a sound one cannot ascertain whether it is eternal or non-eternal, because the property of soundness neither belongs to man, beast etc. that are non-eternal nor in atoms etc. that are eternal. Thirdly, the conflicting testimony sometimes may give rise to doubt. With reference to some textual references it is very difficult to ascertain whether self exists or not. As we have ample references in favour of both the alternatives, it is not always possible to ascertain the status of it. Fourthly, an irregularity of perception becomes sometimes the cause of doubt. As for example, we may have some perceptual awareness about water, but it is difficult to ascertain whether we are seeing real water or water in the mirage. A question always remains in one's mind whether water is perceived in a place where water really exists or even when it does not exist (*upalabdhi-*

*avyavasthātaḥ*). Lastly, an irregularity of non-perception (*anupalabdhi-avyavasthātaḥ*) may become the cause of doubt in some cases. We do not find water, for example, where it really exists and also in the dry land where it does not.<sup>4</sup> The situation leads us to a stage of confusion. A question arises whether water is not perceived only when does not exist or also when it does exist.

### III

Now we may concentrate to the arguments given by Nāgārjuna on denying doubt or *saṁśaya* as a category (*padārtha*) in his famous *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* which is available in the Tibetan version. In this small but philosophically significant text Nāgārjuna has refuted all the sixteen categories accepted by the Naiyāyikas with special reference to Vātsyāyana. An attempt has been made to highlight the arguments given by Nāgārjuna on refuting *saṁśaya*, which is very much significant in the philosophical analysis.

In the treatise *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*<sup>5</sup> Nāgārjuna is of the opinion that the Naiyāyikas have introduced a new category called *saṁśaya* or doubt in order to prove the existence of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. If someone thinks whether something is *pramāṇa* or *prameya*, a doubt arises regarding this. The phenomenon of doubt allows someone to infer the existence of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. By virtue of being a *padārtha* doubt cannot refer to an unreal object.

Nāgārjuna has encountered this position of the Naiyāyikas and refuted their position with some convincing arguments. Nāgārjuna has emphatically established the impossibility of the doubt as a category. Because doubt is not related to something which is perceived and to something which is not perceived. The importance of such statement is grounded on the fact that the perceived object is an existent object while the non-perceived object refers to a non-existent one.

Nāgārjuna, however, assumes a third alternative, which may be taken as an object of doubt. To him there may remain an object which seems to be perceived apart from the two alternatives—a pure perceptual and a pure imperceptual. Even this third alternative cannot justify doubt, because there does not remain an entity, which seems to be perceived. Hence three probable alternatives cannot justify doubt as an entity.<sup>6</sup>

If the above-mentioned logical stand of Nāgārjuna is analyzed, the following clarifications can be offered. When an object is seen, a mere mental representation of that particular object is manifested. If an entity is known as, ‘as a man or a trunk of a tree’ (*sthāṇurvā puruṣo vā*), the corresponding image in the form of either man or a trunk of a tree is produced in the mind. If the object is a man and it is perceived as such, there is a valid cognition. On the other hand, if the object is a trunk of a tree but it is perceived as a man or vice-versa, there is an illusory or invalid cognition, which is nothing but the lack of valid cognition. Perception,

as Nāgārjuna suggests, provides us the data of the perceived object and hence our expression, which is dependent on these data, cannot provide us the cognition of the object as otherwise or the cognition, which can generate doubt. If a man is perceived, the mere representation of a man bears no elements, which can generate doubt in the form; ‘I am seeing a man or a trunk of a tree’ or which can lead to think that what is known as a man is not an actual man. If, on the other hand, there is the mere absence of the perception of an object, it will lead to the cognition of its non-existence, but it does not bear any element, which can provoke doubt.

Apart from the above-mentioned two alternatives there may be a third one. An object may be related to something that seems to be perceived. When a rope is perceived as a serpent, a rope is related to serpent, which seems to be perceived, accepted by the Naiyāyikas. In such cases, Nāgārjuna argues, there is only the false representation of a serpent in the place of rope- this false representation of a serpent is nothing but the lack of representation of rope generated through the mere absence of its perception. Hence there are no elements that can give rise to doubt.<sup>7</sup>

The Naiyāyikas may come up with the following justifications. To them doubt does not arise at all if there were no reference (*itos pa, apekṣā*) to particular attributes or peculiarities (*khyad par, viśeṣa*). First, the Naiyāyikas give a description of an instance of doubt. After seeing an object from a distance there arises an uncertain cognition or

a wavering judgement (*vimarśa*), which provides an uncertain cognition in the form: ‘It is a man or a trunk of a tree’. In this case some common features between man and a trunk of a tree are perceived. It is justified by the definition-‘*tad anavadhāraṇam jñānam samśayaḥ*’. Secondly, Vātsyāyana explains how the doubt is resolved. To him when the specific characters or differentiating features of a man or a trunk of a tree is known, the doubt ceases due to having certainty in the mind in the form-‘It is a man or a trunk of a tree’. Lastly, Vātsyāyana has added a novel feature of doubt. For, the perceived object can be or cannot be a man or a trunk of a tree, as the qualities common to the both are seen. This uncertainty of mind can generate a tendency to search (*Itos pa, apekṣā*) for the specific qualities, which can distinguish an object from the other (*khyad pa, viśeṣa*). As soon as these are available, doubt is resolved. As these differentiating factors or ‘some features different from that’ (*de las gzan du na*) are searched for, it leads to the presupposition that doubt persists in our minds. The ‘looking for’ or ‘the search of’ (*Itos pa, apekṣā*) or ‘desire to know’ (*bubhutsā*) the specific feature of the thing is the new element in Vātsyāyana’s definition of doubt (*viśeṣāpekṣaḥ vimarśaḥ samśayaḥ*). Over all we get three stages: a) perception in a correct cognition or erroneous cognition. b) The perception of special features, which generate the correct cognition and rectify the wrong one. c) There is a third moment when a knower’s mind wavers due to the non-ascertainment of the thing perceived, which leads to looking for the specific character. The last one generates doubt in one’s mind.<sup>8</sup>



Nāgārjuna in his *sūtra* xxiii has refuted the above-mentioned view and proved that doubt does not exist at all. As the doubt is nothing but a fiction to him, there is no room for the relation between doubt and peculiarities. In the stock example- whether it is a man or a trunk of a tree, if the characteristic features distinguishing them are perceived, there is no doubt at this moment, as it gives rise to certain cognition presenting things as such (*yan dag pa ji lta ba bzin du, yathābhūta*), i.e., a man as a man or a trunk of a tree as a trunk of a tree. On the other hand, if the characteristics perceived are not adequate to give a correct cognition, there is no doubt due to having ‘a lack of cognition’ (*mi ses pa, ajñāna*). In other words, if the peculiarities of ascertaining an object exist, there is knowledge. If these do not exist, or not perceived, there is the lack of knowledge. The third alternative, which asserts the existence and non-existence of peculiarities at the same time, is denied by Nāgārjuna. Hence doubt does not at all exist.<sup>9</sup>

#### IV

When Nāgārjuna considers the third alternative, i.e., rope is considered as serpent due to the lack of presentation of rope (*ajñāna*), it reminds me the Mīmāṃsā theory of error technically called *akhyātivāda*. It explains error (e.g., snake in the place of rope) as the absence of the knowledge of discrimination between snake and rope (*yatra yadadhyāsastadvivekāgrahanibandhano bhramaḥ*).<sup>10</sup> Nāgārjuna takes the same position when he says that the

understanding of snake as rope is due to the absence of the cognition of rope.

The Naiyāyika could say that doubt arises when there is a cognition touching both the alternatives (*ubhayakoṭikajñāna*). When an object is known as either as a man or a trunk of a tree, it is true that there is some lack of cognition. It can be interpreted that when there is cognition of a man, it is due to the lack of cognition of a trunk of a tree. When there arises the cognition of a trunk of a tree, it is due to the lack of the cognition of a man. Whatever may be the case we must admit that there is certainly a cognition sometimes taking man as its content and sometimes taking a trunk of a tree as its content. An individual's mind waves between two cognitions successively, but not simultaneously. That is why; such wavering cognition arises from the mental state metaphorized as the movement of the cradle (*dolācalacittavṛtti*). The cognition of a man may be caused by the absence of the cognition of a trunk of a tree or otherwise, but the existence of the cognition of a man for one moment and the cognition of a trunk of a tree for the next moment must be accepted. In this case the existence and non-existence of the peculiarities in a man is known in the successive moment, but not simultaneously as accepted by Nāgārjuna. Herein lies the difference between two schools- Bauddha and Nyāya.

When the determinants are not available in determining the nature of an object, doubt arises there. The absence of

determining proof of an entity, which is the object of knowledge, is the cause of doubt. Doubt plays a positive role in generating critical thinking of mankind after removing blind faith from them. In other words, doubt is the revealer of the windows of our critical and open-minded thinking. Considering this aspect Gautama has enumerated it as one of the sixteen categories, the right cognitions of which lead us to the land of success--mundane and transcendental (*niḥśreyasādhiḡamaḥ*). To Vātsyāyana doubt has been given a due emphasis in Nyāya on account of the fact that logic can alone be applied to the object in doubt, but not to an object which is purely known or unknown ( ‘*Tatra nānupalabdhe na nirñīte’rthe nyāyaḥ pravarttate. Kim tarhi? samśayite’rthe’ -Nyāyabhāṣya* on sūtra no.1.1.1.). From this statement it is proved that Nāgārjuna’s thesis that something is either known or unknown is wrong. If it is known, he says, it is a kind of valid cognition. If it is unknown, it is to be taken as illusion. Vātsyāyana is of the opinion that this is the ideal case where we can have doubt. To him doubt is a kind of intellectual activity arising out of the confrontation by two different philosophical positions called *pakṣa* (thesis) and *pratipakṣa* (antithesis) at the same time.<sup>11</sup> To think an entity as both known and unknown does not lead us to admit its fictitious character, but it is a kind of doubt. This view of the Naiyāyikas will find support in Vācaspati Miśra’s *Bhāmatī*, where he accepts the dubious character of an object as a criterion of an enquiry about it.<sup>12</sup>

We may recall Udayana in this connection. To him if there is mistrust among the family-members, social-beings etc, our empirical doubt will not be possible. If, on the other hand, there is no doubt, there does not arise any philosophical enquiry (*Śamkā cedanumāstyeva na cecchānkā tatastarām/ vyāghātāvadhiraśankā tarkaḥ śamkāvadhirmataḥ.*//)<sup>13</sup> If there is doubt, there is inferential cognition or an inferential procedure is to be resorted to, with a view to resolving doubt. If not, inference is established easily. Such doubt is permissible so long there does not arise self-contradiction (*vyāghāta*). Sometimes the method of *Tarka* (*reductio-ad-absurdum*) is taken into account. From this it is proved that doubt has got a positive role in philosophical methodology if it is taken as a category.

The Buddhists in general and Nāgārjuna in particular cannot accept the perceptibility and imperceptibility simultaneously due to various presuppositions in their minds. To them a perceptual entity remains only for a moment, as per the theory of momentariness, and hence it is of *svalakṣaṇa* nature. An imperceptible entity does not come under the purview of it due its vitiation by the mental constructions (*kalpanā*) and hence it bears a character of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. On account of such ontological commitments, the Buddhist cannot feel the existence of the contradictory properties in an entity. For this reason Nāgārjuna does not accept the existence and non-existence of the peculiarities of an object at the same time, leading him to the non-acceptance of doubt as an existent object.

Thus Nāgārjuna cannot accept the dubious character of an object which is *svalakṣaṇa* (unique particular) in nature.

## V

In the same way it has already been shown that doubt (*saṁśaya*) is not to be taken as a witch (‘*na hyevam sati śamkāpiśācyavakāśamāsādayati*’) destroying all positive actions. It may play a positive role, particularly in philosophical analysis. Philosophy cannot go further, had there been no confusion or doubt regarding some concepts. The arousal of confusion leads to the composition of so many commentaries like *Ṭīkā*, *Bhāṣya*, *Vārtika* etc. That is why; in philosophy no conclusion is to be taken as final but ad hoc. One can easily doubt or challenge the thesis propounded by an individual or a section of philosophers and can refute or substantiate the earlier thesis. In this way, philosophy grows through *Pūrvapakṣa* and *Uttarapakṣa* debate. Doubt is the seed through which the philosophical plant grows and hence doubt is the mother of invention.

Apart from the above-mentioned arguments, we can supply some more from common sense point of view. Any discovery, scientific or philosophical, presupposes doubt about something. Newton had discovered the law of gravitation as he had some doubt regarding the falling of an apple downwards. His doubt was why it cannot go up. Before this apple had fallen down many times, but no question was raised about it due to the absence of doubt. That is why; doubt is taken as the key of discovery or invention. Doubt prompts an individual to question

regarding something. If there is questioning, it is to be presupposed that there prevails a kind of doubt. Our Upaniṣads start with a question from an innocent disciple. The Kenopaniṣad has started with a question which runs as follows: *‘keneṣitam patati preṣitam manaḥ, kena prāṇaḥ prathama praiti yuktaḥ/ keneṣitām vācamimām vadanti cakṣuḥ śrotraṁ ka u devo yunakti//’*.<sup>14</sup> That is, by whose desire does our mind direct towards an object? By whom our vital organ has received first prominence? Whose desire does make, our speaking organs function? And by whom our eye and hearing organs are engaged in revealing the objects. Again, in Kathopaniṣad Naciketā, a representative of the youth, asks the question of knowing self to the great teacher Yama, which is very much appreciated as *‘varāṇameṣo varastrīyaḥ’* (i.e., among the three boons third was the most desired one as it involves doubt regarding self). Following the same line Maitreyī in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad asks question to Yājñavalkya- *‘yenāham nāmṛtām syām tenāham kim kuryāma’* (What can be done with that which cannot provide me Immortality?). Even Narendranath who was known as Swami Vivekananda afterwards went to Ramakrishna with a question- ‘Have you seen God?’ All these questions are prompted by some doubt regarding a particular object. Keeping this in view *Śrīmadbhagavad-gītā* has taken *paripraśna* or repeatedly questioning as a method of learning (*praṇipātena paripraśnena sevayā*). In fact there are three methods of learning- repeatedly questioning (*paripraśna*), deep regards towards teachers (*praṇipāta*) and service to the teachers (*sevā*). All these activities are

backed by certain doubt to know the truth. In ancient time when a student used to feel tension being disturbed by some doubt regarding some incident, he tried to dispel his doubt through questioning about this again and again to the senior persons. Sometimes the teacher is given service to get some enlightenment from him, which is also prompted by doubt in mind on certain subject. It is already known to us that a student having profound regards to his preceptor can attain knowledge alone (*śraddhāvān labhate jñānam*). One who has regards can attain education from the preceptor and in this way doubt in the form of darkness is dispelled. If we seriously think about it, the proper education is meant for removing doubt from the mind.

Those who are engaged in laboratory for scientific discovery try to dispel some sort of doubt there. Had there been no doubt, no discovery is possible. That is why; we get so many scientific discoveries. There are two types of doubt- positive and negative. The positive doubts are called non-pathological doubts which are otherwise called epistemological or metaphysical doubts. These doubts are virtuous in nature as they lead us to phenomenon of philosophical analysis. At the same time there is another type of doubt called pathological doubts which have no importance in our philosophical enterprise. It has been said in the Bhagavad-gītā – ‘*saṁśayātmā vinaśyati*’. Those who are possessing doubt are ruined. For smooth running of our empirical and spiritual life we must have a sense of reliance towards our Vedic and secular codes that are called *vidhi*-s. If we do not have reliability towards our laws formulated

by the state machinery, our society would be turned into an anarchic state, which is not desirable. That is why; we must maintain the laws and orders in the society. If we always nourish doubt, regarding the efficacy of such laws, we shall refrain from obeying it, which ultimately leads to the world of chaos technically called *mātsyanyāya*. Just as big fishes can swallow the smaller ones due to having greater physical power, the powerful persons would have killed the weaker section (*śūle matsyānivāpakṣyan durbalān balavattarāḥ*). If we want to live in a society, we have to maintain civic laws without any doubt on them. We always depend on our near and dear relatives and hence some sort of reliability lies on them. Had there been doubt, our life would not have been smooth and steady. In habitual cases (*abhyāsadaśāyām*) we cannot doubt about the efficacy of an object as told earlier. Depending on our past experience we take food when hungry, drink water when thirsty, when sick, take medicines, when tired take rest. These are habitual behaviors grown after repeated experience. If somebody expresses doubt even in these cases, this leads to contradiction (*vyāghāta*). A question may be asked to a person entertaining doubt- if doubt pertains whether water will quench thirst or not then why does he ask for water? Even after this if he carries on doubts about the efficacy of water, food, medicine etc., then this doubt is to be taken as pathological one having no importance in philosophical activities. This type of doubt is taken as *bhayāvaha* or frightening. For the phenomenon of doubting may be treated as psychological disorder. Such pathological doubt



leads one to the state of disbalance described as a ruin or *vināśa*.

The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* begins with enquiry being moved by the suffering of three types (*duḥkhatrayābhighātād bhavati jijñāsā*).<sup>15</sup> When an individual suffers from sorrow, he will have doubt whether such suffering can be removed or not. This doubt gives rise to the innovation of a path for it. In *Tattvakaumudī* it has been explained that a sufferer has got doubt about its removal, because such suffering cannot be dispelled through an ordinary means (*laukika upāya*). The suffering related to body (*ādhyātmika duḥkha*) and suffering caused by external factors like animal etc. (*ādhibhautika duḥkha*) can somehow be managed if an individual takes prior precaution. But doubt regarding its removal is more prominent when we see our helplessness in case of suffering arising out of Divine will (*ādhidāivika duḥkha*). The calamities caused by earth-quake, draught, flood etc. are not under the control of human being and hence it is under Divine will. So prior precaution cannot help us to remove such suffering. Doubt becomes stronger in such cases regarding the impossibility of its removal. To the Sāṃkhya system, the absolute cessation of suffering is not possible even through the super-normal means (*alaukika upāya*). Doubt is clear when Īśvarakṛṣṇa has prescribed a path, for the knowledge of discrimination between Purusa and Prakṛti. Most of the systems of Indian Philosophy are found to be worried about suffering and its removal. Hence Indian systems are not free from doubt, giving rise to philosophical exercise.

Again, a question may be raised that sometimes over reliance on some authority; person or institution makes no room for doubt which sometimes leads to a chaotic situation. Just like over-confidence over-reliance is harmful and hence the doubt on some principles of the authority or person or institution makes them self-critical and self-assessing. Doubt remaining in the opponents or critical points helps them to rectify themselves. This is true in case of philosophical or any type of writing. Had there been doubt giving rise to critical analysis, the writer would have been cautious in self-assessment leading to their self-rectification. All these cases are the results of positive or constructive or virtuous or non-pathological doubt and hence its methodological value can never be ignored.

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Critique of *Pramāṇa* and *Samśaya* (Doubt) in  
*Vaidalyasūtra* of Nāgārjuna

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**Dilipkumar Mohanta**

**Introduction:**

My contention here is mainly text-based exposition of Nāgārjuna's arguments against Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* in the context of *pramāṇa* and *samśaya* (doubt). Apart from occasional reply from the Nyāya position no elaborate discussion is included in this presentation. Before entering into the textual details let us put the gist of the arguments of Nāgārjuna. He raises the objection that as claimed by the Nyāya philosopher, there is no necessary tie that exists between the truth of any cognitive position and how do we arrive at it. There lies an epistemic gap between our available causal evidence and asserted content. Nāgārjuna is critical about any kind of cognitive claim for certitude. He also questions the veracity of the law of excluded middle. He tries to show the patent incompleteness and inconsistency in the very assumption of the Nyāya philosopher. If *pramāṇa*-s are admitted as self-established and *prameya*-s are by *pramāṇa*-s, then this argument is nothing but an exercise of dogmatism (*dr̥ṣṭivāda*). It will be a case of assumption of putting it in privileged and sacrosanct class without sufficient logical ground. If *pramāṇas* are not *prameya*-dependent, then let *prameya* be not dependent on *pramāṇas*. If *pramāṇas* do not require *prameya*, then *pramāṇas* are *pramāṇas* of what? Let both

be admitted as inter-dependent on this ground. Again, in case of arguing for the validity of *pramāṇas* on the basis of something external to *pramāṇa* itself, this will lead to the blemish of infinite regress. So in either way *pramāṇa* cannot be claimed as established. If *pramāṇas* themselves as causal instruments (*karaṇas*) are not established, there is no possibility of establishing *prameya* and *pramā*. The claim to the possibility of non-erroneous and certain presentational cognition thus remains unestablished. Therefore, the very possibility of non-erroneous and certain cognition is doubtful. There cannot be any such thesis. Because, no knowledge-claim can be accepted as absolutely indubitable or certain. Our judgments are never free from obscurity and uncertainty. Had it been so, the question like ‘Is the judgment true?’ could not be raised. This indicates that there always remains an epistemic gap between our available evidence and asserted content. The no certainty position is followed from the ‘No Criterion Argument’ (refutation of *Pramāṇa*). For Nāgārjuna, in this strict sense ‘certainty’ here means ‘absolute certainty’ and this is next to impossibility. He questions the Nyāya Cognitivist’s assumption that the *Law of Excluded Middle* cannot be doubted. The claimer of the possibility of knowledge relies on the assumption that the judgment about the world of fact (either *bhāva* or *abhāva*) is either true or false. You are to accept either ‘p or not-p’; there is no other alternative. But Nāgārjuna finds no sufficient rational ground to accept either of the two. To him, to any pro-argument for a thesis there is an equally strong counter-argument, and therefore, honestly speaking, he cannot have

any position to put forward or a thesis of his own. “The great individuals hold no thesis and are without disputes. How can there be a counter-thesis for those who do not have a thesis? When one assumes any position /thesis, one is destroyed by the deceitful poisonous snakes of the afflictions. Those individuals whose minds lack any position / thesis will not be destroyed”<sup>1</sup> The shunning of all standpoints (*sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇa*) is the main content of *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā*. It is a kind of philosophy with 'no-position, no thesis'. It ends with contextual refutation of all views and with no further assertion. With these prerequisites let us discuss the textual position of *Vaidalyasūtra* of Nāgārjuna in the context of *pramāṇa* and *pramā*.

### *Refutation of Pramāṇa:*

In the *Treatise of Tearing (Vaidalyasūtra)* Nāgārjuna refutes the claims made by *pramāṇavādi* philosophers. In the *Aphorism of Logic (Nyāyasūtra)*, Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya school of philosophy has asserted the existence of sixteen objects of knowledge or in short, knowable beginning with the causal instrument of knowing (*pramāṇa*). The realists in general, and the Nyāya philosophers in particular admit the independent existence of knowable and causal instrument of knowing, and on the basis of this admittance, they developed their knowledge-claims. It is quite natural that Nāgārjuna who is engaged to question any kind of absolute claim about knowledge and to refute all kinds of exclusivism about what is real would

advance intensive criticism against the Nyāya realism and as a matter of fact, Nāgārjuna has applied dialectics to tear, to refute the Nyāya assumption of the sixteen independent categories to pieces. So *Vaidalyasūtra* or ‘the *Aphorism of Tearing*’ or ‘*Treatise of Tearing*’ aims at demolishing or refuting the Nyāya philosophy of Gautama primarily and secondarily the other allied matters admitted also by other realist philosophers of philosophical debate-tradition.<sup>2</sup> He devoted nineteen verses numbering from 2 to 19 of *Vaidalyasūtra*<sup>2</sup> and twenty verses numbering from 31 to 51 of *Vigrahavyāvartanī*<sup>3</sup> in order to refute the Nyāya claim for independent existence of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. If this claim of the Nyāya Cognitivist is refuted, then logically there cannot be any claim in favor of the possibility of valid cognition (*pramā*) which is necessarily characterized by ‘non-promiscuity’ and ‘certitude’.

Though Nāgārjuna has not mentioned the name of Akṣapāda Gautama in this *Treatise of Tearing/ Refutation*, yet from the close reading of the text it is evident that it is Gautama’s sixteen categories or the objects of knowledge which have been subjected to tearing into pieces one by one. Gautama in the very first *aphorism* of his *Treatise on Logic (Nyāyasūtra)* states that the right cognition of the sixteen knowables will lead to emancipation (*niśreyasaḥ*). The sixteen categories, according to Gautama, are 1) the causal instrument of knowing (*pramāṇa*), 2) the object of knowing (*prameya*), 3) doubt (*saṁśaya*), 4) the purpose of activity (*prayojana*), 5) the corroborative example (*drṣṭānta*), 6) the proved thesis (*siddhānta*), 7) the inference

component (*avayava*), 8) the hypothetical argument (*tarka*), 9) the final ascertainment (*nirṇaya*), 10) debate for the final ascertainment (*vāda*), 11) the debating maneuver (*jalpa*), 12) the commitmentless denial (*vitaṇḍā*), 13) the *pseudo-probans* (*hetvābhāsa*), 14) the purposive distortion of the counter-thesis (*chala*), 15) the futile rejoinder based on mere similarity or dissimilarity (*jāti*) and 16) the point of defeat (*nigraha-sthāna*). The right cognition of the afore-said categories of knowing leads, according to Gautama to the attainment of the highest good (*niśreyasaḥ*). All these sixteen categories of knowing have been refuted by Nāgārjuna one by one.

In the 1<sup>st</sup> *aphorism* Nāgārjuna uses the word ‘*yaḥ*’ (who) to indicate the author of *Nyāyasūtra* and his followers. This is in our opinion the philosophers who admit the objective reality of the aforesaid categories as independently existing and who on the logical strength of their admission express pride and arrogance in philosophical circle are Nyāya philosophers. Nāgārjuna thus starts his refutation right from the causal instrument of knowing (*pramāṇa*) and stops with the refutation of the point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*). An important question may arise here: why is Nāgārjuna silent about ‘the right cognition of real that leads to emancipation (*tattva-jñānānniśreyasaḥ*), an important component of the first *aphorism* of Gautama’s ‘*Nyāya-sūtra*’? It is our considered opinion that it is the liberty of the author of any philosophical treatise to put something where it suits the most in his opinion. And as a matter of fact, Nāgārjuna has not left it untouched in his refutation. In the sixty sixth



*aphorism* of ‘*Vaidalyasūtra*’ Nāgārjuna clearly states, ‘*samastottaresvayaṃ prasaṅgahsyāt*’ – that is to say, Nāgārjuna intends to tell us here that one who understands his refutation from ‘*pramāṇa* to *nigrahasthāna*’ understands that in other remaining matters, the refutation would follow automatically from the aforesaid refutations done by him.<sup>4</sup> In other words, when all sixteen categories of the Nyāya are refuted how can there be any knowledge of what is real? And in such a situation ‘the possibility of the question of emancipation through the knowledge of what is real’ stands irrelevant. It is to be noted here that after refuting the Nyāya claim with regard to *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, Nāgārjuna has used the Sanskrit word ‘*niṣedha*’ right from the refutation of doubt to the refutation of the point of defeat. The word *niṣedha* is ordinarily translated into English as ‘*negation*’. But the word ‘*negation*’ is used as ‘*propositional negation*’ (*paryudāsa pratiṣedhaḥ*) as well as ‘*simple negation*’ (*prasajya pratiṣedhaḥ*).<sup>5</sup> In the first type of negation, if we negate ‘P’ as false, we are compelled to admit ‘Not-P’ as true. But in ‘*pure negation*’ we negate something without any commitment, that is to say, without any possibility of admitting ‘the counter-thesis’. Here Nāgārjuna’s use of the Sanskrit word ‘*niṣedha*’ is to be understood in the second sense of negation, that is to say, as ‘*refutation -- pure and simple*’.

But the Nyāya philosopher might argue here that Nāgārjuna’s “No thesis is a thesis”. The very denial of the veracity of all *pramāṇa* is self-referring, because otherwise it cannot make any ‘*sense*’. But from Nāgārjuna’s side it

could be said that the Nyāya charge is based on the dogmatic assumption that “nothing is equal to something”. If I am asked whether there is ‘anybody’ in my room of the Guest House of the University of Rajasthan now and if I reply, “there is nobody” do I mean ‘somebody’ by the word ‘nobody’? The answer is in the negative. When Nāgārjuna rejects all *pramāṇas* his rejection is to be understood as ‘meta-level’ statement, a second order activity where to deny ‘p’ does not necessarily imply the admission of ‘not- p’. Let me take two statements: “Dog’ has four legs” and “ ‘Dog’ has three letters”. In the first one I am speaking about the animal called ‘DOG’ and in the second I am speaking about the grammatical word “DOG” and by no means the two can be called the same sort of entity. Here Nāgārjuna would suggest the Nyāya Philosopher to take little effort to understand the distinction between ‘object-level’ and ‘meta-level’ statements.<sup>6</sup> There is no room for ‘inconsistency phobia or self contradiction’. His statements are to be understood as ‘negations of their opposites’.<sup>7</sup> He only questions the exclusive categorization of our possible worlds as ‘either ‘p’ or ‘not-p’’. If something is not possible how can it be necessary? If something is not necessary, then its denial does not lead to contradiction. In the denial of four possible ways of know-ability ‘p’ is ‘true for’ a specific set of individuals and ‘not-p’ stands for a separate set of individuals. The world of know-ability is a fluid one with all its fuzzy and definitely categorically indefinable character. We see only relative, context-bound, interdependent existence. Let us be non-assertive about categorical / independent existence of *pramāṇa* and

*prameya*. It would allow us to be open-ended and be non-egoist, and always ready to learn. Let us now see how Nāgārjuna carries further his refutation in *Vaidalya-sūtra* from the 2<sup>nd</sup> aphorism to aphorism 19<sup>th</sup>.

In the 2<sup>nd</sup> *aphorism* Nāgārjuna begins his refutation with the criticism of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* as independently real. According to Nāgārjuna, this claim of the Nyāya philosopher is unjustified. The so-called differentiating marks between the two are confusing. Neither the first nor the second can be established as existing something independent of others. The so-called causal instrument of knowing is worthy of name *pramāṇa* only when there exists a knowable, *prameya*. This means that without the knowable, the *pramāṇa* stands as the causal instrument of nothing. Again, a knowable (*prameya*) as the object of knowing is worthy of name only when there exists an instrument of knowing which causally justifies it. A *pramāṇa* is the causal proof for a knowable being existing. This shows that one is claimed to be established as existing *depending on the other* and *vice versa*. The rigid distinction between the two, Nāgārjuna argues, does not seem to hold good and as such the defining features of the two would become inter-changeable and they stand worthy of their names only on the basis of the mutual relation of dependence. In other words, the defining features of the one becomes applicable to the other and *vice versa* and this amounts to say that any one of them would function both as the causal instrument of knowing and as the knowable which may create a very confusing situation. This shows

that neither of them as existing is established in the sense in which the Nyāya philosopher holds.

In the 3<sup>rd</sup> *aphorism* Nāgārjuna develops a fresh argument against the claim of independent existence of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. What is dependently existent is devoid of its own nature and what is devoid of any nature of its own cannot be established as an independent category. In other words, there is no substantiality, no essence. It is a mistake, according to Nāgārjuna, to classify in absolute sense the furniture of the world into sixteen independent categories. The arising of a pot cannot be explained had it been existing independent of others. In such a case, it could not have been arisen depending on clay, instrument say a stick, the usually known causal conditions for arising of the pot. On the other hand, if something is independent, and by its own nature is non-existent like sky-flower or rabbit's horn, that is called fictitious. Nothing can be classified as both existing and non-existing in this sense. Neither *pramāṇa* nor *prameya* can be classified either as existent or non-existent or both because of their own dependent nature.

The *pramāṇa*-theorists like Nyāya philosophers may object here that the *pramāṇa* is required to establish the *prameya*, the knowable. The *pramāṇa* is like a *weighing instrument* and just as the *weighing instrument* measures other objects, *pramāṇa* establishes *prameya*. In response to such an explanation in favour of the independent existence of *pramāṇa* Nāgārjuna advances subtler implication of this and derives absurdity from it. He argues that if we admit

that *pramāṇa* is required as the causal instrument in order to establish the knowable, *prameya* but *pramaṇā* itself belongs to a ‘self-establishing, privileged and sacrosanct’ class then the *pramaṇā*-theorist would be introducing arbitrariness and dogmatism (*drṣṭivāda*). And without sufficient logical ground the admission of the distinction between *pramāṇa* and *prameya* is as good as admitting inconsistency and discord. Again, another implication of admitting *pramāṇa* as self-established may amount to say that *pramāṇa* is established independent of *prameya*. In fact, in such a situation it would cease to be a *pramāṇa*, because it would be the *pramāṇa* of nothing. If one is established, however, through the other and *vice versa*, then none of them would have an independent nature. It would further be a case of proving what is already proved (*siddhasādhana*), because of the assumption that *prameya* is already established. In that case the necessity of *pramāṇa* itself for establishing *prameya* becomes superfluous. And when the independent nature of both *pramāṇa* and *prameya* remains un-established, the so-called ‘knowledge claim’ by the Nyāya cognitivism becomes unwarranted.

The 4<sup>th</sup> *aphorism* also contains the examination of the Nyāya cognitivist’s arguments in favour of the existence of *pramāṇa* as an independent category. The *pramāṇa*-theorist here introduces the analogy of weighing scale. But Nāgārjuna refutes the justifiability of the analogy of the weighing scale or a lamp-light. What itself is not established cannot be the causal instrument for establishing others. If in order to avoid the arising of the aforesaid

question it is said that a *pramāṇa* is established by another *pramāṇa*, then the so-called first instance of *pramāṇa* would turn out to be a *prameya*. In that case how can we distinguish between a *pramāṇa* and a *prameya*?

But the *pramāṇa*-theorist may, however, argue here that a *pramāṇa* is just like a lamplight which illuminates others as well as itself and when a *pramāṇa* is established through other *pramāṇa*, that other one is also a *pramāṇa*. But Nāgārjuna at this juncture brings the charge of infinite regress against the *pramāṇa*-theorist. If in order to avoid the charges of non-accordance and of dogmatism, the *pramāṇa*-theorist adopts that a *pramāṇa* is established by another *pramāṇa* of the same type or of different type, this would instead of providing any justification for establishing *pramāṇa* as existing simply invite infinite regress. To cite an example of the first alternative, we may say that a perception, say P<sup>1</sup> is established through another perception, say P<sup>2</sup>, and P<sup>2</sup> by P<sup>3</sup> and so on, and for the second alternative, a perception, say P is established through an inference say F, and so on. But in either case, the blemish of infinite regress would be inevitable. The net outcome, according to Nāgārjuna, is that the existence of *pramāṇa* is not established.

The fifth and the sixth *aphorisms* contain a possible counter-argument by the cognitivist Nyāya philosopher and the refutation of that counter-argument by Nāgārjuna. We see in the *Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.19 that there is comparison of *pramāṇa* to a lamp-light (*pradīpa*). Light is the revealer of

objects. But we do not require any other thing for revealing the existence of light itself. *Pramāṇa*, according to Gautama, functions in this manner in order to establish the existence of *prameya*. But Nāgārjuna, however, shows the unfitness of the afore-said analogy in the 6th *aphorism*. Darkness is opposite / contrary to light and there is no generally admitted connecting tie between the two. As there is no established connecting tie between the two, the light cannot be said to reveal objects being in connection with darkness. Now if light is in no way in connection with darkness, how can it destroy darkness? In a similar way it is absurd to say that *prameya* is established by *pramāṇa*. To strengthen his refutation, Nāgārjuna in the 7<sup>th</sup> *aphorism* introduces a possible analogy in favour of the opponent and refutes it subsequently. The opponent may argue that though light is not outwardly in connection with darkness, yet it can illuminate the object destroying darkness as it is seen in case of the hurtful influences of planets upon human beings despite there is no contact between the two. Similarly light can destroy darkness, though there is no direct contact between light and darkness. This shows that for influencing the cessation of darkness by light no direct contact is necessary between the two.

But Nāgārjuna refutes this possibility and considers the new analogy given by the opponent not only unfit but also contradictory to the example. In the given analogy, planets and individual human beings who are said to be affected by the inferences of the planets, both have bodies. But it is not fit for the case of light. In case of an individual, say

Devadatta or Brahmadata, it has a body to be affected by the evil influences of the planets. But this is not the case with darkness. Now if it is argued that even in the absence of any contact light destroys darkness, then it must also be admitted that a lamplight in a particular room is also able to destroy the darkness that prevails in the interior of the caves of the mountain or a distant dark place is illuminated by the lamp-light of this room.

In the 9<sup>th</sup> *aphorism* Nāgārjuna continues his refutation of *pramāṇa*. He says that darkness is considered as the absence of light. And both the common people as well as the scholars admit that darkness being the absence of light does not have any independent nature, that is to say, it does not exist independently. Now if lamplight is compared to *pramāṇa* and darkness to *prameya*, then in the absence of *prameya*, (i.e. darkness) the role of *pramāṇa* (i.e. light) becomes irrelevant. So light cannot be claimed to be established as the illuminator of darkness. And this proves that the example of light and darkness is not a suitable one. Moreover, this 9<sup>th</sup> *aphorism* elaborates another dimension of the same argument. It is logically arguable that light can illuminate itself if and only if there is darkness. But light and darkness are mutually exclusive and therefore are contradictory and on account of this the claim that the presence of darkness is to be eliminated by the presence of lamplight remains unestablished.

In the 10<sup>th</sup> *aphorism* Nāgārjuna has constructed a counter-argument, we would like to call it ‘*darkness-analogy*’ in



contrast to the Nyāya-cognitivist's argument what we have titled as '*light analogy*'. The Nyāya cognitivists argue that light illuminates other things as well as itself. Analogous to this, we may say, according to Nāgārjuna, that 'darkness conceals the existence of itself as well as of other things.' But as a matter of fact, though darkness conceals the presence of other things, it does not conceal the presence of itself. What is evident here is that the claim of the *pramāṇavādin's* is not justified.

Next Nāgārjuna tries to show that neither *pramāṇa* nor *prameya* can be established as existing in any of the three times. The 11th *aphorism* thus continues the refutation of *pramāṇa* in a broad sense introducing the temporal consideration of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. Nāgārjuna argues that if *pramāṇa* is meant to establish *prameya* (as existing), then it must exist either '*before or after*' *prameya* or it must be admitted that *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are simultaneous. According to Nāgārjuna, none of the afore-said alternatives are tenable. If *pramāṇa* is temporally '*before*' *prameya*, then it must be admitted that '*pramāṇa* exists when *prameya* does not exist. But in that case *pramāṇa* itself cannot be worthy of its name; because without *prameya*, it is *pramāṇa* of nothing. The cognitivists themselves defined *pramāṇa* as the causal instrument of knowing and *prameya* as the object of knowing. So in the absence of the knowable how can the causal instrument of knowing be worthy of its name? Again, if it is argued that *pramāṇa* exists after the knowable, *prameya*, then it must also be admitted that even in the absence of the causal instrument of knowing, the

object of knowing, the knowable (*prameya*) is already established (as existing), and in that case, there would not be any necessity for the role of *pramāṇa*. We cannot logically any more say that *pramāṇa* is required to establish *prameya*. But it is absurd to admit something as the causal instrument which comes into being *after* the very object whose existence is already established. And something being a causal instrument of knowing must be temporally *prior* to the object of knowing. This shows that something existent and something non-existent may be seen at the same time. But our practical experiences show that even the simultaneous existence of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* cannot establish *pramāṇa* as the causal instrument of establishing *prameya* just as the fact of simultaneity in existence of two horns of a bull cannot prove that the left horn causes the right horn.

In the 12<sup>th</sup> *aphorism* Nāgārjuna apprehends another counter-argument from the *pramāṇa*-theorists like a Naiyāyika. The objection is that if you deny the existence of *pramāṇa* in three times, the denial is not established as existing in any of the three times. If you deny everything, then you cannot deny the fact that ‘you are denying’. If you do not deny the fact that ‘you are denying’ then you are not denying everything. Only foolish or a mad person can deny all *pramāṇas*, all positions. Such a person can first burn his own finger in order to burn others’ finger later. It involves self-refutation.<sup>8</sup>

But Nāgārjuna in the 13<sup>th</sup> *aphorism* eliminates the possibility of the afore-said counter-argument as *non-sensical*. It is an admitted position to all that if something is negated earlier, then from that negation the existence of that thing cannot be followed. When something, say, *pramāṇa* is negated as existing, it is *non-sensical* to argue that here ‘negation’ itself is established as something existing. It is as good as saying ‘nobody’ is ‘somebody’. In such a situation, we are to accept the non-sensical derivation from “There is nobody” to “There is somebody who is called nobody”. Candrakīrti for a similar occasion states that suppose, A asks B for something and B replies “I have nothing to give.” Then A again says, “Give me *that nothing*.” (*yoḥ na kiñcidapi te panyaṁ dāsyāmitiyuktaḥ, sa ced “dehi bhostadevamahyaṁ na kiñcinnāmapanyaṁ” iti bruyāt, sa keno ’payena sakyāḥ paṇyābhāvaṁ grahayitum*”<sup>9</sup>) Here A’s understanding of the meaning of the word ‘*nothing*’ as ‘something’ is ‘*non-sensical*’. Similarly, when the opponent’s cognitivistic position is negated, that is to say, as the claim that “*pramāṇa* and *prameya* are existent and the former causally establishes the latter” is already negated, it must be admitted, that from the fact of *negation* of their existence, their existence cannot be claimed to be established.

In the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> *aphorisms* Nāgārjuna simply continues the implication of his refutation of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* as existing. His main contention is that once the claim for the independent existence of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* has been shown unjustified, there remains no further scope or

necessity for debate.<sup>10</sup> However, Nāgārjuna sharpens his refutation of *pramāṇa-prameya* tradition by saying further that even if the *negatum* is non-existent, yet the *negation* is meaningful. How? He explains that in negation we deal with the *concept of negation* and *with the claim about something being negated*. Nāgārjuna's aim in this 'Treatise of Refutation/Tearing' is to demolish the wrong philosophies and so he also refutes the idea of something non-established posing as existing something.

But the opponents (i.e. the *pramāṇavādins*), however, may loom a fresh argument in defense of their claim from the right act of knowing. They would begin with the first *pramāṇa*, say perception. The cognition which yields the correct object is called right (*yathārtha*) and only with correct cognition of object, we feel temptation of performing or non-performing certain acts. Nāgārjuna states this in the 16<sup>th</sup> *aphorism* and examines this claim in the 17<sup>th</sup> *aphorism*. His point is that even if for the sake of argument we admit the existence of *pramāṇa*, this by no means constitutes any guarantee for the existence of *prameya* as established. If something is a knowable for its being something perceived or inferred, then there is no meaning in saying that it independently exists. Therefore, the independent existence of *prameya* is not established even if the existence of *pramāṇa* is admitted. And what is true about perception and inference with regard to their respective knowable is also true about other *pramāṇa-s* and their respective knowable.

If it is said by the opponent (i.e. the Nyāya cognitivist) that in the instance of a pot, the knowable is the pot and the idea of the pot is the causal instrument of knowing, Nāgārjuna keeps himself ready with a fresh refutation. ‘What is an idea about something?’ asks Nāgārjuna. The idea arises out of sense-object-contact in *knowledge-episode*. The pot constitutes a determining condition only with regard to the function of *pramāṇa*. But the idea cannot be the causal instrument of knowing. Again, the pot cannot fulfill the sufficient condition to be a knowable in the true sense, according to Nāgārjuna. The idea of the pot is temporarily *prior* to the cognition of the pot and therefore, it is non-existent during the time of cognition. In order to be a knowable, the pot must be independently existent at the time of cognizing. Since in the given instance, the pot does not fulfill this condition, it cannot be established as the right object of knowing. *Nyāyasūtra* (1.1.1) also characterizes *prameya* as “*ātma-śarīre-indriyārtha-buddhi-manah-pravṛtti-doṣa pretyabhāva-phala-dukhāpavargāstu-prameyam*” – this is to say, soul, bodies, senses, intellect, mind .....suffering, liberation etc. are knowables. These are claimed to be established by the four different types of *pramāṇa*, according to Nyāya. Nāgārjuna, therefore, in the 19<sup>th</sup> *aphorism* continues his refutation of *pramāṇa* including its varieties.

Refutation of Doubt:

Nāgārjuna tries to strengthen his refutation of the *pramāṇa-prameya* trend of philosophical investigation by way of

criticizing doubt as a pertinent knowable. All furniture of the world, as we have discussed earlier, are classified under several sets of knowable. In Nyāya system of philosophy knowledge is taken as something which always points beyond itself. A piece of cognition is valid if it can give us an indubitably true awareness of an object that exists independently. Nāgārjuna's main concern in the refutation of Nyāya position here is *not to say* that what we know about the world is false; rather he maintains that the knowledge-claims made in the Nyāya philosophy of Gautama are not supported by adequate logical grounds. In Nyāya doubt (*samśaya*) is one of the indispensable categories of knowing, because it is the necessary pre-condition for any philosophical investigation. The *ipso-facto* doubt is to be dispelled by thorough investigation through *pramāṇa*. Unless there is initial doubt, the necessity of admitting the existence of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* cannot be explained. Nāgārjuna, therefore, refutes the existence of doubt as a *prameya* as classified in Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra*. In the 20<sup>th</sup> *aphorism* of *Vaidalyasūtra* Nāgārjuna apprehends the Nyāya position with a possible argument. This is that doubt cannot be arisen about an unreal object and therefore, it exists. Nāgārjuna examines three possibilities – the object of doubt may be something perceived or non-perceived or something seemingly perceived. In none of the cases, it is logically justified to admit the existence of doubt as an independent category of knowable. The object of doubt is characterized by two mutually contrary attributes; here our mind vacillates between the two and unless this peculiar

characteristic is attributed to the same object of knowledge, doubt would not be established as existing. But before elaborating Nāgārjuna's arguments against doubt as an existing knowable it is important to discuss, at least in short, the necessity of combating doubt according to Nāgārjuna. Nāgārjuna makes it clear in his *commentary* just before the 20<sup>th</sup> *aphorism* that the Nyāya *pramāṇavādin* might argue that the *pramāṇa-prameya* tradition is not refutable, because even the argument that 'what is called *pramāṇa* turns out to be a *prameya* and *vice-versa*' refers to the existence of doubt. And it enables the *pramāṇavādin-s* to admit *pramāṇa* and *prameya* as existing because they are the objects to which doubt refers. Doubt is accepted as an existing knowable in the Nyāya set of knowable and for this an unreal or a non-existing object cannot be referred by doubt. This is precisely the reason why Nāgārjuna takes so much care in refuting doubt as an independent category of knowable. In order to refute the *pramāṇavādin's* new argument in favour of the existence of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, Nāgārjuna in the 20<sup>th</sup> *aphorism* contends that doubt is not possible about the perceived objects nor about the non-perceived objects nor even about the seemingly perceived objects. What is perceived is apprehended, cognized with certitude as existing. What is not-perceived is also apprehended, cognized with certitude as non-existing. So in these two cases, there is no possibility of doubt. Now remains the third possibility that is to say, the cases of seemingly perceived objects. When a piece of rope is seemed to appear as a snake, the object is cognized not with real defining characteristics but with the

characteristics of something other than itself. So the cognition is surely a case of false cognition; there is no scope for uncertainty in that cognition. And since there is no scope of uncertainty, there is no possibility of doubt. The spirit of Nāgārjuna's refutation here seems to be as follows: Ascertainment of something by perception is a piece of confirmed cognition about that thing's existence. In fact, when we perceive something, we do have a mental picture of the object of the said perception. When we perceive something as a tree-trunk, we are sure about its existence. In case of true perceptual cognition there is always an element of certitude. The same is true about other alternatives. Even the case of false perception of a snake in a rope is not a case of doubt during the time of perception or after perception, because in that case there is the absence of representation of mental picture of a rope but there is no sufficient condition for producing doubt as we usually find in the example of the *mere non-perception*.

In Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra*, doubt is called a kind of wavering cognition (*vimarśa*) (*samāna-aneka-dharma-upapatteḥ vipratipatteḥ upalabdhi-anupalabdhi-avyavasthātaḥ ca viśeṣa-apekṣaḥ vimarśaḥ samśayaḥ* – 1.1.23). It is the contradictory 'apprehension about the same knowable which relies on the recollection of the specific distinguishing marks of each.' The five varieties of doubt are due to five different causal conditions. When we recollect the unique features of each objects and we are indecisive about the nature of the yonder object because of the apprehension of common features we have the



contradictory cognition of the same object. This is the first form of doubt. There we find common features, -- like the length and the breadth, between the man and the tree-trunk. From a distant place an yonder object may be perceived having the common features of the tree-trunk and the man. Next because of the nearness we can see the specific features of the moving of hand and feet etc. which distinguish it from a tree-trunk and we have the cognition of a man. Nāgārjuna's point is that there cannot be any relation between the state of doubt and the unique feature's awareness. The confusing features assigned to the same object is the distinguishing mark of doubt. According to Nāgārjuna, this is not possible. In the 22<sup>nd</sup> *aphorism* Nāgārjuna argues that the confusing features of the yonder object which is the distinguishing mark of doubt may either be known or unknown. If it is known, then there cannot be any scope for doubt. Even if it is not known, then also there is no possibility of doubt. When we know that there is tree-trunk or this is a man, in either case, there is no doubt. In either case it is the right cognition. If on the other hand the exact features of the object are unknown, it is then cognized (i.e. known) as unknown. There is also no scope for uncertainty. The cognition of distinguishing unique features of existence and non-existence cannot be possible in the same time. This leads Nāgārjuna to conclude that the existence of doubt cannot logically be established.

These objections of Nāgārjuna have immense value in the philosophical debate between the Nyāya of Gautama and the Madhyamaka critique of Gautama's categories of

knowable. In the second chapter of the *Nyāyasūtra* while examining different objections against doubt Gautama in a very subtle way criticized the arguments of Nāgārjuna. Gautama in *Nyāyasūtra* 1-5 elaborates the objections against doubt and in 6-7 *sūtra-s* tries to defend the Nyāya position. The objections against Gautama's understanding of doubt as a separate category of existents have been elaborated by Vātsyāyana in his *commentary* and it is noticeable that the second and the fifth objections are directly the objections raised by Nāgārjuna in *Vaidalyasūtra* (i.e. 20-22 *sūtra-s*). Whether Gautama himself in the second part of *Nyāya-sūtra* (i.e. 2.1.1 – 2.1.7) could answer Nāgārjuna's charges or whether any later Nyāya philosopher is successful in meeting the charges raised by Nāgārjuna is a separate issue and this needs further research by the competent researchers who are well-versed in the development of both Nyāya and Madhyamaka traditions.

### Concluding Remarks:

From what has been explained above there seems to be *no commonly shareable ground* where both of them (Gautama and Nāgārjuna) can meet. Rather they seem to be walking on two parallel tracks without any meeting-point. Sometimes they use the same term in two different senses – 'relative' and 'absolute' - due to the difference in their meta-theoretic presuppositions. But this does not imply that the skeptical charges of Nāgārjuna leaves the arena of knowledge empty-handed. Nāgārjuna is right in pointing

out that the Nyāya cognitivist's conception of knowledge is *not well-defined* and that *the knowledge-claim and its causal ground is not sufficiently well-connected*. The risk of incoherence seems to be an in-eliminable fact of epistemic enterprise and a Nāgārjunian philosopher with skeptical orientation can avoid it by using different levels of language. Even when all object-level statements are asserted to be false it cannot affect the truth-status of the meta-level one. In meta-language the limits of our ordinary language can be conceived. This type of analysis seeks a much deeper root of our linguistic aberrations. All linguistic assertions are vitiated by some inner contradictions. The remedy, as would have been suggested by the non-cognitivists like Nāgārjuna, is the rejection of language as an adequate instrument for any veridical description of the real. It seems to be just on virtually the entire gamut of the subsidiary issues, related to the insufficiency of our knowledge. Nāgārjuna's statements are to be understood as *negations of their opposites*. The overall ever dynamism in the context of knowledge will lead to an open question device applicable to all kinds of 'theory-making' regarding the infallibility of knowledge. The lacking in finalization and openness are the key notes of research for the philosophers with skeptical orientation. Such a philosopher understands the progress of science as a fundamentally historical project. The moot question here is not that a scientific theory is absolutely wrong and another theory is absolutely right. Scientific theories, as we know, are all the time 'better and better approximation and one is developed upon the realization of the limitation of the

earlier one'. The Nāgārjunian skeptic's rejection of the Law of Excluded Middle seems to be consistent with the presupposition of many valued logic. It is a kind of logic that also works on modality. Our possible world does not have the exclusive categorization of "either 'p' or 'not-p'". And if something is not possible how can it be necessary? If  $\sim Mp$  then  $\sim Lp$ . Therefore, the law of excluded Middle is not necessary. If something is not necessary, then its denial does not lead to contradiction. Like a Cognitive Skeptic Nāgārjuna's use of negation in Indian philosophy is *not propositional* but rather *pure or simple* which may be called '*verbally bound predicate negation*'. In actual state of affairs in the world there are ill-defined and vague areas where we are incapable of saying whether the concept or its negation is applicable to it. The Nāgārjunian skeptic points his finger to this important fact of our epistemic discourse. The Nyāya philosopher uses hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*) within the scope of only two alternative possibilities where one is the exhaustive denial of the other. But Nāgārjuna's rejection of each possible alternatives in a different context enables him to exercise the art of non-asserting and his use of dialectics is a case of negation of unrestricted principle of *Reduction ad Absurdum*, which is rather a case of *de-conditioning* instead of *deconstruction*. The Nyāya philosopher uses *paryudāsa pratiṣedha* whereas Nāgārjuna uses *prasajya pratiṣedha* and this roughly corresponds to Johnson's understanding of the difference between 's is not-p' and 's is non-p'.<sup>11</sup> Nāgārjuna negates different possibilities separately and in different senses. Like the cognitive skeptics in Western philosophy we cannot deny

that Nāgārjuna ‘has fought a stiff fight and has won many battles in its course’. Do the repeated cognitivistic efforts ensure our claim to know in absolute term?<sup>12</sup> However, it is indeed admirable that many required clarification<sup>13</sup>, regarding our claim about the nature of knowledge, can solely be gained “by analyzing how the key arguments deployed by the skeptic fail in the final analysis to establish his governing conclusion of the illegitimacy of claims to knowledge.”<sup>14</sup> This presupposition is based on experience that we ‘cannot know’ more things than we ‘can know’. In other words, it is possible to say that whatever we can know is interdependent, relative and context-bound. There cannot be any absolute claim about the nature of the world. Context-free absolute claim is a non-sense. The world of our know-ability is a fluid one with all its fuzzy and definitely indefinable character. Our experiential data cautiously tell us that we cannot exhaustively demarcate in exclusive terms anything in the world as either real or unreal and therefore, cannot make any statement either as true or false in absolute or categorical term. All objects of the world have relative, context-bound, interdependent existence in our actual experience. *Nāsti ca mama pratijñā*, - *I have no thesis to advance*. Let us learn to be non-assertive and avoid dogmatism, be open-ended and always ready to learn, and be non-egoist.<sup>15</sup>

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#### Notes and References :

1. Nāgārjuna, *The Sixty Verses of Reasoning*, (*Yuktiṣaṣṭikākārikā*) of Nāgārjuna, vv, 50-51.
2. Vātsyāyana in his commentary on *Nyāya-sūtra V.1,39-40* tries to give rejoinder to Nāgārjuna's objection though Vātsyāyana does not mention the name of Nāgārjuna. He simply treats it as an opponent. But *Nyāya-sūtra IV.1,39-40* seem to refer to the 15<sup>th</sup> chapter of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and a careful reader can read the reference of the chapter 7<sup>th</sup> of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* as *pūrvapakṣa* in *Nyāya-sūtra IV.2.31-32*.
3. Nāgārjuna, *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, Eng Tr titled *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna* by Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, MLBD, Delhi, 1978, p. 113--114; also see, Bengali Tr and annotation by Dilipkumar Mohanta titled *Madhyamakadarśaner Rūparekhā O Nāgārjunakṛta savṛtti Vigrahavyāvartanī*, Mahabodhi Book Agency, Kolkata, 2006, p. 104 -105
4. Dilipkumar Mohanta, *Studies in Vaidalyasūtra (Treatise of Tearing) of Nāgārjuna*, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Utkal University, Bhubaneswar, 2009, pp 72—79

5. “ aprādhānyam vidheryatra niṣedhe pradhānatā prasajya pratiṣedho sau kriyayā saha yatrañān / prādhānyam hi videheryatra niṣdhopradhānatā/ paryyudāsa sa vijneyo yatrottarapadena nān//” *Śabdakalpadruma*, vol 3, Motilal Banarasidass, 1961, p 298
6. ---- *Nāgārjunakṛta savṛttiśūnyatāsaptati*, Bengali Tr and Annotation titled *Bhāgirathivyākhyā*, Ramakrishna Mission Vivekananda University, Belur, 2011
7. ----- “Cognitive Scepticism of Nāgārjuna” published in *the Proceedings of the 20<sup>th</sup> World Congress of Philosophy*, ed E. Sosa, Boston, 2000
8. In Indian philosophy we may consider the case of the Nyāya philosopher as a cognitivist and the case of Nāgārjuna as a cognitive skeptic in a specific sense. Uddyotkara raises the charge of self-stultification against the cognitive skeptic. He compares a cognitive skeptic with a foolish person who burns his own finger in order to burn others. “*Naiṣa doṣaḥ, tasya svavacanavyāghāta codanāt.---yathā nāma kaścit svāṅgulijvālayā param didhaksuḥ sa ca param dahnemā vā svāṅgulidāham-tāvadnubhavaṭīti.*”-- *Nyāya-Vārttika*, ICPR edition,1997:183); also see, Uddyotkara, *Nyāyavārttika*, (Bibliotheca Indica), ed. V. P. Dvivedin, Chowkhamba, Varanasi, 1915
9. – *Prasannapadā* on *Mūla-Madhyamaka-Karikā* (MMK), Vol 1, ed. R. R. Pandeya, Motilal Banarasi Das, Delhi, 1988, p. 241-242
10. For example, the Nyāya cognitivist (Vātsyāyana) uses the same entity both as an instrument of knowing and object of knowing in two different linguistic contexts. The use of case-inflections are not denotative of various things, but of potentialities for various ‘role-playing’. The use of rationality, for the Nyāya cognitivist, is flexible and not fixed in any absolute sense. But Nāgārjuna takes the absolute sense of rationality and asks for meeting that standard. Sometimes the cognitivist speaks from psychological consideration while the skeptic argues from purely logical consideration and brings the charge of infinite regress. A cognitivist may rely on

deterministic assumption of two-valued logic and use first order language for describing what is real. On the other hand, a cognitive skeptic like Nāgārjuna questions the validity of this assumption and prefers to speak in second order language. He is aware of the possibility that the world cannot be explained exhaustively by two exclusive domains of 'is' and 'is not'; there remains the possibility of many-valued logic. It seems that these different meta-theoretic presuppositions do not allow the cognitivist and the skeptic in Indian tradition to share any common ground for holding any dialogue.

11. Johnson, W. E., *Logic*, Dover Pub. Inc. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1964 (1921)
12. E. Sosa, "Postscript to Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology" in J.L. Kvanvig (ed), *Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology*, Rowman & Littlefield, 1996, p.276
13. A. Dasgupta, Believer: The Locus of Epistemic Justification, *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, (ed) G. Mishra, vol XXV No 4, Oct-Dec, 2008, pp. 38-58
14. N. Rescher, *Scepticism*, 1980, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p.250
15. It is interesting to note that Buddha himself was in favour of critical analysis before accepting or rejecting any view. "To judge the purity of gold, it is burnt, cut and rubbed. In the same way, carefully examine the teachings I gave you. If you find truth in them, follow them zealously, do not have hatred for others, simply because it is not ours... Oh Bhiksu! Examine what is said by me through critical reason before admitting it. Please do not admit it just out of blind reverence or faith upon me", said by Gautama Buddha to his first five disciple. ('Tāpācchedācca nikaṣāt suvarṇamiva paṇḍitaṅṅ, paṅkṣyamadvācagrāhyaṃ, bhikṣave! Na tu gauravāt'--See, Śāntideva, *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Kārikā, 3587) ; In the *Digha Nikāya* "Kesaputtara Kālāmāsutta" we see that "It is proper for you, Oh! Kalamas, to doubt, to be uncertain, do not be led by



reports, or tradition, or hearsay. Do not be led by the authority of religious texts, nor by mere logic or inference, nor by considering appearances; nor by delight in speculative opinions, nor by seeming possibilities, nor by the idea, this ascetic is our teacher. But rather, when you yourselves know [that] certain things are unwholesome and wrong, [that such] things are censured by the wise, and when undertaken, such things lead to harm, [then] abandon them.” [DN 1.4]

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[**Abstract:** In the *Bhagavadgītā* Kṛṣṇa is presented as the best destroyer of *saṁśaya*. *Samśaya* in Vedic tradition means not only cognitive uncertainty and doubt but also conative irresolution and hesitation to perform action. It is the conative irresolution and hesitation as part of meaning of *saṁśaya* that receives greater emphasis in the *Bhagavadgītā*. The doubt and hesitation emerge as question (*praśna*) in thinking. Emergence of question is emergence of multiple possibilities of the thing, which are not yet settled in favour of the one possibility that is actual. Once multiple possibilities of the thing emerge in the open then it takes the form of doubt and hesitation (*saṁśaya*) whether the thing is like this or that. The doubt and hesitation (*saṁśaya*), therefore, is nothing but opening up of the multiple possibilities in thinking, where it is not yet settled which one of them is actual. Uncertainty and hesitation (*saṁśaya*) is destroyed by knowledgeable resolve (*jñāna*). The essay, therefore, explores various aspects of knowledgeable resolve (*jñāna*) and perception (*mātrāsparśa*) in the *Bhagavadgītā*

**Key Words:** *saṁśaya, praśna, jñāna, mātrāsparśa, dehin, deha and karma*]

*yogasamnyastakarmāṇaṃ jñānasamchinnasamśayaṃ /  
 ātmavantam na karmāṇi nibadhnanti dhanamjaya //  
 tasmād ajñānasambhūtaṃ hṛtsthaṃ jñānāsinātmanaḥ /  
 chittvainam samśayaṃ yogam ātiṣṭhottiṣṭha bhārata //*

“Him who has *yoga* with rightly vested action, whose doubt (*samśaya*) has been cloven asunder by knowledgeable resolve, who is self-possessed, actions bind not, O Dhanamjaya. Therefore, with the sword of knowledgeable resolve cleave asunder this doubt (*samśaya*), born of ignorant irresolution and lying in the heart and, and resort to Yoga. Arise, O Bharata.”

*Bhagavadgītā* 4.41-42

## 1. Kṛṣṇa as Destroyer of *Samśaya*

In the *Bhagavadgītā* Kṛṣṇa is presented as the best destroyer of *samśaya*. Arjuna says to Kṛṣṇa in *Bhagavadgītā* 6.39: “This doubt (*samśaya*) of mine, O Kṛṣṇa, you destroy without remainder; for none other than yourself there is possibility of taking steps for destruction of this doubt.”<sup>1</sup> Although we have translated *samśaya* as ‘doubt’, in Vedic tradition it conveys more than mere ‘doubt’. *As we will show later samśaya in Vedic tradition means not only cognitive uncertainty and doubt but also conative irresolution and hesitation to perform action. It is the conative irresolution and hesitation as part of meaning of samśaya that receives greater emphasis in the Bhagavadgītā.*

Kṛṣṇa himself gives assurance of absence of doubt regarding what he is conveying to Arjuna thrice in the *Bhagavadgītā*. First time he gives assurance in *Bhagavadgītā* 8.5: “And whoso, at the time of end, remembering of Me alone, leaves the body and goes forth, he reaches My being; there is no doubt (*saṁśaya*) here.”<sup>2</sup> Second assurance is given in *Bhagavadgītā* 10.7: “He, who feelingly knows in essence this *vibhūti* and *yoga* of mine, is harnessed unwaveringly in (*karma*) Yoga; there is no doubt (*saṁśaya*) here.”<sup>3</sup> Third time the assurance of absence of doubt is given in *Bhagavadgītā* 12.8: “Fix your mind wholly in Me, enter your reason into Me. You will no doubt (*saṁśaya*) live in only Me hereafter.”<sup>4</sup> What does Kṛṣṇa as destroyer of doubt (*saṁśaya*) represent? It will be answered later.

## 2. Destruction of *Samśaya* by *Jñāna*

How is doubt destroyed? The answer to this question is contained in what Kṛṣṇa says in *Bhagavadgītā* 4.41-42: “Him who has *yoga* with rightly vested action, whose doubt (*saṁśaya*) has been cloven asunder by knowledgeable resolve, who is self-possessed, actions bind not, O Dhanamjaya. Therefore, with the sword of knowledgeable resolve cleave asunder this doubt (*saṁśaya*), born of ignorant irresolution and lying in the heart and, and resort to Yoga. Arise, O Bharata.”<sup>5</sup> In these two verses doubt (*saṁśaya*) is destroyed by knowledgeable resolve (*jñāna*).

### 3. *Jñāna and Karmacodanā*

Before we proceed further a semantic point related to the word *jñāna* needs to be taken care of. Generally the word *jñāna* in the *Bhagavadgītā* is understood and translated as ‘knowledge’. Since in the modern sense knowledge does not imply conation, understanding of the word *jñāna* as ‘knowledge’ is misleading. The *Bhagavadgītā* 18.18ab states: impulse to action (*karma codanā*) is threefold, i.e. *jñānam*, *jñeya* and *parijñātā*.<sup>6</sup> In the *Bhagavadgītā* in particular and Vedic thought in general, *jñāna* entails ‘resolve’ (*cikirsā*). As resolve (*cikirsā*) is already involved as a component of meaning in *jñāna*, it cannot be understood as ‘knowledge’ in the modern sense because ‘knowledge’ in the modern sense entails no conation or resolve. Hence, proper translation of *jñāna* cannot be ‘knowledge’ it has to be ‘knowledgeable resolve’, so that the fused cognition and conation involved in *jñāna* becomes apparent in translation in modern vocabulary, otherwise we will get into confusion in following the logic of thinking involved in the *Bhagavadgītā*.

One may object that impulse to action is that type of *jñāna*, where the distinction of *jñānam*, *jñeya* and *parijñātā* can be made. This distinction is available only in *indriya-jñāna*. As this distinction is not available in the *Brahma-jñāna*, there is no conation or impulse to action (*karmacodanā*) in the *Brahma-jñāna*. But this argument does not hold good in the *Bhagavadgītā*, for conation or impulsion to action (*karmacodanā*) is involved in the *Brahman* itself. One can

cite the following from the *Bhagavadgītā*: “Penetratively know that action originates in *Brahman*”<sup>7</sup> (3.15a); “*Brahman* is the offering, *Brahman* the oblation; by *Brahman* is the call given in the fire of *Brahman*; verily the destination of that (call/caller) absorbed in *Brahmakarma* (action of *Brahman*) is *Brahman*”<sup>8</sup> (4.24); “He, who does actions, placing/ascribing them on *Brahman*, abandoning attachment, is not smeared by sin, as a lotus leaf by water”<sup>9</sup> (5.10); “Whoever taking shelter under Me strive for liberation from old age and death, they feelingly realize in full that *Brahman*, the transcendental Self and all action”<sup>10</sup> (7.29); “And how should they not, O Mighty Self welcome you, superior even to the *Brahman*, the Primal agent”<sup>11</sup> (11.37ab).

That *Brahman* itself involves impulse to action (*karmacodanā*) and also is involved in *indriya-jñāna* is testified in the Śruti itself. The *Kena Upaniṣad* 1 asks: “By whom impelled and directed does the mind soar/alight? By whom engaged does first breath move? By whom motivated men speak this speech? Who is the deity that engages the eye and the year?”<sup>12</sup> The *Kena Upaniṣad* 1.4–8 answers who is the impeller of the sense organs: “What one cannot express by speech, by what speech is expressed, you penetratively know (*viddhi*) that that alone is *Brahman*, and not what they here worship. What one cannot think with the mind, by what, they say, the mind is made to think, you penetratively know that that alone is the *Brahman*, not what they here worship. What one cannot see with the eye, by what the eyes are made to see, you penetratively know that

that alone is the *Brahman*, not what they here worship. What one cannot hear with the ear, by what the ears are made to hear, you penetratively know that that alone is the *Brahman*, not what they here worship. What one does not breathe with the breath, by what breath moves, you penetratively know that that alone is the *Brahman*, not what they here worship.”<sup>13</sup> The same question was asked in the *Aitareya Upaniṣad* 3.1 but in different words: “Who is this (Ātman=Self)? Whom shall we attach ourselves to as the Ātman? Which [of the two spoken of in the first two adhyāyas of the *Aitareya Upaniṣad*: Brahman and man] is the Ātman? Is it that by which one sees, or by which one hears, or by which one smells the smell, or by which one speaks the speech or by which one discerns what is tasty and what is not tasty?”<sup>14</sup> The *Aitareya Upaniṣad* 3.3 answers: “he is brahma...”<sup>15</sup>.

So, in Vedic tradition *jñāna* gives impulse to action. This not only differentiates Vedic *jñāna* from modern conception of knowledge, but also differentiates modern conception of action, the impulse for which comes from free-will, which is not only different from knowledge but also cannot be an object of knowledge.

#### 4. *Jñāna* in the *Bhagavadgītā* 13.7-11

In this essay the expression *jñānaṃ* has been consistently understood as ‘knowledgeable resolve’ instead of ‘knowledge’ going against traditional Sanskrit scholarship. The point of view of the present essay is confirmed by the five verses *Bhagavadgītā* 13.7-11 where what is *jñānaṃ* is

explained. The list of *jñāna* that is given in these verses cannot be taken as list of ‘knowledge’ *simpliciter* as it is counter intuitive to the usage of ‘knowledge’ for these, but there is no violation of usage when we see the list of items in these verses, which is really a list of ‘knowledgeable resolves’. Since the verses give list of *jñāna* it follows that *jñāna* cannot be translated as ‘knowledge’ rather it is to be translated as ‘knowledgeable resolve.’

The following items are recognized as *jñāna* ‘knowledgeable resolve’ in *Bhagavadgītā* 13.7-11: “Humility, modesty, nonviolence, patience (forgiveness), uprightness, service of the teacher, purity, stability, self-control; absence of attachment for objects of the senses, and also absence of I-doer-ness; perception of blemish in birth, death and old age, in sickness and pain; Un-attachment, absence of affection for son, wife, home and the like, and constant equanimity on the attainment of the desirable and the undesirable; Unflinching sharing in Me in Yoga of non-separation, resort to solitary places, distaste for the society of men; constancy in transcendent Self-knowledgeable resolve, perception of the end of the knowledgeable resolve of that-ness. This is declared to be knowledgeable resolve, and what is opposed to it is ignorant irresolution.”<sup>16</sup>

The last line of the verse 13.11 declares: ‘this is declared to be knowledgeable resolve, and what is opposed to it is ignorant irresolution.’<sup>17</sup> This declaration fits well with the role of *jñānam* ‘knowledgeable resolve’ that is given in



*karma codanā* ‘connation or impulsion to action’ in 18.18. As *jñānam* ‘knowledgeable resolve’ is opposed to and destructive of *saṁśaya*, the latter also means not only cognitive uncertainty and doubt but also simultaneously conative irresolution and hesitation to perform action.

## 5. *Praśna* and *Samśaya*

How does doubt (*saṁśaya*) arise? In *Bhagavadgītā* 6.39 quoted above Arjuna asks Kṛṣṇa to destroy his doubt, as Kṛṣṇa happens to be the one who is unrivalled in destroying doubt. The context of emergence of doubt is as follows: Kṛṣṇa states in *Bhagavadgītā* 6.36 to Arjuna: “Yoga (with Self), in my view is hard to attain for a man of uncontrolled self; but by him who is self-controlled, who (often) strives, it can be acquired by coming nearer to it.”<sup>18</sup> When Arjuna heard this, a question (*praśna*) emerges for him which is asked by him in 6.37: “He who does not succeed in controlling the mind, but who is possessed of faith, whose mind wanders away from Yoga, having failed to attain perfection in Yoga, what way, O Krishna, does he go?”<sup>19</sup> The question emerges because there is no guarantee that even if a man has *śraddhā* for being harnessed with the Self, that he will succeed in getting fully harnessed with the Self. He may fail halfway through. Then, what happens to such person? There are other possibilities open to him than success. This is expressed in the further question by Arjuna in 6.38: “O mighty-armed, perplexed in the path to Brahman, having failed in both, does he not perish like a supportless torn cloud?”<sup>20</sup> The doubt of Arjuna that

emerges as question (*praśna*) had emerged in Arjuna's thinking. Emergence of question is emergence of multiple of possibilities of the thing, which are not yet settled in favour of the one possibility as actual. Once multiple possibilities of the thing emerge in the open then it takes the form of doubt (*samśaya*) whether the thing is like this or that. The doubt (*samśaya*), therefore, is nothing but opening up of the multiple possibilities in thinking, where it is not yet settled which one of them is actual.

## **6. Destruction of *Samśaya* as Removal of Multiple Possibilities**

As emergence of doubt (*samśaya*) is emergence of multiple possibilities in the open, the destruction of doubt is removal of the multiple possibilities in favour of one of them which is actuality. Hence Arjuna, who has doubt (*samśaya*) whenever more than one possibility appear, keeps insisting that it be determined with one of them is actual.

For example in Bhagavadgītā 3.1-2 Arjuna insists: "If it be thought by you that intelligence is superior to action, O Janārdana, why then do you, O Keśava, direct me to this terrible action? With an apparently perplexing speech, you confuse as it were my understanding. Tell me with certainty that one by which I may attain the good."<sup>21</sup> Arjuna was in doubt as he was thinking that Kṛṣṇa is advocating two possible paths for achieving good: path of intelligence (*buddhi*) and path of action (*karman*). Hence he wants to get his doubt destroyed by getting the multiple possibilities

removed by being told which one of them will actually attain the good.

Similarly in 5.1 Arjuna once again insists: “*Samnyāsa* of actions, O Kṛṣṇa, you praise, and again Yoga. Tell me conclusively that which is the better of the two.”<sup>22</sup> Arjuna is in doubt as he understood Kṛṣṇa as praising and advocating two possible paths: *samnyāsa* of action and yoga of action. He wants his doubt to be removed by being told which one of them is actually superior to the other.

## 7. The Need for Destruction of *Samśaya*

Why is destruction of doubt essential? Why is assurance of absence of doubt needed? Kṛṣṇa had laid down the reason that necessitates removal of doubt as early as 2.41: “O son of Kuru, there is one resolute *buddhi* here. Many branched and endless are the irresolute *buddhis*.”<sup>23</sup> The resolute *buddhi* is one for every man. Resolute *buddhi* is resolved in favour of the one actuality and it is effective (*vyavasāyātmikā*) and also it is one *buddhi* in all men. In contrast to this when *buddhi* is branched into multiple possibilities it ceases to be effective and there is no one way of branching of *buddhi* but there can be infinite way of branching of *buddhis* of different men, i.e. each man has his own doubt which makes them dysfunctional. Hence, it was stated by Kṛṣṇa in *Bhagavadgītā* 4.40: “The ignorant irresolute, the one without faith, and one of doubting self, is ruined. There is neither this world, nor the other, nor happiness, for one of doubting self (*saṁśayātmā*).”<sup>24</sup> Man of doubting self is ruined because he is dysfunctional, i.e.

he is *kiṃkartavyavimuḍha* and cannot perform action in the present or future so long as the doubt lasts. Hence, doubt needs to be destroyed.

## 8. Relevance of the Discourse on the Embodied-Body Relation to *Jñāna*

The embodied-body relation is discussed in chapter 2 not to prove immortality of soul as is generally assumed. Immortality of self is not proved in the chapter 2 of the *Bhagavadgītā* at all. It was the prevailing doctrine of the time of the *Mahābhārata*, which is assumed as known to the readers and listeners of the *Bhagavadgītā*. It is used, in the arguments of the chapter 2 of the *Bhagavadgītā* to clarify the relation of the embodied with the body, which was needed to clarify the structure of resolve involved in the *jñāna* arising due to *mātrā-sparśa* ‘sense object contact’.

The context of the discussion is provided by the *śoka* (grief) and *moha* (delusion) that emerged for Arjuna due to his perception. In the battlefield Arjuna asks Kṛṣṇa (1.21) to place his chariot in the middle of the two armies saying: (1.22) “till *I may inspect* those who stand here desirous to fight”<sup>25</sup>; (1.23) “*I will see* those who are assembled here and are about to engage in battle.”<sup>26</sup> Kṛṣṇa places the chariot in the middle of two armies (1.24) and said (1.25) “O son of Pṛthā, *look at* these assembled Kurus.”<sup>27</sup> Then Saṃjaya informs: (1.26-28) “Then *the son of Pritha saw* arrayed there in both the armies fathers and grandfathers, teachers, maternal uncles, brothers, sons, grandsons and comrades,

fathers-in-law and friends. When *the son of Kunti* saw all the kinsmen standing, he was overcome with deepest pity and said thus in sorrow: *Seeing* these own-people, O Kṛṣṇa, arrayed and desirous to fight...”<sup>28</sup> Arjuna further says: (1.31) “And, O Kesava, *I see* omens foreboding evil. Nor do *I see* any good from killing my kinsmen in battle.”<sup>29</sup> He further argues: (1.38-39) “Though these, whose intelligence is stricken by greed, *perceive no* evil in the extinction of families and no sin in treachery to friends, yet, O Janardana, should not we, who clearly *see* evil in the extinction of a family, *know* to refrain from this sinful deed?”<sup>30</sup> Further he says: (1.44) “We *have heard*, O Janārdana, that necessary is the dwelling in hell of the men whose family dharmas are subverted.”<sup>31</sup> Arjuna articulates his *śoka* (grief) and *moha* (delusion) due to what he saw in words: (2.8) “I do not *indeed see* what can dispel the grief which dries up my *senses*...”<sup>32</sup>

It is interesting to note that most of words related to knowledge used with respect to Arjuna are concerning *pratyakṣa* ‘perception’ especially perception by eye<sup>33</sup> and only one word is used which is related to hearing<sup>34</sup>. But all of these in one way or the other relate to body (*deha / śarīra*), as the instruments of knowledge like eye, ear etc. belong to body. The problem of *śoka* (grief) and *moha* (delusion) of Arjuna is emerging due to his perception of his situation in the beginning in the battlefield.

So, the issue Kṛṣṇa is discussing in the beginning of his discourse in chapter 2 is regarding correct understanding of

perception, the being of the perceiver, the embodied being, and the means of perception, i.e. the body, which has sense organs, and the relation of the embodied being with the body. This is confirmed by Kṛṣṇa's statement in the middle of the argument regarding the embodied body relation in 2.14-15: "The sense-contacts it is, O son of Kunti, which cause heat and cold; pleasure and pain; they come and go, they are impermanent. Them endure bravely, O descendant of Bharata. That wise man whom, verily, these afflict not, O chief of men (*puruṣarṣabha*), to whom pleasure and pain are same, he for life (*mṛtatvāya*) is fit."<sup>35</sup> The statement of 2.14-15 makes no sense if the discussion is to prove the immortality of self. So, the issue is not immortality of self but clarification of the being of the perceiver who is embodied and the nature of the body and the relation of the two, where the doctrine of immortality of the soul is presupposed. The significance of the verses 2.14-15 will become clear later.

The problem of *śoka* (grief) and *moha* (delusion) is emerging for Arjuna due to his erroneous way of conceiving the perceiver in himself when he perceives his situation in the battlefield. The perceiver in Arjuna should have been the *Brahman* as required by valid perception according to the Vedic tradition outlined above, but unfortunately Arjuna was completely under the sway of his *Ahaṃkāra* 'Ego' or the 'I'. This came out clearly when he spoke for the first time in the battlefield in 1.21bc-23, which I quote in full: "O Acyuta, place *my* chariot between the two armies, that *I* may just see those who stand here

desirous to fight, and know with whom *I* must fight in this strife of battle. *I* will observe those who are assembled here and are about to engage in battle desirous to do service in war to the evil-minded son of Dhṛtarāṣṭra.”<sup>36</sup>The way the words *me (my)*, *aham (I)* [used twice], *mayā (by me)* are used in Arjuna’s utterance and its content, i.e. contempt for sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra clearly manifests Arjuna’s *Ahaṃkāra* ‘Ego’. When in 2.9 Arjuna takes his resolution *na yotsya* “I will not fight”, then he was under the sway of *Ahaṃkāra* ‘Ego’. Kṛṣṇa makes it explicit when he tells Arjuna in 18.59: “If, indulging egoism, thou think ‘I will not fight,’ vain is this, your resolve; *prakṛti* will engage you.”<sup>37</sup> Arjuna suffered *śoka* (grief) and *moha* (delusion) in the battlefield because he perceived his situation with *Ahaṃkāra* ‘Ego.’ Had he allowed the *Brahman* to be the perceiver in him he would have suffered no *śoka* (grief) and *moha* (delusion). *Brahman* is the collective Self of all existents, present as self of each existent, in the Bhagavadgītā in particular and the Vedic tradition in general.

This is stated as a principle in *Īśopaniṣad* 6 and 7. The *Īśopaniṣad* (Kāṇva) 6 says: “Who however sees all existents in the self and the self in all existents – thereupon he does not hesitate (*vijugupsate*).”<sup>38</sup> In the Mādhyandina recension in the last quarter *vicikitsati* replaces *vijugupsate* of Kāṇva recension and the mantra there is: “Who however sees all existents in self and self in all existents – thereupon he does not doubt.”<sup>39</sup> If anyone perceives that all existents belong to the self, and perceives that the self belongs to all existents, then his hesitation and doubt is removed. This

means that one who has realized that his self is a collective self, he neither hesitates nor doubts.

The very setting of the Bhagavadgītā in the condition of the war where Arjuna is hesitating to fight in the war is based on the transposition of *Īśopaniṣad* 6, thereby showing that he does not see all in the self and self in all, of which he will get convinced only by listening to the message of Kṛṣṇa and he will not hesitate any more regarding fighting in the war and will participate in the war enthusiastically. Hence after setting the condition of hesitation regarding action, to overcome that hesitation of Arjuna, he was informed of how the self has to be envisioned in two consecutive verses, i.e. Bhagavadgītā 6.29-30: “The Self abiding in all existents, and all existents (abiding) in the Self, sees he whose self has been harnessed by Yoga, who sees the same everywhere. He who sees Me everywhere and sees everything in Me, for him I do not get destroyed, nor for Me does he get destroyed.”<sup>40</sup>

*Īśopaniṣad* 7 says: “One who has knowledgeable resolve of action, in whom all existents have verily become the self: one who constantly beholds oneness, there what delusion, what sorrow can be?”<sup>41</sup> The questions in the third quarter of the mantra: “there what delusion, what grief can be?”<sup>42</sup> is a rhetorical question which contains its own answer that there can be no delusion and no grief. The reasoning is as follows: The man in whom all existents have verily become the self, i.e. has realized *Brahman*, necessarily constantly beholds oneness, which in turn implies indubitability and



self-evidence of knowledgeable resolve of action.

Since, the reasoning is correct, the mantra in transposition implies that if a man suffers from *moha* “delusion/infatuation” and *śoka* “grief/sorrow,” as was the case with Arjuna in the beginning of the *Mahābhārata* war, then neither in him all existents have verily become the Self nor does he constantly behold the unity and oneness of the Self, i.e. he has not realized the Brahman in him. Hence, Arjuna was imparted the knowledgeable resolve of the Unity and Oneness of Self, which is the *Brahman* by Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhagavadgītā*. The entire argument of the *Bhagavadgītā* is to convince Arjuna of the truth of Īsopaniṣad 7, that’s why after the argument of the *Bhagavadgītā* is over and Kṛṣṇa asks Arjuna in *Bhagavadgītā* 18.72: “Has it (argument of the *Bhagavadgītā*) been heard by you, O Pārtha with an attentive mind? Has the delusion of ignorant irresolution been destroyed, O Dhanamjaya?”<sup>43</sup> And Arjuna replies in the next verse, i.e. *Bhagavadgītā* 18.73: “Destroyed is delusion, and I have gained recollection through your Grace, O Achyuta. I am firm, with doubts gone. I will carry out your advice.”<sup>44</sup>

Kṛṣṇa as destroyer of doubt (*saṁśaya*) is the collective self in man. That is to if a man has realization that the self in his body is the collective self then he neither has doubt nor hesitation.

Earlier it was mentioned that knowledgeable resolve (*jñāna*) destroys uncertainty and hesitation (*saṁśaya*), now

it is mentioned that realization of one's self as Kṛṣṇa dispels doubt and irresolution (*saṁśaya*). Is there a change of opinion? The answer is in the negative. The realization that one's self is Kṛṣṇa leads to obtainment of knowledgeable resolve (*jñāna*) and destruction *ajñāna*, which leads to *saṁśaya*. According to 4.42 doubt or hesitation (*saṁśaya*) is born of ignorant irresolution (*ajñāna*).<sup>45</sup> Kṛṣṇa says in 10.10-11: "To those who are constantly harnessed, those who share Me with love, I give the yoga of intelligence by which they obtain Me. Out of mere compassion for them, I, abiding in their self, destroy the darkness born of ignorant irresolution, by the luminous lamp of knowledgeable resolve."<sup>46</sup>

The discussion of embodied-body relation in the second chapter of the *Bhagavadgītā* is just the beginning of clarification of the being of the thinker, perceiver, and knowledgeable resolver in the body of man.

## 9. The beginning of Argument in *Bhagavadgītā* 2.11-12

Kṛṣṇa's intention to correct the perceptual activity that lies behind Arjuna's hesitation or doubt comes out clearly in the first verse spoken by him to begin a discourse that will last till the near end of chapter 18 of the *Bhagavadgītā*. Kṛṣṇa says to Arjuna in 2.11: "For those not to be cared for you have cared, yet you speak words of wisdom. To which breath is gone or breath is not gone the wise do not care."<sup>47</sup>

Kṛṣṇa's intention here is not to address Arjuna's grief or to console the grieving Arjuna, but to correct the error in his

thinking.<sup>48</sup> The error is not in what he is thinking of, but how he is thinking. The thinker in him, who is doing the thinking, is erroneous in itself, which is making the thinking erroneous leading to overwhelming care. From 2.11 onwards Kṛṣṇa is clarifying the very nature of thinker, who has to think in each one of us, to make the thinking, non-erroneous or straight.

The verse spoken by Kṛṣṇa in 2.11 has a parallel verse spoken by Vidurā in Mahābhārata 5.131.15: *alabdhvā yadi vā labdhvā nānuśocanti paṇḍitāḥ /ānantaryam cārabhate na prāṇānām dhanāyate* // The verse is translated by Kishori Mohan Ganguli<sup>49</sup> as: “Whether he gaineth his object or not, he that is possessed of sense never indulges in grief. On the other hand, such a person accomplisheth what should be next done, without caring for even his life.” Malinar translates the verse as: “The wise men do not care about winning or losing (*alabdhvā yadi vā labdhvā nānuśocanti paṇḍitāḥ*); they immediately take action and never run for their lives.”<sup>50</sup> To me it appears that the proper translation is: “Whether not having perceived or having perceived, *paṇḍitas* do not care; they immediately begin to act and are not desirous of lives.” What the verse is saying is that it is not perception that motivates the action, rather it is motivated independently of perception, it is immediately motivated a priori. The *paṇḍitas* do not care about what is perceived or not perceived and do not have desire for lives.

Similarly in Bhagavadgītā 2.11 Kṛṣṇa is using *gatāsūn agatāsūmś ca* in the sense of perceived (*labdham*) and unperceived (*alabdham*) respectively. Here perception is modeled on the early understanding of the activity of smelling. In *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmana* 1.60.5, (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3. 2. 2 = Śatapatha Brāhmana 14.6.2.2) one hears: “by *apāna*, indeed, that one smells scents” (*apānena hi gandhāñ jighrati*). Here *apāna* is the breath that goes out to grasp the thing. In Vedic metaphysics in grasping a thing by senses something goes out to grasp the thing. Hence breath (as fire) goes out to smell, similarly rays (fire) go out of eyes to grasp the thing seen, breath (fire) go out to grasp and lick the food. Understood in the Vedic sense *gatāsūn* is masculine accusative plural of *gatāsu*, which is a Bahuvrīhi Compound meaning that to which *asu* (breath) has gone (*gata*), i.e. the thing perceived. Similarly *agatāsūn* is masculine accusative plural of *agatāsu*, which is a Bahuvrīhi Compound meaning that to which *asu* (breath) has not gone (*agata*), i.e. the thing not perceived. Arjuna’s overwhelming grief had emerged due to what he perceived. But *paṇḍitas* do not care about what they perceive and do not perceive. But Arjuna was concerned with what he perceived and was overwhelmed by emotion due to perception and refused to fight. Hence Kṛṣṇa opens the discussion smilingly but reproaching Arjuna for caring for what is not fit to be cared for. What is not fit for caring is what is perceived or not perceived from the limited horizon of perception, as *paṇḍitas* do not care about what is perceived or not perceived from the limited horizon of

perception. And yet he is speaking words of wisdom but lacking wisdom of *pañḍitas*. That means that Kṛṣṇa is reproaching Arjuna for his speech giving arguments, which although is clothed in the words of wisdom but actually is lacking wisdom. Hence, Arjuna's speech is erroneous. The indication of error in Arjuna's speech and error in thinking behind it is given by the expression *pañḍitāḥ*. Who is *pañḍita*? *Pañḍita* is one who has *pañḍā*, i.e. *buddhi* that reflects *ātman/puruṣa*. *Pañḍā* is from root *pañḍ* meaning 'to gather', 'to pile up', 'to stack' etc. and hence brings out the collective aspect of *ātman/puruṣa* reflected in *buddhi*. *Pañḍita* is one who has *buddhi*, which is fit to do the thinking for collective self and to take resolution for collective action. *Pañḍitāḥ* are the fit persons to be collective institutional persona. So when it is said *gatāsūn agatāsūmś ca nānuśocanti pañḍitāḥ* "pañḍitas do not care of what is perceived and what is not perceived" what it means is that when *buddhi* reflects collective person, then the concern is not with things perceived and not perceived. Their concern is the *ātman/puruṣa*, the collective self or person reflected in *buddhi*, who does the thinking. Arjuna has fallen into error, as it is not the collective *ātman/puruṣa*, who is doing the thinking, rather it is his *ahaṃkāra*, that has taken over his thinking, as it will be stated in by Kṛṣṇa in 18.59 as stated earlier in the essay.

The topic of discussion, as rightly noticed by Śaṅkara, is opened up in the very first line of 2.11 with the words: *aśocyān anvaśocas tvam* "for that which is not fit to be

cared for you have cared.” So the issue is what is fit thing for caring by the wise.

As what is perceived or not perceived from the limited horizon of perception are not fit things for caring, rather what is to be cared for from the universal holistic eternal point of view of the collective self, is introduced by Kṛṣṇa in 2.12, without stating it explicitly: “[It is] not indeed the case [that] (*na tu eva*) I was not there ever, nor thou, nor these rulers of people; and [it is] not the case [that] (*na ca eva*) after this time we all shall not be there.”<sup>51</sup>

We have to pay close attention to how Kṛṣṇa is speaking. The first thing to be noticed is that the negative particle *na* is repeated six times in the verse: four times in first line and twice in the second line. This repetition is to draw attention to the speech itself. Secondly, all the three grammatical *puruṣas* – *ahaṃ: uttam-puruṣa (puruṣottama)* [1st person in English], *tvaṃ: madhyam puruṣa* [2nd person in English], and *ime janādhipāḥ: pratham puruṣa* [3rd person in English] occur in the very first line of the verse. This is drawing attention to the metaphysics of grammatical *puruṣas*. Thirdly, the first line indicates I-Thou structure, i.e. dialogical structure and the topic, which is between the I and Thou, is a collectivity ‘these rulers of people’ and the second line absorbs the I and Thou into the collectivity to make it a ‘We’. This indicates that the concern is not with the individual speaker or hearer but the collectivity to which one belongs harboring that collectivity as speaker and hearer in oneself. Fourthly, instead of saying positively

that I, thou and these rulers were there all the time, Kṛṣṇa says negatively that it is not the case that I, thou, and these rulers were not there ever. Similarly instead of saying we all shall be there from this time onwards, Kṛṣṇa says it is not the case that we all shall not be there. Kṛṣṇa in his negative formulation is ruling out the *abhāva* of the collectivity at any time past, present and future, as the collectivity is *sat* 'eternal'. Kṛṣṇa will draw this conclusion in 2.16. Fifthly, Kṛṣṇa although speaks in a manner where the reference to past and future is explicit, but present is also covered implicitly in the very speaking in the dialogue, that is going on in the present time between I and Thou with respect to presently perceived 'these rulers of people' severally and collectively. And lastly, the preponderance of *sarvanāma* (pronoun in English) - *aham*(I), *tvam* (Thou), *ime* (These), and *vayam* (We) is noticeable in the verse. All the *sarvanāma* are names of the same *sarva* 'a collectivity of all', which has being as *puruṣa* in each member of the collectivity *sarva*. The occurrence of the word *sarve* 'all' is to indicate *samaṣṭi* 'the collectivity' of all, which remains the invariable concomitant of each and every *sarvanāma* applied to speaker, hearer or the one spoken about. That a *samaṣṭipurūṣa* 'collective person' is involved will become clear in the next verse, i.e. 2.13.

Kṛṣṇa in 2.12 is not beginning any argument for the immortality of soul, as it is interpreted traditionally, but using the metaphysics of Sanskrit grammar to clarify the true nature of the speaker and hearer, and by extrapolation clarifying the perceiver and motivator of action (*karma*) in

each of us. If one does not take care of the true nature of the speaker, hearer, perceiver and motivator of *karma* in himself, then he will err in performing the corresponding function. How any action is motivated to be performed by the *samaṣṭipurūṣa* ‘collective person’, who is present as self in each body as *dehin* in *deha*, comes out in the next verse, i.e. 2.13, spoken by Kṛṣṇa where an explanation of the involvement of the collective puruṣa as self in action is given.

### 10. *Dehāntaraprāpti* and *Karma*

Kṛṣṇa says in *Bhagavadgītā* 2.13: “Just as in this body the embodied (Self) obtains childhood and youth and old age, so does He obtain another body (*dehāntaraprāpti*). There the wise one is not distressed.”<sup>52</sup>

To understand this verse 2.13 of the *Bhagavadgītā* we have to find out what phenomenon exactly does the *dehāntaraprāpti* ‘obtaining of another body’ by *dehin* ‘the embodied’ refer to. Does it refer to passing of the self at death into another body due to cycle of birth-death-rebirth-redeath till one gets liberated from the operation of law of *karma* by obtaining *mokṣa* from *saṃsāra*? Or does it refer to some other phenomenon? The entire commentarial tradition, both Indian as well as Western have unanimously interpreted *dehāntaraprāpti* ‘obtaining of another body’ by *dehin* ‘the embodied’ as referring to passing of the self at death into another body due to cycle of birth-death-rebirth-redeath till one gets liberated from the operation of law of *karma* by obtaining *mokṣa* from *saṃsāra*. But the context



does not warrant this interpretation. In the previous verse (2.12) there is no establishment of eternal individual soul, which can be caught in the cycle of birth, death and rebirth etc., rather through the metaphysics of grammar eternity of a collective person is introduced, who is involved in the activity of perception (2.11). In the next verse (2.14) also once again as we shall see *mātrāsparśa* ‘sense-object contact’, i.e. sense perception, is discussed. So, in between discussion of activity of sense perception, sudden discussion of cycle of birth and death, is incongruous and it is erroneous interpretation to attribute this kind of incongruity to the text, if better interpretation is available that removes the incongruity and explains successfully the continuous development of the topic, then that interpretation is to be preferred, which we will discuss.<sup>53</sup>

So, what phenomenon exactly does the *dehāntaraprāpti* ‘obtaining of another body’ by *dehin* ‘the embodied’ refer to? It refers to the discharge of the semen from male body to female body in the *prajanana karma*. We explained above that in perceptual activity something goes out to the thing to grasp it as in *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa* 1.60.5, *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 14.6.2.2 (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.2.2). This idea of activity of perception is the specific application of more generalized idea of *yajña-karma*, which in our understanding is collective action involving the collective person. This generalized idea of *yajña-karma* is modeled on the discharge of the semen from male body to female body in the *prajanana karma*.

The discharge of the semen from which originates the child provides the fundamental model for action in the *Bhagavadgītā*. The discharge of the semen in sexual union from which originates the child is understood as *yajña-karma* in the Vedic literature. Consider Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 11.6.2.10: “they (i.e. two libations) enter woman and make her vagina their sacrificial fire...and the semen their pure libation..., and for him who, knowing this, approaches his mate, the *agnihotra* comes to be performed. The son who is born there from is the renascent ‘world’: this is the *agnihotra*, there is nothing higher than this.”<sup>54</sup> As we will be showing below the Bhagavadgītā has crystalized the definition of action from ideas that occur in *Brāhmaṇas* and *Upaniṣads*. As part of doctrine of five fires (*pañcāgni vidyā*)<sup>55</sup> *Jāiminīya Brāhmaṇa* 1.45 says: “Woman is Agni Vaiśvānara. Its fuel is the vagina, its flame the vulva, its smoke desire, its spark the feelings of enjoyment, its coals the coitus. In this same Agni Vaiśvānara the deities offer semen. From this oblation when it has been offered Man (*puruṣa*) comes into existence.”<sup>56</sup> The sexual act of procreation in the passage is implicitly taken as *yajña karma*.<sup>57</sup>

It may be noted that not only the definition of action in Bhagavadgītā 8.3 but also the factors of action mentioned by Kṛṣṇa in Bhagavadgīta 18.13-14<sup>58</sup>, especially the deity (*deva*) as the fifth factor, fit with the above model of action from the doctrine of five fires (*pañcāgni vidyā*).

It may be argued: If the Bhagavadgītā’s conception of

action is modeled on the basis of doctrine of five fires (*pañcāgni vidyā*) as described above then one can at most relate birth to action but not death. The reply is that the Vedic literature relates death and birth to *yajña-karma* through the idea of *punrmṛtyur* ‘re-death’ and *punarjanma* (re-birth), which we will present below.

One comes across the idea of *punrmṛtyu* ‘re-death’ in the *Jāiminīya (or Talavakāra) Brāhmaṇa* 1.46. This idea of re-death is elaborated in the *Jāiminīya (or Talavakāra) Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa* 3.11.1-4: ‘Verily, thrice man dies, thrice he is born. Then he dies for the first time, when the seed, emitted, comes into being. He is converted into breath; he is born into space. Then he dies for the second time, when he consecrates himself. He is converted into meters; he is born unto the sacrificial gift. Then he dies for the third time, when he dies. He is converted into faith; he is born into [his] world.’<sup>59</sup> So the idea of *punarmṛtyu* ‘re-death’ is homologized with emission of semen and initiation etc. in the Vedic literature.

Corresponding to the idea of *punrmṛtyur* ‘re-death’ in *Jāiminīya (or Talavakāra) Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa* 3.11.1-4 one also comes across the idea of *punar-janma* ‘re-birth’ in *Āitareya Upaniṣad* 2.1-4: “At the beginning, this *garbha* comes into being within a man as semen. This radiance gathered from all limbs he bears as self (*ātman*) in self (*ātman*). And when a man emits it in a woman, he gives birth to it. That is his first birth. It becomes one with the woman’s self (*ātman*), as it were her own limb. As a result

it does not harm her. And she nourishes this self (*ātman*) of his that has entered her. As she nourishes him, so he should nourish her. The woman carries him as the *garbha*. At the beginning, he nourishes the child even before its birth. When he nourishes the child even before its birth, he thereby nourishes self (*ātman*) for the continuance of these worlds, for it is in this way that these worlds continue. That is his second birth. And he – this self (*ātman*) of his – is appointed to carry out holy actions, while his other self, after it has done all it has to do, becomes old and departs. As soon as he departs, he is born again. That is his third birth.”<sup>60</sup>

Why is emission of semen homologized with death and also birth in Vedic Literature? Here we have to keep in mind that according to the Vedic literature the man carries in himself, his soul, as his own *garbha*, which goes out of his body to be deposited in as the *garbha* of the wife. In *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 6.4.20 the man says to his wife: “Come, let us two clasp together, together let us deposit the semen, to get a male, a son.”<sup>61</sup> In 6.4.21, i.e. in the next passage: “Then he spreads apart her thighs, saying: ‘Spread apart, earth and sky.’ He slips his penis into her, presses his mouth against hers, and strokes her three times in the direction of her hair, as he says: May Viṣṇu prepare your womb, and Tvaṣṭṛ mold the forms; May Prajapati impregnate you, and Dhātṛ lay the *garbha* in you. Lay the *garbha*, Sinīvāli, lay the *garbha*, you with broad plaits. Lay the *garbha*, you two Aśvins, lay the *garbha*, you two with lotus wreaths.”<sup>62</sup> He continues to speak in 6.4.22: “The

golden fire-drills with which the Aśvins churned the fire; That I invoke as the *garbha* for you, for delivery in the tenth month. As fire lies a *garbha* in the earth, and rain in the sky; As the wind is the *garbha* of the cardinal points; So I place this *garbha* in you, So-and-so.”<sup>63</sup> This shows that in Vedic literature the *garbha* is carried within the male and subsequently an emission of semen is the emission of the *garbha* from the body of the male into the womb in the female. The male is conceived as bearing himself, i.e. his own soul, as *garbha* within himself prior to his discharge into the womb of the wife. According to Āitareya Brāhmaṇa 7.13.9: “The husband enters as an embryo in his wife; having become again new in her he is born in the tenth month (=the twelfth month). Then the wife (*jāyā*) becomes wife (*jāyā*) when he is born of her again.”<sup>64</sup> Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 12.4.3.1 also says, “The father is the same as the son, and the son is the same as the father.”<sup>65</sup> Pāraskara Gṛhyasūtra 2.3.2 makes a man say with respect to his son: “From my every limb you spring; out of my heart you are born. You are my self (*ātman*) called ‘son’; live a hundred autumns!”<sup>66</sup> Jaimīnīya Brāhmaṇa 1.17 says: “The human womb is the human world. It is the generative organ of the woman. Out of that progeny is born. Therefore also one should desire a good wife (thinking:) ‘Let my Self come into existence in something good.’ Therefore also one should seek to watch over one’s wife (thinking:) ‘Lest in my womb, in my world somebody else come into existence’. When he is about to come into existence (during the coitus) the life-breaths enter first, then the seed is emitted.”<sup>67</sup> Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 7.13 eulogizes

the son as the new birth of the father: “The husband enters the wife; becoming an embryo he enters the mother. Becoming in her a new man again, he is born in the tenth month. A wife is called ‘wife’ (*jāyā*), because in her he is born again (*jāyate*). The gods said to men: ‘She is your mother again’. A sonless man has no world.”<sup>68</sup> Similarly Mahābhārata 1.68.36, 47-48 informs us: “Because a husband enters his wife and is born (*jāyate*) again from her, the poets of old knew that this is the ‘wifehood’ (*jāyātva*) of a wife (*jāyā*) ... A son, the wise say, is the man himself born from himself; therefore a man will look upon his wife, the mother of his son, as his own mother. The son born from his wife is like a man’s face in a mirror.”<sup>69</sup> This conception of one’s Self entering the womb of wife and then getting born as one’s son comes from the Ṛgvedic idea that the father himself is reborn in his progeny. The ṛṣi prays to Agni in Ṛgveda 5.4.10: “As I, remembering thee with grateful spirit, a mortal, call with might on thee Immortal, Vouchsafe us high renown, O Jatavedas, and may I be immortal by my children.”<sup>70</sup> The ṛṣi in Ṛgveda 6.70.3 says: “Whoso, for righteous life, pours offerings to you, O Heaven and Earth, ye Hemispheres, that man succeeds. He in his seed is born again and spreads by Law: from you flow things diverse in form, but ruled alike.”<sup>71</sup> Chāndogya Upaniṣad 2.13.2 says: “When in this manner a man knows this Vāmadevya Sāman woven upon copulation—he becomes proficient in copulation and regenerates himself through every copulation.”<sup>72</sup> Āpastamba Dharmasāstra 2.9.24.2 says: “Now it can also be perceived by senses that the father has been reproduced

separately in the son.”<sup>73</sup> The emission of the soul from the body is death. Since the male carries his own soul in the body, when he emits that soul in the form of semen into the womb of the female it is also death. This comes out explicitly in Jāiminīya-Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa 3.10.4: “When the father thus emits him as having become semen into the womb, then the son thus emits him as having become semen in the womb. He there lords over this death.”<sup>74</sup> These quotations make it obvious that the self (*ātman*) when seen as going from inside of the body in the form of semen it is death, but the same movement when seen as coming out of the body it is birth. So death and birth are indissolubly interrelated as these are the two aspect of the same movement which is a boundary crossing, i.e. crossing the boundary of a body involved in *yajña karma*. The indissoluble interrelation of birth and death will be explicitly stated as a metaphysical principle by Kṛṣṇa in Bhagavadgītā 2.27.

Now we can see what Kṛṣṇa is saying in 2.13 when he says that as the embodied experiences in the body the transition from childhood to youth to old age similarly he experiences the transition from one body to another body. The embodied is the self here, which is present as *garbha* in the body of man and this self as *garbha* experiences the transition from one body, i.e. male body, to another body, i.e. female’s body. Experience of this transition by the self is exactly like its experience of transition from childhood to youth to old age in the body. The continuity of the transition of self from one body to another body is

continuous without a demarcating line because in copulation the penis is inserted in the vagina, the male and female body overlap and get joined, and therefore, there is no exact demarcating line when the self has made the transition from one body to another. It may be kept in mind this is the description of *prajanana karma*, which is a *yajña karma* according to *pañcāgni vidyā*, and it is a collective action involving the collective person as the self, as both male, female and deities are involved together in it. This provides the model for all actions in the Vedic tradition, which is followed by the *Bhagavadgītā*.

Hence, what is true of emission of semen, is also true of other actions in Vedic literature. In *Dīkṣā* (i.e. initiatory consecration for the Soma *yajña*) womb and gestation symbolism are conspicuously present. The *dīkṣita* (i.e., he who undergoes the *Dīkṣā*) is placed in a hut in which he spends much of his time. Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 1.3.1 notes: ‘The hut of the *dīkṣita* is the womb of the *dīkṣita*; verily thus they [i.e., the priests] conduct him to his own womb.’ The text also notes: ‘Him whom they cause to undertake the *Dīkṣā*, the sacrificial priests make into an embryo again.’ The *dīkṣita* is covered with a garment. ‘The garment is the caul (i.e., *ulba*) of the *dīkṣita*; verily thus they cover him with a caul. Above that is the black antelope skin; the placenta (i.e., *jarāu*) is above the caul; verily thus they cover him with the placenta.’ Other Brāhmaṇa texts also use the symbolism of self-sacrifice and death while describing the consecrated *yajamāna* [i.e., the *dīkṣita*]. Taittirīya Saṃhitā 7.4.9 explains *Dīkṣā* as a sort of slow



self-sacrifice. The text notes at 7.4.9.1: “They kindle themselves with Dīkṣās.” Being kindled through the Dīkṣā, the body is enveloped by flames. Since Dīkṣā involves fasting, Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 10.6.5.1 states, “Hunger is death.” Further Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 11.1.8.4 states, “When he [i.e. the yajamāna] enters on a fast, he thereby gives himself up to the gods... for he becomes an oblation to the gods.” So in nutshell the practices of the *brahmacārin* and the *dīkṣita* when successfully performed amount to death and rebirth. So, the Vedic idea of multiple deaths (re-death) and births (re-birth) is involved in multiple kinds of actions of taking initiation as explained above.

The idea of symbolic death in the action of initiation is present from the Vedic saṃhitā period. The student spends three nights in the womb of the teacher according to Atharva Veda 11.5.3: “The teacher, welcoming his new disciple, into his bowels takes the Brahmachāri. Three nights he holds and bears him in this belly. When he is born, the deities convene to see him.”<sup>75</sup> Atharva Veda 11.5.14 further states that the teacher is death.<sup>76</sup> Atharva Veda 6.133.3 a mantra explicitly prescribed for use at the Upanāyana, notes that the *brahmacārin* is the student of Death.<sup>77</sup> Atharva Veda 8.1, also a mantra prescribed by Kauśika Sūtra for use at the Upanāyana, states, ‘Step up here... loosening the fetters of death’ (verse 4)<sup>78</sup> and ‘make now (this one), O gods, pass up out of death’ (verse 18)<sup>79</sup>.

Further in Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 11.2.1.1 rebirth is also symbolic: “Verily, man is born thrice, namely in this way:

first he is born from his mother and father; and when he to whom the sacrifice inclines performs offering he is born a second time; and when he dies, and they place him on the fire, and when he thereupon comes into existence again, he is born a third time.”<sup>80</sup> Jāiminīya (or Talavakāra) Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa 3.14.8 notes: “Verily unborn is man in so far as he does not sacrifice. It is through the sacrifice that he is born; just as an egg first burst.”<sup>81</sup> It is interesting to note that one is born through *yajña-karma*. The image of egg bursting here is instructive, for egg born like the birds are specifically termed *dvi-ja* ‘twice born’, in the Vedic texts. They are born first when they are laid as eggs and born a second time when the eggs burst. Through the funeral pyre the dead one is reborn as a *pitr*, i.e. as ancestor.

That rebirth of creatures is symbolic ritual rebirth becomes clear from Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 3.8.4.18<sup>82</sup> where significantly, the sacrifice is viewed as a process of repeated birth or more exactly continuing rebirth. This indicates that the symbolism of death and birth is related to the very idea of action in the Vedic tradition. The successful undertaking of initiation for studentship is birth and death, i.e. begins in death and ends in birth. Similarly successful undertaking of initiation for *yajña* is birth and death, i.e. begins in death and ends in birth. Since the one undertaking initiation has to be in condition of embryo in the womb for three nights the modern scholars have wondered whether the embryo presents the essence of life through birth or essence of death through being placed in the womb.<sup>83</sup> But if we keep in mind the metaphysical

principle then it follows that the condition of the *garbha* in the womb represents both death (due to placing into womb) and life (due to birth) simultaneously as the two are metaphysically interrelated as one is not without the other.

In the Vedic literature the symbol of the womb carries the bivalent imagery of death and life. The fast of the *dikṣita* is a death as hunger is death (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 10.6.5.1), yet the Brāhmaṇas also note that the *dikṣita* fasts because “embryos live in the womb without taking food”<sup>84</sup> (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 2.3.1.4). Further Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 8.4.2.1 notes that “Prajāpati became pregnant with all beings; whilst they were in his womb, death seized them.”<sup>85</sup> Even more strikingly, at Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 10.6.5.4<sup>86</sup>, Prajāpati desires to be reproduced. It is here Death, which carries Prajāpati as a *garbha* for a year and after that time gives birth to Prajāpati, thus effecting his rebirth.

Bhagvadgītā 8.3 is also seeing action to be a kind of boundary crossing when it states: “Brahman the Imperishable (*Akṣara*), the Supreme, One’s own being is said to be the transcendent Self (*Adhyātma*). The emission which springs up the being of existents is called action (*Karma*).”<sup>87</sup> Emission (*visarga*) that is action (*karma*) involves departure-from something or leaving something behind or getting rid of something, or freeing something from itself. It is the time of departure-from required for action that is indicated by *prayānakāla* (7.30; 8.2; 8.10). Who or what is the *prayātā* (8.23; 8.24) that departs (*prayāti*: 8.5; 8.13) in action (*karma*)? The definition of

action (*karma*) makes it clear that it springs up the being of existents (*bhūta bhāva udbhavakara*), and it was also clarified that the one's own being is said to be the transcendent Self (*adhyātma*), so it follows that in every action by the *bhūta* (existent) its own being (*sva-bhāva*) which is the self in the body (*adhyātma*) that springs up and hence the self of the *bhūta* (existent) is the *prayātā*, who *prayāti* (departs). In every action when the self of the existent departs then it abandons or frees what? In every action the self of the existent departs leaving the body (*tyaktvā dehaṃ*: 4.9) or freeing the cover of the body (*muktvākalevaram*: 8.5). In the *Bhagavadgītā* the discussion in terms of *prayānakāla* (7.30; 8.2; 8.10) or *antakāla* (2.72; 8.5) and the movement of soul *muktvākalevaram* (8.5) or *tyaktvā dehaṃ* (4.9) 'abandoning the body' is not actually a discussion regarding what happens at actual death. Similarly neither *prayātā* (8.23; 8.24) refers to the one departing from the world nor *prayāti* (8.5; 8.13) refer to actual dying. In *Bhagavadgītā* 4.9 the event of *tyaktvā dehaṃ* 'leaving the body' does not mean actual death *mṛtyu*. Rather it means beginning of *yajña karma*, which is homologized with death. Similarly *gatāsūn* refers to the perceptual action that has begun by departure of self and *agatāsūn* refers to the perceptual action, which has not yet begun, as the departure of the spirit has not yet taken place.

Does this metaphysical explanation of action (*karma*) make sense in the *Bhagavadgītā*? It may be recalled that in 8.3 the definition of *karma* is preceded by explanation of the self inside (*adhyātma*) equated with own being (*svabhāva*),

which in turn is preceded by the declaration that own being is the supreme *Brahman*. So it is the *Brahman* that is in movement in all action. So it fits with what *Bhagavadgītā* says regarding *yajña-karma* in 3.14-15: "... sacrifice is born of action; penetratively know that action comes from *Brahman*, and that *Brahman* comes from the *Imperishable*. Therefore, the all-pervading *Brahman* ever rests in sacrifice."<sup>88</sup> So action originates in *Brahman*, which is the Self of the *bhūta* (existent), and also it is the *Brahman* (the Self), which is in movement in action, and the action along with the *Brahman* (the Self) gets deposited in the *yajña*, making *Brahman* (the Self) ever established in *yajña*. The emission that is called action is not merely departure of *Brahman* (the Self) from inside the body (death) but also movement to the *yajña* outside the body (birth), making this emission of *Brahman* (the Self) as *yajña-karma*, just as described in the doctrine of five fires given above. We also hear in *Bhagavadgītā* 4.24: "*Brahman* is the offering, *Brahman* the oblation; by *Brahman* is the call given in the fire of *Brahman*; verily the destination of that (call/caller) absorbed in *Brahma-karma* (action of *Brahman*) is *Brahman*."<sup>89</sup>

The model of action is presented not only in the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* but also in other *Upaniṣads*, which the modern mind failed to understand. The model of action is given in *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 2.1.1: "That here is the eternal-actual-ethical: As from a well-stoked fire sparks fly by thousands, all looking just like it, so from the imperishable issue diverse things, and into it, O fair one, they return."<sup>90</sup> Here

the flying of the sparks is the analogy of the action of the imperishable and the tiny spark is the analogy of the thing that results from the action of the imperishable, that the sparks have the same form as the main fire is the analogy of the things having the form (=manifestation=bhāva=being) of the imperishable in it. Returning back of the spark in the fire is the analogy of the another phase of the action of the imperishable, whereby the thing that manifest go to the imperishable in the sense that it belongs to the imperishable. That this is the model of yajña karma becomes clear in *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 2.1.6: “From That [=the imperishable] (result) R̥g verses, Sāman chants, Yajus formulas, as well as initiation (for *yajña*), *yajña*, all actions, and *dakṣiṇā*, the year, the *yajamāna*, and the worlds were *soma* gets purified and where [there is] sun.”<sup>91</sup> Then in the last stanza of the Dvītīya Muṇḍaka Prathama Khaṇḍa (2.1.10) it is stated: “All this is simply that Puruṣa – actions, *tapas*, *brahman* (= mantra spoken in words), the highest immortal (or alive/non-dead). One who feelingly resolves this, hidden in the cave (= *hṛdaya*=heart) cuts the knots of *avidyā* here, O Fair one!”<sup>92</sup> When we read the entire *Dvītīya Muṇḍaka Prathama Khaṇḍa* keeping in view the three stanzas we translated above, it becomes clear that for *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* the flying away of the spark from the well stoked fire and returning back to it represents the to and fro of the action going on repeatedly unendingly, as *sahasra* in the vedic tradition represents uncountable number also. The spark flying has the form of fire, and hence the spark flying is also like the *yajamāna* riding the ray of sun, the latter also being fire, and the spark flying is

also carrying oblation of the form (*rūpa*) of something to the fire. The *rūpa* is never without name (*nāman*), which is functioning as the ray here representing *vāc* (speech).

There are more similes used for action in the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 1.1.7: “As a spider stretches out threads, then draws them into itself; as plants are born from earth; as head and body hair grows from a living man; so from the imperishable all things here spring.”<sup>93</sup> Here the action is homologized with stretching of thread and drawn back into the tantra where it is stretched, and also with emergence of plants from the earth, emergence of hair from head and body of living person etc.

Both the imagery of action is simultaneously presented in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.1.20: “As a spider sends forth its thread, and tiny sparks spring forth from fire, so indeed do all the vital functions (*prāṇāḥ*), all the worlds, all the gods, and all beings spring from this self (*ātmanah*). Its hidden name (*upaniṣad*) is ‘the actual behind the actual,’ for the actual consists of the vital functions, and the self is the actual behind the vital functions.”<sup>94</sup> Even when the sparks of self fly repeatedly from fire of self and thread of self emerge repeatedly from the spider, i.e. the self it is not exhausted because according to *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 5.1.1: “That is full (infinite); this is full (infinite), (for) from the full (infinite) the full (infinite) (indeed) arises. When the full (infinite) is taken from the full (infinite), what remains is full (infinite) indeed.”<sup>95</sup>

The imagery of sparks flying from the fire was the favorite

imagery of the *karma* for the *yājñikas*, the imagery of action as stretched thread was the favourite imagery for the *muni-traya* of the *Samśkrta Vyākaraṇa*: Sūtrakāra Pāṇini, Vārttikakāra Kātyāyana and Bhāṣyakāra Patañjali. It is reflected in the definition of *kartṛ* given in Pāṇini Sūtra 1.4.54: *svatantraḥ kartā* // “Kartṛ (agent) is one having *svam* (Self) as warp/thread (*tantra*) to weave *kriyā* (action).” Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* explains the sūtra: “Is a *svatantra* a person who has his own thread/warp (*svam-tantra*)? And what follows from that? It would result that [*svatantra* means] ‘weaver’.”<sup>96</sup> Patañjali further explains: “This is not a shortcoming. Certainly the word *tantra* is employed in the sense of ‘extended [thread/warp]’, e.g., *āstīrṇam tantram* ‘the thread/warp has been stretched side to side’, *protam tantram* ‘the thread/warp has been strung lengthwise’. [In such cases] ‘extended [thread/warp]’ is meant...”<sup>97</sup>

The connection between the two imageries of action was presented in *Nighaṇṭu* and also Yāska’s *Nirukta*. In *Nighaṇṭu* after the eleven names of flame (*ekādaśa jvalatō nāmadheyāni*) are given in section 1.17, the next section 2.1 gives twenty six names of action (*ṣaḍviṃśatiḥ karmanāmāni*) followed by section 2.2, which gives fifteen names of offspring (*pañcadaśāpatyanāmāni*) which includes among them *tanayaḥ* (in some recensions: *tanayam*) meaning ‘one who stretches or extends’ from the  $\sqrt{\text{tan}}$  meaning ‘to stretch, to extend’. Synonyms of action follow those of flame, because it is from the flame of burning fire that action begins and also in the flame of



burning fire it ends. Action in *Yajña* is flanked on two sides, i.e. beginning and end, by flames. Hence *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* after giving exhortation in 1.2.1 to perform action as seen by ṛsis in mantras explains how to perform actions in 1.2.2: “When the flame flickers after the fire [literally: carrier of oblation (*havyavāhana*)] is lit, let him make the offering [*āhuti* = the action = calling the deities as *kāraḥ* of the *kriyā*] of portion of ghee of the goat [*ājya* =literally: the offspring (*tanaya*) of the unborn (*aja*= Self)]in the intermediate space/time of the [two flames].”<sup>98</sup>The synonyms of offspring follow those of the action, because procreation is not only the most important of all actions but also it was the model of action for the Vedas. In the Vedic model of action self/brahman/puruṣa emerges from self/brahman/puruṣa.

## 11. *Dehin and Deha*

What the Bhagavadgītā is trying to say is that since it is the same self, which is in all *kṣetras* it is a collective self, which is in all bodies. All action, which is *yajña karma*, is the manifestation of this collective self. As manifestation is nothing but movement from hiddenness to openness, it is simultaneously death (emission from hiddenness) and birth (emission into openness), involving crossing the boundary that separates hiddenness from openness. Here it is of interest to note that emergence of self from the body is emergence from hiddenness because of the very meaning of *deha* in Sanskrit. ‘Deha has been derived from the root ‘*dih*’ which primarily means ‘to gather, collect or pile-up’.

The act of gathering, collecting and piling of is in fact the act of what we call in English harvesting, which act in turn leads to the experience of ‘growth, increase, prosperity’. This, in fact, is an alternative meaning of the root ‘*dih*’ which also means ‘to increase, grow, prosper’. But there is a third meaning of root ‘*dih*’, which is ‘to cover.’ To cover also means to hide, to conceal, to anoint, to plaster and smear. When what is harvested is piled up much of it is hidden as the surface hides and covers the pile. This meaning of *deha* is visible in the word ‘*samdeha*’, meaning doubt. *Samdeha* has two components: ‘*sam*’ and ‘*deha*’. The word ‘*sam*’ is a prefix, which refers to the experience of completeness, totality and perfection. We also see this in the English word ‘sum’. The next component is ‘*deha*’, meaning concealing or covering. The word *Samdeha*’s root sense is ‘perfect concealment or covering’. So in a state of doubt, consciousness is perfectly clouded, the reality is covered or concealed, the truth is hidden, and thus there is no clarity of vision.<sup>99</sup> One is confused and is groping in the dark. The body is called *deha* in Sanskrit because it is a cover for the *dehin* (the embodied). It conceals the *dehin* within as the *dehin* gathers, collects and piles *deha* up and *deha* increases and grows.

That the *dehin* is not the individual transmigrating self but is the collective self comes out further in the way the analogy is stated. The first thing to be noticed is that the possibility of ontological separation of *dehin* from *deha* is explicitly denied in the verse 2.13. This denial is by way of bringing in the analogy of *deha* and its various states, as

there is no possibility of ontological separation of the *deha* from its changing states.

Had there been any indication of ontological separation, then the prevailing theory of transmigration of soul, i.e. migration of *dehin* from one *deha* to another *deha* would have been a clear enough example by itself. There was no need of giving the analogy of 2.13, which is indicating deviation from that theory. Had the prevailing theory of trans-migration been accepted in Bhagavadgītā, with possibility of separation of *dehin* from *deha* there would have been no need to bring in the analogy of relation of *deha* with its changing states: childhood, youth and old age. The example of the *deha* with its changing states is precisely to emphasize the permanence in the change without the ontological separation of the permanent from what is changing in it, as *deha* cannot be separated from the changing states of it, as that is inconceivable, i.e. it is inconceivable that there can be *deha* which is not in any of its changing states. The way the verse is formulated, this example is primary, and on the basis of this example one has to think of the relation of *dehin* with *deha*, i.e. *deha* is changing but *dehin* is permanent and we are not to think of *dehin* as existing ontologically separated from *deha* ever. *Dehin's* being is like that of the numbers. Even though a number is distinct from the same number of things, yet number is not separable from the same number of things. Even if these things perish, the number is present in another same number of things. That is to say the *dehin* if not with this *deha* then it is with another *deha*.

As there is no ontological separation of embodied individual self and the body, there is no question of the individual self getting embodied in a body (birth) followed by it getting separated from that body (death) and after that the same individual self getting embodied in a different body (re-birth) and followed by its separation from the new body (re-death) and the same cycle repeated again and again for the same individual self. So the traditional reading of the verse appears to be erroneous.

In verse 2.13 the analogy is between the passing from childhood to youth to old age and passing from one body to another. We saw one aspect of this analogy above, but there is a second aspect too. In transition from childhood to youth to old age there is a continuous passing. There is no abruptly dividing and demarcating line between childhood and youth and also between youth and old age. In the analogy the transition of the embodied from one body to another also have to be thought of as a continuous transition like transition from childhood to youth and from youth to old age. What self is that which experiences this kind of change of body where there is no abrupt change and continuity is maintained in change? In the traditionally understood theory of transmigration no individual *jīvātman* is conceived to be transmigrating from one body to another as described in Bhagavadgītā 2.13. It is only the collective institutional self that has body with features like this. For collective body [politic] of the institutional self does change but not abruptly and discretely, i.e. over a period of time maintaining continuity. The body (politic) of the

institutional self changes continuously over a long period of time like the change from childhood to youth and from youth to childhood.

That the *dehin/sārīriṇa/Ātman/Brahman* is never manifest without body is an accepted principle of the Śruti. One can cite the following passages in this regard. The *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.12: “It is like this. When a chunk of salt is thrown in water, it dissolves into that very water, and it cannot be picked up in any way. Yet, from whichever place one may take a sip, the salt is there! In the same way this Immense Being, which has no limit boundary and is a single dense mass of activity of perception. It arises from and together with these existents and disappears after them – so, I say, after death there is no awareness.’ Yajñavalkya said.”<sup>100</sup> The *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 4.5.13: “It is like this. As a mass of salt has no distinctive core and surface; the whole thing is a single mass of flavour – so indeed, my dear, this self has no distinctive core and surface; the whole thing is a single mass of cognition. It arises out of and together with these beings and disappear after them – so I say, after death there is no awareness.’ Yājñavalkya said this.”<sup>101</sup> The example of the lump of salt dissolved in water is not to emphasize the prior separate existence of lump of salt from the water, rather it is to emphasize that there is inseparability of salt and water in salty water. Similarly the Brahman/Ātman is inseparable from body in an animated/conscious body. Hence *apāraṃ vijñānaghana*, which is Brahman, arises from and together with these existents and disappears after

them.

So inseparability self from the body and continuity of change of body, just like the inseparability of body from its state and continuity of bodily states, are exhibited by the institutional self and its body (politic) only. The individual *jīvātman* and the body of the *jīva* do not exhibit such properties. So the issue under discussion in the verse vulgate 2.13 (or Kashmir 2.14) is not regarding the individual *jīvātman* and its changing bodies, rather it is the collective institutional self and its changing body (politic) that is at issue here.<sup>102</sup>

The last quarter of *Bhagavadgītā* 2.13 says: *dhīras tatra na muhyati* “There the wise one (*dhīra*) is not distressed.” Why is the *dhīra* not perplexed by what has been said in the first three quarters of *Bhagavadgītā* 2.13? *Dhīra* is someone who has capacity of *dhīḥ*, and according to Kullūka and Rāghavānanda *dhīḥ* is *sāstrāditatvajñānam* i.e. “knowledge of the true meaning of the authoritative works”.<sup>103</sup> Only in light of the essence of traditional authoritative texts like *Samhitās*, *Brāhmaṇas* and *Upaniṣads*, as we have explained one can understand *Bhagavadgītā* 2.13 without getting perplexed or distressed. The commentators are perplexed because they interpret it not in light of the authoritative texts like *Samhitās*, *Brāhmaṇas* and *Upaniṣads*, but their own superficial understanding of meaning of words. But once we interpret 2.13 in light of the traditional authoritative texts it is easy to

understand how the transition is made to verse 2.14-15 where once again the activity of perception is discussed.

*Dehin deha* distinction is only a distinction in ‘*dhīh*’ into which *dhīra* has insight. In the thinking of something the two relata distinguished as well as related by ‘of’ is a distinction and relation within an ideational realm. Here it is pertinent to remember that the *dhīra* is not perplexed by all this, as *dhīra* is someone who has capacity of *dhīh*, i.e. capacity of holistic insight, i.e. capacity for holistic thought, which is required by collective institution as person for its functioning.

Even when the distinction is made between *dehin* and *deha*, there is denial of separation. The denial of separation is declared in the śloka 2.22: “As a man casts off worn out clothes and takes on new ones, even so the embodied (self) discards worn out bodies and meets new ones.”<sup>104</sup>

Since there is a change of meter in 2.22 by reverting from the meter of 2.21 to that of 2.20, there is an emphasis on something that is present in 2.20 as well as earlier. Hence, the analogy of garment (*vāsāṃ*) with body (*deha*) is to be understood carefully. A man may be without cloth naked but the *dehin* is not without a *deha* or *śarīra* (body). It is the same with numbers. Even though a number is distinct from the same number of things, yet number is not separable from the same number of things. Even if these things perish, the number is present in another same number of things. That is to say the *dehīn* if not with this *deha/śarīra* then it is with another *deha/śarīra*.

We had mentioned in the context of interpretation of *Bhagavadgita* 2.13 that the inseparability of self from the body and continuity of change of body, just like the inseparability of body from its state and continuity of bodily states, are exhibited by the collective institutional self and its body (politic) only. The individual *jīvātman* and the body of the *jīva* do not exhibit such properties. So the issue under discussion in the verse vulgate 2.13 is not regarding the individual *jīvātman* and its changing bodies, rather it is the institutional self and its changing body (politic) that is at issue here. The same point is emphasized here in *Bhagavadgītā* 2.22 too.

The traditional commentators have unanimously read 2.22 , just like vulgate 2.13, as concerned with the *jīvātman* and its body. But their reading is erroneous, as these are dictated not by logic of the verse but by their prior commitment to the cycle of birth and death of *jīvā* in *saṃsāra* governed by law of *karma*. But their kind of reading of the verse is erroneous because none of them has taken into consideration semantic syntax of vulgate 2.22, which determines the meaning of the analogy given in it. The expression ‘*naro*’ and *dehī* are in singular but expressions *vāsāṃsi jīrṇāni, navāni ... 'parāṇi, śarīrāṇi ...jīrṇāny, anyāni... navāni* are in plural indicating that man has many old garments which he discards and he acquires many new garments and similarly a single *dehin* has many old bodies which he discards and it acquires many new bodies. This feature, of having many bodies at a time like the man having many garments at the same time, is



satisfied by the collective institutional self or collective institution as person, but not by *jīvātman*. The traditional thinkers having commitment to the cycle of birth and death of *jīva* under the control of law of *karma* assume that multiplicity of bodies of *dehin* is due to sequentially discarded or acquired bodies but one at a time and then they account for the multiplicity of garments of a man in the same way. But this is not a natural reading as it is reading backwards as if the issue under discussion is the garments of man which is to be understood in analogy to bodies of *jīvātman* (=man), which are sequentially acquired and discarded one at a time in the cycle of birth and death under law of *karma*. But that is not the issue at all. The issue is that of discarding and acquiring (not acquiring and discarding) of many bodies by a single *dehin* which has to be understood in analogy to discarding and acquiring of many garments by a man. Then the natural reading is that the *dehin* is the collective institutional self or person and it discards many old bodies as many human beings die in the body-politic of the collective institution as person, and it acquires many new bodies by birth of many human beings in the collective body politic of the institution as person. So, the traditional commentators are not actually faithful to the nuances of the terms in the verses and the semantic syntax of the verses due to their prior doctrinal commitments, which prevent them from seeing the meaning present in the verse due to its semantic syntax.

It is the metaphysics introduced in *Bhagavadgītā* 2.11-30, which enables Kṛṣṇa to say in *Bhagavadgītā* 13.1-2: “This,

the body, O son of Kuntī, is holistically thought of as *Kṣetra*; him who feelingly knowingly resolves it, they, who feelingly knowingly resolve of them, call *Kṣetrajña* (knowledgeable resolver of *Kṣetra*). And you also penetratively knowledgeably resolve Me as *Kṣetrajña* in all *Kṣetras*, O Bhārata.”<sup>105</sup> It is interesting to note that in 13.2 *kṣetrajñam* and *mām* are in singular just like ‘*naro*’ and *dehī* in 2.22 and in 13.2 *sarvakṣetreṣu* is in plural just like *vāsāmsi jīrṇāni, navāni ... ‘parāṇi, śarīrāṇi ...jīrṇāny, anyāni... navāni* in 2.22. It may further be noted that *sarvakṣetreṣu* is in locative case meaning (in all *kṣetras*) making the *kṣetrajña* related to *kṣetra* just as *dehin/śarīriṇa* is related to *deha/śarīra*. Now the important question arises: why is it first declared that *śarīra* is holistically thought of as *kṣetram* then it is declared that Kṛṣṇa is the one *kṣetrajña* in all the multiple *kṣetras* instead of straightaway saying that Kṛṣṇa is the knowledgeable resolver of body in all bodies? The answer is that once the vocabulary of *kṣetras* is introduced then the possibility of Kṛṣṇa being in the bodies one after another is dispelled, as *kṣetras* do not admit of being successive in time rather these are simultaneous in time. So, Kṛṣṇa is in all bodies (*sarvakṣetreṣu*) simultaneously making it obvious that Kṛṣṇa is the collective self in all bodies at the same time, dispelling the idea that *dehin/śarīriṇa* is individual *jīvātman* as Kṛṣṇa is the *dehin/śarīriṇa*.

The analogy of discarding and acquiring of new garments by man with *dehin* discarding of old bodies and acquiring of new bodies introduces the feature of voluntarism without

agency of change. What body or which body has this feature of voluntarism in change? This feature is not present in body of the transmigrating *jīvātman* of traditional theory of transmigration of soul. To repeat, in traditional theory of transmigration of *jīvātman*, there is no voluntarism in discarding or acquiring of body as it is strictly governed by law of karma. So, *the feature of voluntarism point not to transmigration of jīvātman, as understood traditionally, but to some other phenomenon.* It is the collective institution as person, which exhibits voluntarism of change of body. The collective institutional self discards the old bodies, for example in the Indian āśrama system the people with bodies of more than 75 years old were discarded and required to leave the institutional life to retire into forest to prepare and wait for death and in modern institutions people are retired by institution when they reach the age of superannuation and the institutional self acquires new bodies when after being born a man becomes fit to be member of the institution and he enters the institution, in modern institution new bodies are hired, and one comes across expressions like ‘body shopping’ for companies and corporations. In many Upaniṣads the so-called movement of soul, e.g. Bṛhadāraṇyak Upaniṣad 6.2.15-16 and Chāndogya Upaniṣad 5.10.1-6, does not describe so-called transmigration of individual soul as it tries to convey the idea of individual member’s entry into and exit from and temporary and permanent inclusion in the collective institution as person.

Therefore, the conclusion of the above discussion is that the assumption of the theory of cycle of birth and death, which is the traditional theory of transmigration of soul, is not advocated or justified in Bhagavadgītā; rather the vocabulary of prevailing theory of transmigration of soul is utilized, neutralizing some features of it, to clarify the metaphysics behind the collective institutional action and institutional actuality.<sup>106</sup>

Bhagavadgītā 2.22 is not only reformulating the change of collective body politic as understood in Bhagavadgītā 2.13, but also is re-emphasizing the eternality of the collective institutional self mentioned in Bhagavadgītā 2.20. But there is a difference too. Earlier in Bhagavadgītā 2.20 it is mentioned that body is killed in contrast to the collective self, which cannot be killed. But now the language of killing of the body is avoided but only the language of discarding of old bodies and acquiring of new bodies is used. Why? In the previous verse, i.e. 2.21 the question is raised: “How, O son of Pṛthā, does such a person [who knows his self to be collective person] cause to slay whom, and whom does he slay?”<sup>107</sup> The answer is that as a member of the body politic, when one participates in the war, the war is a collective action and killing occurs in the war, which is not attributed to any member, but from the collective universal institutional person’s point of view it is a natural occurrence as the natural birth and death of many in the body politic. The idea is that as many people die of natural old-age, disease, epidemic, no one is held responsible for such deaths as do not amount to killing. So,

there is no attribution of killing to any one, even if he participates in the war, as war is a natural phenomenon, not an artificial making of individuals as moderns think. The collective person being unborn and undying is eternal and hence natural and not an artificial person created by individuals as moderns think. The war, as a collective phenomenon, is also natural. This will be stated explicitly in Bhagavadgītā 2.32 when war (yuddha) will be claimed to be occurring by itself (*yadr̥cchayā ...upapannam*), i.e. it is not brought about artificially by the individuals, rather occurs naturally whether one wants or not. One can, therefore, cause someone to be slayed in the context of institution, as judge can cause the criminal to be killed, without inviting the charge of murder. The same applies to the context of war, which is a collective institutional context of settlement of an institutional issue as claimed by Indra in *Kauśītaki Upaniṣad*.<sup>108</sup>

Therefore, the conclusion of the above discussion is that the Bhagavadgītā clarifies the structure of institutional action including the perceptual activity. And institutional actuality, as the collective person or self of institution, has some voluntary control over discarding and acquiring of men in its body (politic).<sup>109</sup>

## 12. *Mātrāsparsā* and Feelings

When we read the *Bhagavadgītā* 2.13 and 2.14 quoted above together, what emerges is the identical triadic structure in both embodied-body relation and the perceiver-perceived relation. In embodiment there is (1) eternal *dehin*

hidden in (2) temporary *deha*, which is being replaced by another in time and (3) each *deha* is experienced by *dehin* in some changing state. Similarly in perception (*mātrāsparśa*) of something there is (a) eternal perceiver hidden in (b) temporary some thing perceived, which is being replaced by another thing perceived in time and (c) each something is perceived by the perceiver accompanied by changing feelings. As the state of body belongs to the body and not to the embodied the feeling accompanying a thing perceived belongs to the thing perceived and not to the perceiver. The feeling is not subjective in the *Bhagavadgītā* as it belongs to the something perceived and not to the perceiver. It is declared in 3.34 by Kṛṣṇa: “In object of each sense is respectively stationed attraction and aversion of (respective) senses; one should not come under the control of these two; for, they are obstacles on the path of his.”<sup>110</sup> The primary model of perception (*mātrāsparśa*) in the *Bhagavadgītā* is the embodied body relation as was the case with *jñāna* (knowledgeable resolve) in the *Bhagavadgītā* 13.1-2. In the *Bhagavadgītā* 13.6 feelings like pleasure and pain (*sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ*) belong to the body (*śrīra*), which is also designated as *Kṣetra* (clearing). Hence, neither perception (*mātrāsparśa*) nor *jñāna* (knowledgeable resolve) in the *Bhagavadgītā* admit of modern subject-object dualism.

In 2.13 it was mentioned that the triadic structure of embodiment does not perplex the holistic thinker or the one who has holistic insight (*dhīras ... na muhyati*). In 2.15 it was mentioned that the man, who is holistic thinker or who

has holistic insight (*puruṣaṃ...dhīraṃ*), whom feelings in the triadic structure of perception do not afflict, he is fit for life (*yaṃhi na vyathayanty ete puruṣaṃ...dhīraṃ so 'mṛtatvāya kalpate*). The introduction of *dhīra* 'holistic thinker' or 'who has holistic insight' is very significant. The term '*dhīra*' is necessarily connected with '*dhiḥ*', namely, with the 'holistic idea/insight reconciled of many elements,' or 'holistic thought/vision reconciled of many elements.' So, *dhīra*, 'who has holistic insight' or 'who is holistic visionary,' has insight into or has the vision of connection between embodiment and perception.

The two triadic structures (X) *dehin– deha*– state of *deha* and (Y) perceiver – perceived thing – feeling of the thing perceived, together create a third structure (Z) *Dehin* (=perceiver) – *Deha* in some state – the thing perceived with some feeling. *Dehin* and *deha* relation of the structure (X) which is a necessary relation will be the locus of action (*karma*) and the intentional structure of action (*karma*), as all actions are performed by the body, speech and mind (*śarīravānmanobhir:* 18.15), which belong to *kṣetra* 'clearing' (=śarīra), mediated by feeling from the structure (Y) (13.5-6), and *Dehin* (=perceiver) and the thing perceived relation, which again is a necessary relation from the structure (Y) will be the locus of *jñāna* and intensional structure of *jñāna* mediated by the state of *deha* from the structure (X), and these two structures of (i) action – intention of action and (ii) *jñāna*– intension of *jñāna* merge to become a unitary structure of life. A *dhīra* grasps this totality without getting perplexed or getting afflicted and he

is fit for life, where life is characterized by ‘deathlessness’ (*amṛtatva*).

The cognition in the *Bhagavadgītā* is never dissociable from feeling. The relation of image cognition of object in sense object contact and the associated feeling are not conceived, the way modern philosophy conceives these two. In the modern thought the feeling is subjective but the image comes from outside from the object. But in the *Bhagavadgītā* the thing itself is the giver of form to cognition in sense object contact and also the giver of feeling to consciousness. Both are given by the sense object together intimately related and are not dissociable.

In modern philosophy one can treat cognition of image independently from the subjectively felt feelings, but not in the *Bhagavadgītā*. It has significant impact on the manner of articulation of cognition and expression of the cognition in language affecting the intensional structure of thought and speech in the *Bhagavadgītā*. The intensional structure of thought and speech in the *Bhagavadgītā* is therefore, different from the intensional structure of thought and speech of modern thought. That is to say modern thought is entirely different from the thinking in the *Bhagavadgītā*. The intensional structure of thought and speech cannot result in intentional structure of action in modern thought because image cognition is dissociable from feelings. In modern thought image cognition is objective but feeling is subjective, therefore, any objective image cognition can combine externally with any subjective feeling felt by the



cogniser. There is no objective relation between the two in modern thought. But, in contrast, in Vedic thought there is necessary connection between the image cognition of a thing and the feeling that the thing gives rise to, associated with the image cognition. In the *Bhagavadgītā* the locus of connection between the image cognition and the associated feeling is in the thing itself and it is not a mere subjective connection, but objective connection. Therefore, the intensional structure of thought and speech necessarily gives rise to intentional structure of action precisely because of un-dissociability of image cognition from feeling of life in the *Bhagavadgītā*.<sup>111</sup>

To recapitulate the train of argument of the second chapter of the *Bhagavadgītā* it must be stated that in the verse 2.14 the idea of *mātrā-sparśāḥ* is brought in to show the connection of the *dehin-deha* relation and perceiver (*dehin*)-and *thing perceived* relation. Many things are given to perception (*mātrā-sparśa*) and the action like *yuddha* ‘war’ is to be performed in the world of perception (*mātrā-sparśa*). The *dehin – deha* relation the locus of action and intentional structure of action, get related to perceiver (*dehin*)- *thing perceived* relation, the locus of *jñāna* and intensional structure of *jñāna* via *mātrā-sparśāḥ*, the former performing action in the world of perception (*mātrā-sparśa*) out of/impelled by associated feelings and the later receiving many entities for perception from world of perception (*mātrā-sparśa*), according to the state of body, the two forming a circle which never ceases but continues ever which is life and *jñāna* in one.

And yet the *dehin* which is the common relatum of intensional structure of *jñāna* and intentional structure of action (*karma*) remains unaffected, as stated in 2.15, by the world of perception (*mātrā-sparśa*) both in receiving of entities from it for *jñāna* as per the state of body and performing of action in it impelled as per the associated feeling.

The *Bhagavadgītā*'s a priori condition of perception (*mātrā-sparśa*) is different from the a priori 'I' in 'I think' which accompanies the experience of object from Descartes to Kant as the 'I' of 'I think' is not out of focus of consciousness but is in the focus of consciousness as self-consciousness, i.e. transcendental consciousness of the unity of apperception and the 'I' of 'I think' of the modern tradition is not only not out of focus of consciousness, it is self-consciousness and as consciousness of something that is transcendental consciousness of unity of apperception is limited and delimited by *mātrā*, i.e. the measure of the self which is distinguished and delimited by limits from other selves. To use the *Bhagavadgītā*'s terminology, the self-consciousness, 'I' of 'I think' of modern tradition is simultaneously *ahaṁkāra* (*mamakāra*). None of this is applicable to the a priori condition of the perception (*mātrā-sparśa*) in the *Bhagavadgītā*.

Hence, there is a fundamental difference in the a priori condition of perception (*mātrā-sparśa*) in the *Bhagavadgītā*, which is out of focus of consciousness, merely like light (*jyoti*), but without delimitation. It is ideational like

number, which is non-dual due to nonlimitation and infinite. But in modern thought the a priori of the experience of object is in the focus of consciousness as self consciousness, is delimited consciousness limited by the limits of ‘you think’ ‘he thinks’ ‘the other thinks’ etc. In modern thought the intensional structure of knowledge has limited things on both side of thought, i.e. the thinker side and the thing thought side. There is total separation of feeling from this intensional structure of thought in modern thought, as feeling has no role to play in it.<sup>112</sup>

There is another difference too. The locus of sense perception is not the individual ‘I’ in the *Bhagavadgītā*. The locus of all the senses in it is the collective body of the collective person as stated in *Bhagavadgītā* 13.13: “With hands and feet everywhere, with eyes and heads and mouths everywhere, with ears everywhere, That exists enveloping all.”<sup>113</sup> What this verse of the *Bhagavadgītā* is describing is a collectivity, which is institution as person. Further more in *Bhagavadgītā* 13.14 it is stated: “Shining by the guṇas (strands of prakṛti) of all the senses, (yet) without the senses; unattached, yet supporting all; devoid of guṇas but enjoyer of guṇas.”<sup>114</sup> According to this verse the collective institution as person manifests with functions of senses without having corporeal senses.

### 13. The relation of *Karma* with *Jñāna*

There is a little prefiguring of the relation of intentional structure of action with intensional structure of *jñāna* in perception (*mātrāsparśa*) in the *Bhagavadgītā* 2.25, which

says: “It is said that it (i.e. *Brahman/Ātman/Puruṣa/Dehin/Śarīriṇa*) is unmanifest, unthinkable and without possibility of *vikāra* (without modes). Therefore, feelingly knowing apriori (*viditvā*) it to be such, you should not grieve.”<sup>115</sup> The first statement indicates that the being of the collective self is not to be validated by perception for that deals with what is manifest, thinkable and transitory. Rather it is confirmed by language, what we say. All confusion in thinking and hence thinking of what is to be done arises because we fail to distinguish and to keep distinct in thinking the one ideational being from the many empirical changing particulars in which it is present. Arjuna is failing to distinguish the one idea of *dharma* from the many empirical individual situations in which it is present. Since he is unable to distinguish the two he is caught in the sophistic dialectic, speaking like *paṇḍita* while actually caring for that which the learned find as something for which one should not care. So to remove the sophist dialectic confusion we have to pay attention to the language and how the distinction is present in the way we speak. Arjuna should think of the one idea of *dharma* and not the empirical particular situation of *dharma*. As Arjuna is thinking of the empirical particular situation of *dharma* he is thinking all that is involved in the particular empirical situation, i.e. killing, dying involved in the particular situation and these have no bearing on the issue of *dharma* when the war has already arrived. Once the war has arrived it is the arrival of war that is relevant to determination of *dharma*. It is this that is highlighted through the linguistic distinction between one soul, which is unmanifest,

unthinkable and unchanging, like number, which is the collective person of institution in himself and many empirical particular bodies, which are manifest, thinkable and changeable, constituting a collective body politic, in which the collective self of institution is present. To arrive at one idea of *dharma* and what it requires one has to base his argument on the a priori felt knowledge of the collective soul and not on what happens to the empirical body. But this a priori felt knowledge of the collective soul is knowledge of the unmanifest, unthinkable and the unchanging, i.e. what is *aprameya*, that is not measurable and hence not an object of perception (*mātrāsparśa*) and hence not perceptually known, but feelingly known a priori. What is being said is that feelings associated with many perceptual things must be equalized and balanced with its opposite feeling and neutralized and action is to be performed without attraction or aversion to perceptual things.

Here there is a little prefiguring of the relation of intentional structure of action with intensional structure of perception (*mātrāsparśa*) of something. In this prefiguring of the relation, it must be noticed that the intentional structure of action emerges parallel to the intensional structure of *jñāna* in perception (*mātrāsparśa*) from the same *puruṣa*; and the two parallel structures, i.e. the intensional structure of *jñāna* in perception (*mātrāsparśa*) and intentional structure of action merging in one structure which is both, i.e. has both aspects as explained earlier.

In the modern thought the intensional structure of experience of object and the intentional structure of action are independent and when the two are related then they are related sequentially in a series where the experience of object with its intensional structure with the two relata the 'I' of 'I think' and the object experienced come first and then the action with its intentional structure with its two relata 'I' of 'I freely will' and the intended objective come next and the relation of the two structure is from the side of the object as the intended objective is always the breakdown of the resistance of the object whose experience is already obtained prior to action. This modern model of action has catastrophic and holocaustic consequences when it comes to institutional and social action and necessarily involves power to break the resistance of the object be it a man, be it a society or institution, or be it an object like wood or iron. Since, the Vedic and the *Bhagavadgītā*'s way of relating the intensional structure of *jñāna* in perception (*mātrāsparśa*) to the intentional structure of action is entirely different. The *Bhagavadgītā* discusses it at length spreading the discussion till the last chapter, i.e. eighteenth chapter. Here it was merely a prefiguration of the relation that is presented in 2.25.

The Indian way of conceiving the relation between the intensional structure of *jñāna* in perception (*mātrāsparśa*) and the intentional structure of action is such that once the intentional structure of action emerges parallel to the intensional structure of *jñāna* in perception (*mātrāsparśa*), in fact the two merging into one structure then from

whichever side of the two sides of intensional structure of *jñāna* in perception (*mātrāsparśa*) one proceeds the intentional structure of action remains unaffected. The example of why *nānuśocitum arhasi* “you should not care” as the example of intentional structure of action has already been discussed in the śloka 2.25 starting from one side of the intensional structure of *jñāna* in perception (*mātrāsparśa*), i.e. the side where one has the infinite and indestructible *puruṣa* as the relatum. Now Kṛṣṇa demonstrates that even if one proceeds from the finite measured side of the intensional structure then also the intentional structure of action remains unchanged. The same example of why *nānuśocitum arhasi* “you should not care” of the śloka 2.25 is discussed in the next two ślokas starting from the other side of the intensional structure of *jñāna* in perception (*mātrāsparśa*) where the relatum is finitely delimited existent.

2.26-27 says: “And even if you think it (the finite side of the intensional structure of thought is taken to be *puruṣa*) to be constantly born (when the body is born) and constantly dying (when the body dies), O mighty-armed Arjuna, you should not care for it. For, death is certain for one that is born and birth is certain for one that dies. Therefore, you should not care for that which is inevitable.”<sup>116</sup> The second premise is a metaphysical principle, which says that the birth/beginning/origin on one side and death/end on the other are indissolubly related, so that one that has birth/origin has death/end and one that has death/end had birth/origin too. So, once the intentional structure of action

emerges from the intensional structure of *jñāna* in perception (*mātrāsparśa*) as parallel to it and merging with it, that intentional structure of action remains firm and unshakable from whichever side of the intensional structure of thought you may proceed. So, this was Kṛṣṇa's elaboration of the comment with which he had begun his discourse in 2.11: "For those not to be cared for you have cared, yet you speak words of wisdom. To which breath is gone (the thing perceived) or breath is not gone (the thing unperceived) the wise do not care."<sup>117</sup> So, this comment was actually on the intensional structure of Arjuna's *jñāna* in perception (*mātrāsparśa*) going wrong leading to doubt and hesitation.

With 2.28 the discussion of so-called immortality of soul comes to an end. It says: "Existents are unmanifest in their beginnings; they become manifest in the middle, O Bharata; and they become unmanifest after death. So why care for them?"<sup>118</sup> With this rhetorical question one argument is completed. Be it noted it is not an argument for the immortality of soul. For if we take it to be argument for eternity of soul it will require explanation of the existence of soul after it is dead or before it is born, i.e. when it is unmanifest. But in this argument this issue is not raised at all. So, the issue is that of intention to care or not to care when the thought of death of near and dear ones is haunting Arjuna and the consequent thought of demise of the familiar social formation is also haunting him. This issue is solved not by any decision or choice as a modern man would do with reasons. Kṛṣṇa's way of solving the issue is entirely different. He questioned the intensional structure of



thought that was involved in the doubt and hesitation that was haunting Arjuna. When the intensional structure of thought was corrected by discerning what went wrong in the intensional structure of his thought, then automatically and necessarily the intentional structure of action emerged that gave the injunction/resolution not to care.

#### Notes and References :

- 1 *etan me samśayaṃ kṛṣṇa chettum arhasy aśeṣataḥ / tvad anyah samśayasāyasya chettā na hy upapadyate //*
- 2 *antakāle ca mām eva smaran muktvā kalevaram / yah prayāti sa madbhāvaṃ yāti nāsty atra samśayah //*
- 3 *eṭāṃ vibhūtiṃ yogam ca mama yo veti tattvataḥ / so 'vikampena yogena yujyate nātra samśayah //*
- 4 *mayy eva mana ādhatsva mayi buddhiṃ niveśaya / nivasiṣyasi mayy eva ata ūrdhvaṃ na samśayah //*
- 5 *yogasamnyastakarmāṇaṃ jñānasaṃchinnasaṃśayam / ātmavantaṃ na karmāṇi nibadhnanti dhanamjaya // tasmād ajñānasaṃbhūtaṃ hr̥tsthaṃ jñānāsīnatmanaḥ / chītvainam samśayaṃ yogam ātiṣṭhottīṣṭha bhārata //*
- 6 *jñānaṃ jñeyaṃ parijñātā trividhā karmacodanā*
- 7 *karma brahmodbhavaṃ viddhi*
- 8 *brahmārpaṇaṃ brahmahavir brahmāgnau brahmaṇā hutam /brahmaiva tena gantavyaṃ brahmakarmasamādhinā //*
- 9 *brahmaṇy ādhāya karmāṇi saṅgaṃ tyaktvā karoti yah /lipyate na sa pāpēna padmapatram ivāmbhasā //*
- 10 *jarāmaraṇamokṣāya mām āśrītya yatanti ye /te brahma tad viduḥ kṛtsnam adhyātmaṃ karma cākhilam //*
- 11 *kasmāc ca te na nameran mahātman; garīyase brahmano 'py ādikartre /*
- 12 *Om keneṣitaṃ patati preṣitaṃ manaḥ kena prāṇaḥ prathamah praiti yuktaḥ /keneṣitāṃ vācamināṃ vadanti cakṣuḥ śrotraṃ ka u devo yunakti //*
- 13 *yadvācānabhyuditaṃ yena vāgabhyudyate /tadeva brahma tvaṃ viddhi nedaṃ yadidamupāsate //yanmanasā na manute yenāhurmano matam /tadeva brahma tvaṃ viddhi nedaṃ yadidamupāsate //yaccakṣuṣā na paśyati yena cakṣuṣi paśyati /tadeva brahma tvaṃ viddhi nedaṃ yadidamupāsate //yacchrotreṇ na śṛnoti yena śrotramidaṃ śrutam /tadeva brahma tvaṃ viddhi nedaṃ yadidamupāsate //yat prāṇena prāṇiti yena prāṇaḥ praṇīyate /tadeva brahma tvaṃ viddhi nedaṃ yadidamupāsate //*
- 14 *ko 'yam / ātmeti vayam upāśmahe / katarah sa ātmā / yena vā paśyati yena vā śṛnoti yena vā gandhāṇ jighrati yena vā vācaṃ vyākaroṭi yena vā svādu cāsvādu ca vijānāti //*
- 15 *eṣabrahmaīsa...*
- 16 *amānitvam adambhitvam ahiṃsā kṣāntir ārjavam /ācāryopāsanam śaucaṃ sthairyam ātmavinigrahaḥ //indriyārtheṣu vairāgyam anahaṃkāra eva ca /janmamṛtyujarāvādhiduhkhadoṣānudarśanam //asaktir anabhiṣvaṅgaḥ putradāragrḥādiṣu /nityam ca samacittatvam iṣṭāniṣṭopapattiṣu //mayi cānanyayogena bhaktir avyabhicāriṇī /viviktadeśasevitvam aratir janasaṃsadi*

- //adhyātmajñānanityatvaṃ tattvajñānārthadarśanam /etaj jñānam iti proktam  
ajñānaṃ yad ato 'nyathā //
- 17 etaj jñānam iti proktam ajñānaṃ yad ato 'nyathā
- 18 asaṃyatātmanā yogo duṣprāpa iti me matiḥ / vaśyātmanā tu yatatā śakyo 'vāptum  
upāyataḥ //
- 19 ayatiḥ śraddhayopeto yogāc calitamānasah / aprāpya yogasaṃsiddhiṃ kām gatim  
kṛṣṇa gacchati //
- 20 kaccin nobhavavibhraṣṭaś chinnābhram iva naśyati / apratiṣṭho mahābāho vimūḍho  
brahmaṇaḥ pathi //
- 21 jyāyasī cet karmaṇas te matā buddhir janārdana /tat kiṃ karmaṇi ghore māṃ  
niyojayasi keśava // vyāmiśreṇaiva vākyena buddhiṃ mohayasīva me /tat ekaṃ vada  
niścīya yena śreyo 'ham āpnuyām //
- 22 saṃnyāsam karmaṇām kṛṣṇa punar yogam ca śaṃsasi / yac chreya etayor ekaṃ tan  
me brūhi suniścitam //
- 23 vyavasāyātmikā buddhir ekeha kurunandana / bahuśākhā hy anantāś ca buddhayo  
'vyavasāyinām //
- 24 ajñāś cāśraddadhānaś ca saṃśayātmā vinaśyati / nāyaṃ loko 'sti na paro na sukhaṃ  
saṃśayātmanaḥ //
- 25 yāvad etān nirīkṣe 'haṃ yoddhukāmān avasthitān
- 26 yotsyamānān avekṣe 'haṃ ya e te 'tra samāgatāḥ
- 27 uvāca pārtha paśyatiṅ samavetān kurūn iti
- 28 tatra apaśyat sthitān pārthaḥ pītṛn atha pitāmahaṅ /ācāryān mātulān bhrātṛn putrān  
pautṛān sakhīṃs tathā //śvaśūrān suhṛdaś caiva senayor ubhayor api / tān samīkṣya  
sa kaunteyah sarvān bandhūn avasthitān //kṛpayā parayāviṣṭo viśīdam idam abravīt  
/ dṛṣṭvemān svajanān kṛṣṇa yuyutsūn samavasthitān //
- 29 nimitāni ca paśyāmi viparītāni keśava /na ca śreyo 'nupaśyāmi hatvā svajanam  
āhave //
- 30 yady apy e te na paśyanti lobhopahatacetasah / kulakṣayakṛtaṃ doṣaṃ mitradrohe ca  
pātakam // kathaṃ na jñeyam asmābhiḥ pāpād asmān nivartitum / kulakṣayakṛtaṃ  
doṣaṃ prapaśyadbhir janārdana //
- 31 utsannakuladharmāṇām manuṣyāṇām janārdana / narake niyataṃ vāso bhavatiṅ  
anuśuśrūma //
- 32 na hi prapaśyāmi mamāpanudyād; yac chokam ucchoṣaṇam indriyāṇām
- 33 1. 22 (nirīkṣe); 23 (avekṣe); 25 (paśya); 26 (apaśyat); 27 (samīkṣa); 28 (dṛṣṭvā); 31  
(paśyāmi, anupaśyāmi); 38 (paśyanti); 39 (prapaśyadbhi)
- 34 1.44 (anuśuśrūma)
- 35 mātrāsparśāś tu kaunteya śtoṣnasukhaduḥkhadāḥ / āgamāpāyino 'nityāś tāṃs  
tītikśasva bhārata //yaṃhi na vyathayanty ete puruṣaṃ puruṣarśabha /  
samaduḥkhasukhaṃ dhīraṃ so 'mṛtatvāya kalpate //
- 36 senayor ubhayor madhye rathaṃ sthāpaya me 'cyuta // yāvad etān nirīkṣe '**haṃ**  
yoddhukāmān avasthitān / kair **mayā** saha yoddhavyam asmin raṇasamudyame //  
yotsyamānān avekṣe '**haṃ** ya e te 'tra samāgatāḥ / dhārtaraṣṭrasya durbuddher  
yuddhe priyakirīśavaḥ //
- 37 yad ahamkāram āśrīya na yotsya iti manyase / mithyaīsa vyavasāyas te prakṛtis  
tvām niyokṣyati //
- 38 yas tu sarvāṇi bhūtāny ātmany evānupaśyati |sarvabhūteṣu cātmānaṃ tato na  
vijugupsate ||
- 39 yas tu sarvāṇi bhūtāny ātmany evānupaśyati | sarvabhūteṣu cātmānaṃ tato na  
vicikitsati ||
- 40 sarvabhūtaṣṭham ātmānaṃ sarvabhūtāni cāmani / īkṣate yogayuktātmā sarvatra  
samadarśanaḥ // yo māṃ paśyati sarvatra sarvaṃ ca mayi paśyati / tasyāhaṃ na  
praṇaśyāmi sa ca me na praṇaśyati //

41 *yasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāny āmaivābhūd vijānataḥ | tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvam anuśāyataḥ ||*

42 *tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka*

43 *kaccid etac chrutaṃ pārtha tvayaikāgreṇa cetasā / kaccid ajñānasam̐mohaḥ prāṇaṣtas te dhanam̐jaya //*

44 *naṣṭo mohaḥ sm̐rtir labdhā tvatprasādān mayācyuta / sthito 'smi gatasam̐dehaḥ kariṣye vacanam̐ tava //*

45 *ajñānasam̐bhūtam ... sam̐sayam̐*

46 *teṣāṃ satatayuktānāṃ bhajatām̐ pr̐tipūrvakam̐ / dadāmi buddhivyogam̐ taṃ yena mām̐ upayānti te //teṣāṃ evānukampārtham̐ aham̐ ajñānam̐ tamah̐ / nāṣayām̐ ātmabhāvastho jñānadīpena bhāsvatā //*

47 *aśocyān anvaśocas tvam̐ prajñāvādāṃś ca bhāṣase / gatāsūn agatāsūṃś ca nānuśocanti paṇḍitāḥ //*

48 Generally it is believed that Kṛṣṇa's intention is to address Arjuna's grief or to console the grieving Arjuna. Taking cue from *Viṣṇu Smṛti*, regarding the group of verses *Bhagavadgītā* 2.11-30 Angelika Malinar writes, "Thus, whether one thinks of the self as eternal or as being constantly born or dead, the conclusion is the same: there is nothing to grieve for. This message is conveyed in the refrain-like formula, 'You must not grieve' (*na socitum arhasi*; 2.25, 26, 27, 30), which is a perfect conclusion of this speech of consolation, drawing on the style of funeral oration. That consolation is the main purpose of these verses is corroborated by their inclusion of the *Viṣṇusmṛti* (*ViS*), one of the later manuals on *dharma*. In this text, the verses are cited as an example of words of consolation that should be addressed to mourners (cf. *ViS* 19.24). Almost all the verses in the *BhG* are cited, with slight variations and certain omissions, as a repertoire of aphorisms to be used on such occasions." (In her *The Bhagavadgītā: Doctrines and Contexts*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2007 [referred to as *Malinar* herein after], pp.65f.) Malinar also compares Kṛṣṇa's speech in *Bhagavadgītā* 2.11-30 with Vidura's speech of consolation in *Mahābhārata* 11.2.3ff. She continues the quoted passage, "It is probable that the authors of the *BhG* [*Bhagavadgītā*] are drawing on an extant stock of teachings as is the case in other passages from the *MBh* [*Mahābhārata*]." (*Malinar*: 66), and clarifies that she is referring to Vidura's speech of consolation in *Mahābhārata* 11.2.3ff (*Malinar*: 66, fn.20). She further explains, "Here, the refrain *tatra kā paridevanā* ('Why should one complain?') is frequently used, as is the case in the *BhG* 2." (*Malinar*: 66, fn.20).

According to Olivelle the *Viṣṇu Smṛti* was composed by a single Brahmin, who was a devotee of Viṣṇu and an expert in the Dharmasāstra tradition, most likely between 700 and 1000 CE on the ground that (1) the text cites the centrality of written documents and events which occurred in the Common Era, (2) the text uses a vocabulary that emerged in the Common Era, for example the word *pustaka*, used in *Viṣṇu Smṛti* 18.44, was first used by a sixth-century astronomer, (3) the text mentions *satī* and deals comprehensively with *tīrthas*, which is a late development, as no other Dharmasāstra deals with them, and (4) the text gives a description of *Vaiṣṇava* images, which uniquely correlate with the specimens found only after the eighth century in Kashmir. (Patrick Olivelle, "The Date and Provenance of the *Viṣṇu Smṛti*," *Indologica Taurinensia*, 33 (2007), pp.149-163.)

Hence, to interpret *Bhagavadgītā* 2.11 as mere part of a funeral speech on the basis of *Viṣṇu Smṛti* is anachronistic and to interpret it by comparing Kṛṣṇa's speech *Bhagavadgītā* 2.11-30 with Vidura's speech of consolation in *Mahābhārata* 11.2.3ff is to miss the significance of the verses, which is not just meant for consolation of Arjuna, but meant for clarification of the manifestation of the collective institution as person and the very nature of collective institutional action, performed by mind,

speech and body, and what is involved in the performance of such collective institutional action, which we will try to show in this essay.

That Kṛṣṇa's speech in Bhagavadgītā 2.11-30 is not to be interpreted as speech of consolation, even though he is addressing the grieving Arjuna is indicated in Bhagavadgītā 2.10, which is a report by Saṁjaya. Since, in this verse, Kṛṣṇa is reported to be speaking as if smilingly precludes his speech being a speech of consolation. Malinar's translation of the verse 2.10 is as follows: "To him who sat desparate between the two armies, Hṛṣīkeśa (Kṛṣṇa) spoke almost bursting out in laughter" (*Malinar*: 64). One speaking almost bursting out in laughter and at the same time consoling is incongruous. Hence Kṛṣṇa's speech could not have been a speech of consolation if we go by Saṁjaya's report, even though Kṛṣṇa's speech appears to be a speech of consolation on the surface when seen in light of *Viṣṇu Smṛti* 20.1-53 and Vidura's speech of consolation in *Mahābhārata* 11.2.3ff.

The *Viṣṇu Smṛti*'s injunction for speech of consolation as part of funeral presupposes not merely the fact of mourning but also the correctness and validity of mourning for the dead as part of funeral. *Viṣṇu Smṛti* 19.24 gives the injunction: "The mourners, who lament the loss of a relative, shall be addressed by men gifted with a tranquil frame of mind with such consolatory speeches as I shall now recite to thee, O Earth, who art cherished to my, mind." (*duḥkhānvitānām mṛtabāndhavānām āśvāsanaṁ kuryur adīnasattvāḥ* // *vākyais tu yair bhūmi tavābhidhāsyē vākyāny ahaṁ tāni mano 'bhirāme* // Translated by Julius Jolly in his *The Institutes of Vishnu*).

The injunction is followed by the group of verses 20.1-53 which constitute the speech of consolation. The verse 2.11 of the *Bhagavadgītā* is not included in these verses. Traditionally the verse 2.11 of the *Bhagavadgītā* following translation: "For those who cannot be grieved for you have grieved, yet you speak words of wisdom. For whose life breath is gone or whose life breath is not gone the wise do not grieve." In this translation this verse appears to be questioning the very validity of grieving and mourning. Hence, the verse 2.11 is present to prevent the speech of Kṛṣṇa from 2.11-30 in the *Bhagavadgītā* from being construed as speech of mourning.

To get the clue to the correct interpretation of these verses interpreters need to ask what is that *gatāsūn* (whose breath have departed) and *agatāsūn* (whose breath have not departed) which are *anvaśocas* (cannot be grieved for) and regarding which *nānuśocanti paṇḍitāḥ* (wise do not grieve). We have to keep in mind that grieving for the dead is a legitimate part of funeral and Kṛṣṇa is not advocating modification of manual of Dharma to do away with the mourning in the funeral. So, *gatāsūn* and *agatāsūn* do not mean dead (whose breath have departed) and alive (whose breath have not departed), rather it refers to the activity of sense perception of things and non-performance of such activities of sense perception of things respectively, as we will show below.

Malinar did not notice the incongruity between the two claims she makes: first the claim, "Kṛṣṇa declares that the truly educated, the *paṇḍita*, do not grieve when there is nothing to grieve for. They never mourn for either the living or the dead because they distinguish between the mortal body and the immortal 'owner of the body' (*dehin, śarīriṇa*)" (*Malinar*: 65), and the second claim, "Thus, whether one thinks of the self as eternal or as being constantly born or dead, the conclusion is the same: there is nothing to grieve for. This message is conveyed in the refrain-like formula, 'You must not grieve' (*na socitum arhasi*; 2.25, 26, 27, 30), which is a perfect conclusion of this speech of consolation, drawing on the style of funeral oration." (*Malinar*: 65).

Since *paṇḍita*'s conduct is taken as the exemplar, the *paṇḍita* for Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavadgītā is performing the same function as performed by *śiṣṭa* in determination of *dharma* where there is no clear injunction from the texts (śāstra). On Malinar's

reading, since *paṇḍitas* do not mourn, and they being exemplar of the correct conduct, there is no place for mourning and speech of consolation in the funeral performed by them, this goes against the injunction for speech of consolation in the *Viṣṇu Smṛti* accepted by Malinar.

Simon Brodbeck articulates Arjuna's anxiety as presented in the first chapter in the following words: "... he expresses his misgivings first of all in terms of anticipated loss of *śreyas* (the good, 1:31), *prīti* (joy, 1:36), and *sukha* (contentment, 1:37). These terms seem to indicate the existential problem of living with himself thereafter. This is then tied to kinship responsibility: the anticipated act is contrary to *kuladharmā* and *jātidharmā* and will precipitate *varṇasaṃkara* and *kulakṣaya* (class-mixture, tribal destruction, 1:39-42) through the corruption of the *kula*'s womenfolk (1:41). *Kula* here is conceived as containing the already dead and the yet to be born, each group dependent on the other in equal measure. *Naraka* (hell, 1:42, 44) denotes the oblivion of this particular *kula* as an entity, as well as serving as a postmortem location (in contrast to *pitṛloka*) for its individual members." (Simon Brodbeck, "Calling Kṛṣṇa's Bluff: Non-attached Action in the Bhagavadgītā," *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 32 (2004), p. 83). It is this anxiety that is making Arjuna grieve. Had there been a direct attempt to address Arjuna's grief then there should have been an attempt on the part of Kṛṣṇa to respond to Arjuna's anxieties directly. He does not respond to these anxieties of Arjuna. Therefore, it cannot be said that Kṛṣṇa in his speech in Bhagavadgītā 2.11-30 is trying to console Arjuna, as that attempt would require responding to his anxiety, which were never addressed by Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhagavadgītā*. So, the intention of Kṛṣṇa starting with 2.11 is not to address Arjuna's grief, not to console grieving Arjuna, not to allay Arjuna's anxiety.

<sup>49</sup> In Pratap Chandra Roy, *Mahābhārata*, vol.4, *Udyoga Parva*, Sec.133, Oriental Publishing Co., Calcutta (1884-1894), p.266.

<sup>50</sup> *Malinar*: 40.

<sup>51</sup> *na tv evāhaṃ jātu nāsaṃ na tvaṃ neme janādhīpāḥ / na caiva na bhaviṣyāmaḥ sarve vayam ataḥ param //*

<sup>52</sup> *dehino 'smin yathā dehe kaumāraṃ yauvanaṃ jarā / tathā dehāntaraprāptir dhīras tatra na muhyati //*

<sup>53</sup> But first we have to find out what can be the reason for this erroneous incongruent interpretation of verse 2.13 of the Bhagavadgītā. This verse is included verbatim in speech of consolation in *Viṣṇu Smṛti* as verse 20.49, which can be dated earliest to the 700CE and it is this inclusion that appears to be the cause of erroneous understanding advocated by traditional commentators from Śaṅkarācārya onwards, whose commentaries date from 700CE onwards. All traditional commentators including Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānujācārya, Madhvācārya, Bhāskara and Abhinavagupta take the analogy of *deha* and its states with self and its body as meant merely to highlight that as one states of *deha* gives way to another state and for passing away of the earlier state of body we do not grieve because the individual-self remains unchanged through the changing states of body, in the similar way one body of the self gives way to another and the individual-self remains unchanged while passing from one body to another. Hence, we should not grieve for the old discarded body. But as explained above this kind of interpretation is incongruous in the context.

<sup>54</sup> *te striyamāviśataḥ tasyā upasthamevāhavanīyaṃ kurvāte ... reta eva śukrāmāhutiṃ / te striyaṃ tarpayataḥ sa ya evaṃ vidvānmithunamupaityagnihotramevāsya hutam / bhavati yastataḥ putro jāyate sa lokāḥ pratyuthāyeyetadagnihotraṃ / ... nātaḥ paramastīti.../*

<sup>55</sup> In the description of doctrine of five fires (*pañcāgni vidyā*) we hear in Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 6.2.13: *yoṣā vā agnir gautama | tasyā upastha eva samit | lomāni dhūmaḥ*

|yonir arcih |yad antah karoti te 'ngārāh |abhinandā viṣphuliṅgāh |tasminn etasminn agnau devā reto juhvati |tasyā āhutyai puruṣaḥ sambhavati |“A fire—that’s what a woman is, Gautama. Her firewood is the vulva; her smoke is the pubic hair; her flame is the vagina; when one penetrates her, that is her embers; and her sparks are the climax. In that very fire gods offer semen, and from that offering springs a man (puruṣa).” Similarly in doctrine of five fires (pañcāgni vidyā) Chāndogya Upaniṣad 5.8.1-2 says: yoṣā vāva gautamāgniḥ |tasyā upastha eva samit |yad upamantrayate sa dhūmah |yonir arcih |yad antah karoti te 'ngārāh |abhinandā viṣphuliṅgāh || tasminn etasminn agnau devā reto juhvati |tasyā āhuter garbhāḥ sambhavati ||“A fire—that’s what a woman is, Gautama. Her firewood is the vulva; when she is asked to come close, that is her smoke; her flame is the vagina; when one penetrates her, that is her embers; and her sparks are the climax. In that very fire gods offer semen, and from that offering springs the fetus.”

<sup>56</sup> striyo vā agnir vaiśvānaraḥ / tasyopasthaṃ samid yonir jyotir iṣyā dhūmo 'bhinando viṣphuliṅgās saṃsparṣo 'ngārāh / tasminn etasminn agnau vaiśvānare 'harahaḥ devā reto juhvati / tasyā āhuter hutūyai puruṣas sambhavati //

<sup>57</sup> This comes out quite clearly in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 6.4.1-4: eṣāṃ vai bhūtānāṃ pṛthivī rasaḥ /pṛthivyā āpaḥ /apām ośadhayaḥ /ośadhīnāṃ puṣpāni /puṣpānāṃ phalāni /phalānāṃ puruṣaḥ /puruṣasya retaḥ // sa ha prajāpatir iṅśāṃ cakre -- hantāsmāi pratiśthāṃ kalpayāntī sa striyaṃ sasṛje /tām sṛṣṭvādha upāsta /tasmāt striyaṃ adha upāsīta /sa etaṃ pṛāṅcaṃ grāvāṇaṃ ātmana eva samudapārayat /tenaināṃ abhyasṛjata //tasyā vedir upasthaḥ / lomāni barhiś /carmādhiṣavane /samiddho madhyatas tau muṣkau /sa yāvān ha vai vājapeyena yajamanasya loko bhavati tāvān asya loko bhavati /ya evaṃ vidvān adhohāśaṃ caraty āśāṃ strīnāṃ kṛtāṃ vṛñjate /etaḥ dha sma vai tad vidvān uddālaka ārunir āha /etaḥ dha sma vai tad vidvān nāko maudgalya āha /etaḥ dha sma vai tad vidvān kumārāhārīta āha -- bahavo maryā brāhmanāyānā nirindriyā visukṛto 'smāl lokāt prayanti ya idam avidvāṃso 'dhohāśaṃ carantīti /“Of these existents, essence is verily the earth; of the earth, the waters; of the waters, the herbs; of the herbs, the flowers; of the flowers, the fruit; of the fruits, man; of man, semen. Prajāpati then thought to himself: ‘Let me make a base for that semen,’ and he created woman. Having created her, (he) had intercourse with her. A man, therefore, should have intercourse with a woman. Prajāpati stretched out from himself the elongated stone for pressing Soma and impregnated her with it. Her vulva is the sacrificial platform; her pubic hair is the sacred grass; her labia majora are the Soma-press; and her labia minora are the fire blazing at the centre. A man who engages in sexual intercourse with this knowledge obtains as great a world as a man who performs a Soma-yajña (Vājapeya), and he appropriates to himself the merits of the women with whom he has sex. The women, on the other hand, appropriate themselves the merits of a man who engages in sexual intercourse with them without this knowledge. Surely it was this knowledge that made Uddālaka Āruṇi exclaim, as also Nāka Maudgalya and Kumārāhārīta: ‘Many are the mortals of Brahmin descent who, engaging in sexual intercourse without this knowledge, depart this world drained of virility and deprived of merit.’” Patrick Olivelle also claims that “... I find that the author of BU [Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad] intends to teach a theology of sexual intercourse as a fire sacrifice...” in his essay “Young Śvetaketu: A Literary Study of an Upaniṣadic Story,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol.119, No.1 (Jan. – Mar., 1999), p.48.

<sup>58</sup> pañcāitāni mahābāho kāraṇāni nibodha me / sāmkye kṛtānte proktāni siddhaye sarvakarmaṇāṃ // adhiśthānaṃ tathā kartā karaṇaṃ ca pṛthagvidham / vividhās ca pṛthakceṣṭā daivaṃ caivātra pañcamam //“These five factors in the accomplishment of all action, you understand from Me, O mighty armed, as procained in the

*Sāmkhya* which ends/completes action. The ground/seat and agent and the various organs/instruments, and the separate functions of various sorts, and the deity also, the fifth among these.”

- 59 *trir ha vai puruṣo mriyate trir jāyate/ Sa hāi 'tad eva prathamam mriyate yad retas siktam sambhūtam bhavati/ sa prāṇam evā 'bhisambhavati/ āsām abhijāyate/ athāi'tad dviṭiyam mriyate yad dīkṣate / sa chandānsy eva 'bhisambhavati/ dakṣiṇām abhijāyate/ athāi 'tat trīṭiyam mriyate yan mriyate/ sa śraddhām evā 'bhisambhavati/ lokam abhijāyate/*
- 60 *puruṣe ha vā ayam ādīto garbho bhavati yad etad retaḥ /tad etat sarvebhyo 'ṅgebhyaḥ tejaḥ sambhūtam ātmany evātmānam bibharti /tad yadā striyām siñcaty athainaj janayati /tad asya prathamam janma //tat striyā ātmabhūyam gacchati yathā svam aṅgam tathā /tasmād enām na hinasti /sāsyaitam ātmānam atra gataḥ bhāvayati //sā bhāvayitrī bhāvayitavyā bhavati /taḥ strī garbham bibharti /so 'gra eva kumāraḥ janmano 'gre 'dhi bhāvayati /sa yat kumāraḥ janmano 'gre 'dhi bhāvayati ātmānam eva tad bhāvayaty eṣām lokānām santatyai /evam santatā hīme lokāḥ /tad asya dviṭiyam janma //so 'syāyam ātmā puṇyebhyaḥ karmebhyaḥ pratidhīyate /athāsyāyam itara ātmā kṛtakṛtyo vayogataḥ praiti /sa itaḥ prayann eva punar jāyate /tad asya trīṭiyam janma //*
- 61 *tāv ehi saṃrabhāvahai saha reto dadhāvahai /puṃse putrāya vittaya iti //*
- 62 *athāsyā ūrū vihāpayati -- vijihūhām dyāvāpṛthivī itī /tasyām arthaḥ niṣṭhāya mukhena mukham samdhāya trir enām anulomām anumārṣṭi --viṣṇur yoniḥ kalpayatu tvaṣṭā rūpāni piṃṣatu /ā siñcatu prajāpatir dhātā garbham dadhātu te /garbham dhehi sinīvāli garbham dhehi pṛthustuke /garbham te aśvinau devāv ādhattām puṣkarasraju //*
- 63 *hiraṇmayī arañī yābhyāḥ nirmanthatām aśvinau /taḥ te garbham havāmahe daśame māsi sūtaye /yathāgnigarbhā pṛthivī yathā dyaur aindrena garbhniḥ /vāyur diśām yathā garbha evaḥ garbham dadhāmi te 'sāv iti //*
- 64 *patirjāyām praviṣati garbho bhūtvā sa mātaram; tasyam punar navo bhūtvā daśame māsi jāyate / tājāyā jāyā bhavati yadsyām jāyate punaḥ /*
- 65 *ya u vai putrah sa pita yaḥ pita sa putrah*
- 66 *aṅgād aṅgāt sambhavasī hṛdayād adhijāyase / ātmā vai putranāmāsi sa jīva śaradaḥ śatam /*
- 67 *sā yā manuṣyayonir manuṣyaloka eva saḥ / tat striyai prajananam / ato 'dhi prajāḥ prajāyante / tasmād u lalyāñīm jāyām icchet kalyāṇe ma ātmā sambhavād iti / tasmād u jāyām jugupsen nen mama loka 'nyas sambhavād iti / tasya vai sambhaviṣyataḥ prāṇā agram praviṣanty atha retas sicyate / See also Baudhāyana Dharmaśāstra 2.2.3.34; Āpastambha Dharmaśāstra 2.13.7; Mānava Dharmaśāstra 9.7-9; Yājñavalkya Dharmaśāstra 1.81.*
- 68 *...patir jāyām praviṣati garbho bhūtvā sa matsaram / tasyām punar navo bhūtvā daśame māsi jāyate // taj jāyā bhavati yad asyām jāyate punaḥ //... devā manuṣyān abruvann eṣā vo jananī punaḥ // nāputrasya loka 'stīti...*
- 69 *bhāryām patiḥ saṃpraviṣya sa yasmāj jāyate punaḥ / jāyāyā itī jāyātvaḥ purāṇāḥ kavayo viduḥ // ... ātmātmanaiva janitāḥ putra ity ucyate budhaiḥ / tasmād bhāryām naraḥ paśyen mātṛvat putramātaram // bhāryāyām janitām putram ādarṣe svam ivānanam /*
- 70 *as tvā hṛdā kīriṇā manyamāno 'martyam martyo johavīmi /jātavedo yaśo asmāsu dhehi prajābhir aṅne amṛtatvam aśyām //*
- 71 *yo vām ṛjave kramaṇāya rodasī marto dadāśa dhīṣaṇe sa sādhati /pra prajābhir jāyate dharmaṇas pari yuvoḥ siktā viṣurūpāni savratā //*
- 72 *sa ya evam etad vāmadevyam mithune protam veda /mithunī bhavati /mithunān mithunāt prajāyate /*

- <sup>73</sup> *atha-api sa eva-ayam [virūḍhaḥ pṛthak pratyakṣeṇa-lupalabhyate [drśyate ca-api sārūpyam dehatvam eva-nyat /*  
<sup>74</sup> *sa yad dha vā enam etat pita yonyām reto bhūtaṃ siñcaty ādityo hāi 'nam tad yonyām reto bhūtaṃ siñcati / sa hā 'sya tatra mṛtyor tse /*  
<sup>75</sup> *ācārya upanayamāno brahmacāriṇaṃ kṛṇute garbham antaḥ / taṃ rātrīs tisra udare bibharti taṃ jātāṃ draṣṭum abhisamṃyanti devāḥ //*  
<sup>76</sup> *ācāryo mṛtyur...*  
<sup>77</sup> Atharva Veda 6.133.3: *mṛtyor aham brahmacārī yad asmi niryācan bhūtāt puruṣam yamāya / tam aham brahmaṇā tapasā śrameṇānayainaṃ mekhalayā sināmi //* "As I am now Death's Brahmachāri claiming out of the living world a man for Yama, So with Austerity and Prayer and Fervour I bind this Girdle round the man before me."  
<sup>78</sup> *ut krāmātaḥ puruṣa māva patthā mṛtyoḥ paḍvīṣam avamuñcamānaḥ / mā chūthā asmāl lokād agneḥ sūryasya saṃdrśaḥ //* "Up from this place, O man, rise! sink not downward, casting away the bonds of Death that hold thee. Be not thou parted from this world, from sight of Agni and the Sun."  
<sup>79</sup> *ayam devā ihaivāstv ayam māmutra gād itaḥ / imaṃ sahasravīryeṇa mṛtyor ut pārāyāmasi //* "Here let this man, O Gods, remain: let him not go to yonder world. We pass him out him from Mṛityu with a charm that hath a thousand powers."  
<sup>80</sup> *trirha vai puruṣo jāyate etannveva mātuścādhi pītuścāgre jāyate'tha yaṃ yajña upanamatī sa yadyajate taddvīṭyaṃ jāyate'tha yatra mriyate yatra namagnāvabhyādadhati sa yattataḥ sambhavati tatṛṭīyaṃ jāyate tasmātrīḥ puruṣo jāyata ityāhuḥ /*  
<sup>81</sup> *ajāto ha vāi tāvat puruṣo yāvan na yajate, sa yajñenāi 'va jāyate / sa yathā 'ṇdam prathamaniṛhñnam evan eva /*  
<sup>82</sup> *athātyupayajati / sa yannātyupayajedyāvatyo haivāgre prajāḥ sṛṣṭāstāvatyo haiva syurna prajāyerannatha yadatyupayajati praivaitajjanayati tasmādimāḥ prajāḥ punarabhyāvartam prajāyante /* "He then makes additional by-offerings. Were he not to make additional by-offerings, there would only be as many living beings as were created in the beginning; they would not be propagated; but by making additional by-offerings he indeed propagates them; whence creatures are again born here repeatedly."  
<sup>83</sup> Walter O. Kaelber writes in his essay, "The "Dramatic" Element in Brāhmic Initiation: Symbols of Death, Danger, and Difficult Passage," *History of Religions*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Aug., 1978), pp. 58f, "Both Oldenberg and Hauer argued that at both the Upanāyana and the Dikṣā symbols of rebirth are preceded by a symbolic representation of death. Lommel, however, consistently maintains that rebirth at these rituals is not preceded by symbols of death. The intricacies of this "debate" between Hauer, Oldenberg, and Lommel need not be detailed, except to say that the major argument revolves around the issue of whether the embryo is a symbol of new life, "the essence of life" (as it is for Lommel), or a symbol of death or a deathlike condition which precedes new life (as it is for Oldenberg and Hauer). It appears, however, that the crucial issue has been overlooked. The issue is not whether the embryo represents "the essence of life" or death but rather that it represents both simultaneously."  
<sup>84</sup> *garbhā anañanto jīvanti*  
<sup>85</sup> *etadvai prajāpatiretasminnātmanaḥ pratihite sarvāṇi bhūtāni garbhyabhavattānyasya garbha eva santi pāpmā mṛtyuragrḥṇāt*  
<sup>86</sup> *so'kāmayata dvīṭyo ma ātmā jāyete sa manasā vācam mīthunaṃ samabhavadaśanāyām mṛtyustadyadreta āsīsa samvatsaro'bhavanna ha purā tataḥ samvatsara āsa tamedāvantaṃ kālambibharyāvāntsamvatsarastamedāvataḥ kālasya parastādasrjata taṃ jātambhivīyādadātsa bhāṇakarotsaiva vāgabhavat*



“He desired, ‘May a second self be produced for me.’ By his mind he entered into union with speech,--(to wit) Death with hunger: the seed which was produced became the year, for theretofore there was no year. For as long as the year he (Death) carried him (within him), and at the end of that time he produced him. He opened his mouth (to devour) the new-born one, and he (the child) cried ‘bhā’; thus speech was produced.”

87 *akṣaram brahma paramaṃ svabhāvo 'dhyātam ucyate / bhūtabhāvodbhava-karo visargaḥ karmasamjñitah //*

88 *...yajñah karmasamudbhavaḥ // karma brahmodbhavaṃ viddhi brahmākṣarasamudbhavam / tasmāt sarvagataṃ brahma nityaṃ yajñe pratiṣṭhitam //*

89 *brahmārpaṇaṃ brahmahavir brahmāgnau brahmaṇā hutam / brahmaiva tena gantavyaṃ brahmakarmasamādhinā //*

90 *tadetsatyam /yathā sudīptātpāvakādviṣphuliṅgākaḥ sahasraśaḥ prabhavante sarūpāḥ / tathākṣarādvidhāḥ soṃya bhāvāḥ prajāyante tatra caivāpiyanti //*

91 *tasmādṛcaḥ sāmajaḥ dīkṣā yajñāśca sarve kratavo dakṣiṇāśca / saṃvatsaraśca yajamānaśca lokāḥ somo yatra pavate yatra sūryaḥ //*

92 *puruṣa evedaṃ viśvāṃ karma tapo brahma parāmṛtam / etadyo veda nihitaṃ guhāyāṃ so 'vidyāgranththiṃ vikiraṭiḥa soṃya //*

93 *yathorṇābhīḥ sṛjate grhṇate ca yathā pṛthivyāmoṣadhayaḥ sambhavanti / yathā sataḥ puruṣāṭkeśalomāni tathākṣarātsambhavaṭiḥa viśvam //*

94 *sa yathorṇāvābhis tantunoccareḥ yathā agneḥ kṣudrā viṣphuliṅgā vyuccaranti evam evāsmād ātmanaḥ sarve prāñāḥ sarve lokāḥ sarve devāḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāni vyuccaranti / tasyopaniṣat satyasya satyam iti /prāñā vai satyaṃ teṣāṃ eṣa satyam //*

95 *pūrṇam adaḥ pūrṇam idaṃ pūrṇāt pūrṇam udacyate /pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya pūrṇam evāśiṣyate /*

96 *kiṃ yasya tantram sa svatantraḥ? kiṃ cātaḥ?tantuvāye prāpnoti.*

97 *naiṣa doṣaḥ / ayaṃ tantrasabdō 'styeva vitāne vartate / tadyathā /āstūrṇaṃ tantram / protaṃ tantramiti / vitānamiti gamyate /*

98 *yadā lelayate hyarciḥ samiddhe havyavāhane / tadāyabhāgāvantarenāhuti pratipādayet //*

99 Arjuna uses the expression *saṃdeha* in this sense when he says in Bhagavadgītā 18.73: *naṣṭo mohah smṛtir labdhā tvatprasādān mayācyuta / sthito 'smi gatasaṃdehaḥ kariṣye vacanaṃ tava //*“Destroyed is delusion, and I have gained recollection through your Grace, O Achyuta. I am firm, with doubts gone. I will carry out your advice.”

100 *sa yathā saindhavakhilya udake prāsta udakam evānuvilīyeta na hāsyodgrahaṇāyeva syāt /yato-yatas tv ādadīta lavaṇam /evaṃ vā ara idaṃ mahad bhūtam anantam apāraṃ vijñānaghana eva /etebhyo bhūtebhyah samutthāya tāny evānuvinaṣyati /na pretya saṃjñāstīty are bravīmi /iti hovāca yājñavalkyaḥ //*

101 *sa yathā saindhavaghano 'nantaro 'bāhyaḥ kṛtsno rasaghana eva /evaṃ vā are 'yam ātmānantaro 'bāhyaḥ kṛtsnah prajñānaghana eva /etebhyo bhūtebhyah samutthāya tāny evānuvinayati /na pretya saṃjñāstīty are bravīmi /iti hovāca yājñavalkyaḥ //*

102 The speech of Kṛṣṇa in 2.11-30 is not for consolation of grieving Arjuna, rather it is a preparation of collectivist metaphysics of *yajna karma*, which also includes perceptual activity. This also confirms that inclusion of the verse 2.13 in the speech of consolation in *Viṣṇu Smṛti* as verse 20.49 appears to be because of erroneous understanding.

103 Cf. J. Gonda, *The Vision of the Vedic Poets*, Munshiram Monoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1984, p.10 fn.9.

104 *vāsāṃsi jīrṇāni yathā vihāya; navāni grhṇāti naro 'parāṇi / tathā śarīrāṇi vihāya jīrṇāny; anyāni saṃyāti navāni dehi //*

<sup>105</sup> *idaṃ śarīraṃ kaunteya kṣetram ity abhidhīyate / etad yo vetti taṃ prāhuḥ kṣetrājñā itī tadvidāḥ // kṣetrājñāṃ cāpi māṃ viddhi sarvakṣetreṣu bhārata /*

<sup>106</sup> Malinar also makes the same error as the traditional commentators when she writes: “The author [of the Bhagavadgītā] is obviously drawing on teachings that were current in certain contemporary philosophical schools that make the ontological distinction between a mortal body and an immortal entity functioning as the temporary ‘owner’ of a mortal body. ‘Ownership’ is based on the idea of transmigration, or rather re-embodiment, characteristic of the older Upaniṣads and early Sāṃkhya philosophy. Upaniṣadic ideas are recalled when death is described as a chance to acquire a new body and compared with ‘weaving a new cloth’ (BĀU [Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad] 4.4.5; cf. BhG [Bhagavadgītā] 2.22).” (Malinar: 66).

<sup>107</sup> *kathaṃ sa puruṣaḥ pārtha kaṃ ghātayati hanti kam //*

<sup>108</sup> Indra says to Prataradana Daivodāsi in *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* 3.1 when the latter asks what the highest boon is: *mām eva vijānīhi / etad evāham manuṣyāya hitatamam manye yan māṃ vijānīyan / triśiṣṣāṇaṃ tvāṣṭram ahanam arunmukhān yatīn sālāvṛkebhyaḥ prāyaccham bahvīḥ sandhā atikramya divi prahlādīyān aṭṭṇam aham antarikṣe paulomān pṛthivyām kālakañjān / tasya me tatra na loma canāmīyate / sa yo māṃ veda na ha vai tasya kena cana karmaṇā loko mīyate na steyena na bhrūnahaṭayā na mātṛvadhena na pitṛvadhena / nāsya papaṃ cakṛṣo mukhān nīlamvetīti!* “Perceive just me. This I consider most suitable for a person, that they perceive me. I killed the three-headed son of Tvastṛ; I offered the Arunmukha ascetics to the dogs; violating many agreements, I crushed the Prāhlādīyas in the sky, the Paulomas in the intermediate region, and the Kālakañjas on earth. In doing so, not a single hair of mine was damaged. Whoever knows me does not have their world damaged by any action whatever, be it stealing, infanticide, matricide or patricide. Having committed a sin (*pāpa*), their face does not pale.” (Brodbeck (2004):p.82.) How can this be so? The answer is in what is stated in *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* 2.6: *tadetadaīṣṭikaṃ karmamayamātmanamadhvaryuḥ samskaroti tasmīnyajurmayaṃ pravayati yajurmaya ṛṅmayaṃ hota ṛṅmāye sāmamayamudgātā / sa eṣa trayyai vidyāyā ātmaīṣa u avatitadindrasyātmā bhavati ya evaṃ veda //* “Now, this self of the sacrifice, this self consisting of rites—the Adhvaryu priest puts it together and weaves upon it the self consisting of the Yajus formulas; upon the self consisting of the Yajus formulas the Hotṛ priest weaves the self consisting of the Rg verses; and upon the self consisting of the Rg verses the Udgatṛ priest weaves the self consisting of the Sāman chants. Such is the self of the triple Veda—and this becomes, therefore, the self of Indra, [the self of him] who knows this.” (Patrick Olivelle, *The Early Upaniṣads*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998 [referred to as Olivelle herein after]: p.337.) Here it is made clear that Indra is the self of *yajña* (= *yajñapurūṣa*) consisting of *karma* (= *yajña karma*).

From the very beginning of the Vedic tradition *yajña puruṣa* is a collectivity, and *yajña karma* is a collective action as testified by *Puruṣa Sūkta*. The *Puruṣa Sūkta* is one of the most important sūktas in the Vedic literature. It is present in all the four Vedas. The extant *Puruṣa Sūkta* consists of sixteen mantras in the Rgveda and the Śukla Yajurveda, of eighteen mantras in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, of five mantras in the Āraṇya Parva of the Sāmaveda, of fifteen mantras in Śaunakīya Śākhā of Atharvaveda and of thirteen mantras in the Paippalāda Śākhā of Atharvaveda. The collectivity involved in *yajña* is not a collectivity of a group of individuals, but a collectivity of the character of an institution. I have discussed this issue and have given reasons elsewhere. (Binod Kumar Agarwala, “Errors Revisited in Light of the Balanced Contrast of Two Polarities in the First Chapter of Bhagavadgītā,” *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*: Volume 32, No. 3 (December 2015), pages 337-357, and “*Yajña Puruṣa*: The Uniting Thread in the Continuous

Development of *Śṛti* from Vedic *Samhitās* to *Upaniṣads*,” paper presented in a National Seminar on “Neo-Vedanta” organized by the Department of Philosophy, Dr. Hari Singh Gour Vishwavidyalaya: A Central University, Sagar (M. P.) on 9<sup>th</sup> March 2016 to 11<sup>th</sup> March 2016). So, *yajna karma* is of the nature of collective institutional action. When one knows the self of Indra then the self of Indra becomes his self too and he also becomes capable of performing collective institutional action. The context in which the issue of the boon came is stated in the very opening line of *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* 3.1: *pratardano ha vai daivodāsirindrasya priyaṃ dhāmopajagāma yuddhena pauruṣena ca* //“Once Pratardana, the son of Divodāsa, arrived at the favourite residence of Indra as a result of war and valour.” (*Olivelle*: 347). And then Indra asked him to choose a boon. War (*yuddha*) is a collective act, in fact an institutional act, and never an act of the individual. So the context makes it clear that the discussion regarding boon is in the context of collective institutional act.

So, according to Indra the highest boon is to know the *yajna puruṣa* ‘the institution as person’, and by implication to know the institutional action. When Indra acts, it is institutional action that occurs. So, the example of his own actions given by Indra are examples of institutional actions, which involved cruelty, but did not harm the institution as person, i.e. himself. When a member of the institution performs institutional action, it is vested on the institution and its results also accrue to the institution, and not to the member who performs the institutional action. Hence, Indra said when a man performs institutional action even if it is stealing, patricide, matricide, or infanticide, its consequences in the form harm of body or guilty conscience will not come to that member. There is a way of performing institutional action, and whatever be its form and whatever its consequence, it does not lead to guilty conscience or harm. When a hangman executes a death sentence, he neither suffers the guilt of murdering a man, nor any revenge harm can happen to him from the relatives of the executed man, as hangman’s execution is an institutional act.

Here we have to keep in mind that the context of the discussion in the *Bhagavadgītā* is just the beginning of the Great War (*Mahābhārata*) according to the epic *Mahābhārata*, in which the *Bhagavadgītā* is embedded. In the epic *Mahābhārata*, the war between the Pāṇḍavas and the Kauravas was a *yajña*, i.e. *raṇa-sattra* (*Mahābhārata* 3.242.14), *raṇayajña* (*Mahābhārata* 5.57.12 and 5.154.4) and *śastrayajña* (*Mahābhārata* 5.139.29). So, while performing action according to the injunction of the previous verse one performs collective action as required by the collectivity, and hence there is no guilt on the part of the *śarīrin*, who is the collective institutional person in the *śarīra*, of killing and no fear of being killed as it is *pūrṇa* ‘full’ eternally and inexhaustibly. When the action of battle is performed, action is not formed to kill someone as both Arjuna and Duryodhana were thinking, even if killing takes place. So, *śarīrin* as the source of action of *yuddha* is not a killer, even if killing takes place. The *śarīrin* is also not killed, as collective person the one *śarīrin* is eternal.

<sup>109</sup> The simile in the *Bhagavadgītā* II.22 has its roots in Vedic literature, for the idea that the “body-dweller” (*dehi*) abandons his inveterated bodies, *vāsāṃsi jūrṇāni yathā vihāya* echoes Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa 25.15. 4: *hītvā jūrṇaṃ tvacam*. In the Ṛgveda 9.86. 44, Soma “like Ahi creeps forward out of his old skin” (*ahir na jūrṇām ati sarpatī*); in 4.13.4 “Thou goest forth with mightiest steeds, discarding the black robe (*asītam* . . . *vasma*, cf. *asītaḥ* in Atharva Veda 6. 72. 1), the quivering rays of the Sun, as he extends his web (*tantum avavyayan* ... *rasmayah*), involving the “spider” *Ūrnāvābha* “thread-spinner,” imagery, sink the darkness like a skin (*carmeva*) into the Waters,” cf. 7. 63. 1; that is, “when man’s libation calls me to the white-garment” (*nirñije*, 10. 49. 7), for indeed *Varuṇa* “changes the black robes into clean and white

ones in his operation” (*anu vratā*, 8. 41. 10, his operations being respectively interior, *guhya*, and exterior, *āvis*), “Agni now weilds, now layeth down his tool (*vāśīm*), as does the Titan his white garment” (8. 19. 23, cf. 10. 20. 6 *agnim ...vāśīmantam*, “with the flaming sword?”); in 10. 63. 4 the Ādityas “man-regarding, with ever open eyes, have won as Angels, won by their qualification (*arhaṇā*) a lofty aeviternity; driving in chariots of light (*jyotirathah*), contrast the young streams that are still ‘footless and carless’ in 10. 99. 4), having the serpents’ magic but yet innocent (*ahimāyā anāgasah*), have clothed them in a glorious heavenly garment.” In Jāiminīya Brāhmaṇa 2. 134 “As Ahi casts his skin, as one would pull a blade of grass from its sheath,<sup>10</sup> he (Indra) is liberated from all evil” (*yathāhir ahi-cchavyai nirmucyeta. . . eva, sarvasmāt pāpmano nirmucyate*). In Pañcaviṃsa Brāhmaṇa 25.15.4 *etena vai sarpā apamṛtyum ajayann apamṛtyum jayanti ya etad upayanti tasmāt te hitvā jirṇām tvacam atisarpanty apa hi te mṛtyum ajayan sarpā vā ādityā ādityānām ivaiśām prakāśo bhavati ya etad upayanti* “By that sacrificial session, the serpents conquered Death; he conquers Death who follows the same course. Thereby they shook off their old skin, and crept onwards, put away Death and conquered him. The serpents are the Ādityas. He who follows the same course shall shine with the Ādityas’ glory.” In Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 2. 3.1.3 and 6 the Sun, who when he sets enters as an embryo (*garbha*) into that womb that is Agni (*agnāv eva yonau*), and is hidden by the night as embryos are hidden, now when he rises, “Even as Ahi, so does he free himself from his skin (*yathā ahis tvaco nirmucyeta*), so does he free himself from night, from evil” (*pāpmanah*, cf. Aitreya Brāhmaṇa V. 25, where the Sun is called “that Angel who has most effectively smitten evil away”); and all this is imitated in the ritual when the officiating priests “creep” (*sṛp*, with, *prati,niḥ*, etc.) to or from the *sadas*, “Even as Ahi frees himself from his skin, even so do they free themselves from all evil.” To put off the snake skin corresponds, accordingly, to “putting off the old man.”

*Sarpā vā ādityāḥ* “The Serpents are the Suns,” Pañcaviṃsa Brāhmaṇa 25.15. 4. R̥gveda 9. 86. 44 Soma “even as Ahi, creeps forward from the ancient skin” (*ahir na jirṇām ati sarpanti*), is in harmony with Pañcaviṃsa Brāhmaṇa 25. 15. 4 where the serpents “abandoning their inveterated skin (*hitvā jirṇām tvacam*) creep forward (*atisarpanti*), put away Death, and become Ādityas.” So, the idea behind the Collective Institutional Self abandoning the old bodies and acquiring the new bodies is that without that happening the manifest institution will loose the character of Deva and Asura, i.e. the institution will loose the powers of Light and acquire the powers of Darkness. Without the transformation of body politic the institution will become opposite of itself in operation. Hence, the principle of Bhagavadgītā 2.22, is not applicable as the individual principle but as collective principle of body politic.

<sup>10</sup> *indriyaśyendriyaśyārthe rāgaḍveṣau vyavasthitau / tayor na vaśam āgacchet tau hy asya paripanthinau //*

<sup>11</sup> The enormity of the error committed by mankind by dissociation of feeling from cognition under the influence of modern thought cannot be described in words. Even if I say this error is horrendous, catastrophic or holocaustic, these adjectives pale in insignificance compared to the enormity of the error. By this single error the modernity lost its capacity to think, for science does not think in the true sense of the word, making Heidegger look in vain for what calls for thinking. By this single error the modern humanity lost its capacity to speak, for science does not speak making Buber and Gadamer search for the word in dialogue, a dialogue that got drowned in the noise of technology even before it started. By this single error mankind lost its capacity to listen to the extent that it can merely see the others’ faces but cannot hear even the *ārtanāda* (the cry of distress) of any one, giving ascendancy to ocularity

which could not be undone even by the combined and successive efforts of Jewish thinkers like Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig, Christian thinkers like Theodor Haecker and Ferdinand Ebner, and the Protestants like Kierkegaard, Graf Yorck, Karl Hohl, and so on, and over against the Greek ocularity the hearing of the word has found no actual home in modern times. By this single error the mankind lost its capacity to act becoming *kimkartayva vimūḍha* (confused regarding what is doable) making Heidegger lament in 1949 “We are still far from pondering the essence of action decisively enough.” [Martin Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism’,” translated by Frank A Capuzzi, in Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, edited by William McNeill, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p.239.]

<sup>112</sup> This again is the consequence of the earlier error mentioned in fn.10 from whose consequences modern thought could never escape as it inexorably led to solipsism, subjectivism making it impossible to have an institutional arrangement free from the exercise of power by one solipsistic subjectivity over another of the same kind.

<sup>113</sup> *sarvataḥpāṇipādaṃ tat sarvatokṣiśiromukhaṃ / sarvataḥśrutimal loke sarvaṃ āvṛtya tiṣṭhati* //This verse is taken verbatim from Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 3.16. If we go by Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad this verse is an explanation and expansion of the idea of someone with all round organs brought in as answer to a query raised by *ṛṣi* Viśvakarmā Bhauvanaḥin the Ṛgveda sūkta 10.81 dedicated to devatā Viśvakarmā: *ya imā viśvā bhuvanāni juhvad ṛṣir hotā ny asīdat pitā naḥ /sa āśiṣā dravinam icchamānaḥ prathamacchad avarām ā viveṣa* //1// “He who sate down as Hotar-priest, the Rsi, our Father, offering up all things existing, he, seeking through his wish a great possession, came among men on earth as archetypal.” Then the question is raised: *kim svid āsīd adhiṣṭhānam ārambhaṇam katamat svit kathāsīt / yato bhūmiṃ janayan viśvakarmā vi dyām aurṇon mahinā viśvacakṣāḥ* //2//” What was the place whereon he took his station? What was it that supported him? How was it? Whence Viśvakarman, seeing all, producing the earth, with mighty power disclosed the heavens.” Answer is given: *viśvataścakṣur uta viśvatomukho viśvatobāhur uta viśvataspāt / sam bāhubhyām dhamati sam patatrair dyāvabhūmī janayan deva ekaḥ* //3// “He who hath eyes on all sides round about him, a mouth on all sides, arms and feet on all sides, he, the sole deity, producing earth and heaven, welds them, with his arms as wings, together.” What is called *deva ekaḥ* in this mantra is further elaborated as the *puruṣa* of the first two mantras of Puruṣa Sūkta, i.e. Ṛgveda manta 10.90.1-2, which were quoted in Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad as verses 3.14-15: *sahasraśīrṣā puruṣaḥ sahasrākṣaḥ sahasrapāt / sabhūmiṃ viśvato vṛtvātyatiṣṭhad daśāṅgulam // puruṣa evedaṃ sarvaṃ yad bhūtaṃ yacca bhavyam / utāmṛtatvasyeśāno yadammenātirohati* // “A Puruṣa with thousand head, a thousand eye, a thousand feet, on every side grasping ground by ten fingers, stays. This Puruṣa is all that yet has been and all that is to be; the Lord of what is not dead (alive) grows greater still by food.” This is a description of a corporate person, which incorporates many human persons.

The verse 13.13 of the Bhagavadgītā needs to be compared with the Sāttva Samhitā verses 1.23 and 1.25-27: *trividhena prakāreṇa paramaṃ brahma śāśvatam/ārādhayanti ye teṣāṃ rāgastiṣṭhati dūrataḥ//1.23//śāḍgunyavigrahaṃ devaṃ bhāsvajvalanatejasam/ sarvataḥ pāṇipādaṃ tat sarvato 'kṣiśiromukham//1.25//parametat samākhyātakekaṃ sarvāśryaṃ prabhum/etatpūrva trayam cānyajñānādyairbheditaṃ guṇaiḥ//1.26//viddhi tad vyūhasamjñāṃ sad niḥśreyasaphalapradaṃ/mukhyānuvṛttibhedena yuktaṃ jñānādikairguṇaiḥ/ nānākṛtiṃ ca tad viddhi vaibhavaṃ bhuktimuktidaṃ//1.27//*

The verse 13.13 of the Bhagavadgītā also needs to be compared with the Jayākhyā Samhitā verses 4.63-64 & 4.42 4.76-82: *Sarvatra kara-vāk-pādaṃ sarvato 'kṣi-śiro-*

*mukham //4.63//sarvataḥ-śrutimad viddhi sarvaṃ āvṛtya tiṣṭhati /4.64./sarvataḥ  
pāṇipādyairduktam lakṣaṇaistavayā /4.72/  
tathā samastamākṣiptam yasmādvai parmātmanā //4.76//tasmādvai sarvapāṇitvam  
sarvagasyānumīyate/nāvaccinnam hi deśena na kālenāntarīkṣtam//4.77//  
ataḥ sarvagatatvādvai sarvataḥpāt prabhūḥ smṛtaḥ/ūrdhvaṃ  
tiryagadhoyatāiryathocairbhāsayed raviḥ//4.78//tadvat prakāśarūpatvāt  
sarvacakṣustato hyajah/yathā sarveṣu gātreṣu pradhānam gīyate  
śirah//4.79//bhave 'smin prakṛtānām tu na tathā tasya sattama/samtvāt pāvanatvācca  
siddha sarvaśirah prabhūḥ//4.80//yathā 'nantarasāḥ sarve tasya santi sadaiva  
hi/sarvatra śāntarūpasya ataḥ sarvamukhaḥ smṛtaḥ//4.81//satvarāśiryato viddhi sa  
eva parameśvaraḥ/sarvataḥ śṛtimāmścāsau yathā drkśrāvakoragah//4.82//*

These mantras from the Ṛgveda, the Sāttvata Saṃhitā and the Jayākhyā Saṃhitā and the tracing of lineage of verse 13.13 of the Bhagavadgītā to these mantras shows that there is an unbroken tradition of Pañcarātra/Vaiṣṇava thinking from the Ṛgveda to the Bhagavadgītā which has successfully developed a theory of manifest institution as person which encompasses all existents including multiplicity of all human beings.

114 *sarvendriyaguṇābhāsam sarvendriyavivarjitam / asaktaṃ sarvabhṛc caiva nirguṇam  
guṇabhoktr ca //*This verse is taken with modification from Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 3.17 which says: *sarvendriyaguṇābhāsam sarvendriyavivarjitam /sarvasya  
prabhūmīśānam sarvasya śaraṇam suhṛt//* “Shining by the guṇas (strands of prakṛti) of all the senses, (yet) without the senses; the influencer, the sovereign lord of all, the shelter, the heart-felt of all.”

This verse also occurs with modification in the Sāttvata Saṃhitā 12.164: *sarvendriyaguṇābhāsam sarvendriyavivarjitam / ādhāram bhuvanānām ca  
dhyātvayastadadhah sthitaḥ //*Compare also the Jayākhyā Saṃhitā 4.64:*saguṇair  
indriyais sarvair bhāsitaṃ caiva varjitam //* What 13.14 of Bhagavadgītā is describing is the function of the institution as person to further crystallize the idea of institution as person. It is *sarvendriyaguṇābhāsam* ‘shining by the guṇas (strands of prakṛti) of all the senses’, i.e. it is shining and hence manifest with functions/workings/actions of all the senses. But it is *sarvendriyavivarjitam* ‘devoid of the senses’, i.e. the institution as person does not have any of the senses as human being as person has. How does the institution as person then manifests with functions/workings/actions of senses? Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 3.19 answers the question by saying: *apāṇipādo javano grahītā, paśyatyacakṣuḥ sa śṛṇotyakarnaḥ/ sa  
vetti vedyam na ca tasyāsti vettā, tamāhuragryaṃ puruṣam mahāntam //* “Without hands and feet fast grasper; he without eyes sees; without ears hears; he, fit to be feelingly known, feelingly knows; of him there is not feelingly knower; him they say the foremost great person.” It is because the institution as person manifests with functions/actions of senses without having corporeal senses, the institution as person is called the foremost and greatest person which surpasses all human persons. Institution in this crystallization is just an arrangement of actions of senses spread over space and time divested of the corporeality of senses, which belong to individual human beings who are members of the institution.

The problem of the verse 13.14 of Bhagavadgītā was anticipated earlier in Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad as mantra 3.3: *viśvataścaḥsurūta viśvatomukho  
viśvatobāhurūta viśvataspāt/ saṃ bābhyām dhamati sampatatreirdyāvābhūmi  
janayan deva ekaḥ //*“(Though) heaven and earth creating deva one only, (yet he is) conjoined with all eyes, conjoined with all mouths, conjoined with all hands and conjoined with all feet, by means of two hands by means of bellows, (he) fans/excites fire into flames.” This mantra in a way solves in advance the issue of how the one devaḥ who is the institutional person manifests with the functions/actions of senses

without having the corporeal senses. The problem is solved by giving or vesting the corporeal senses to human beings but vesting the functions of these senses in the one institutional person, this is how the institution as person is conjoined through functions/working with senses divesting it of corporeality of senses.

<sup>115</sup> *avyakto 'yam acintyo 'yam avikāryo 'yam ucyate / tasmād evaṃ viditvainam nānuśocitum arhasi //*

<sup>116</sup> *atha cainaṃ nityajātaṃ nityaṃ vā manyase mṛtam / tathāpi tvaṃ mahābāho nainaṃ śocitum arhasi //jātasya hi dhruvo mṛtyur dhruvaṃ janma mṛtasya ca /tasmād aparihārye 'rthe na tvaṃ śocitum arhasi //*

<sup>117</sup> *aśocyān anvaśocas tvaṃ prajñāvādāmś ca bhāṣase / gatāsūn agatāsūmś ca nānuśocanti paṇḍitāḥ //*

<sup>118</sup> *avyaktādīni bhūtāni vyaktamadhyāni bhārata / avyaktanidhanāny eva tatra kā paridevanā //*

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अम्बिका दत्त शर्मा

भारतीय दर्शन में प्रामाण्यवाद के प्रश्न पर पहले मीमांसक और बाद में नैयायिकों ने जितनी गम्भीरता से विचार किया है उतनी गहराई से इस प्रकरण पर बौद्ध परम्परा में विचार नहीं हुआ है। इसका एक कारण बौद्ध प्रमाणमीमांसीय चिन्तन पर तत्त्वमीमांसा का वह अधिभार है जिसके चलते उनकी प्रमाणमीमांसा लोकाभिमुख कम और निर्वाणोन्मुखी अधिक रही है। इसका दूसरा कारण यह भी हो सकता है कि बौद्धों ने इसे व्यवहार को इतना अधिक समर्पित प्रश्न माना कि तत्त्वमीमांसा और ज्ञानमीमांसा की अनुरूपता में इसकी व्याख्या करने की उन्हें आवश्यकता ही महसूस नहीं हुई। बौद्ध परम्परा में तर्कपुंगव दिङ्नाग, धर्मकीर्ति, धर्मोत्तर, दुर्वेक मिश्र, प्रज्ञाकर गुप्त, मोक्षाकर गुप्त, रत्नाकरशांति, रत्नकीर्ति और ज्ञानश्रीमित्र जैसे एक से बढ़कर एक प्रमाणमीमांसक हुए। इनके प्रभाव में भारतीय प्रमाणमीमांसीय चिन्तन का अभूतपूर्व विकास हुआ है। परन्तु इनके ग्रन्थों में प्रामाण्यवाद की चर्चा प्रसंगप्राप्त रूप से यत्किंचित् ही देखने को मिलती है। जबकि प्रामाण्यवाद को सुगठित रूप में प्रस्तुत करना किसी भी प्रमाणमीमांसा के लिए अपने पुरुषार्थ को प्राप्त करने जैसा होता है। शान्तरक्षित और कमलशील ही केवल इसके अपवाद कहे जा सकते हैं जिन्होंने क्रमशः 'तत्त्वसंग्रह' और 'तत्त्वसंग्रह पंजिका' में प्रामाण्यवाद के सभी विकल्पों पर बौद्ध दृष्टि से विचार किया है।<sup>1</sup> शान्तरक्षित वह पहले व्यक्ति हैं जो बौद्धेतर दर्शनों के प्रामाण्य सम्बन्धी विचारों को पूर्वपक्ष बनाकर उनका भूरिशः खण्डन करते हैं और प्रामाण्यवाद के बौद्धपक्ष को समीक्षित रूप से उद्घाटित भी करते हैं। यहाँ यह भी द्रष्टव्य है कि दिङ्नाग से कमलशील पर्यन्त बौद्ध प्रामाण्यवाद के विकास की लम्बी यात्रा में उसका स्वरूप एकरेखीय नहीं रहा है। जबकि मीमांसक और नैयायिक अपने-अपने स्वतः प्रामाण्यवाद और परतः प्रामाण्यवाद की दृढ़ धारणा से कभी विचलित होते दिखाई नहीं पड़ते। वस्तुतः बौद्ध नैयायिकों के



समक्ष एक ओर ज्ञान की आदर्शभूत स्थिति बुद्ध की सर्वज्ञता थी तो दूसरी ओर साधारण व्यक्तियों को होने वाला नील-पीत का ज्ञान सांव्यावहारिक ज्ञान का प्रतिदर्श था। इन दोनों प्रकार के ज्ञान को एक स्तर का ज्ञान नहीं कहा जा सकता। इसलिए बौद्ध नैयायिकों ने प्रारम्भ से ही प्रामाण्यवाद के विमर्श को परमार्थ और संवृत्ति के द्वितलीय धरातल पर सुगठित करने का प्रयास किया है। बुद्ध सर्वज्ञ हैं और परमार्थ सत्य को सम्यक् रूप से जानने वाले हैं। इतना ही नहीं, वे परमार्थ सत्य और संवृत्ति सत्य के भेद को भी जानते हैं। इसीलिए उन्हें सम्यक् सम्बुद्ध कहा जाता है। अतः उनके ज्ञान की स्वतः प्रामाणिकता स्वाभाविक ही है।<sup>2</sup> यह बात ठीक वैसी ही है जैसे मीमांसक वेदों की अपौरुषेयता की रक्षा हेतु स्वतः प्रामाण्यवाद का प्रतिपादन करते हैं परन्तु इससे आगे घटपटादि लौकिक ज्ञानों के प्रामाण्य का स्वतस्त्व सिद्ध करने के लिए हठ करते हुए दिखाई पड़ते हैं। बौद्ध ऐसा नहीं करते। उनके अनुसार बुद्ध सर्वज्ञ होने से प्रमाणभूत हैं। अतः उनके ज्ञान का स्वतः प्रामाण्य होना औत्सर्गिक है। परन्तु साधारण व्यक्तियों को होने वाला नील-पीत का सांव्यावहारिक ज्ञान प्रथम दृष्ट्या परतः प्रामाण्य ही होता है। यह बात अलग है कि सांवृत्तिक धरातल पर होने वाले सभी ज्ञानों की प्रस्थिति एक जैसी नहीं होती। अतः सांव्यावहारिक क्षेत्र के कुछ ज्ञानों का प्रामाण्य स्वतः और शेष का परतः भी स्वीकार किया जा सकता है। वस्तुतः यह यथोपलब्धिन्याय से निकला हुआ सौगत प्रामाण्य चिन्तन का 'अनियमवाद' है जिस पर शान्तरक्षित और कमलशील सबसे अधिक बल देते हैं।<sup>3</sup>

बौद्ध प्रमाणमीमांसा में साधारण व्यक्तियों को होने वाला वह ज्ञान जिससे व्यवहार का सम्पादन होता है वह नाम, द्रव्य, जाति गुण और क्रिया नामक पंचविध कल्पनाओं से युक्त हुआ करता है। इसीलिए ऐसे सभी ज्ञानों को सांवृत्तिक कहा जाता है। बौद्ध प्रमाणमीमांसा में प्रामाण्य और अप्रामाण्य की चर्चा इन्हीं सांवृत्तिक ज्ञानों के संदर्भ में की गई है। सांवृत्तिक ज्ञानों का प्रामाण्य परतः होता है, इसका सर्वप्रथम प्रतिपादन धर्मकीर्ति ने किया है। प्रमाणवार्तिक में बौद्ध सम्मत प्रमाणलक्षण की

प्रस्तावना करते हुए ही वे इसका संकेत कर देते हैं कि 'स्वरूपस्य स्वतोगतिः, प्रामाण्यं व्यवहारेण'।<sup>4</sup> धर्मकीर्ति का यह अभिकथन एक प्रकार से बौद्ध प्रामाण्यवाद का प्रस्थानभेदी वक्तव्य है। इसका तात्पर्य यह है कि सभी ज्ञानों का अपने स्वरूप की अवगति स्वतः होती है, अर्थात् ऐसा कोई ज्ञान ही नहीं जो अपने स्वरूप के स्वसंवेदन से वियुक्त रहता हो। ज्ञान होना और इस बात से अनभिज्ञ रहना वदतोव्याघात है। परन्तु अपने स्वरूप की अवगति के साथ उत्पन्न हुए ज्ञान के प्रामाण्य का निर्धारण व्यवहार से अर्थात् अर्थक्रिया की सिद्धि से परतः होता है। इसीलिए धर्मकीर्ति ने प्रमाण को अविशंवादी ज्ञान के रूप में परिभाषित किया है और अविशंवाद शब्द की निरुक्ति 'अर्थक्रियास्थिति' की है।<sup>5</sup> धर्मकीर्ति के मंतव्य को स्पष्ट करते हुए कहा जा सकता है कि यद्यपि प्रत्येक ज्ञान को अपने स्वरूप का स्वसंवेदन होता है तथापि ज्ञान के स्वरूप का स्वतः अवगत होना उसके प्रामाण्य का समानुपाति नहीं कहा जा सकता। यदि दोनों एक दूसरे के समानुपाति होते तो एक ओर प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्य की जिज्ञासा नहीं होती और दूसरी ओर यथार्थ एवं अयथार्थ ज्ञान में अन्तर किया जाना सम्भव नहीं होता। ऐसा इसलिए कि जिस तरह यथार्थ ज्ञान की स्वरूप में अवगति स्वतः होती है उसी तरह भ्रमात्मक ज्ञानों की स्वरूपावगति भी स्वतः ही होती है। अतः धर्मकीर्ति के उपर्युक्त कथन का निहितार्थ यह है कि प्रत्येक ज्ञान अपने स्वरूप को 'मैं ज्ञान हूँ' यह द्योतित करते हुए तो उत्पन्न होता है लेकिन 'मैं प्रमा हूँ' इस प्रमाणपत्र के साथ उत्पन्न नहीं होता। ज्ञान का प्रमात्व या प्रामाण्य एक उत्तरभावी स्थिति है जो पूर्व ज्ञान के द्वारा प्रदर्शित वस्तु की प्राप्ति (अर्थक्रियास्थिति) से निर्धारित होता है।<sup>6</sup>

यहाँ धर्मकीर्ति द्वारा प्रतिपादित प्रामाण्य के परतस्त्व को ठीक से समझाने के लिए न्यायसम्मत परतः प्रामाण्य के अवधारण से उसके अन्तर को समझना जरूरी है। उपर से देखने पर ये दोनों एक दूसरे से मिलते-जुलते प्रतीत होते हैं। नैयायिकों के लिए प्रामाण्य का निकष प्रवृत्तिसाफल्य है तो धर्मकीर्ति के लिए अर्थक्रिया का निष्पादन। ये दोनों कसौटियाँ ऐसी हैं कि प्रामाण्य की विवक्षा ज्ञानवृत्तिक न होकर

क्रियावृत्तिक हो जाती है। परन्तु परतः प्रामाण्य के इन दो संस्करणों में सूक्ष्म अन्तर भी है और उस अन्तर की अनदेखी नहीं की जा सकती। वह यह कि नैयायिक प्रामाण्य की ज्ञप्ति और निर्धारण दोनों को परतः मानते हैं जबकि धर्मकीर्ति का मानना है कि प्रामाण्य की ज्ञप्ति तो स्वतः होती है परन्तु उसका निर्धारण परतः होता है। इस सूक्ष्म अन्तर से परतः प्रामाण्यवाद की व्याख्या और सौष्टव पर निर्णायक प्रभाव पड़ता है। इस निर्णायक प्रभाव को इस संदर्भ में समझ पाना सुकर होगा कि परतः प्रामाण्य के इन दो संस्करणों पर किस तरह अनवस्था दोष की प्रसक्ति दिखाई जाती है और उसका किस तरह परिहार किया जाता है। न्यायमत में एक ज्ञान का ज्ञान अनुव्यवसाय रूपी मानस प्रत्यक्ष नामक दूसरे ज्ञान से होता है और दूसरे ज्ञान के ज्ञान के लिए तीसरे अनुव्यवसाय रूपी मानस प्रत्यक्ष की अपेक्षा है। इस अपेक्षा का अन्तहीन होना ही मूलोच्छेदक अनवस्था है। यही अनवस्था प्रामाण्य की परतः ज्ञप्ति को लेकर उत्थापित होती है, क्योंकि प्रामाण्य का ग्रहण भी तो एक ज्ञानस्थिति ही है और उसके ज्ञान के लिए ज्ञानान्तरों की आवर्तीय अपेक्षा अनवस्था को सैद्धान्तिक रूप से दुर्निवार बना देती है। इसके उत्तर में नैयायिक यह नहीं कह सकते कि प्रवृत्तिसाफल्य के पश्चात् प्रेक्षावान व्यक्ति की निवृत्ति हो जाती है, अतः यह प्रक्रिया इसी बिन्दु पर विरमित हो जाती है। यह उत्तर प्रामाण्य के भी परतः प्रामाण्य की दृष्टि से सर्वथा उचित है लेकिन जिस प्रवृत्तिसाफल्य से पूर्ववर्ती ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य निश्चित और ज्ञापित होता है उस प्रवृत्तिसाफल्य-ज्ञान के ज्ञान की दृष्टि से यह समाधान कथमपि संतोषजनक नहीं है। यहाँ अनवस्था का प्रसंग प्रामाण्य के भी परतः प्रामाण्य की अपेक्षा से नहीं है बल्कि प्रामाण्य-ज्ञान की परतः ज्ञप्ति की अपेक्षा से है। यह सही है कि पूर्ववर्ती ज्ञान का प्रामात्व या प्रामाण्य उत्तरवर्ती प्रवृत्तिसाफल्य से सिद्ध हो जाता है और प्रामाण्य की जिज्ञासा इसी के साथ विरमित भी हो जाती है लेकिन प्रवृत्तिसाफल्य भी तो एक ज्ञानस्थिति ही है और उसके परतः ज्ञापित अथवा प्रकाशित होने की अपेक्षा यहाँ भी बनी ही रहती है। अतः नैयायिकों के परतः प्रामाण्यवाद में अनवस्था की प्रसक्ति ज्ञानमीमांसीय दृष्टि से दुर्निवार है। उनके पास एक ही विकल्प शेष बचता है कि वे

मानें कि सभी ज्ञानों का ज्ञात होना अपरिहार्य नहीं है। इस तरह प्रवृत्तिसाफल्य की ज्ञानस्थिति अज्ञात रहकर भी पूर्व ज्ञान की प्रामाणिकता को सिद्ध कर सकती है। परन्तु ऐसे निश्चेष्ट प्रामाण्यग्रह को आत्मचेतन मनुष्य का प्रामाण्यबोध नहीं कहा जा सकता।

अब धर्मकीर्ति के द्वारा परतः प्रामाण्यवाद की जैसी व्याख्या की गई है उसमें नैयायिकों के परतः प्रामाण्य की तरह 'प्रामाण्य-ज्ञान' की परतः ज्ञप्ति को लेकर अनवस्था नहीं दिखाई जा सकती, क्योंकि जैसे पूर्ववर्ती ज्ञान को स्वरूप की स्वसंवित्ति होती है उसी प्रकार पूर्ववर्ती ज्ञान को प्रामाणित करने वाले उत्तरवर्ती ज्ञान अर्थात् 'अर्थक्रियास्थिति-ज्ञान' का भी स्वसंवेदन होता है। परन्तु कुछ एक प्रतिपक्षियों ने धर्मकीर्ति की व्याख्या पर बेवजह अनवस्था को दूसरे तरीके से आरोपित करने का प्रयास किया है। वह ऐसे कि यदि पूर्ववर्ती ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य उत्तरभावी अर्थक्रियास्थिति से निर्धारित होता है तो अर्थक्रिया स्थिति के प्रामाण्य का निर्धारण भी किसी अवान्तर अर्थक्रियास्थिति से होनी चाहिए। यह भी एक आवर्तीय प्रक्रिया होने से अनवस्थाकारक ही होगा। बौद्ध पक्ष से इसका स्पष्टीकरण देते हुए कहा जा सकता है कि ज्ञान में हमारी प्रवृत्ति किसी प्रयोजन को लेकर होती है। 'यह जल है' इस ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य हम इसलिए जानना चाहते हैं कि इसका सीधा सम्बन्ध हमारी स्नान-पान की इच्छा पूर्ति से है। अतः जल ज्ञान के पश्चात् हम तत्सम्बन्धी प्रवृत्ति की ओर अग्रसर होते हैं। उस ज्ञान के फलस्वरूप हमारा प्रयोजन पूर्ण हो जाता है तो वह ज्ञान प्रामाण्य रूप माना जाता है तथा इससे आगे जाने की न तो हमें प्रवृत्ति ही होती है और न इससे आगे जाने की आवश्यकता ही है। माना कि प्यास बुझाने के लिए हम जलज्ञान से प्रवृत्त हुए थे और जब जल पी कर हमारी तृषा शांत हो गई तो इस अर्थक्रिया निष्पत्ति के साथ ही प्रामाण्य की विवक्षा भी विरमित हो जाती है। अतः अनवस्था के लिए कहाँ अवकाश है।<sup>7</sup> इस प्रसंग में प्रज्ञाकर गुप्त<sup>8</sup> की अभ्युक्ति यह है कि जहाँ प्रथम ज्ञान में केवल अग्नि का भान, द्वितीय ज्ञान में दाहादि-रूप अर्थक्रिया और तृतीयादि ज्ञानों में उत्तरोत्तर अर्थक्रिया का भान होता है वहाँ अवश्य ही

पूर्व-पूर्व ज्ञान को उत्तरोत्तर ज्ञान की अपेक्षा होने से अनवस्था प्रसक्त होती है, किन्तु उपर्युक्त प्रसंग में ऐसा नहीं है। जिस द्वितीय अर्थक्रियास्थिति-ज्ञान से पूर्ववर्ती ज्ञान के प्रामाण्य का अधिगम होता है वह द्वितीय ज्ञान स्वतः ही प्रमाण होता है (तत् सुतरामेव प्रमाणम्) क्योंकि उस एक ही ज्ञान में विषय और उसकी अर्थक्रिया दोनों का अधिगम होता है। अतः अनवस्था का प्रश्न ही नहीं उठता। शान्तरक्षित भी यह प्रश्न उठाकर कि प्रथम ज्ञान की अपेक्षा द्वितीय ज्ञान में कौन सी विशिष्टता होती है कि पहले का परतः प्रामाण्य और दूसरे को स्वतः प्रामाण्य माना जाता है, कुछ इसी प्रकार की अभ्युक्ति प्रस्तुत करते हैं। संक्षेप में शान्तरक्षित और कमलशील दोनों का आशय यह है कि प्रथम ज्ञान में केवल वस्तुस्थिति की ज्ञापकता होती है, प्रापकता नहीं। इसीलिए वह ज्ञान न तो मनुष्य को उस स्थान पर ले जाता है, जहाँ पर वह विषय है और न ही विषय को ही ज्ञाता के पास उठाकर ले आता है। परन्तु द्वितीय ज्ञान अर्थात् अर्थक्रियास्थिति का अतिशय यह है कि वह ज्ञापकता और प्रापकता दोनों का आश्रय होता है। इसलिए प्रथम ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य परतः होता है और द्वितीय का स्वतः<sup>9</sup> शान्तरक्षित और कमलशील<sup>10</sup> ने अन्य तरीके से भी अनवस्था का परिहार दिखाया है। वस्तुतः ज्ञान को दो प्रकारों में विभाजित किया जा सकता है— सन्निकृष्ट विषय वाला और असन्निकृष्ट विषय वाला। इसमें पहले प्रकार के ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य—निश्चय ज्ञान के कारणों के गुणावधारण से नहीं अपितु अर्थक्रिया के अविस्वादी ज्ञान के द्वारा होता है। जब तक अर्थक्रिया संवाद के द्वारा ज्ञान में सम्यकत्व का निश्चय नहीं हो जाता तब तक उसमें गुण का अवधारण सम्भव नहीं और जब सम्यकत्व ज्ञान में अवस्थित हो तो उत्तरवर्ती अर्थक्रिया संवाद के द्वारा पुनः उसमें गुण का अवधारण अकिञ्चित्कर ही है। जहाँ ज्ञान विप्रकृष्ट विषय वाला होता है, जैसे सुवर्णशंखग्राही ज्ञान, तो उसके प्रामाण्य का निश्चय विशुद्ध कारणजन्यता के आधार पर हो जाता है। जो ज्ञान विशुद्ध कारणजनित होता है वह प्रमाण होता है— यद्विशुद्धकारणजनितं तत् प्रमाणम्।

उपर्युक्त समीक्षा के आधार पर न्यायसम्मत परतः प्रामाण्यवाद और धर्मकीर्ति के परतः प्रामाण्यवाद के बीच के अन्तर का उपसंहार करते हुए कहा जा सकता है कि इन दोनों व्याख्याओं में 'द्वितीय ज्ञान' की प्रस्थिति सर्वाधिक महत्वपूर्ण और विवादास्पद है जिससे प्रथम ज्ञान के प्रामाण्य का परतः अधिगम होता है। नैयायिक अपनी सम्पूर्ण प्रमाणमीमांसीय निष्ठा के साथ इस द्वितीय ज्ञान (प्रवृत्तिसाफल्य) की प्रस्थिति के विषय में यही कहना चाहेंगे और उन्हें यही कहना भी चाहिए कि उसके लिए प्रामाण्य जिज्ञासितव्य नहीं है। उसकी प्रस्थिति का विचार स्वतः प्रामाण्य और परतः प्रामाण्य की कोटि में नहीं किया जाना चाहिए। यह प्रमाणमीमांसीय जिज्ञासा की उपरति की स्थिति है। परन्तु धर्मकीर्ति और उनके व्याख्याकारों के मत में वह द्वितीय ज्ञान (अर्थक्रियास्थिति) स्वतः प्रामाण्य है। उसका परतः प्रामाण्य जिज्ञास्य नहीं, क्योंकि उसमें ज्ञान की ज्ञापकता और प्रापकता की एकनिष्ठता होती है। जहाँ ज्ञान की ज्ञापकता और प्रापकता में दूरी और अन्तराल रहता है वहीं प्रामाण्य की विवक्षा होती है और यह विवक्षा परतः रूप से ही पूर्ण हो सकती है।

इस प्रकार प्रामाण्यवाद के विषय में धर्मकीर्ति का मत इस रूप में स्थिर होता है कि व्यवहार दशा में वह ज्ञान जिसके प्रामाण्य की जिज्ञासा प्रेक्षावान व्यक्ति के द्वारा की जाती है, उसके प्रामाण्य की सिद्धि परतः ही होती है और वह ज्ञान जिसके द्वारा पूर्ववर्ती ज्ञान के प्रामाण्य को सिद्ध किया जाता है वह स्वतः प्रामाण्य होता है। परन्तु इस निष्कर्ष से जो एक दूसरी बात सामने आती है वह यह कि सांख्यावहारिक क्षेत्र के सभी ज्ञानों को प्रामाण्य की दृष्टि से एक कोटि का नहीं कहा जा सकता। उनके प्रामाण्य का निश्चय किसी एक सिद्धान्त (स्वतः अथवा परतः) का आश्रय लेकर सम्भव नहीं। अतः इस बात की खोज की जानी चाहिए कि व्यवहार दशा में वे कौन-कौन सी परिस्थितियाँ हैं जिसमें ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य स्वतः और कौन-कौन सी परिस्थितियों में ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य परतः निश्चित होता है। इससे प्रामाण्यवाद की समस्या पर विचार करने का एक नया ही आयाम उद्घाटित हो सकता है, जहाँ हम

एकल सैद्धान्तिक निष्ठा से मुक्त होकर यथोपलब्धिन्याय का अनुसरण करते हुए प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्य की समस्या पर पुनर्विचार कर सकते हैं।

बौद्ध और जैन परम्परा के उत्तरकालीन प्रमाणमीमांसीय चिन्तन में प्रामाण्य की समस्या पर इसी दृष्टि से विचार करने की प्रवृत्ति दिखाई पड़ती है। इसलिए दिङ्नाग और धर्मकीर्ति के पश्चात् अधिकांश टीकाकारों ने धर्मकीर्ति का अनुसरण करते हुए भी अपनी रचनाओं में उन परिस्थितियों और ज्ञान के उन प्रकारों को यत्र-तत्र संकेतित किया है जिनमें कुछ ज्ञानों का प्रामाण्य स्वतः और कुछ का परतः अधिगत होता है।<sup>11</sup> देवेन्द्रबुद्धि ने अर्थक्रियाज्ञान और अनुमान को स्वतः प्रमाण माना है जबकि वैसे प्रत्यक्ष के प्रामाण्य को परतः कहा है जिसमें भ्रान्ति के निमित्तों का अपनोदन नहीं हुआ रहता है। शाक्यबुद्धि ने अर्थक्रियासमर्थ वस्तु के वैसे प्रत्यक्ष को जहाँ संशय और भ्रान्ति के लिए अवकाश न हो तथा अनुमिति और अर्थक्रियास्थिति – ज्ञान के स्वतः प्रामाण्य होने का संकेत किया है। साथ ही साथ प्रवर्तक मात्र प्रत्यक्ष के प्रामाण्य को परतः माना है जिसमें भ्रान्ति के तथाकथित कारणों का निश्चय नहीं हुआ हो। इसी तरह धर्मोत्तर ने अर्थक्रियानिर्भासी प्रत्यक्ष, अभ्यासदशापन्न प्रत्यक्ष और अनुमान के प्रामाण्य को स्वतः माना है जबकि परतः प्रामाण्य के अन्तर्गत उन्होंने चार प्रकार के प्रत्यक्षों को परिगणित किया है। प्रथम, वह प्रत्यक्ष जिसमें ज्ञान का अर्थ से अविनाभाव संशययुक्त हो (अर्थाविनाभाव संशयः)। द्वितीय, वैसा प्रत्यक्ष जिसमें प्रतिभासमान अर्थ संशयास्पद हो। तृतीय, ऐसा प्रत्यक्ष जिसमें सामान्य धर्म तो स्पष्ट रूप से विदित होता है लेकिन विशेष धर्मों का ज्ञान विविक्त रूप से प्रतिभासित नहीं होता है। ऐसी स्थिति में सामान्य धर्म (धर्मज्ञान) का ज्ञान तो स्वतः प्रामाण्य लेकिन विशेष धर्मों (धर्मज्ञान) के ज्ञान का परतः प्रामाण्य होता है। चतुर्थ, ऐसे प्रत्यक्षों का प्रामाण्य भी परतः अधिगत होता है जहाँ स्वयं प्रत्यक्ष के स्वरूप को लेकर अनिश्चय की स्थिति रहती है। मनोरथनन्दी<sup>12</sup> ने अर्थक्रियानिर्भासात्मक प्रत्यक्ष और अनुमिति के प्रामाण्य को स्वतः माना है। साथ ही साथ कुछ ऐसे भी प्रत्यक्ष होते हैं जिनके प्रामाण्य निश्चय के लिए अर्थक्रियासमर्थ वस्तु की

प्राप्ति की अपेक्षा नहीं होती बल्कि अभ्यास की दृढ़ता (असकृद् व्यवहाराभ्यासाद्) के कारण उनमें अर्थक्रियासमर्थ वस्तु की प्रापणयोग्यता स्वतः प्रमाणित रहती है। इसके अतिरिक्त अनभ्यासदशापन्न प्रत्यक्षों का प्रामाण्य सन्दिग्ध होने से उनके प्रामाण्य का निश्चय उत्तरकालीन अर्थक्रियाज्ञान से अथवा अनुमान से होता है। दुर्वेकमिश्र<sup>13</sup> भी प्रापणशक्ति को ही ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य मानते हैं। वह प्रापणशक्ति प्राप्त होने वाले अर्थ के कारण आत्मलाभ का निमित्त होती है क्योंकि जिसके द्वारा प्रवर्तन होता है वह भी प्रापणयोग्य ही है। अर्थक्रिया को निर्भासित करने वाले सभी अनुमानों में इस प्रापणशक्ति रूप प्रामाण्य का निश्चय स्वतः हो जाता है। प्रवर्तक प्रत्यक्ष में जहाँ अभ्यास के चलते विभ्रम की आशंका चारों तरफ से समाप्त हुई रहती है वहाँ भी प्रापणशक्ति का निश्चय स्वतः ही होता है। साथ ही साथ निद्रा से अनुपप्लुत पास वाले स्थान में रहने वाली वस्तु का ग्रहण, जिसमें किसी अन्य व्यंजक के कारण किसी अन्य प्रकार की अभिव्यक्ति की आशंका न हो, भी स्वतः हो जाता है। उसके स्वरूप की संवेदना से ही उसके वास्तविक अर्थ का निश्चय हो जाता है। ऐसे ही कहीं पर प्रापणशक्ति का निश्चय परतः भी होता है। परतः का अर्थ है अर्थक्रियानिर्भासात्मक स्वतः प्रमाण से अन्य किसी स्रोत से, जैसे कि दूरस्थ किसी अर्थ को देखने से बीच के काल में होने वाली शंका को हटाकर होने वाला निश्चय।

यहाँ उल्लेखनीय है कि सन्दर्भ विशेष में प्रामाण्य के स्वतस्त्व और परतस्त्व का प्रश्न न्याय परम्परा में भी उठता रहा है, जबकि नैयायिक उभयतो परतःवाद (प्रामाण्य और अप्रामाण्य दोनों का परतः निश्चय) की एकलनिष्ठा के अभिमानी माने जाते हैं। अनुव्यवसाय, अनुमिति, फलज्ञान और अभ्यासदशापन्न ज्ञान ऐसे ज्ञान होते हैं जिनमें मध्यवर्ती संशय के लिए कोई अवकाश नहीं रहता। इसलिए न्यायमत में ऐसे ज्ञानों का स्वतः प्रामाण्य माना जाता है। यद्यपि बहुसंख्यक नैयायिक इसे स्वीकार नहीं करते हैं फिर भी प्रकृत प्रसंग में इतना कहना ही पर्याप्त है कि न्याय परम्परा में भी इस प्रश्न को उठाया गया है। यह बात अलग है कि बाद में जयन्त भट्ट, उदयन और गंगेशोपाध्याय ने इसकी भर्त्सना



करते हुए भुरिशः खण्डन किया है। जैन परम्परा में भी उत्पत्ति और ज्ञाप्ति की दृष्टि से प्रामाण्य के परतस्त्व और स्वतस्त्व को लेकर कितना भी उहापोह क्यों न किया गया हो लेकिन बौद्ध प्रभाव में अन्ततः उनका झुकाव प्रामाण्य के प्रति क्वचित् स्वतः और क्वचित् परतः का ही रहा है। परीक्षामुख का सूत्र ही है— तत्प्रामाण्यं स्वतः परतश्चेति। प्रभाचन्द्र<sup>14</sup> ने इसकी व्याख्या करते हुए “प्रामाण्यमुत्पत्तौ परतः एव। ज्ञप्तौ स्वकार्ये च स्वतः परतश्च अभ्यासानभ्यासापेक्षया” कहा है, प्रामाणनयतत्त्वालोक में भी “तदयमुत्पत्तौ परतः एवं ज्ञप्तौ तु स्वतः परतश्चेति” कहा गया है। जैन प्रमाणमीमांसा का सर्वाधिक व्यवस्थित और समीक्षित रूप हेमचन्द्र की ‘प्रमाणमीमांसा’ नामक ग्रन्थ में मिलता है। इस ग्रन्थ में प्रामाण्यवाद के जैन पक्ष को रखते हुए किसी एक सिद्धान्त का अनुसरण नहीं किया गया है बल्कि बलाघात इस बात को दिखाने में है कि प्रामाण्य का निश्चय कुछ स्थलों पर स्वतः और कुछ स्थलों पर परतः होता है।<sup>15</sup> उदाहरण के लिए अभ्यासदशापन्न स्वकरतल आदि के ज्ञान में अथवा स्नान-पान, अवगाहन और पीपासा शान्ति आदि में तथा अर्थक्रियानिर्भासक प्रत्यक्ष में प्रामाण्य का निश्चय स्वतः ही होता है। ऐसे स्थलों में प्रेक्षावानों को परीक्षा करने की आकांक्षा नहीं होती। प्रथमतया जल का ज्ञान होता है, उसके बाद गर्मी अथवा प्यास से पीड़ित व्यक्ति की उसमें प्रवृत्ति होती है। तदुपरांत जल की प्राप्ति और स्नान-पान आदि के बाद गर्मी से राहत और पीपासा की शान्ति। इतने से ही प्रेक्षावान प्रमाता कृतकृत्य हो जाता है। यह नहीं कि वह दाह और पीपासा शान्ति के अनुभव की परीक्षा करता है। अतः ऐसे सभी ज्ञानों के प्रामाण्य को स्वतः मानने में कोई कठिनाई नहीं। पुनः उस प्रकार की अनुमिति जिसमें व्यभिचार शंका का सर्वथा निरास हो चुका है, उसके प्रामाण्य का निश्चय भी स्वतः ही होता है। अव्यभिचारी लिंग से उत्पन्न अनुमिति का आकार लिंगाकार होता है और लिंगाकार ज्ञान लिंग के बिना तथा लिंग लिंगी के बिना नहीं हो सकता। वैसे ही अनभ्यासदशापन्न प्रत्यक्ष में चूँकि अर्थ के साथ उसका अव्यभिचार गृहीत नहीं रहता, अतः उसका समान विषय वाले संवादक ज्ञान से, दूसरे ज्ञान से अथवा अर्थक्रियाज्ञान से, या फिर अविनाभाव के दर्शन से परतः ही

निश्चित होता है। परन्तु अभ्यासदशापन्न ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य निश्चय, सुतरां स्वतः ही गृहीत हो जाता है। जहाँ तक शब्द प्रमाण का प्रश्न है तो दृष्ट अर्थ से उसके अव्यभिचार का ज्ञान दुष्कर होने से संवाद इत्यादि के अधीन ही उसके प्रामाण्य का निश्चय माना जा सकता है। परन्तु अदृष्ट विषयों के सन्दर्भ में दृष्टार्थ चन्द्रग्रहण आदि के प्रतिपादक ज्ञानों के संवाद से प्रामाण्य निश्चित हो जाने पर आप्तवचन रूप शब्द का प्रामाण्य बिना संवाद के ही सुनिश्चित हो जाता है।

शान्तरक्षित और कमलशील ने इस समस्या पर अपेक्षाकृत अधिक गम्भीरता से विचार किया है। इनकी विशिष्टता यह है कि बौद्ध, जैन, और न्याय परम्परा के अन्य विद्वानों ने जहाँ केवल प्रामाण्य को लेकर ही उसके कस्यचित् स्वतः और कस्यचित् परतः होने का संकेत किया है वहीं कमलशील प्रामाण्य और अप्रामाण्य दोनों के स्वतस्त्व एवं परतस्त्व का विचार संदर्भसंवेदी रूप से करते हैं। इन्होंने प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्य के स्वतस्त्व और परतस्त्व को जिस तरह सूचीबद्ध किया है वह भी अन्यों की अपेक्षा अधिक व्यापक है। कमलशील<sup>16</sup> ने स्वसंवेदन प्रत्यक्ष, योगिज्ञान, अभ्यासवत् प्रत्यक्ष और अनुमान को स्वतः प्रामाण्य माना है जबकि चोदनाजन्य और भ्रान्ति के निमित्तों से अनुपगत प्रत्यक्ष के प्रामाण्य को परतः बताया है। पुनः अभ्यासवत् प्रत्यक्ष की भूमिका को वे अन्यों की तरह केवल प्रामाण्य के स्वतः निश्चय तक सीमित नहीं करते बल्कि उसका विस्तार मिथ्याज्ञान पर्यन्त करते हैं। जैसे अभ्यासबल से कुछ ज्ञानों का प्रामाण्य स्वतः गृहीत होता है उसी प्रकार अभ्यासबल से कतिपय मिथ्याज्ञानों का अप्रामाण्य भी स्वतः निश्चित हो जाता है।<sup>17</sup>

इस प्रकार देवेन्द्रबुद्धि से कमलशील पर्यन्त उपर्युक्त सर्वेक्षण के आधार पर कहा जा सकता है कि धर्मकीर्ति के बाद और धर्मकीर्ति की व्याख्या करते हुए भी बौद्ध परम्परा के अन्दर ही अन्दर प्रामाण्य के प्रश्न को लेकर एक भिन्न प्रवृत्ति विकसित हो रही थी। इस प्रवृत्ति को उस एकल सैद्धान्तिक निष्ठा का विरोधी कहा जा सकता है जिसके तहत हम यह मान लेते हैं कि प्रामाण्य और अप्रामाण्य दोनों की व्याख्या या

तो स्वतः या फिर परतः रूप से ही की जा सकती है। वस्तुतः यह विरोध संकलित और संगठित होकर प्रामाण्यवाद पर एक नये शिरे से विचार करने की भूमि तैयार करता है। शान्तिरक्षित और कमलशील ने इस विचार-भूमि को पहचाना और उसे सकल प्रामाण्यव्यापिनी बनाकर एक वैकल्पिक सिद्धान्त के रूप में प्रतिष्ठापित किया है। कमलशील इसे प्रामाण्यवाद की अनियमवादी बौद्ध दृष्टि कहते हैं। यह बौद्ध दर्शन के विभिन्न सम्प्रदायों की तत्त्वमीमांसा और ज्ञानमीमांसा से कहाँ तक संगत है, यह निश्चित ही एक विचारणीय प्रश्न है, फिर भी शान्तिरक्षित और कमलशील ने इसे भारतीय प्रामाण्यवाद के चतुर्विध पक्षों की समीक्षा का फलितार्थ कहा है। इन दोनों आचार्यों ने तत्त्वसंग्रह और तत्त्वसंग्रहपंजिका में इसकी प्रतिष्ठापना एक व्यापक ऐतिहासिक पृष्ठभूमि में की है। अवधेय हो कि मीमांसक भी प्रामाण्यवाद की समीक्षा उसके चतुर्विध विकल्पों की अवधारणात्मक योजना में करते हैं। उन्होंने तीन विकल्पों का खण्डन करके चतुर्थ विकल्प (प्रामाण्य स्वतः और अप्रामाण्य परतः) को अपना सिद्धान्त पक्ष बनाया है। अब शान्तिरक्षित और कमलशील प्रामाण्यवाद के चारों विकल्पों की समीक्षा करते हैं (ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि इन दोनों आचार्यों ने विशेष रूप से मीमांसा सम्मत स्वतः प्रामाण्यवाद का ही खण्डन किया है और शेष तीन पक्षों का मीमांसकों द्वारा खण्डन किये जाने से ही खण्डित मान लिया है) और पंचम विकल्प के रूप में अनियमवाद का प्रस्ताव करते हैं।<sup>18</sup> इस अनियमवाद को यदि दूसरे शब्दों में कहा जाय तो इसे 'सन्दर्भसंवेदी प्रामाण्यवाद' से अभिहित करना अधिक उचित होगा। देवेन्द्रबुद्धि से कमलशील पर्यन्त बौद्ध प्रमाणमीमांसकों ने जिन-जिन ज्ञान-स्थलों को उदाहरित कर प्रामाण्य-निश्चय के प्रति नियमवादी दृष्टि का विरोध किया है, उससे वास्तव में अनियमवाद फलित नहीं होता बल्कि प्रामाण्य-निश्चय का सन्दर्भ-संवेदी विचार उद्घाटित होता है। अतः प्रामाण्य और अप्रामाण्य के सन्दर्भ-संवेदी निर्धारण को ही प्रामाण्यवाद के प्रति बौद्ध प्रमाणमीमांसकों का विशिष्ट योगदान कहा जा सकता है।

## सन्दर्भ एवं पाद टिप्पणी –

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2. दिङ्नाग ने प्रमाणसमुच्चय में बुद्ध को 'प्रमाणभूताय' कह कर स्तोत्राभिधान किया है—प्रमाणभूताय जगद्धितैषिणे प्रणम्य शास्त्रे सुगताय तायिने। अतः बुद्ध को 'प्रमाणभूत' कहने का आशय यही है कि उनके ज्ञान में प्रामाण्य उत्सर्गतः अर्थात् स्वाभाविक रूप से स्वतः ही रहता है।
3. तत्त्वसंग्रह (पंजिका), न हि बौद्धैरेषां चतुर्णामेकतोऽपिपक्षोऽभीष्टः, अनियमपक्षस्येष्टत्वात्। तत्त्वसंग्रह, सम्पादक, स्वामी द्वारिकादास शास्त्री, बौद्ध भारती प्रकाशन, पृ.— 981, वाराणसी, 1968।
4. प्रमाणवार्तिक, प्रमाणसिद्धिः, 6 एवं 7वीं कारिका का अर्द्धांश।
5. वही, 3, प्रमाणमविसंवादी ज्ञानम्, अर्थक्रियास्थितिः।
6. प्रमाणवार्तिकालंकारभाष्य, न खलु ज्ञानस्वरूपमात्रावगताविदं प्रमाणमितिभवति। किन्तर्हि, अर्थस्य दाहपाकादेः क्रियानिष्पत्तिस्तस्याः स्थितिरविचलनमविसंवादनं व्यवस्था वा। सा च अर्थक्रिया भविनी न तत्काले। ततस्तत्सम्बन्धो न स्वरूपसंवेदनमात्रावधूतः। स्वामी योगीन्द्रानन्द, प्रमाणवार्तिकम् (वार्तिकालंकारव्याख्योपेतवार्तिकलंकारभाष्यसहितम्), प्रथम भाग, पृ.—4, षड्दर्शन प्रकाशन प्रतिष्ठान, वाराणसी—1991।
7. द्रष्टव्य, तत्त्वसंग्रह, कारिका—2959-2962 और उस पर पंजिका व्याख्या।
8. प्रमाणवार्तिकालंकारभाष्य (स्वामीयोगीन्द्रानन्द), पृ.—5, यात्रार्थक्रियास्थितिरपरोपकल्पिता तद् यावत् प्रमाणम्। यत्र तु स्वतस्तदैवार्थक्रियानुभवः, तत् सुतरामेव प्रमाणम्।
9. द्रष्टव्य तत्त्वसंग्रह, कारिका—2958 से 2961 पर पंजिका व्याख्या।
10. तत्त्वसंग्रह, कारिका— 2988 से 2989 पर पंजिका व्याख्या।
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12. प्रमाणवार्तिक (मनोरथनन्दी वृत्ति सहित), सम्पादक, स्वामी द्वारिकादास शास्त्री, बौद्धभारती, वाराणसी, 1987, पृ. 4— अर्थक्रियानिर्भासं तु प्रत्यक्षं स्वतः एवार्थक्रियानुभवात्मकम्, न तत्र परार्थक्रियाऽपेक्ष्यते इति तदपि स्वतो निश्चित प्रामाण्यम्। अतएवार्थक्रियापरम्परानुसरणादनवस्था दोषोऽपि दुःस्थ एव। यत्त्वनभ्यस्तदशायां सन्दिग्धप्रामाण्यम्, उत्पत्तौ तस्यार्थक्रियाज्ञानाद्, अनुमानाद्वा प्रामाण्यं निश्चीयते।

13. धर्मोत्तर प्रदीप, सम्पादक, दलसुखभाई मलवाणिया, के.पी. जायसवाल इन्स्टीट्यूट, पटना, 1955, पृ.19— अतएव प्रापणशक्तिरेव ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यम्। सा च प्राप्यादर्थादात्मलाभ निमित्तेति, यतो येन प्रवर्तते तदपि प्रापणयोग्यमेव। शक्तिनिश्चयस्त्वर्थक्रियानिर्भासस्य सर्वस्यानुमानस्य च स्वत एव। प्रवर्तकाध्यक्षस्य च कस्यचित्स्वत एव यदभ्यासेन परितो निरस्तविभ्रमाशंकम्, यन्निद्राद्यनुपप्लुतं सद् आसन्नदेशमनाशंक्यव्यंजकाधीनाऽन्यथाभिव्यक्ति च वस्तु गृहणाति। तद्गुणसंवेदनादेव सत्यार्थं निश्चीयते। कस्यचित् परतोऽर्थक्रियानिर्भासात्मकात् स्वतः प्रमाणादन्यतो वा यतः कुतश्चिन्नान्तरीयकार्थदर्शनान्मध्यकालवर्तिभ्रान्तिशंकापनोदेन् निश्चीयत इति।
14. प्रमेयकमलमार्तण्ड, पृ.149
15. प्रमाणमीमांसा वृत्ति, पृ.6(1.1.8)
16. तत्त्वसंग्रह, 2943—44 पर पंजिका व्याख्या— तैः किञ्चिद् स्वतःप्रमाणमिष्टम्, यथास्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षं, योगिज्ञानम्, अर्थक्रियाज्ञानम्, अनुमानम्, अभ्यासवच्च प्रत्यक्षम्, तद्वि स्वत एव निश्चीयते; अभ्यासबलेनापहस्तितभ्रान्तिकारणत्वात्। किञ्चिद् अन्यतः यथा— विवादास्पदीभूतं चोदनाजनित ज्ञानम्, प्रत्यक्षं चानपगतभ्रान्तिनिमित्तम्, अभ्यासार्थक्रियाज्ञानयोरनवाप्तत्वात्।
17. तत्त्वसंग्रह, 3099 — अभ्यासिकं यथा ज्ञानं प्रमाणं गम्यते स्वतः। मिथ्याज्ञानं तथा किञ्चिदप्रमाणं स्वतः स्थितम्।। कमलशील ने अपनी पंजिका व्याख्या में स्पष्ट करते हुए कहा है— तथा मिथ्यात्वमपि कस्यचित् स्वत एवावसीयते। यथा च दृश्यन्त एव तैमिरिकादयः केचित् अभ्यासबलात् केशोण्ड्रकादिविज्ञानमुत्पादसमनन्तरमेव मिथ्यात्वेन् निश्चिन्वन्तः।
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संशयसूत्र की व्याख्या:  
तन्त्रान्तर्गत विचलन और समानतन्त्री भिन्नता

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**अरुण मिश्र**

न्यायशास्त्र के अन्तर्गत प्रमाणमीमांसा के क्षेत्र में विषयों के विश्लेषण और तत्सम्बन्धी सिद्धान्तों की स्थापना में एक सरलरेखीय गमन नहीं है। यह गमन सूत्र को स्वीकार करते हुए तिर्यकरेखीय है। न्यायशास्त्र की यह प्रवृत्ति परीक्षा सूत्र की महत्ता को भी स्पष्ट करती है। उदाहरण के लिये संशय सूत्र की व्याख्या से यह स्पष्ट है कि उद्योतकर की व्याख्या भाष्यकार की व्याख्या से विचलित हो जाती है। पुनः वाचस्पति की व्याख्या और उदयनाचार्य की व्याख्या में भी विचलन है। संशय सूत्र की व्याख्या में सूत्र को स्वीकार करते हुए वात्स्यायन, उद्योतकर, वाचस्पति, एवं उदयनाचार्य अनेक बिन्दुओं पर एक दूसरे से विचलित हो जाते हैं। न्याय के समानतन्त्र वैशेषिक में विचलन नहीं अपितु भिन्नता पायी जाती है। यह भिन्नता श्री शंकर मिश्र के उपस्कार में और अधिक मुखर हो जाती है। श्री शंकर मिश्र अपने इस ग्रंथ में न्यायभाष्यम् और न्यायभाष्यवार्तिकम् में प्रतिपादित मतों का ही विरोध नहीं करते अपितु अपना स्वतन्त्र मत प्रतिपादित करते हैं। अतएव इस लेख का उद्देश्य न्यायचतुर्ग्रंथिका में की गयी संशयसूत्र की व्याख्या प्रस्तुत करने के साथ साथ उपस्कार में की गयी श्री शंकर मिश्र की व्याख्या भी प्रस्तुत करना है जिससे कि न्याय और उसके समानतन्त्र वैशेषिक में संशय सूत्र की व्याख्या की दिशा निर्धारित की जा सके। यह लेख निम्नलिखित ग्रंथों पर आधारित है – वात्स्यायन का न्यायभाष्यम्, उद्योतकर का न्यायभाष्यवार्तिकम्, वाचस्पति मिश्र की न्यायभाष्यवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका, उदयनाचार्य की न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यपरिशुद्धि, और श्री शंकर मिश्र का उपस्कार। विषय के अनुसार लेख को तीन खंडों में विभाजित किया गया है – प्रथम खंड में न्याय मत प्रस्तुत किया गया है, द्वितीय खंड में

श्री शंकर मिश्र का मत प्रस्तुत किया गया है, तथा तृतीय खंड में लेख का उपसंहार किया गया है।

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‘प्रमा’ को स्पष्ट करने के लिये उसे ‘अप्रमा’ से पृथक् करना आवश्यक है। संशय, विपर्यय, और तर्क के ज्ञान को ‘अप्रमा’ कहा गया है। इसीलिए संशय की व्याख्या की गयी है। संशय सूत्र की व्याख्या करते हुए वात्स्यायन संशय का पाँच और उद्योतकर मात्र तीन हेतु मानते हैं। यद्यपि वाचस्पति मिश्र एवं उदयनाचार्य उद्योतकर के मत का ही समर्थन करते हैं तथापि तीनों की व्याख्याएं भिन्न हैं। सूत्रकार अपने प्रथम सूत्र में प्रमाण और प्रमेय पदों के बाद ‘संशय’ का उल्लेख करते हैं, इसीलिए न्याय परंपरा में प्रमाण और प्रमेय का लक्षण और विश्लेषण करने के बाद संशय का लक्षण और विश्लेषण प्रस्तुत किया गया है।

**सूत्र में संशय का लक्षण :**

गोतमीय न्याय में संशय का सूत्र है कि “समानानेकधर्मोपपत्तेर्विप्रतिपत्तेरुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातश्च विशेषापेक्षो विमर्शः संशयः” (9-9-23) संशय एक अनवधारित ज्ञान है और यह अनवधारित ज्ञान विमर्श कहलाता है। हमारा यह ज्ञान कि दूर में अवस्थित विषय स्थाणु है या पुरुष संशय का एक उदाहरण है। इस ज्ञान में हम दोनों में से किसी एक के विशेषधर्म की अपेक्षा करते हैं। विशेषधर्म की अपेक्षा करना या आकांक्षा करना विशेषापेक्ष कहलाता है। संशय में हमें वस्तु का विशेषधर्म उपलब्ध नहीं होता है। विशेषधर्म उपलब्ध होने से संशय नहीं होता है। विशेषधर्म अज्ञात होने में ही उस विशेषधर्म की अपेक्षा या आकांक्षा संभव है।

“विशेषस्यापेक्षा आकांक्षा सा चानुपलभ्यमाने विशेषे युक्ता।”<sup>9</sup>

‘विशेषापेक्ष विशेषधर्म की स्मृति की अपेक्षा होता है। संशय में विशेषधर्म को अज्ञात होने के अतिरिक्त उस विशेषधर्म की स्मृति भी अपेक्षित है। विशेषधर्म की स्मृति के बिना संशय संभव नहीं है। ज्ञाता को दूर से प्रत्यक्ष होता हुआ विषय की ऊँचाई और विस्तार देखकर यह संशय होता है कि वह विषय स्थाणु है या पुरुष। इस उदाहरण में ज्ञाता को उस विशेषधर्म की स्मृति हो रही है जिसका उसे संशय हो रहा है या किसी अन्य विशेषधर्म की स्मृति हो रही है या किसी अन्य विषय के विशेषधर्म की स्मृति हो रही है?’

‘विशेषापेक्षो विमर्शः संशय इति। विशेषापेक्षो विशेषस्मृत्यपेक्ष इति। अथ सा विशेषस्मृतिः किं विशेषविषया, किं संशयविषयविशेषविषया, उतान्यविषयेति?’<sup>२</sup>

उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि विशेषापेक्ष एक सामान्य कथन है और के या किसी अन्य विषय का विशेषधर्म की स्मृति नहीं होती है। यदि हमें पूर्व में ज्ञात विषय के विशेषधर्म की स्मृति होती है तो वह स्मृति पूर्व में अनुभूत विशेषधर्म की होती है। स्मृति अननुभूतों की नहीं होती। यदि संशय उस विषय का होता है जो पूर्व में अज्ञात था परन्तु वह विषय किसी ऐसे विषय के सदृश है जो पहले ज्ञात था, तो वह स्मृति उस अन्य विषय के विशेषधर्म की होती है जो पहले ज्ञात था। यह स्मृति विषय के सादृश्य के कारण होती है।<sup>३</sup>

वाचस्पति संशय के भावात्मक पक्ष पर बल देते हुए कहते हैं कि संशय में हमें सत्य जानने की इच्छा होती है। विशेषधर्म की अपेक्षा करना विशेषापेक्ष कहलाता है और वहाँ हमें सत्य जानने की इच्छा होती है। यद्यपि हमारी इच्छा में अपेक्षा होती है तथापि वाक्य के सामर्थ्य से यह स्पष्ट है कि विशेषधर्म की अपेक्षा में ज्ञाता को सत्य ग्रहण करने की इच्छा होती है। परन्तु सत्य जानने की इच्छा संशय का हेतु नहीं है। विशेषापेक्ष से यह स्पष्ट है कि पहले के अनुभूत वस्तु के धर्म के सादृश्य के आधार पर उत्पन्न स्मरण में दो विशेषों में ज्ञाता सत्य ग्रहण करना चाहता है।<sup>४</sup>



इससे स्पष्ट है कि नैयायिक संशयवादी नहीं हैं अपितु सत्य जानने के लिये संशय नामक प्रत्यय पर विचार करते हैं। प्रमा को अप्रमा से पृथक् करने के लिये ही संशय की परीक्षा की गयी है।

‘विशेषापेक्ष’ के अतिरिक्त ‘विमर्श’ संशय का दूसरा लक्षण है। विषय में स्थाणु और पुरुष का ज्ञान होना ही विमर्श है। अतएव ‘संशय’ पद लक्ष्य और ‘विमर्श’ उसका लक्षण है। उद्योतकर के अनुसार विषय में नाना प्रकारक अर्था का ज्ञान होना विमर्श कहलाता है।

“विमर्श इति नानार्थावमर्शनं विमर्शः।”५

वाचस्पति लक्षण और लक्ष्य में भेद करते हैं और कहते हैं कि ‘विमर्श’ संशय का सामान्य लक्षण और ‘संशय’ पद लक्ष्य है।

“अत्र च विमर्शः संशय इति संशयसामान्यलक्षणम्। तत्र संशय इति लक्ष्यनिर्देशः, विमर्श इति लक्षणपदम्।”६

वे कहते हैं कि एक धर्मी में नाना प्रकारक अर्थों का ज्ञान होना ही नहीं अपितु नाना प्रकारक विरोधी अर्थों का ज्ञान होना विमर्श कहलाता है।

“एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि विरोधिनानार्थावमर्शो विमर्शः, किं स्वदिति ज्ञानम्।”७

वाचस्पति के अनुसार विमर्श संशय का एक सामान्य लक्षण है, परन्तु उदयनाचार्य कहते हैं कि ‘विमर्श’ पद से संशय के दो सामान्य लक्षण – विषयतः और स्वरूपतः – सूचित होते हैं। उदयनाचार्य की यह अवधारणा विषय और उसके स्वरूप में भेद पर अवस्थित है। विषय स्थाणु है या पुरुष विषयतः संशय का उदाहरण है। विषय इस प्रकारक है या उस प्रकारक स्वरूपतः संशय का उदाहरण है।

“विमर्श इत्यनेन च विषयतः स्वरूपतश्च सामान्यलक्षणद्वयं सूचितम्। तत्र प्रथमाह – एकस्मिन्निति। द्वितीयमाह – किं स्वदिति।८

अतः विशेषापेक्ष और विमर्श संशय के दो लक्षण हैं। इस प्रकार यह स्पष्ट है कि एक धर्मी में नाना प्रकारक विरोधी अर्थों का ज्ञान होना संशय कहलाता है।

### सूत्र में संशय के हेतु

संशय का सूत्र है कि

“समानानेकधर्मोपपत्तेर्विप्रतिपत्तरूपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातश्च विशेषापेक्षो विमर्शः संशयः।”६

वात्स्यायन के अनुसार विषय में समानधर्म का ज्ञान होने से, अनेकधर्म का ज्ञान होने से, विप्रतिपत्ति होने से, उपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था होने से, अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था होने से संशय होता है। सत्य को जानने का इच्छुक ज्ञाता विषय में विशेषधर्म की अपेक्षा करता है। ज्ञाता की यह अपेक्षाबुद्धि ही संशय प्रवर्तित करती है। इसी हेतु से विशेषापेक्ष और विमर्श को संशय का लक्षण कहा गया है। दूर से दिखाई देते विषय की लम्बाई और विस्तार देखकर हमें संशय होता है कि वह विषय स्थाणु है या पुरुष। लम्बाई और विस्तार स्थाणु और पुरुष दोनों के समानधर्म हैं। विषय में दोनों के समानधर्म को देखते हुए ज्ञाता पूर्व में देखे गये दोनों के विशेषधर्म अवधारित नहीं करता है। यह अनवधारणात्मक ज्ञान संशय कहलाता है। स्थाणु और पुरुष दोनों का समानधर्म उपलब्ध है परन्तु विशेषधर्म नहीं।<sup>१०</sup>

उद्योतकर संशय सूत्र की व्याख्या करते हुए इस प्रकरण को एक नई दिशा प्रदान करते हैं। उनकी व्याख्या वात्स्यायन की व्याख्या से विचलित हो जाती है। उद्योतकर के अनुसार विषय में समानधर्म का ज्ञान होने से, अनेकधर्म का ज्ञान होने से और विप्रतिपत्ति होने से संशय होता है। उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था इन तीनों के विशेषण हैं। संशय में विषय के स्वरूप का अवधारण नहीं होता है। हम यह निश्चय नहीं कर पाते कि विषय स्थाणु है या पुरुष। संशयात्मक ज्ञान निश्चयात्मक नहीं, अनवधारणात्मक होता है। अनवधारणात्मक होना

अनिश्चयात्मक होना है। संशय में विषय के स्वरूप का अवधारण नहीं होता है। विषय के स्वरूप का अनवधारणात्मक प्रत्यय संशय कहलाता है। वह प्रत्यय जो विषय के समानधर्म से उत्पन्न होता है अनवधारणात्मक होता है और संशय कहलाता है। यहाँ ज्ञाता विषय का विशेषधर्म अवधारित नहीं करता है। समानधर्मादि से उत्पन्न संशय में विषय के स्वरूप का अवधारण नहीं होता है। उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि समानधर्मादि से उत्पन्न विषय के स्वरूप का अनवधारणात्मक प्रत्यय जो विषय के विशेषधर्म अवधारित नहीं करता है संशय कहलाता है। क्या प्रत्यय को अनवधारणात्मक कहना विरोधी नहीं है? प्रत्यय को अनवधारणात्मक कहना विरोधी तब है यदि प्रत्यय में अवधारण होता है। यदि प्रत्यय में विषय का स्वरूप अवधारित होता है तब प्रत्यय को अनवधारणात्मक कहना विरोधी है। परन्तु संशय में विषय के स्वरूप की प्रतीति होती है, न कि विषय के स्वरूप का अवधारण। प्रतीत होना ही प्रत्यय है। इस प्रकार प्रत्यय को अनवधारणात्मक कहना विरोधी नहीं है।<sup>91</sup>

### विषय में समानधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय –

वात्स्यायन के अनुसार ज्ञाता को विषय में समान-धर्म का ज्ञान होने से वह विशेष-धर्म की अपेक्षा करता है और उसका यह ज्ञान अनिश्चयात्मक होता है। ऐसा अनिश्चयात्मक ज्ञान संशय कहलाता है। ज्ञाता पूर्व में स्थाणु और पुरुष दोनों का विशेष-धर्म देख चुका है। स्थाणु और पुरुष दोनों के समान-धर्म को विषय में देखकर ज्ञाता को दोनों के पूर्व में देखा हुआ विशेष-धर्म का स्मरण होता है। ज्ञाता को दोनों में से किसी एक के विशेष-धर्म का ज्ञान नहीं होने से वह यह निश्चय नहीं कर पाता कि विषय स्थाणु है या पुरुष। ज्ञाता विशेष-धर्म की अपेक्षा करता है और ज्ञाता की यह अपेक्षाबुद्धि संशय प्रवर्तित करती है। इस प्रकार वात्स्यायन कहते हैं कि ज्ञाता का विषय में नाना प्रकारक अर्थों का ज्ञान जहाँ ज्ञाता विशेष की अपेक्षा करता है संशय कहलाता है।<sup>92</sup>

वात्स्यायन सूत्र की व्याख्या का दिशा निर्देश मात्र करते हैं, वे युक्ति की परतों को नहीं खोलते हैं। इन परतों को उद्योतकर खोलना आरम्भ करते हैं और वाचस्पति तथा उदयनाचार्य पूर्णतया खोल देते हैं।

### ‘समान’ पद का अर्थ ‘साधारण’ नहीं अपितु ‘सादृश्य’ है—

उद्योतकर सूत्र में ‘समान’ पद की व्याख्या सादृश्य के अर्थ में करते हुए कहते हैं कि

“न ब्रूमो गुणः साधारण इति, नापि सामान्यम् अपितु सादृश्यार्थः समानार्थः।”<sup>93</sup>

दूर से दिखाई देते धर्मी में संशय होता है कि वह स्थाणु है या पुरुष। उनके अनुसार यह संशय विषय में दोनों के समानधर्म के ज्ञान से होता है। उद्योतकर के अनुसार सूत्रस्थ ‘समान’ पद को साधारण के अर्थ में ग्रहण नहीं किया जा सकता है। ‘समान’ को साधारण के अर्थ में ग्रहण करने से यह कहना चाहिये कि संशय साधारणधर्म के ज्ञान से होता है और पुनः ‘साधारण’ पद का अर्थ विचारणीय हो जाता है। ‘साधारण’ पद गुणवाचक है या सामान्यवाचक। उद्योतकर के अनुसार ‘साधारण’ पद गुणवाचक या सामान्यवाचक नहीं हो सकता है। गुण को एकद्रव्यवृत्तित्व होता है अर्थात् वह एक द्रव्य में होता है। गुण को एक द्रव्य में होने से गुण स्थाणु और पुरुष दोनों में साधारण नहीं हो सकता है। अतएव एक द्रव्य में पाये जाने से गुण साधारण के अर्थ में ग्रहण नहीं किया जा सकता है। ‘साधारण’ पद सामान्यवाचक भी नहीं है। ऊर्ध्वत्व नामक सामान्य निश्चय ही द्रव्य में नहीं अपितु ऊर्ध्व नामक गुण में होता है। सामान्य के इस द्रव्यावृत्तित्व से ‘साधारण’ पद सामान्यवाचक भी नहीं कहा जा सकता है। ‘ऊर्ध्व’ नामक गुण में वर्तमान यह ‘ऊर्ध्वत्व’ सामान्य द्रव्य में संशय उत्पन्न करने का हेतु नहीं हो सकता है। गुण को अवधारितत्व होता है अर्थात् गुण का हमें अवधारण होता है। गुण के अवधारितत्व से गुण में पाये जाने वाला सामान्य भी अवधारित होता है और वह अर्थ अवधारित होता है जहाँ गुण पाये जाते हैं। अर्थ अवधारित होने से संशय नहीं होता है।

उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि 'साधारण' के अर्थ की व्याख्या अन्य प्रकार से संभव नहीं है। 'साधारण' पद गुणवाचक नहीं है, सामान्यवाचक भी नहीं है, अतः सूत्रस्थ 'समान' पद को साधारण के अर्थ में ग्रहण नहीं करना चाहिये। उनके अनुसार 'समान' पद सादृश्यवाचक है। जिन दो अर्थों को पहले देखा था उनमें ऊर्ध्वत्व धर्म पाया था। उन दोनों में ऊर्ध्वत्व धर्म वर्तमान था और उस धर्म के सदृश यह धर्म है। उस धर्म की उपलब्धि अध्यवसाय कहा जाता है। यह नहीं कह सकते कि समान धर्म की उपलब्धि से संशय होता है क्योंकि समानधर्म की उपलब्धि से संशय होना स्वीकार करने से अनुक्त का भी अभिधान हो जाता है। 'समान' पद को 'सादृश्य' के अर्थ में ग्रहण नहीं करने से और समानधर्म की उपलब्धि से संशय होना स्वीकार करने से स्थाणु और पुरुष में जो धर्म अनुक्त है वह अनुक्त धर्म भी जाना जाता है, और इस प्रकार विशेष का अभिधान व्यर्थ हो जाता है। स्थाणु और पुरुष के विशेष-धर्म को जानने की हमारी अपेक्षा आकांक्षा कहलाती है और वह आकांक्षा विशेष-धर्म को वहाँ अनुपलभ्यमान होने में ही संभव है। विशेषधर्म को वहाँ उपलब्ध होने में हमें उसे जानने की आकांक्षा नहीं होती है। विशेषधर्म अनुपलभ्यमान होने में हमें उसे जानने की आकांक्षा होती है और संशय होता है। अनुपलभ्यमान विशेष में हमें उस विशेष को जानने की आकांक्षा होती है। यदि ज्ञाता स्थाणु या पुरुष का विशेषधर्म नहीं देखता है तो विशेष की अनुपलब्धि से वह सामान्य ही देखता है। यह नहीं कह सकते कि संशय में हम धर्मों में न सामान्य और न विशेष देखते हैं क्योंकि उस स्थिति में सूत्र में विशेषापेक्ष नामक वचन व्यर्थ हो जाता है। इस सामर्थ्य से हम धर्मों में स्थाणु और पुरुष का सामान्य जानते हैं और और वह सामान्य उपलब्ध होता है।<sup>14</sup>

इस प्रकार उद्योतकर सूत्रस्थ 'समान' पद की व्याख्या सादृश्य के अर्थ में करते हुए वात्स्यायन से विचलित हो जाते हैं।

उद्योतकर के अनुसार 'समानधर्मोपपत्ति' पद में 'उपपत्ति' पद उपलब्धि का पर्याय है। उपपत्ति की प्रमाणगम्यता ही उपलब्धि है। संशय में

विशेष की अपेक्षा होती है और विशेष उपलब्ध नहीं होने से संशय होता है। संशय में विशेष अनुपलभ्यमान होता है। संशय में अनुपलभ्यमान का सद्भाव होता है और वह विद्यमान होता है। अनुपलभ्यमान का सद्भाव अविद्यमान के तुल्य होता है। अनुपलभ्यमान का सद्भाव का तात्पर्य उसे विद्यमान होना है। अनुपलभ्यमान को विद्यमान होना अविद्यमान के तुल्य कैसे कहा जा सकता है? उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि अनुपलभ्यमान के सद्भाव को और अविद्यमान दोनों को प्रमाण का स्वतन्त्र आलम्बन नहीं होता है। प्रमाण का स्वतन्त्र आलम्बन नहीं होना ही दोनों की तुल्यता है। दोनों को ही प्रमाण का अनालम्बनत्व है। अविद्यमान को भी प्रमाण का स्वतन्त्र आलम्बन नहीं होता है और अनुपलभ्यमान का सद्भाव भी अनुपलब्धि लक्षण प्राप्त होता है। उसे भी प्रमाण का स्वतन्त्र आलम्बन नहीं होता है। विद्यमान का अविद्यमान के साथ यही समानता है। इस प्रकार उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि 'समानधर्मोपपत्ति' में उपपत्ति उपलब्धि का पर्याय है।<sup>१५</sup>

विषय शब्द से ज्ञान प्रत्यय का अभिधान होता है या 'समानधर्मोपपत्ति' शब्द से ज्ञान अभिहित है। उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि इस वक्य से लौकिक न्याय प्रतिबन्धित नहीं होता है। हम लोग यह कहते हैं कि 'धूम से अग्नि की अनुमिति होती है'। इस वाक्य में दर्शन शब्द का प्रयोग नहीं हुआ है। हम यह नहीं कहते कि 'धूम' दर्शन से अग्नि की अनुमिति होती है'। इस वाक्य से यह बोध होता है कि धूम को देखकर हम अग्नि का अनुमान करते हैं।<sup>१६</sup>

### क्या समान—धर्म के साथ 'अव्यवच्छेद' का प्रयोग उचित है

सूत्र के अनुसार विषय में समानधर्म का ज्ञान होने से संशय होता है। विषय में स्थाणु और पुरुष के समान—धर्म का ज्ञान होने से हम भेद नहीं कर पाते हैं, फलतः हमें संशय होता है। अतएव एकदेशीय नैयायिक कहते हैं कि समान— धर्म के साथ 'अव्यवच्छेद हेतु' का भी प्रयोग होना चाहिये। इस प्रकार उनके मत में अव्यवच्छेद हेतु से

विशिष्ट समानधर्म के ज्ञान से हमें संशय होता है। उनके अनुसार केवल समानधर्म का ज्ञान संशय का हेतु नहीं है। केवल समानधर्म के ज्ञान को संशय का हेतु कहने से कृतकत्व पाये जाने से नित्यत्व और अनित्यत्व में भी संशय होना चाहिये। अतएव अव्यवच्छेद हेतु से विशिष्ट समानधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय होता है। वाचस्पति कहते हैं कि इस मत के अनुसार समान-धर्म व्यवच्छेद भी करता है। फलतः इस मत के अनुसार मात्र समान-धर्म का ज्ञान संशय का हेतु नहीं है। जैसे कृतकत्व शब्द नामक साध्यधर्मी में और घटादि नामक दृष्टान्त-धर्मी में समान है। परन्तु कृतकत्व नित्यत्व और अनित्यत्व के बीच संशय उत्पन्न नहीं करता है। अपितु यह समान-धर्म साध्यधर्मी 'शब्द' में अनित्यत्व का योग नहीं होने का व्यवच्छेद करता है। अतः समानधर्म व्यवच्छेद हेतु भी है और मात्र उसी से संशय नहीं होता है। संशय होने के लिये समान-धर्म के साथ अव्यवच्छेद का भी प्रयोग होना चाहिये। अतएव इन एकदेशीय नैयायिक का अभिमत है कि अव्यवच्छेद हेतु से विशिष्ट समानधर्म का ज्ञान संशय का हेतु है।<sup>90</sup>

उद्योतकर के अनुसार समानधर्म के साथ अव्यवच्छेद हेतु का प्रयोग उचित नहीं है। उनके अनुसार 'समान' पद के अर्थ का ज्ञान नहीं होने से 'अव्यवच्छेद हेतु' का प्रयोग किया गया है। अव्यवच्छेद हेतु के प्रयोग के पीछे यह अवधारणा है कि समान-धर्म व्यवच्छेद भी करता है। उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि एक ही धर्म दोनों में समान और पुनः वही धर्म दोनों का व्यवच्छेद नहीं कर सकता है। व्यवच्छेद हेतु स्थाणु जाति को पुरुष जाति से भिन्न करता है। वह जो तज्जातीय में होता है और विजातीय में नहीं होता है व्यवच्छेद हेतु कहलाता है। वे दोनों में समान नहीं हो सकता है। उसको समानार्थता नहीं होती है। इसके विपरीत समानधर्म तज्जातीय और विजातीय दोनों में होता है, फलतः हमें संशय होता है। अतएव स्थाणु और पुरुष के समानधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय होता है और अव्यवच्छेद हेतु का प्रयोग उचित नहीं है।<sup>91</sup>

वाचस्पति के अनुसार सूत्रस्थ 'समान' पद सादृश्य अर्थ का वाचक है, परन्तु कृतकत्व और अनित्यत्व के उदाहरण में 'समान' पद सादृश्य का वाचक नहीं है। दूर से दिखाई देते विषय में स्थाणु या पुरुष का संशय उनके सादृश्य के आधार पर होता है। संशय अपने विषय का उपास्थापक होता है। संशय अपने विषय का उपस्थापक होने से दो परस्पर विरोधी वस्तु, स्थाणु और पुरुष, उपस्थित होते हैं और हमें संशय होता है कि दूर से दिखाई देता वस्तु स्थाणु है या पुरुष। लम्बाई और विस्तार दोनों में समान है और वह समान दोनों के लिये जाना जाता है। लम्बाई और विस्तार तज्जातीय स्थाणु में और उससे अन्यजातीय पुरुष दोनों में होता है। यहाँ स्थाणु और पुरुष में सादृश्य है। यह कहना कि कृतकत्व नामक समानधर्म से व्यवच्छेद भी होता है, अतः समान —धर्म के साथ अव्यवच्छेद हेतु का भी प्रयोग करना चाहिये उचित नहीं है। जिस प्रकारक सादृश्य हम स्थाणु और पुरुष में पाते हैं उस प्रकारक कृतकत्व नहीं है। कृतकत्व तज्जातीय और अन्यजातीय में नहीं पाया जाता है। वहाँ 'समान' शब्द का अर्थ सादृश्य नहीं है। अतः यह कहना उचित नहीं है कि अव्यवच्छेद हेतु से विशिष्ट समानधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय होता है।<sup>6</sup>

### मात्र समानधर्म का ज्ञान संशय का हेतु नहीं है

मात्र समानधर्म का ज्ञान संशय का हेतु नहीं है। इसके साथ अन्य भी अपेक्षित है। दूर से दिखाई देते विषय का लम्बाई और विस्तार देखकर हमें संशय होता है कि वह विषय स्थाणु है या पुरुष। इस उदाहरण में मात्र उपलब्ध होता हुआ समानधर्म संशय का हेतु नहीं है। समानधर्म के ज्ञान के साथ उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था भी अपेक्षित है। परन्तु इतने मात्र को भी संशय का हेतु नहीं कहा जा सकता है। उद्योतकर के अनुसार विशेष की आकांक्षा, समानधर्म की उपलब्धि, वस्तु की उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि स्थिर नहीं होना संशय का हेतु है। वस्तु को अमुक होने का भाव इदन्ता और अमुक नहीं होने का भाव नेदन्ता कहलाता है। इदं का भाव इदन्ता और इदं नहीं होने का भाव नेदन्ता



कहलाता है। अतएव समानधर्म का ज्ञान, इदन्तया या नेदन्तया वस्तु को व्यवस्थित नहीं होना और विशेषाकांक्षा होने में संशय होता है।<sup>20</sup>

वाचस्पति उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को साधक एवं बाधक—प्रमाण के अभाव के पद में व्याख्या करते हैं तथा कहते हैं कि इदन्ता और अनिदन्ता को नहीं होना ही साधक प्रमाण और बाधक प्रमाण का अभाव है।

वाचस्पति उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था की व्याख्या क्रमशः साधक—प्रमाण और बाधक—प्रमाण के अभाव के पद में करते हैं। इदन्ता का होना उपलब्धि और अनिदन्ता का होना अनुपलब्धि है। उपलब्धि व्यवस्थित होने से समानधर्म का ज्ञान संशय का हेतु नहीं होता है। उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था में साधक—प्रमाण और बाधक—प्रमाण का अभाव होता है। ऊर्ध्व वस्तु में शिर और पाणि का होना तथा वक्रकोटर नहीं होना पुरुष का साधक—प्रमाण है। इसके विरुद्ध शिर तथा पाणि का नहीं होना और वक्रकोटर का होना पुरुष का बाधक—प्रमाण है। इससे सिद्ध होता है कि वह पुरुष ही है या यह इदन्ता से व्यवस्थित होना है। या पुरुष की इदन्ता के निषेध से हम कहते हैं कि यह पुरुष नहीं है। यह पुरुष की अनिदन्ता से व्यवस्थित है। अनिदन्ता से व्यवस्थित होने का अभाव पुरुष होने की व्यवस्था कहलाती है। इससे साधक और बाधक प्रमाण का अभाव का वर्णन होता है।<sup>21</sup>

इस प्रकार सूत्र से यह स्पष्ट है कि विषय में समानधर्म का ज्ञान, उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था तथा विशेषधर्म की अपेक्षा से विषय में अनेक अर्थों का ज्ञान होता है और फलतः हमें संशय होता है।

**संशय का कारण तीनों का समस्त है या असमस्त?**

यह प्रश्न विचारणीय है कि विषय में समानधर्म का ज्ञान, उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था, तथा विशेष —धर्म की अपेक्षा समस्त रूप से

संशय का हेतु है या पृथक्-पृथक् रूप से। क्या इन तीनों में से कोई भी एक एक संशय के हेतु है या कोई भी दो दो संशय के हेतु है? उद्योतकर के अनुसार इन तीनों में से एक पद या दो पद संशय के हेतु नहीं है। एक पद और दो पद के निषेध से यह स्पष्ट है कि ये तीनों ही पद सम्मिलित रूप से संशय के हेतु हैं। यदि केवल यह कहते हैं कि समानधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय होता है तो उपलब्ध विशेष के सामान्य का हमें प्रत्यक्ष होता है और हमें संशय होना चाहिये। परन्तु ऐसा नहीं होता है। अतएव यह नहीं कह सकते कि केवल समानधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय होता है। उद्योतकर के शब्दों में –

“किमिदं समस्तं कारणम्, उतासमस्तमिति? समस्तमिति ब्रूमः। यदि समानधर्मोपपत्तेरिति केवलमुच्यते उपलब्धविशेषस्यापि सामान्योपलब्धिस्तीति तदापि संशयः स्यात्।”<sup>२२</sup>

वे कहते हैं कि उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था मात्र से भी संशय नहीं होता है। सप्तम रस या दशम द्रव्य अनुपलब्ध होता है। जब हम उपलब्धमान पदार्थ को देखते हैं तो हमें यह संशय नहीं होता है कि वह उपलब्धमान पदार्थ सप्तम रस है या नहीं, या वह उपलब्धमान पदार्थ दशम द्रव्य है या नहीं। उस उपलब्धमान पदार्थ में हमें सामान्य का बोध होता है। अनुपलब्ध (सप्तम रस या दशम द्रव्य) के सामान्य को भी उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था होती ही है। उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था मात्र को संशय का हेतु मानने से उपलब्धमान पदार्थ में यह संशय होना चाहिये कि यह सप्तम रस है या नहीं, या दशम द्रव्य है या नहीं। परन्तु हमें यहाँ यह संशय नहीं होता है। अतः उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था मात्र से संशय नहीं होता है। उद्योतकर के अनुसार

“यदि पुनरुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातश्च संशय इत्येतावदुच्यते, अनुपलब्धसामान्यस्यापि क्वचिदुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्था अस्तीति संशयः स्यात्।”<sup>२३</sup>

वाचस्पति उद्योतकर के मत को साधक और बाधक प्रमाण के अभाव की सहायता से स्पष्ट करते हैं। जब हम विषय को देखते हैं तो हमें

सामान्य का ज्ञान होता है। अनुपलब्ध सप्तम रस या दशम द्रव्य के सामान्य को भी उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था होती है। उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था होने से वहाँ साधक और बाधक प्रमाण का अभाव होता है, परन्तु हमें यह संशय नहीं होता कि वह उपलब्धमान पदार्थ सप्तम रस है या नहीं। इससे स्पष्ट है कि उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था मात्र संशय का हेतु नहीं है। वाचस्पति के शब्दों में –

“अनुपलब्धसामान्यस्यापि क्वचिदुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थास्तीति। यथा सप्तमे रसे दशमे वा द्रव्ये। न हि तत्र साधकं बाधकं वास्ति प्रमाणम्। न च संशयः।”<sup>२४</sup>

उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार इस संशयात्मक ज्ञान में विषय धर्मिता से या धर्मता से हो सकता है। विषय धर्मिन् है इसीलिए विषय धर्मिता से हो सकता है। पुनः विषय में धर्म होता है इसीलिए विषय धर्मता से हो सकता है। इस संशयात्मक ज्ञान में सप्तम रस धर्मिता से या धर्मता से संभव नहीं है। अनुपलब्ध सप्तम रस के सामान्य को भी उपलब्धि तथा अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था होती है, परन्तु वे संशय के हेतु नहीं हैं। इस प्रकारक संशय में कि यह अनुभूयमान पदार्थ सप्तम रस है या दशम द्रव्य है, विषय धर्मिता से या धर्मता से ग्रहण नहीं होता है। अतः यह संदेह भी नहीं होता कि यह उपलब्धमान पदार्थ सप्तम रस है या दशम द्रव्य है। यदि कहते हैं कि यह संशय होता ही है कि सप्तम रस है या नहीं है तो उदयनाचार्य कहते हैं कि सप्तम रस या दशम द्रव्य अननुभूत होता है और अननुभूत में स्मरण का अभाव होता है। पुनः जिसकी हमें स्मृति नहीं है वह संशय का विषय नहीं हो सकता है क्योंकि अस्मृति को संशय का अविषयत्व होता है। सप्तम रस अननुभूत होता है फलतः वहाँ स्मरण का अभाव होने से उसकी स्मृति नहीं होती है। सप्तम रस की स्मृति नहीं होने से वह संशय का विषय नहीं है। अतएव यह संशय नहीं होता है कि अनुभूयमान पदार्थ सप्तम रस है या नहीं है। इस प्रकार यह स्पष्ट है कि मात्र उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था संशय का हेतु नहीं कही जा सकती है।<sup>२५</sup>

यह स्पष्ट किया जा चुका है कि विषय में समानधर्म का ज्ञान, उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था, तथा विशेषापेक्ष में से किसी एक पद से संशय नहीं होता है। उद्योतकर के अनुसार दो पद मात्र से भी संशय नहीं होता है। यहाँ तीन विकल्प बनते हैं – (१) समानधर्म का ज्ञान, और उपलब्धि तथा अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था। (२) उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था, तथा विशेषापेक्ष। (३) समानधर्म का ज्ञान तथा विशेषापेक्ष। इन तीनों में से किसी से भी संशय नहीं होता है। उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि समानधर्म का ज्ञान तथा उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था नामक दो पदों को होने में संशय नहीं होता है। नौयान तथा झूले पर झूलते व्यक्ति को दूर से दिखाई देते विषय में ऊँचाई और विस्तार दोनों धर्मों का ज्ञान होता है। यह पर्वत और बादल का समानधर्म है। यहाँ उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था भी है, परन्तु हमें यह संशय नहीं होता है कि यह बादल है या पर्वत है। उद्योतकर के शब्दों में –

“एवं समानधर्मोपपत्तेरुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातश्चेति पदद्वयेऽपि नौयानप्रंखादिगतस्य न भवति संशयः।” २६

वाचस्पति कहते हैं कि नौयान या झूला पर आरूढ व्यक्ति दूरी पर ऊँचा और विस्तारवान् वस्तु देखता है। ऊँचाई और विस्तार पर्वत और बादल दोनों का समानधर्म है और आरूढ व्यक्ति को इन समानधर्मों का ज्ञान होता है। समानधर्म का ज्ञान होने में भी साधक तथा बाधक प्रमाण का अभाव में विशेष की स्मृति का अभाव होने से यह संशय नहीं होता कि ‘यह बादल है या पर्वत’। इससे स्पष्ट है कि समानधर्म का ज्ञान तथा उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था ये दो पद मात्र संशय के लिये पर्याप्त नहीं हैं। वाचस्पति के शब्दों में –

“नौदोलाद्यारूढो हि गच्छन् विदूरे आरोहपरिणाहवद्वस्तुदर्शनेऽपि सत्यपि च साधकबाधकप्रमाणाभावे विशेषस्मृत्यभावात् नग इति वा नाग इति वा न सन्दिग्धे।” २७

उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार समानता का ज्ञान दो अवधारित वस्तुओं में ही संभव है। इस उदाहरण में समानता का ज्ञान नहीं अपितु सादृश्य का ज्ञान होता है। पर्वत और बादल में जो सादृश्य है उस सादृश्य का ज्ञान होता है। सादृश्य का दर्शन होने में भी स्मरण का अभाव होने से यह संशय नहीं होता कि 'बादल है या पर्वत है'। पटु के अभ्यास का आदर होने से स्मरण और पटु के अभ्यास के आदर का अभाव होने से स्मरण नहीं होता है। अतः सादृश्य के दर्शन में भी पटु के अभ्यास के आदर का अभाव होने से स्मरण नहीं होने के फलस्वरूप संशय नहीं होता है। उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार –

"नौदोलेति। सदृशदर्शनेऽयस्मरणं तु पट्वभ्यासादप्रत्ययाभावात्। यथा हि तथाविधप्रत्ययजन्यः संस्कारः, तथा तदुद्बोधोऽपीति।" २८

उद्योतकर के अनुसार उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था और विशेष की अपेक्षा होने में भी संशय नहीं होता है। वे कहते हैं कि अत्यन्तानुपलब्ध में उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था तथा विशेष की अपेक्षा दोनों होती है। परन्तु दोनों को होने में भी अत्यन्तानुपलब्ध में समानधर्म अनुपलब्धमान होने में संशय नहीं होता है।

"एवमुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातो विशेषापेक्ष इति पदद्वये विधीयमानेऽत्यन्तानुपलब्धे सामान्येऽर्थे संशयः स्यात्।" २९

वाचस्पति कहते हैं कि अनुपलब्धमान धर्मी में उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था तथा विशेषापेक्ष दोनों विधीयमान पदों को होने में भी संशय नहीं होता है। अनुपलब्धमान होना अत्यन्तानुपलब्ध है। उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था तथा विशेषापेक्ष दोनों विधीयमान पदों से संशय हो तो तो अनुपलब्धमान सदृश धर्मी में इन दोनों विधीयमान पदों को होने में संशय होना चाहिये। अनुपलब्धमान धर्मी में विशेष की स्मृति और साधकबाधक प्रमाण का अभाव है परन्तु वक्रकोटरादि या शिरपाण्यादि ग्रहण नहीं कर सकते हैं। अतः दो पदों को होने में भी वहाँ संशय नहीं होता है।<sup>30</sup>

उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि सामान्यधर्म के दर्शन होने में और धर्मि में विशेषधर्म की आकांक्षा होने में भी उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि व्यवस्थित होने से संशय नहीं होता है। जैसे एक द्रष्टा किसी वस्तु को देखता है तो उसे सामान्यवान् और विशेषवान् अर्थ उपलब्ध होता है। वहाँ उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि व्यवस्थित होती है। वह द्रष्टा जब उस स्थान से दूर चला जाता है तो दूर चले जाने से विषय दूर हो जाता है। विषय दूर हो जाने से उसे विषय का सूक्ष्म विषयविशेष का दर्शन नहीं होता है। द्रष्टा को मात्र ऊँचाई और विस्तार नामक सामान्य दिखता है। उस प्रकार से भी द्रष्टा को विषय का सूक्ष्म विषयविशेष की स्मृति रहती है। इससे पुनः उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की व्यवस्था पायी जाती है और द्रष्टा को संशय नहीं होता है। इस प्रकार उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि समानधर्म का प्रत्यक्ष, उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था, और धर्मि के विशेषधर्म की आकांक्षा तीनों में से दो से संशय नहीं होता है।<sup>39</sup>

वाचस्पति के अनुसार साधकप्रमाण और बाधकप्रमाण का अभाव नहीं होने से उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि व्यवस्थित होती है। वे विषय का अल्पविषयत्व और महाविषयत्व स्पष्ट करते हैं। द्रष्टा जब मलय पर्वत से चलने वाले मन्द वायु के प्रभाव से नाचते हुए वाटिका के वृक्ष की शाखा पर मधु के मद से मत्त भ्रमर तथा पंचम स्वर में गाते हुए कोयल का संगीत सुनते हुए उस वृक्ष का अनुभव करता है और पुनः वहाँ से दूर हो जाता है तो दूर जाकर वह हाथी सदृश विषय का अनुभव करता है। द्रष्टा को हाथी और वृक्ष के विशेषधर्म की स्मृति होती है। अतएव वृक्ष का साधकप्रमाण और बाधकप्रमाण का अभाव नहीं होता है। इससे द्रष्टा को दूर चले जाने के उपरान्त भी उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि दोनों व्यवस्थित होते हैं। समानधर्म का प्रत्यक्ष और धर्मि में विशेषधर्म की अपेक्षा होने में भी संशय नहीं होता है। इस प्रकार उद्योतकर का निष्कर्ष है कि तीनों पदों में से एक पद से या दो पदों से संशय नहीं होता है। सभी तीनों पदों को होने से ही संशय होता है। समानधर्म का ज्ञान या उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था या धर्मि में विशेषधर्म की आकांक्षा संशय उत्पन्न नहीं करती है। इन तीनों में से एक पद मात्र

संशय उत्पन्न करने के लिये सक्षम नहीं है। पुनः दो पदों के युग्म से भी संशय नहीं होता है। समानधर्म का ज्ञान और उपलब्धि तथा अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था से, समान-धर्म का ज्ञान और विशेषधर्म की आकांक्षा से, उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था तथा विशेषधर्म की आकांक्षा से संशय नहीं होता है। समस्त पद के ग्रहण से दो दो पदों से संशय होने का निषेध हो जाता है। इस प्रकार उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि धर्मों में समानधर्म का ज्ञान होने से, उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था होने से, विशेषधर्म की आकांक्षा होने से हमें धर्मों में नाना प्रकारक अर्थों का ज्ञान होता है। धर्मों में नाना प्रकारक अर्थों का ज्ञान होना संशय कहलाता है।<sup>३२</sup>

उद्योतकर, वाचस्पति और उदयनाचार्य की यह व्याख्या उन्हें वात्स्यायन से विचलित कर देती है। स्थाणु और पुरुष दोनों का समानधर्म उपलब्धि होना दोनों में से किसी एक का विशेष उपलब्धि नहीं होने की बुद्धि अपेक्षा कहलाती है। वात्स्यायन के अनुसार हमारी वह अपेक्षा बुद्धि संशय प्रवर्तित करती है। यही कारण है कि विशेषापेक्षा और विमर्श को संशय का लक्षण कहा गया है। उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि—

“समानमनयोधर्ममुपलभे, विशेषमन्यतरस्य नोपलभ इत्येषा बुद्धिरपेक्षा। सा संशयस्य प्रवर्तिका वर्तते। तेन विशेषापेक्षो विमर्शः संशयः।”<sup>३३</sup>

वात्स्यायन की व्याख्या ज्ञातृस्थ धर्म और ज्ञेयस्थ धर्म के भेद पर आधारित है। वे उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को ज्ञातृस्थ धर्म कहते हैं तथा उन्हें संशय का दो पृथक् हेतु मानते हैं। उद्योतकर उन्हें पृथक् हेतु नहीं मानते हैं। पुनः वात्स्यायन समानधर्म और अनेकधर्म को ज्ञेयस्थ धर्म कहते हैं। उद्योतकर ज्ञातृस्थ और ज्ञेयस्थ धर्म के भेद को नहीं मानते हैं। उनके अनुसार उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को ज्ञातृस्थ धर्म और समानधर्म तथा अनेकधर्म को ज्ञेयस्थ धर्म कहना व्यर्थ है। ज्ञातृस्थ धर्म और ज्ञेयस्थ धर्म के भेद को निरस्त करने के लिये उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि धर्मों का धर्म संशय का कारण नहीं है, अपितु धर्म का ज्ञान संशय का कारण है और वह ज्ञान ज्ञाता

को होता है। इस प्रकार ज्ञातृस्थ और ज्ञेयस्थ धर्म का भेद समाप्त हो जाता है।<sup>34</sup>

जिस प्रकार से उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को समानधर्म के ज्ञान का विशेषण मानकर समानधर्म के ज्ञान को उद्योतकर संशय का हेतु कहते हैं उसी प्रकार से वाचस्पति कहते हैं कि उद्योतकर 'एतेन' पद का प्रयोग कर उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को तथा विशेषापेक्ष को अनेकधर्म का और विप्रतिपत्ति का विशेषण मानते हैं। इस प्रकार उद्योतकर के अनुसार अनेकधर्म के ज्ञान से तथा विप्रतिपत्ति से संशय होता है। अतः सूत्र में तीन पद – समानधर्म का ज्ञान, अनेकधर्म का ज्ञान, और विप्रतिपत्ति – संशय के हेतु हैं; और अन्य शेष दो पद इन तीनों के विशेषण हैं। वाचस्पति के अनुसार –

"त्रिपदपरिग्रहमनेकधर्मोपपत्तेर्विप्रतिपत्तेत्यत्रापि योजयति एतेनेति।"<sup>35</sup>

**विषय में अनेकधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय : –**

सूत्रकार कहते हैं कि विषय में अनेकधर्म के ज्ञान से ज्ञाता को संशय होता है। वात्स्यायन के अनुसार 'अनेक' पद से समानजातीय और असमानजातीय दोनों का बोध होता है। समानजातीय और असमानजातीय दोनों में 'विशेष' पाये जाने से उस अनेकधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय होता है। समानजातीय और असमानजातीय दोनों के लिये वह अर्थ विशिष्ट होते हैं। शब्द विभागजन्य होने से उसे विभागजन्यत्व होता है। शब्द का विभागजन्यत्व उसका असमानजातीय द्रव्य, गुण, और कर्म में भी पाया जाता है। शब्द का विभागजन्यत्व उसका समानजातीय और असमानजातीय दोनों में पाये जाने से संशय होता है कि शब्द द्रव्य है या कर्म है या गुण है। इस प्रकार वात्स्यायन के अनुसार विषय में अनेकधर्म का ज्ञान होने से ज्ञाता को संशय होता है।<sup>36</sup>



## एकदेशीय नैयायिक द्वारा 'अनेकधर्म' की व्याख्या और उसका खंडन

एकदेशीय नैयायिक के अनुसार एक धर्म को अनेक में होना और अनेक धर्म को एक में होना 'अनेकधर्म' कहलाता है। उद्योतकर का मत है कि एकदेशीय नैयायिक की व्याख्या 'अनेकधर्म' को दो प्रकारों से विग्रह करने का परिणाम है। संयोगजत्व अनेक द्रव्य, गुण और कर्म का धर्म है। द्रव्य, गुण, और कर्म संयोगज होते हैं इसीलिए उन्हें संयोगजत्व होता है। इस प्रकार से संयोगजत्व नामक एक धर्म अनेक का धर्म है। पुनः अनेक धर्म को एक में होना 'अनेकधर्म' कहा जा सकता है। 'अनेकधर्म' से संयोगजत्व, निष्क्रियत्व, क्षणिकत्व का बोध होता है, और ये अनेकधर्म शब्द में होते हैं। यह अनेकधर्म की दूसरी व्याख्या है। 'अनेकधर्म' को इन दो प्रकारों से व्याख्या करते हुए ये एकदेशीय नैयायिक कहते हैं कि 'अनेकधर्म' के ज्ञान से हमें यह संशय होता है कि शब्द जिसे संयोगजत्व होता है द्रव्य है या गुण है या कर्म है। एकदेशीय नैयायिक के मत को उद्योतकर निम्न शब्दों में व्यक्त करते हैं।<sup>39</sup>

उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि एकदेशीय नैयायिक का यह मत सूत्रस्थ 'समानधर्म' से स्पष्ट हो जाता है। इस प्रकार 'समानधर्म' के ज्ञान से ही संशय की व्याख्या हो जाने से सूत्र में 'अनेकधर्म' के ज्ञान को संशय का हेतु कहना व्यर्थ हो जाता है। समानधर्म के ज्ञान से ही वह एक जो अनेक में पाया जाता है और वह अनेक जो एक में पाये जाते हैं दोनों का लाभ हो जाता है। अतः सूत्र में 'अनेकधर्म' को संशय का हेतु कहने का औचित्य समाप्त हो जाता है।<sup>40</sup>

वाचस्पति के अनुसार उद्योतकर वात्स्यायन की व्याख्या ग्रहण करने के लिये ही एकदेशीय नैयायिक की व्याख्या का खंडन करते हैं तथा 'अनेकधर्म' की व्याख्या करते हैं। वाचस्पति के शब्दों में —

“अनेकधर्मोपपत्तेरित्यत्रभष्यकृतो व्याख्यां गृहीतुमेकदेशीयव्याख्यानमुपन्यस्य दूषयति - अनेकेति।” ३६

एकदेशीय नैयायिक की व्याख्या ‘समानधर्म’ से चरितार्थ हो जाती है। शब्द संयोगज होता है। पुनः संयोगजत्व द्रव्य नामक कार्य में, रूपादि नामक गुण में, तथा शरीरादि की क्रिया में पाया जाता है। संयोगजत्व शब्द, द्रव्य, गुण और कर्म सभी का धर्म है, इसीलिए संयोगजत्व उनका समानधर्म है। संयोगजत्व अनेक का धर्म है और यह अनेक का धर्म समानधर्म से ही चरितार्थ हो जाता है। शब्द में पाये जाने वाला अनेकधर्म भी समानता के कारण ही शब्द को द्रव्यत्वादि होने का संशय उत्पन्न करता है। द्रव्य, गुण और कर्म संयोगज होता है। इन तीनों में संयोगजत्व समानधर्म है। गुण और कर्मदोनों निर्गुण होते हैं। इन दोनों को निर्गुणत्व होता है। इस प्रकार से क्षणिकत्व द्रव्य, गुण, और कर्म तीनों का समानधर्म है। शब्द संयोगज, निर्गुण और क्षणिक होता है। ये शब्द के अनेकधर्म है। अतः हमें संशय होता है कि शब्द द्रव्य है, या गुण है, या कर्म है। शब्द के इन अनेकधर्मों की व्याख्या समानधर्म के ज्ञान से हो जाने से सूत्रस्थ ‘अनेकधर्म’ व्यर्थ हो जाता है। फलतः एकदेशीय नैयायिक की व्याख्या उचित नहीं है।<sup>५०</sup>

### उद्योतकर, वाचस्पति और उदयनाचार्य द्वारा अनेकधर्म की व्याख्या

उद्योतकर असाधारणधर्म को अनेकधर्म कहते हैं। वह धर्म जो समानजातीय को इतर जाति से भिन्न करता है असाधारणधर्म कहलाता है। असाधारणधर्म विशेषक होने से उसे विशेषकत्व होता है। ‘अनेक’ पद से समानजातीय और असमानजातीय का बोध होता है और अनेक से भिन्न करने वाला वह विशेषधर्म अनेकधर्म कहलाता है।<sup>५१</sup>

उद्योतकर ‘अनेकधर्म’ की व्याख्या अन्य प्रकार से करने के लिये ‘एकानेक’ पद का प्रयोग करते हैं। यह वाचस्पति की निम्न पंक्ति से स्पष्ट है।

“प्रकारान्तरेणानेकधर्मपदं व्याचष्टेएकानेकेति।”४२

‘अनेकधर्म’ एक प्रत्यय होने का और एक प्रत्यय नहीं होने का हेतु है। वह धर्म जिस आधार पर ‘यह एक है’ और ‘यह एक नहीं है’ कहते हैं, अनेकधर्म कहलाता है। अभेद होने से प्रत्यय एक, और भेद होने से प्रत्यय इतर हो जाता है। जैसे शब्द का विभागजत्व शब्दों के बीच अभेद स्थापित करता है, और वह शब्द को इतर से भी भिन्न करता है। शब्द का विभागजत्व शब्द को इतरों से भेद करने का भी हेतु है। शब्द विभाग से उत्पन्न होने से विभागज कहलाता है और उसे विभागजत्व होता है। उद्योतकर के शब्दों में

“एकानेकप्रत्ययहेतुर्वा धर्मोऽनेकधर्मः, यत एष प्रत्ययो भवति इदमेकमिदमनेकमिति। तत्रैकप्रत्ययहेतुरभेदः अनेकप्रत्ययहेतुर्वा धर्मो विशेषः। यथा शब्दस्य विभागजत्वम्।”४३

एक प्रत्यय और एक प्रत्यय नहीं होने के उभय को वाचस्पति अनेक कहते हैं और वह धर्म जो उस अनेक का हेतु है अनेकधर्म कहलाता है। वह अनेकधर्म भेद और अभेद प्रत्यय का हेतु होता है। शब्दों का विभागजत्व शब्दों के बीच अभेद का और इतरों से भेद का हेतु होता है। शब्दों के विभागजत्व के आधार पर हम कहते हैं कि शब्द एक हैं और शब्दों से इतर अनेक अर्थात् एक नहीं हैं। शब्दों का विभागजत्व एक प्रत्यय होने का और वही विशेषधर्म एक प्रत्यय नहीं होने का भी हेतु है। जहाँ विभागजत्व पाया जाता है वे एक जाति के और जहाँ विभागजत्व नहीं पाया जाता है वे भिन्न जाति के हैं। जाति एकवचनात्मक होता है और जाति के अभिप्राय को व्यक्त करने के लिये वाचस्पति एक वचन का प्रयोग करते हैं।<sup>४४</sup>

शब्द सत् होता है और सत् के आधार पर उसे द्रव्य, गुण, और कर्म से विभाजित नहीं किया जा सकता है। अतः संशय होता है कि शब्द द्रव्य है या गुण है या कर्म है। द्रव्य, गुण, और कर्म में विभागजत्व संभव नहीं है। द्रव्य, गुण, और कर्म में से किसी एक को भी विभाग से उत्पन्न होते हुए नहीं पाते हैं। उनमें विभागजत्व नहीं पाये जाने से संशय होता है

कि क्या शब्द गुण और कर्म से भिन्न द्रव्य है या द्रव्य और कर्म से भिन्न गुण है, या द्रव्य और गुण से भिन्न कर्म है। यह संशय द्रव्य, गुण, और कर्म में विभागजत्व नहीं होने से होता है। विभागजत्व शब्द का विशेषधर्म है।<sup>१५</sup>

उद्योतकर शब्द के विभागजत्व से संशय होना सिद्ध करते हैं।

**असाधारणधर्म व्यतिरेक रूप से संशय का हेतु है : —**

जो धर्म जिस दृष्यमान विषय के साथ सदैव पाया जाता है वह दृष्यमान विषय हमें उस धर्म का स्मरण कराता है। वह विषय अपने सहचरित धर्म के विरुद्ध धर्म के साथ भी सम्बन्धित होने से अनिश्चय की स्थिति उत्पन्न होती है और हमें वैसे ही संशय होता है जैसे कि समानधर्म के ज्ञान से होता है। विषय में असाधारणधर्म का ज्ञान होने से संशय नहीं होता है। शब्द का विभागजत्व नामक असाधारणधर्म शब्द से भिन्न पृथिवी (द्रव्य), या उत्क्षेपण (कर्म) या गन्ध (गुण) में नहीं होता है। विभागजत्व नामक असाधारणधर्म द्रव्य या गुण या कर्म का स्मरण नहीं कराता है। स्मरण नहीं कराने से विभागजत्व यह संशय उत्पन्न नहीं करता कि 'या यह है या यह'। वहाँ जिज्ञासा मात्र उत्पन्न होती है न कि संशय। वाचस्पति के अनुसार उद्योतकर इसी पृष्ठभूमि को स्पष्ट करने के लिये 'न हि' पदों का प्रयोग करते हैं। विभागजत्व द्रव्य, गुण, और कर्म में असंभव होने से वहाँ नहीं पाया जाता है। द्रव्यादियों को विभाग से जन्म होने में अन्वय तथा व्यतिरेक का विधान नहीं पाया जाता है। अतः निश्चय ही द्रव्यादि का जन्म विभागतः संभव नहीं है। इसी आधार पर यह कहा गया है कि विभागजत्व संशय का हेतु नहीं है। इस पक्ष के निराकरण में उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि द्रव्य, गुण, और कर्म को सत् होने से तथा विभागजत्व वहाँ नहीं पाये जाने से संशय उत्पन्न होता है। वाचस्पति के अनुसार यद्यपि विभागजत्व द्रव्यादि में नहीं पाया जाता है तथापि विभागजत्व का व्यतिरेक द्रव्य, गुण, और कर्म में पाया जाता है। शब्द के विभागजत्व से संशय उत्पन्न होता है

कि सत् शब्द द्रव्य और कर्म से भिन्न क्या गुण है, सत् शब्द गुण और कर्म से भिन्न क्या द्रव्य है, सत् शब्द गुण और द्रव्य से भिन्न क्या कर्म है। इस प्रकार विभागजत्व नामक शब्द का असाधारणधर्म निषेधात्मक रूप से तत् तत् द्रव्य, गुण, और कर्म प्रत्येक का स्मरण कराते हुए संशय का कारण है।<sup>46</sup>

वाचस्पति कहते हैं कि वे जो सत् से संपन्न हैं वे विशेष के तुल्य अपने समानजातीय और असमानजातियों से व्यावृत्त हो जाते हैं। जैसे पृथिवी अपने गन्धवत्त्व के कारण जल नामक अन्य द्रव्य से, गुण और कर्म नामक विजातियों से पृथक् हो जाती है। इस प्रकार रूपत्व के कारण रूप गुण होता है, उत्क्षेपणत्व के कारण उत्क्षेपण कर्म होता है। उस प्रकार से सद् रूप शब्द अपने विभागजत्व के कारण समानजातीय और असमानजातीय से भिन्न हो जाता है। अतएव संशय होता है कि शब्द द्रव्य है, या गुण है, या कर्म है।<sup>49</sup>

इस प्रकार असाधारणधर्म निषेधात्मक रूप से संशय का हेतु होता है।

### शब्द का विभागजत्व संशय का हेतु है निश्चय का नहीं: वैशेषिक के मत का खंडन

वैशेषिक के अनुसार फटते हुए वांश से शब्द की उत्पत्ति में वंश दल और आकाश का विभाग वांश दल के विभाग से उत्पन्न होता है। इस प्रकार शब्द के विभागजत्व के आधार पर शब्द गुण है। उनके अनुसार शब्द का विभागजत्व निश्चय का हेतु है, संशय का नहीं। वैशेषिक के अनुसार विभाग विभाग का असमवायि कारण है। नैयायिक के अनुसार विभाग विभाग का नहीं अपितु शब्द का असमवायि कारण है। शब्द का विभागजत्व उसका असाधारणधर्म है तथा वह संशय का हेतु है। उद्योतकर वैशेषिक के मत को निम्न शब्दों में व्यक्त करते हैं— “ननु च विभागजो विभागो विद्यते गुणः।” वैशेषिक का कथन है कि शब्द की उत्पत्ति वंश दल और आकाश के विभाग से उत्पन्न होता है, और यह

विभाग वंश दल के विभाग से उत्पन्न होता है। उनके अनुसार वंश दल और अकाश का विभाग विभागज है। शब्द का विभागजत्व विभागज होता है, और विभागज विभाग के तुल्य शब्द एक गुण है। शब्द का विभागजत्व उसके गुणत्व के निश्चय का हेतु है, संशय का नहीं। उनके अनुसार शब्द का विभागजत्व कर्मज नहीं, अपितु विभागज होता है। वैशेषिक के अनुसार वांश के दलों में क्रिया होती है और उस क्रिया से वांश के दलों में विभाग होता है। वांश के दलों में विभाग से वहाँ अवरुद्ध आकाश के प्रदेश का विभाग होता है और अवरुद्ध आकाश के प्रदेश के विभाग से शब्द की उत्पत्ति होती है। इस प्रकार विदीर्ण होते हुए वांश के दो दलों में क्रिया होती है और उस क्रिया से वांश के दोनों दलों में परस्पर विभाग होता है। दोनों दलों के विभाग से दलों में अवरुद्ध आकाश के प्रदेश का भाग का विभाग होता है जिससे शब्द की उत्पत्ति होती है। आकाश के प्रदेश का भाग का विभाग विभाग से उत्पन्न होने से वैशेषिक विभाग को विभागज कहते हैं। वांश के दलों की क्रिया विकसित होते हुये कमल दलों की क्रिया में देखा जा सकता है। विकसित होता हुआ कमल के दलों में क्रिया होती है और उस क्रिया से कमल विकसित होता है। विकसित होने से कमल अन्य नहीं हो जाता है, अपितु प्रत्यभिज्ञा के आधार पर कहते हैं कि कमल वही है। वांश के दलों की क्रिया भी विकसित होता हुआ कमल दलों की क्रिया के समान है। वांश में भी प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्व होने से स्पष्ट है कि वह वांश अन्य नहीं है। यह असंदिग्ध रूप से कहा जा सकता है कि वांश के दलों में जिस विभाग से शब्द की उत्पत्ति होती है वह विभागज होता है। उस प्रकार से कार्य द्रव्य भी नष्ट नहीं होता है। वांश के दलों में अवरुद्ध आकाश के भाग का विभाग वांश के दलों की क्रिया से नहीं होती है। वांश के दलों में अवरुद्ध आकाश के भाग के विभाग का विभाग के अतिरिक्त अन्य कारण नहीं है। अतः वैशेषिक कहते हैं कि शब्द का विभागजत्व विभागज होता है। जिस प्रकार से विभागज विभाग एक गुण है उसी के तुल्य शब्द के विभागजत्व से शब्द का गुण होना

सिद्ध होता है। इससे स्पष्ट है कि शब्द का विभागजत्व उसके गुणत्व के निश्चय का हेतु है, संशय का नहीं।<sup>६८</sup>

शब्द का विभागजत्व ही शब्द को गुण होने का निर्दुष्ट हेतु है। विभाग से द्रव्य या कर्म का जन्म संभव नहीं है। विभाग को द्रव्य के अनुत्पादक में समवेत मानते हैं तो वह द्रव्य के जन्म का कारण नहीं कहा जा सकता है। विभाग को द्रव्य के उत्पादक में समवेत मानते हैं तो संयोग के नाश से वह विनाशक ही होता है। विभाग को कर्म का कारण मानते हैं तो विभाग कर्म में नहीं होने में आद्य विभाग की उत्पत्ति ही नहीं होती है। पूर्व कर्म के अभाव में उस कर्म का उत्तर कर्म का जन्म भी संभव नहीं है। यदि उत्तर संयोग से पूर्व कर्म की निवृत्ति स्वीकार करते हैं तो विभाग की भी निवृत्ति हो जाती है। विभाग की निवृत्ति हो जाने से विभाग से उत्तर कर्म का जन्म नहीं हो सकता है। उससे सिद्ध होता है कि शब्द का विभागजत्व ही शब्द के गुण होने का प्रमाण है। विभागजत्व शब्द के गुण होने की असंदिग्ध व्याप्ति है। विभाग के अवान्तर विशेष को मानकर असाधारण दोष नहीं दिखाया जा सकता है। उस प्रकार से असाधारण दोष दिखाने में धूम भी अग्नि का अगमक होना चाहिये। अतः यह कहना संगत नहीं कि विभाग से द्रव्य का या कर्म का जन्म संभव है। उदयनाचार्य का कथन है कि उस प्रकार से भी भाष्य में कहे गये उदाहरण का ही व्युत्पादन होता है।<sup>६९</sup>

उद्योतकर के अनुसार विभाग शब्द का असमवायि कारण है, विभाग का नहीं। वे कहते हैं कि शब्द का विभागजत्व संशय का हेतु है, निश्चय का नहीं। जो विभागज विभाग को अस्वीकार करते हैं उनके लिये शब्द का विभागजत्व संशय का और जो स्वीकार करते हैं उनके लिये निश्चय का हेतु है। वे जो विभागज विभाग को स्वीकार करते हुए शब्द के विभागजत्व को उसका निश्चय का हेतु मानते हैं वे विभागज विभाग के तुल्य शब्द को उसके विभागजत्व के आधार पर उसे गुण कहते हैं। विभागज विभाग शब्द का भी असमवायि कारण हो तो शब्द के इस असमवायिकारणकत्व से शब्द इस असमवायिकारण से उत्पन्न होता है,

अन्य पदार्थ नहीं। इस प्रकार शब्द का विभागजत्व नामक उसका असमवायि कारण शब्द के अतिरिक्त अन्यत्र संभव नहीं है। शब्द के इस विशेषधर्म को उसके तुल्य जातियों में और शब्द से भिन्न पदार्थों में दोनों प्रकार से देखे जाने से विभागजत्व से संशय होता है।<sup>10</sup>

वाचस्पति कहते हैं कि विभागज विभाग हो तथापि इस प्रकारक विभागजत्व शब्द का असाधारणधर्म ही है। असाधारणधर्म होने से विभागजत्व निश्चय का नहीं अपितु संशय का हेतु है। वाचस्पति के शब्दों में –

“अस्तु वा विभागजो विभागः, तथापि विभागजत्वमीदृशमसाधारणमेवेत्यताह अस्तु वा तस्याभ्युगतविभागस्यापि विभागजत्वमसाधारणं विशिष्टम्।”<sup>11</sup>

### विभाग, विभाग का असमवायिकारण है या शब्द का

वैशेषिक के अनुसार विभाग, विभाग का असमवायि कारण है। वैशेषिक के विपरीत नैयायिक का मत है कि विभाग विभाग का नहीं, अपितु शब्द का असमवायि कारण है। नैयायिक के अनुसार शब्द का विभागजत्व उसका असाधारणधर्म है और उससे संशय उत्पन्न होता है। नैयायिक अपने मत को स्पष्ट करने के लिये कहते हैं कि विभागज विभाग दो विधियों से होने से दो प्रकारक होते हैं। (1) कारण मात्र के विभाग से उत्पन्न विभाग – द्रव्य का अवयव उसका कारण होता है। उस कारण में उत्पन्न क्रिया जिस समय द्रव्य के उत्पादक संयोग के विनाशक विभाग उत्पन्न करता है उस समय वह क्रिया द्रव्य का आकाशादि देश के साथ विभाग उत्पन्न नहीं करता है। द्रव्य का आकाश से विभाग द्रव्य के अवयव रूप कारणों के विभाग से उत्पन्न होता है। द्रव्य के अवयवों के विभाग से द्रव्य का नाश होता है और पुनः द्रव्य का आकाश के साथ विभाग होता है। द्रव्य का आकाश के साथ विभाग द्रव्य का कारण मात्र के विभाग से उत्पन्न होता है। वह जो द्रव्य के उत्पादक संयोग के विरोधी विभाग का उत्पादक होता है वह द्रव्य के उत्पादक संयोग के विरोधी विभाग के अनुत्पादक को दूर हटाता है और इस प्रकार आकाश



को भी दूर हटाता है। जैसे जल से वह्नि दूर हटने से धूम स्वयं ही दूर हो जाता है। (2) कारणाकारण विभाग से उत्पन्न विभाग – दीवाल का हाथ से विभाग होने से हमारे शरीर का भी दीवाल से विभाग हो जाता है। शरीर और दीवाल का विभाग शरीर की क्रिया से उत्पन्न नहीं होता है क्योंकि शरीर उस समय निष्क्रिय होता है। हाथ की क्रिया से शरीर और दीवाल का विभाग उत्पन्न नहीं हो सकता है क्योंकि एक आश्रय में होने वाली क्रिया उस आश्रय से भिन्न देशों में विभाग उत्पन्न नहीं कर सकता है। अतः शरीर और दीवाल का विभाग शरीर का कारण हाथ और अकारणीभूत दीवाल के विभाग से उत्पन्न होता है। शरीर और दीवाल का विभाग कारण और अकारण से उत्पन्न होने वाला विभाग है। कायाकाश विभाग कारणाकारणविभाग पूर्वक होता है, कारण मात्र विभाग पूर्वक नहीं। वांश के दलों में विभाग कारणमात्र विभाग पूर्वक होता है। यह विभाग विभाग से उत्पन्न नहीं है। इसी भिन्नता के आधार पर नैयायिक वैशेषिक को उत्तर देते हैं।

वाचस्पति का अभिमत है कि वांश के दो दलों में परस्पर विभाग शब्द का निमित्त कारण, और दलों में अवरुद्ध आकाश का विभाग शब्द का असमवायि कारण है। उनके अनुसार वांश के दलों के विभाग से उत्पन्न शब्द, ढोलक तथा दण्ड के संयोग से उत्पन्न शब्द से भिन्न है। ढोलक और आकाश का संयोग ढोलक से उत्पन्न शब्द का असमवायि कारण होता है, परन्तु वांश के दलों और आकाश का संयोग फटते वांश से उत्पन्न शब्द का असमवायि कारण नहीं होता है। वांश के दलों में अवरुद्ध आकाश का विभाग शब्द का असमवायि कारण है। वांश के दलों के विभाग से उत्पन्न शब्द अपने समानजातीय शब्द के असमवायि कारण से उत्पन्न होता है क्योंकि उन शब्दों का शब्दत्व उन शब्दों के असाधारण-कारणजन्य होता है। वांश के दलों के विभाग से उत्पन्न शब्द का शब्दत्व उसके असाधारणकारणजन्य होने से वह अपने समानजातीय के असमवायि कारणजन्य होता है। वे सभी शब्द जो अपने असाधारणकारण से उत्पन्न होता है वे सभी अपने समानजातीय शब्द के असमवायि कारण जन्य होते हैं। ढोलक और दण्ड के संयोग से उत्पन्न

शब्द का असमवायि कारण ढोलक और आकाश का संयोग होता है। और वांश दलों के विभाग से उत्पन्न शब्द का असमवायि कारण दलों में अवरुद्ध आकाश का विभाग होता है। इसीलिए वाचस्पति कहते हैं कि वांश के दलों के विभाग से उत्पन्न शब्द का असमवायि कारण, ढोलक और दण्ड के संयोग से उत्पन्न शब्द के असमवायि कारण के तुल्य नहीं है। दलों में अवरुद्ध आकाश का विभाग कारण मात्र के विभाग से उत्पन्न होता है। अंगुलि और आकाश के विभाग से उत्पन्न हस्ताकाश विभाग कायाकाश विभाग का असमवायि कारण होता है। उस प्रकार से भी ये दोनों भिन्न हैं। वाचस्पति कहते हैं कि भाष्यकार शब्द के विभागजत्व से उसके संशयत्व की सिद्धि में दलों के परस्पर विभाग को शब्दोत्पत्ति का निमित्त कारण और कारण मात्र के विभाग से उत्पन्न वांश के दलों में अवरुद्ध आकाश के विभाग को असमवायि कारण कहते हैं। भाष्यकार के अनुसार अंगुलि और आकाश के विभाग से उत्पन्न कायाकाश विभाग इस प्रकारक नहीं है। वह कारणाकारण विभाग से उत्पन्न होता है, कारण मात्र के विभाग से नहीं। अतएव वैशेषिक का मत कि शब्द का विभागजत्व उसके निश्चयत्व का हेतु है संशयत्व का नहीं एक विवादित मान्यता है।<sup>13</sup>

### वैशेषिक के विभागज-विभाग की संकल्पना का खंडन

वैशेषिक के अनुसार विभाग कर्मज नहीं होता है। उनके अनुसार विभाग से संयोग का नाश और संयोग-नाश से द्रव्य का नाश होता है। द्वितन्तुक पट की उत्पत्ति के लिये दोनों तन्तुओं का संयोग आवश्यक है। विभाग को कर्मज कहने से तन्तु की अवयवों की क्रिया से उन अवयवों में विभाग होने से तन्तु का नाश होने से पट का नाश होता है। अतः वैशेषिक के अनुसार विभाग को कर्मज कहने से द्रव्य-नाश की समस्या उठती है। वाचस्पति का अभिमत है कि हमें विभागज विभाग का ज्ञान ही नहीं होता है, और फलतः शब्द के विभागजत्व से उसका निश्चयत्व नहीं सिद्ध किया जा सकता है। उनके अनुसार शब्द का विभागजत्व शब्द के निश्चयत्व का नहीं अपितु उसके संशयत्व का हेतु

है। वैशेषिक यह कह सकते हैं कि कमल के पत्रों का विभाग और उन पत्रों का आकाश के साथ विभाग को क्रम से होने में प्रमाण का अभाव होने से यह नहीं कह सकते कि कमल के पत्रों की क्रिया दोनों विभागों का कारण है। वाचस्पति का कहना है कि कमल के पत्रों का विभाग और पत्रों का आकाश के साथ विभाग वांश के दलों का विभाग और दलों का आकाश के साथ विभाग के तुल्य है। उनका कथन है कि द्रव्य के अवयवों की क्रिया से संयोग का नाश और संयोग के नाश से द्रव्य नाश की समस्या नहीं उठायी जा सकती है। वाचस्पति द्रव्य का उत्पादक संयोग का अप्रतिद्वन्द्वी विभाग, और द्रव्य का उत्पादक संयोग का प्रतिद्वन्द्वी विभाग में भेद करते हैं। वे कहते हैं कि कर्म द्रव्य के उत्पादक संयोग का अप्रतिद्वन्द्वी विभाग का जनक होता है। द्रव्य-नाश के लिये कर्म को द्रव्य का उत्पादक संयोग का प्रतिद्वन्द्वी विभाग का जनक होना चाहिये। अतः वाचस्पति के मत में वैशेषिक द्रव्य-नाश की समस्या नहीं उठा सकते हैं। वैशेषिक यह युक्ति देते हैं कि वांश के दोनों दलों की क्रिया वांश के दोनों दलों के विभाग का और उनका आकाश के साथ विभाग का कारण है, परन्तु कमल के पत्रों की क्रिया उनके विभाग का कारण है और पत्रों का आकाश के साथ विभाग पत्रों के विभाग से जन्म लेता है। यदि कमल के पत्रों की क्रिया दोनों विभागों का कारण हो तो वांश दलों की क्रिया द्रव्य का उत्पादक संयोग का प्रतिद्वन्द्वी विभाग को जन्म देना चाहिये और इस प्रकार द्रव्य का नाश होना चाहिये। कमल का उदाहरण और वांश का उदाहरण दोनों में से किसी में भी उनके दो विभागों को एक ही वार होने का निश्चय और क्रम से होने का निश्चय का प्रमाण का अभाव एक नहीं है। इस आधार पर वैशेषिक कहते हैं कि क्रिया और विभागजनकत्व में संदेह होने से दोनों में व्याप्य-व्यापक भाव का निश्चय असंभव है। वैशेषिक के अनुसार क्रिया और विभागजनकत्व में व्याप्ति का अवधारण नहीं होने से विभाग कर्मज नहीं है। वाचस्पति के अनुसार विभाग कर्मज होता है और एक क्रिया दूसरी क्रिया से विलक्षण होती है। एक क्रिया द्रव्योत्पादक संयोग का विरोधी विभाग का जनक हो सकती है तो दूसरी अविरोधी

विभाग का जनक हो सकती है। क्रिया की इस विलक्षणता को हमें स्वीकार करना चाहिये और इस प्रकार यह स्वीकार करना चाहिये कि एक क्रिया एक विभाग को जन्म देती है तो दूसरी दूसरे विभाग को जन्म देती है। अतः वैशेषिक का मत कि विभाग को कर्मज मानने से द्रव्यनाश की समस्या उठती है उचित नहीं है। वाचस्पति कहते हैं कि उस उदाहरण के बल से विभागज विभाग की सिद्धि नहीं होती है।<sup>53</sup>

उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार वैशेषिक अवयवों की क्रिया और विभाग में व्याप्ति की अवधारणा पर प्रश्न कर सकते हैं, परन्तु उन्हें यह स्वीकार करना चाहिये कि जो क्रिया द्रव्य का अनुत्पादक संयोग का विरोधी विभाग को जन्म देता है वह क्रिया द्रव्य का उत्पादक संयोग का विरोधी विभाग को जन्म नहीं देता है। क्रिया की यह विलक्षणता है कि एक क्रिया द्रव्योत्पादक संयोग का विरोधी विभाग को जन्म देता है तो दूसरी क्रिया अनुत्पादक संयोग का विरोधी विभाग को जन्म देता है। वैशेषिक का अभिमत है कि दोनों विभागों की उत्पत्ति में कर्म से द्रव्य के अवयवों में स्पन्दन होता है, और स्पन्दन से अवयवों में संयोग का नाश और अवयवों में संयोग नाश से द्रव्य नाश होता है। वैशेषिक के इस मत के विरुद्ध उदयनाचार्य कहते हैं कि अवयवों की क्रिया से द्रव्य का नाश नहीं होता है। उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार जो कर्म अनुत्पादक संयोग का विरोधी विभाग का जनक होता है वह उत्पादक संयोग का विरोधी विभाग का जनक नहीं होता है। कर्म की विलक्षणता के आधार पर वैशेषिक के मत का विपरीत सिद्ध होता है और विभाग को कर्मज होने से वैशेषिक द्रव्य के नाश की समस्या नहीं उठा सकते हैं।<sup>54</sup>

उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार विभाग की उक्त विलक्षणता स्वीकार करना आवश्यक है, अन्यथा विलक्षण क्रिया से विलक्षण कार्य उत्पन्न होने के नियम की उत्पत्ति नहीं होती है। विलक्षण कार्य अपने विलक्षण हेतु से ही जन्म लेता है। फलतः विभाग की विलक्षणता के अनुरोध से कर्म की विलक्षणता भी स्वीकार करनी चाहिये। कर्म की विलक्षणता उसकी जाति के कारण या उनके सहकारियों के कारण हो सकती है। कर्म का

वैलक्षण्य उत्पादकानुत्पादकसंयोग के विरोधी दो विभागों की जनकता के पद में या अनुत्पादक संयोग का विरोधी विभाग—मात्र की जनकता के पद में या अनुत्पादक संयोग—मात्र का विरोधी विभाग की जनकता के पद में नहीं समझा जा सकता है। इस प्रकार उदयनाचार्य इस निष्कर्ष पर पहुँचते हैं कि अनुत्पादक संयोग का विरोधी विभाग का जनक होना ही कर्म का उपहार है। कर्म अनुत्पादक संयोग का विरोधी विभाग का जनक होता है, फलतः वह उत्पादक संयोग का विरोधी विभाग का जनक नहीं हो सकता है। अतएव द्रव्य—नाश की समस्या नहीं उठायी जा सकती है। अपनी इस युक्ति के आधार पर उदयनाचार्य कहते हैं कि विभाग को कर्मज कहने में विरोध नहीं है। तन्तु के अवयवों का संयोग, और पुनः तन्तुओं का संयोग पट का उत्पादक संयोग है। परन्तु तन्तु और वीरण का संयोग पट का अनुत्पादक संयोग है। वीरण का संयोग तन्तु से होता है और वह वीरणक्रिया से सर्वथा रहित होता है। तन्तु पट का उत्पादक, और वीरण अनुत्पादक होता है। तन्तु पट का कारण, और वीरण अकारण है और उन दोनों का संयोग कारणाकारण संयोग है। वीरण का उत्तर संयोग तन्तु के उत्तर संयोग का जनक है और वीरण के इस जनकत्व में ही कर्म को उत्पादक तन्तु के उत्तर संयोग का जनकत्व होता है। उस प्रकार से नहीं होने में कारणाकारण संयोग होता है। जिस प्रकार से क्रिया को क्रम से होने में प्रमाण का अभाव है उस प्रकार से यहाँ भी प्रमाण नहीं है। एक क्रिया दो अवयव मात्र में पाये जाने वाले एक विभाग को जन्म देती है, तो अन्य क्रिया दो अवयवों में पाये जाने वाले तथा अवयव और अनवयव में पाये जाने वाले दो विभागों को जन्म देती है। जिस प्रकार से विभाग में यह विलक्षणता पायी जाती है उस प्रकार से यह भी स्वीकार करना चाहिये कि एक क्रिया अनुत्पादक संयोग का विरोधी विभाग का जनक होता है तो दूसरी उत्पादकानुत्पादक संयोग का विरोधी विभाग का जनक होता है। इस प्रकार विभाग कर्मज होता है और द्रव्य नाश की समस्या नहीं उठती है।<sup>५४</sup>

उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार एक ही समय में देश का सहस्र विभाग संभव है, फलतः यह कहना उचित नहीं कि विभाग विभागज होता है। उनके अनुसार विभागज विभाग के पक्ष में प्रमाण ही नहीं है। वैशेषिक का मत है कि वांश के दो दलों में विभाग से संयोग का नाश और संयोग के नाश से द्रव्य का नाश होता है। जिस समय संयोग के नाश से द्रव्य का नाश होता है उस समय वांश के दोनों दलों का विभाग आकाश से विभाग करता है। इस प्रकार वैशेषिक के अनुसार विभाग विभागज होता है। उदयनाचार्य कहते हैं कि कर्म नियुक्त नहीं होने से विभाग से संयोग का नाश, और संयोग के नाश से द्रव्य का नाश का क्रम प्राप्त नहीं होता है। विभागज विभाग में दो विभाग होते हैं और प्रथम विभाग से द्वितीय विभाग का जन्म होता है। नियुक्त कर्म से दोनों विभागों का जन्म क्रम से या एक ही बार होना चाहिये। नियुक्त कर्म दोनों विभाग क्रम से नहीं कर सकता है। कर्म विभाग का आरम्भ अविलम्ब करता है और विभाग के आरम्भ में कर्म की अपेक्षा नहीं होती है। कर्म की अनपेक्षता से कर्म का अविलम्बकारित्व का निश्चय होता है। कर्म के अविलम्बकारित्व के निश्चय से नियुक्त कर्म दोनों विभाग क्रम से नहीं करता है। विभाग के आरम्भ में कर्म अपेक्षित होने में आद्य विभाग बाद के विभाग को जन्म नहीं देना चाहिये। विभाग में संयोग का ध्वंस होता है और विभाग होना क्रम से मानने में उत्तर संयोग का ध्वंस कर्तव्य होने में पूर्व संयोग का ध्वंस अपेक्षित है। उत्तर संयोग के ध्वंस से पहले पूर्व संयोग के ध्वंस की अपेक्षा होना विलम्ब कहलाता है। परन्तु आगन्तुक संयोग को ध्यान में रखकर विचार करने से स्पष्ट है कि वहाँ पूर्व संयोग का ध्वंस अपेक्षित नहीं है। अतः कर्म से दोनों विभाग क्रम से नहीं होता है। कर्म से दोनों विभाग एक ही बार में भी नहीं होता है। जिस समय कर्म दलों को आकाश से विभाग करता है उस समय कर्म अन्य अवयवों को आकाश से विभाग नहीं करता है। इस प्रकार कर्म दोनों दलों में विभाग क्रम से या एक ही बार नहीं करता है। इस प्रकार कर्म दोनों दलों में विभाग क्रम से या एक ही बार नहीं करता है। आद्य विभाग होने में कर्म की निरपेक्षता के फलस्वरूप आद्य विभाग ही काल

है। द्वितीय विभाग कर्तव्य होने में प्रथम काल के बाद का काल निरपेक्ष होता है। परन्तु उससे काल नामक द्रव्य की उपेक्षा नहीं होती है। कर्म से विभाग क्रम से या एक ही बार नहीं होता है। फलतः विभाग विभागज नहीं है। उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार वैशेषिक का मत विकसित होता हुआ कमल दलों के उदाहरण से ही निरस्त हो जाता है। अवयव की क्रिया से ही वांश के दलों में अवरुद्ध आकाश का विभाग होता है और यह विकसित होता हुआ कमल दलों की क्रिया में देखा जा सकता है।<sup>६६</sup>

### अनेकधर्म की व्याख्या असमानधर्म के पद में संभव नहीं है

यह कहा जा सकता है कि समानधर्म का संशय के हेतु के रूप में प्रयोग हो जाने से 'अनेकधर्म' का अर्थ असमानधर्म है। इस मत के अनुसार 'समानधर्म' और 'असमानधर्म' दोनों संशय के हेतु हैं। 'समानधर्म' का उपयोग हो चुका है और 'असमानधर्म' का उपयोग नहीं हुआ है, अतः सूत्रस्थ 'अनेक' पद असमान का वाचक है।<sup>६७</sup>

यहाँ प्रश्न उठता है कि यदि अनेक पद असमान का ही वाचक है तो सूत्र में समानासमानधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय होना क्यों नहीं कहा गया? इस प्रश्न के उत्तर में यह कहा जा सकता है कि 'समानासमानधर्म' पद का सूत्र में प्रयोग नहीं होने के दो कारण हैं— असमानधर्म से अनेक से व्यावृत्त होने का लाभ नहीं होता है। जो धर्म अनेक से व्यावृत्त होता है वह अनेकधर्म कहलाता है। यह विग्रह असमानधर्म से प्राप्त नहीं होता है। अतः सूत्र में असमानधर्म अभिप्रेत होते हुए भी अनेकधर्म का प्रयोग किया गया है। द्वितीयतः सूत्र में 'असमान' के स्थान पर 'अनेक' का प्रयोग होने से एक वर्ण का लाभ होता है। असमान 'की अपेक्षा 'अनेक' में एक वर्ण कम होता है। 'अनेक' पद का प्रयोग लाघव होता है। लाघव के कारण ही सूत्र में 'अनेक' पद का प्रयोग किया गया है।<sup>६८</sup>

उद्योतकर 'अनेकधर्म' को 'असाधारणधर्म' के अर्थ में ग्रहण करते हैं। वे कहते हैं कि 'अनेक' पद को 'असमान' के अर्थ में नहीं ग्रहण करना चाहिये। उद्योतकर के इस मत के विरुद्ध यह कहा जा सकता है कि यदि 'अनेक' को 'असाधारण' के अर्थ में ग्रहण करते हैं तो असाधारणधर्म जो निश्चय का हेतु है वह संशय का हेतु हो जाता है। जीवित शरीर में आत्मा का अस्तित्व सिद्ध करने के लिये यह युक्ति दी जाती है कि जीवित शरीर आत्मा रहित नहीं है क्योंकि आत्मा रहित होने से शरीर को अप्राणादिमान होने की समस्या उठ जाती है। प्राणादिमान होना ही जीवित शरीर का असाधारणधर्म है और यह असाधारणधर्म निश्चय का हेतु है, संशय का नहीं। असाधारणधर्म को संशय का हेतु कहने से अप्राणादिमान होना जो आत्मरहित होने के निश्चय का हेतु है वह असाधारणधर्म होने से संशय का हेतु हो जाता है। यह दोष आ जाने से 'अनेकधर्म' को 'असाधारण' के अर्थ में नहीं ग्रहण करना चाहिये। इस युक्ति को उद्योतकर निम्न शब्दों में व्यक्त करते हैं —

"यद्यनेकधर्मार्थोऽसाधारणार्थः, असाधारणश्च धर्मः संशयकारणमिति, नेदं निरात्मकं जीवच्छरीरम्, अप्राणादिमत्त्वप्रसंगादित्ययमप्यसाधारणत्वात् संशयहेतुः प्राप्तः।" ५६

इस समस्या का निराकरण करते हुए उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि वह साधारणधर्म जो बिना व्यभिचार के सभी में पाये जाते हैं वे संशय के हेतु नहीं हैं। वही साधारणधर्म संशय के हेतु हैं जो अन्वयी नहीं हैं। वह साधारणधर्म जो व्यभिचारी हैं संशय का हेतु और वह साधारणधर्म जो व्यभिचारी नहीं हैं निर्णय का हेतु हैं। उसी प्रकार से असाधारणधर्म व्यभिचारी होने से संशय का हेतु और अव्यभिचारी होने से निर्णय का हेतु होता है। असाधारणधर्म को अन्य में अनुपस्थित होना चाहिये। उसे अनेकवृत्तित्व नहीं होना चाहिये। असाधारणधर्म को एकवृत्तित्व होने से वह अव्यभिचारी और अनेकवृत्तित्व होने से उसे व्यभिचारी कहा जाता है। उससे यह नहीं कह सकते कि एकवृत्तित्व या अनेकवृत्तित्व निर्णय या संशय का हेतु है। साधारणत्व या असाधारणत्व में व्यभिचार और



अव्यभिचार संशय या निर्णय का हेतु होता है। जो साधारण या असाधारणधर्म व्यभिचारी होता है वह संशय का और जो अव्यभिचारी होता है वह निर्णय का हेतु होता है।<sup>60</sup>

यदि साधारण और असाधारणधर्म का व्यभिचरित होना ही संशय का हेतु है अर्थात् साधारण और असाधारणधर्म सपक्ष और विपक्ष दोनों में पाये जाने से संशय का हेतु होता है तो वह धर्म समानधर्म कहलाता है। इस स्थिति में यही कहना पर्याप्त है कि समानधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय होता है। इस प्रकार अनेकधर्म के प्रसंग में पृथक् रूप से यह कहने का औचित्य समाप्त हो जाता है। उद्योतकर के अनुसार समानधर्म और असाधारणधर्म की व्यभिचारिता के अतिरिक्त अन्य संशय का कारण नहीं है। व्यभिचार भावात्मक और निषाधात्मक दोनों स्थितियों में हो सकता है। इस प्रकार व्यभिचार के दो भेद हो जाते हैं – विधीयमान व्यभिचार और प्रतिषिध्यमान व्यभिचार। समानधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय होने में विधीयमान का व्यभिचार और अनेकधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय होने में प्रतिषिध्यमान का व्यभिचार होता है। इसी भेद के कारण 'अनेकधर्म' को सूत्र में पृथक् अभिधान किया गया है।<sup>61</sup>

वाचस्पति कहते हैं कि फटते हुए वांश से शब्द की उत्पत्ति में उसका विभागजत्व असाधारणधर्म होता है। वह असाधारणधर्म व्यतिरेक रूप से संशय का हेतु है। वे असाधारणधर्म और अनेकधर्म के संबन्ध को स्पष्ट करते हैं। वस्तु का असाधारणधर्म उस वस्तु को उसके समानजातीय और असमानजातीय से व्यावृत्त करता है। वस्तु का असाधारणधर्म अनेक से व्यावृत्त होने से सिद्ध होता है। वस्तु का असाधारणधर्म अनेक में नहीं पाया जाता है। अनेक से व्यावृत्त होना 'अनेकधर्म' का लक्षण है। यह लक्षण 'अनेक' पद के अधीन होता है। वह व्यावृत्त 'असमान' पद से प्राप्त नहीं होता है। इसीलिए इस लाक्षणिक पद का ग्रहण किया गया है। वह धर्म जो अनेक से व्यावृत्त है 'अनेकधर्म' कहलाता है और 'असमान' के विग्रह से वर्णित नहीं होता है। असाधारणधर्म व्यतिरेक रूप से संशय का हेतु होता है।<sup>62</sup>

## अनेक-धर्म की व्याख्या नजसमास से संभव नहीं है

उद्योतकर अपने मत की व्याख्या के लिये कहते हैं कि अनेकधर्म की व्याख्या नजसमास से भी संभव नहीं है। उनका यह मत वाचस्पति की पंक्ति से स्पष्ट है –

“एवमनेकधर्मोपपत्तेरिति स्वमते व्याख्याय परमतव्याख्यानं दूषयितुमुपन्यस्यति – नज इति।”<sup>६३</sup>

कुछ नैयायिक ‘नज’ के पर्युदासविषयत्व के आधार पर विषय में दो अव्यभिचारी धर्मों के होने को ‘अनेकधर्म’ कहते हैं। वे कहते हैं कि विषय में एक से अधिक धर्मों का होना ही ‘अनेकधर्म’ है। ये अव्यभिचारी धर्म होते हैं और एक दूसरे के विरुद्ध होते हैं। विषय में दो विरुद्ध अव्यभिचारी धर्मों का होना ही संशय का हेतु है। जैसे – शब्द का श्रावणत्व और कृतकत्व। शब्द के श्रावणत्व के आधार पर शब्द, शब्दत्व के तुल्य, नित्य कहे जाते हैं। श्रावणत्व नामक शब्द का यह हेतु, हेतु के पाँचों रूपों का अनुसरण करता है। अतः यह हेतु अव्यभिचारी है। शब्द के कृतकत्व के आधार पर शब्द, घट के तुल्य, अनित्य कहे जाते हैं। कृतकत्व नामक यह हेतु हेतु के पाँचों रूपों का अनुसरण करते हैं, अतः यह हेतु भी अव्यभिचारी है। वाचस्पति की निम्न पंक्ति द्रष्टव्य है –

“नित्यः शब्दः श्रावणत्वात् शब्दत्ववदित्येकः पंचरूपोपन्नोऽव्यभिचारी हेतुः। अनित्यः शब्दः कृत-कत्वाद् घटवदिति चायमपरः पंचरूपोपन्नोऽव्यभिचारी हेतुरिति।”<sup>६४</sup>

नज पर आश्रित अनेकधर्म के इस व्याख्या से संशय होता है कि शब्द नित्य है या अनित्य। शब्द का दो विरुद्ध अव्यभिचारी हेतु यहाँ संशय का हेतु है।<sup>६५</sup>

उद्योतकर के अनुसार ये दोनों ही हेतु, हेतु के पाँचों रूपों का अनुसरण नहीं करते हैं और अव्यभिचारी नहीं कहे जा सकते हैं। वाचस्पति कहते हैं कि इन नैयायिकों का प्रयोग उचित नहीं है। ‘विरुद्ध’ शब्द का अर्थ विरुद्धार्थ होता है। विषय में इन दोनों हेतुओं के होने से अर्थ दो हो

जाते हैं और दोनों अर्थों का स्वरूप विरुद्ध हो जाता है। वाचस्पति के शब्दों में –

“न चायं प्रतिवादिनः प्रयोगोऽपि युक्त इति। विरुद्धशब्दस्यार्थो विरुद्धार्थ इति, स्वरूपमनयोर्विरुद्धं परस्परभाववदित्यर्थः।” ६६

एक अर्थ में दो विरुद्ध धर्म परस्पर अव्यभिचारी नहीं हो सकते हैं। वस्तु के दो विरुद्ध धर्मों को वस्तु का अव्यभिचारी होने से वस्तु का दो रूप प्राप्त होता है। एक वस्तु का दो रूप असंभव होने से एक अर्थ में दो विरुद्ध धर्म को वस्तु का अव्यभिचारी कहना संभव नहीं है। यदि एक वस्तु में दोनों धर्म अव्यभिचारी हैं तो एक वस्तु दो होना चाहिये। परन्तु एक वस्तु दो नहीं हो सकते हैं। इसीलिए दोनों धर्म एक वस्तु का अव्यभिचारी नहीं कहे जा सकते हैं।<sup>६७</sup>

बाह्यार्थ के स्वरूप पर आधारित यह युक्ति अधिक समीचीन है क्योंकि एक वस्तु कभी भी दो नहीं कहे जा सकते हैं। एक अर्थ में दो विरुद्ध धर्मों का होना संभव ही नहीं है। दो विरुद्ध धर्म एक वस्तु का अव्यभिचारी नहीं कहे जा सकते हैं। इस प्रतितर्क की सहायता से उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि ‘अनेकधर्म’ से ‘असाधारणधर्म’ का बोध होता है। इस प्रकार यह व्यवस्थित है कि वस्तु में ‘अनेकधर्म’ के ज्ञान से अर्थात् ‘असाधारणधर्म’ के ज्ञान से संशय होता है। उद्योतकर के शब्दों में –

“तदेवं व्यवस्थितमेतत् अनेकधर्मोपपत्तेरसाधारणात् धर्मात् संशय इति” ६८

**विप्रतिपत्ति होने से संशय : –**

सूत्रकार के अनुसार विप्रतिपत्ति संशय का तीसरा हेतु है। एक अर्थ में विरोधी कथनों का होना विप्रतिपत्ति कहलाता है। व्याघाती या विरोधी कथन एक साथ नहीं पाये जाते हैं। ‘आत्मा है’ यह एक दर्शन का मत है। और ‘आत्मा नहीं है’ यह दूसरे दर्शन का मत है। आत्मा का सद्भाव और असद्भाव दोनों एकत्र संभव नहीं है और न दोनों में से किसी एक

का साधक हेतु उपलब्ध है। वहाँ हमें तत्त्व का अवधारण नहीं होता है। फलतः संशय होता है कि आत्मा है या नहीं है।<sup>६६</sup>

वात्स्यायन विषय की उपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय का दो भिन्न हेतु मानते हैं, फलतः वे इन दोनों को विप्रतिपत्ति के अन्तर्गत समाहित नहीं करते हैं। परन्तु उद्योतकर के अनुसार ये दोनों संशय के पृथक् हेतु नहीं हैं। उनके अनुसार ये दोनों अन्य हेतुओं के विशेषण हैं। इससे वे इन दोनों हेतुओं को विप्रतिपत्ति की व्याख्या में समाहित करते हैं। विषय के प्रसंग में विरोधी विचारों का होना विप्रतिपत्ति है। अर्थ विरोधी कथन का विषय होता है। विप्रतिपत्ति से संशय होने के लिये विषय के प्रसंग में विप्रतिपत्ति होना, विषय की उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि को अव्यवस्थित होना, तथा विशेषधर्म का विषय में स्मृति होना आवश्यक है।<sup>७०</sup>

वाचस्पति 'विप्रतिपत्ति' के प्रयोग का औचित्य स्पष्ट करते हुए कहते हैं कि यद्यपि विषय के प्रसंग में विरुद्ध कथन विप्रतिपत्ति है, तथापि वादी और प्रतिवादी को ज्ञात वह विरुद्ध कथन अत्यन्त परोक्ष होता है। विरुद्ध कथन को परोक्ष होने से संशय की उत्पत्ति नहीं होती है। इसी को ध्यान में रखते हुए सूत्रकार 'विप्रतिपत्ति' का प्रयोग करते हैं। इसे संशय का हेतु कहना सूत्रकार का कार्य है। वाचस्पति के शब्दों में —

"यद्यपि विरुद्धा प्रतिपत्तिर्ज्ञानं विप्रतिपत्तिः, तथापि तस्या वादिप्रतिवादिगताया अत्यन्तपरोक्षत्वात् संशयकारणत्वानुपपत्तेः स्वकार्यं प्रवादं लक्षयतीत्यर्थः।" ७१

**उपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था से संशय : —**

वात्स्यायन उपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय का चतुर्थ हेतु मानते हैं। तालाब और मरीचि दोनों में हमें पानी का प्रत्यक्ष होता है। तालाब में प्रत्यक्ष होता हुआ पानी सत् और मरीचि में प्रत्यक्ष होता हुआ पानी असत् है। अतः प्रत्यक्ष में कहीं कहीं तत्त्व के व्यवस्थापक प्रमाण की अनुपलब्धि से संशय होता है कि क्या सत् उपलब्ध होता है या असत्

उपलब्ध होता है। इस प्रकार विषय में उपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को वात्स्यायन संशय का हेतु कहते हैं।<sup>92</sup>

### अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था से संशय : —

वात्स्यायन 'अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था' को संशय का पाँचवां हेतु कहते हैं। वृक्ष के मूल और शाखा में जल पाया जाता है परन्तु उस सत् का हमें प्रत्यक्ष नहीं होता है। पुनः असत् का भी हमें प्रत्यक्ष नहीं होता है। अतः संशय होता है कि जो अप्रत्यक्ष है वह सत् है या असत्। वात्स्यायन के अनुसार —

"अनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातश्च। सच्च नोपलभ्यते मूलकीलकोदकादि, असच्चानुत्पन्नं निरुद्धं वा। ततः क्वचिदनुपलभ्यमाने, किं सन्नोपलभ्यते, उतासदिति संशयो भवति। "93

### उद्योतकर द्वारा संशय के पाँच हेतुओं का खंडन और तीन हेतुओं की स्थापना

वात्स्यायन संशय के पाँच हेतुओं का प्रतिपादन करते हैं परन्तु उद्योतकर सूत्र की व्याख्या कर मात्र तीन ही हेतु प्रतिपादित करते हैं। वात्स्यायन के अनुसार संशय के लिये ज्ञाता और ज्ञेय दोनों ही उत्तरदायी हैं। उनके अनुसार समानधर्म और अनेकधर्म ज्ञेयस्थ तथा उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था ज्ञातृस्थ होते हैं। इस प्रकार विप्रतिपत्ति संशय का एक और हेतु होने से संशय के पाँच हेतु हैं। वात्स्यायन के शब्दों में—

"पूर्वः समानोऽनेकश्च धर्मो ज्ञेयस्थः, उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी पुनर्ज्ञातृस्थे। एतावता विशेषण पुनर्वचनम्। "94

ज्ञेयस्थ और ज्ञातृस्थ धर्म का भेद उद्योतकर को स्वीकार नहीं है। पुनः उनके अनुसार उपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था पृथक् रूप से संशय का कारण नहीं है। इन दोनों को संशय का कारणत्व नहीं है। वे अन्य हेतुओं के विशेषण मात्र हैं। उद्योतकर के

अनुसार समानधर्म और अनेकधर्म ज्ञेयस्थ नहीं होता है। वे विषय का धर्म और विषय के धर्म के ज्ञान में भेद करते हैं। उनके अनुसार विषय का धर्म संशय का कारण नहीं अपितु विषय के धर्म का ज्ञान संशय का कारण है। समानधर्म का ज्ञान और अनेकधर्म का ज्ञान संशय का कारण है और वह ज्ञाता में होते हैं। इस प्रकार ज्ञातृस्थ और ज्ञेयस्थ धर्म का भेद समाप्त हो जाता है। 'समानधर्म' नामक संशय के हेतु में विषय में हमें समानधर्म का ज्ञान होता है। भावात्मक पक्ष होने से यह धर्म विधीयमान धर्म हैं। 'अनेकधर्म' असाधारणधर्म होता है और यह धर्म विषय में अन्य धर्मों का निराकरण करता है। निषेधात्मक पक्ष होने से यह प्रतिषिध्यमान धर्म है। इसी आधार पर समानधर्म और अनेकधर्म को उद्योतकर संशय का पृथक् हेतु कहते हैं। विप्रतिपत्ति नामक संशय का हेतु वक्तागत होता है। श्रोता यह नहीं जानता कि कौन वक्ता विषय का सम्यक् प्रतिपादन कर रहा है और कौन मिथ्या प्रतिपादन कर रहा है। इससे श्रोता को संशय होता है। अतएव उद्योतकर के अनुसार संशय के मात्र तीन ही हेतु हैं और सूत्र के अन्य दो पद उनके विशेषण हैं।<sup>92</sup>

वाचस्पति के अनुसार साधक और बाधक प्रमाण का नहीं होना उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था है।

साधक प्रमाण का नहीं होना उपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था, और बाधक प्रमाण का नहीं होना अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था है। वे कहते हैं कि समान और अनेकधर्म का ज्ञान होने में तथा विशेष की स्मृति होने में और साधक—बाधक प्रमाण को नहीं होने में हमें संशय होता है। साधकप्रमाण या बाधकप्रमाण को होने में संशय नहीं होता है। इसीलिए उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था संशय का पृथक् कारण नहीं है। वाचस्पति के शब्दों में —

"नो खलु समानानेकधर्मोपलब्धौ सत्याम्, सत्यां च विशेषस्मृतौ साधकबाधकप्रमाणासद्भावे संशयो भवतीत्युक्तम्। तस्मात् नोपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थे पृथक् संशयकारणे इति।" <sup>93</sup>

यह विचारणीय है कि संशय के लिये ज्ञाता या ज्ञेय, या दोनों ही उत्तरदायी हैं। वस्तुतः ज्ञान की प्रक्रिया में ज्ञेय का धर्म निश्चित होता है। अतएव यह कहने का औचित्य नहीं है कि समानधर्म और अनेकधर्म ज्ञेयस्थ हैं। यह कहने का भी औचित्य नहीं है कि उपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था या अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था ज्ञातृस्थ होते हैं। ये दोनों अन्य हेतुओं के विशेषण हैं और उद्योतकर के अनुसार ये दोनों संशय के पृथक् हेतु नहीं हैं। उद्योतकर के अनुसार ज्ञेयस्थ और ज्ञातृस्थ धर्म का भेद नहीं है। यह समस्या उठाया जा सकता है कि यदि ज्ञातृस्थ और ज्ञेयस्थ धर्म का भेद स्वीकार नहीं है और ज्ञातृस्थत्व उन सभी हेतुओं का विशेष धर्म नहीं है तो ज्ञातृस्थत्व अविशेषित होने से समानधर्म, अनेकधर्म, और विप्रतिपत्ति नामक संशय के तीनों हेतुओं में भेद समाप्त हो जाता है। फलतः सूत्र में उन्हें पृथक् रूप से कहना व्यर्थ है। उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि समानधर्म और अनेकधर्म को संशय का पृथक् हेतु कहने के लिये ही उन्हें ज्ञाता में होने का प्रयोजन है।<sup>99</sup>

यह कहा जा सकता है कि उन हेतुओं में ज्ञातृस्थत्व अविशेषित होने से ज्ञातृस्थत्व के आधार पर तीनों हेतुओं में यह सभी समानधर्म ही हैं। फलतः अनेकधर्म और विप्रतिपत्ति नामक हेतु व्यर्थ हो जाने से उनका पृथक् प्रयोजन नहीं है। अतः यह कहना चाहिये कि विषय में समानधर्म का ज्ञान होने से और विशेष की अपेक्षा होने से अनवधारणात्मक ज्ञान नामक संशय होता है। उद्योतकर इस आक्षेप का खंडन करते हैं और कहते हैं कि सूत्रार्थ का ज्ञान नहीं होने से यह समस्या उठायी गयी है। उद्योतकर के अनुसार समानधर्म का ज्ञान, अनेकधर्म का ज्ञान, और विप्रतिपत्ति में भेद है। उन तीनों में जिस प्रकार से भेद है उस प्रकार से संशय के तीन हेतु कहे गये हैं।<sup>100</sup>

वात्स्यायन के अनुसार संशय का पाँच हेतु होने से संशय पाँच प्रकारक होते हैं। विषय में समानधर्म का ज्ञान होने से विषय में नाना अर्थों का ज्ञान होता है और हम विशेष की अपेक्षा करते हैं। यह ज्ञान संशय कहलाता है। वे कहते हैं कि जिस प्रकार से समानधर्म के प्रसंग में

कहा गया है उस प्रकार से शेष सभी पदों में कहना चाहिये। उद्योतकर के अनुसार सूत्र की यह व्याख्या उचित नहीं है। वे कहते हैं कि उपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था अन्य पूर्व तीन पदों का विशेषण होने से संशय के तीन ही हेतु कहे जा सकते हैं। इस प्रकार संशय के पाँच हेतु नहीं होने से संशय के पाँच प्रकार भी नहीं हैं। उद्योतकर के अनुसार विषय में समानधर्म का ज्ञान होने में, तथा उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था होने में विषय में नाना अर्थों का ज्ञान होता है और हम विशेष की अपेक्षा करते हैं। विशेष की अपेक्षा से विशिष्ट नाना अर्थों का ज्ञान विषय में संशय उत्पन्न करता है। यही व्याख्या अनेकधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय होने में तथा विप्रतिपत्ति से संशय होने में करनी चाहिये। अतः उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को उद्योतकर संशय का हेतु नहीं मानते और वे पूर्व पदों के विशेषण हैं। वाचस्पति के शब्दों में –

“साधकबाधकप्रमाणाभावरहितं त्रयमपि न संशयकारणमित्युक्तमिति।” ७६

इससे स्पष्ट है कि उद्योतकर एवं उनके टीकाकार, भाष्यकार से सहमत नहीं हैं और वे उपलब्धि तथा अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय का हेतु नहीं मानते हैं।<sup>१०</sup>

वात्स्यायन के अनुसार जो उपलब्ध है वह उपलब्ध हो भी सकता है या पुनः नहीं भी हो सकता है। जो अनुपलब्ध है वह अनुपलब्ध हो भी सकता है या नहीं भी हो सकता है। यही उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था है। इस आधार पर वात्स्यायन उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय के दो पृथक् हेतु मानते हैं। परन्तु उद्योतकर का कहना है कि उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि के इस अव्यवस्था के आधार पर उन्हें संशय के दो पृथक् हेतु कहना अनुचित है क्योंकि इससे लोकज्ञान का विरोध होता है। जो यह कहते हैं कि उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था से संशय होता है वे लोगों को निश्चय पूर्वक प्रवर्तित होने से बाधित करते हैं। वाचस्पति कहते हैं कि इन दोनों को संशय का कारण



कहने से अति प्रसंग की समस्या उठती है। लोक में जो भी कुछ उपलब्ध या अनुपलब्ध है उसके प्रसंग में संशय हो जाता है। अतिप्रसंग होने से लोग निश्चय पूर्वक प्रवर्तित नहीं होते हैं। वाचस्पति के शब्दों में—

“अपि चैतयोः पृथक् संशयकारणत्वेऽतिप्रसंगात् निश्चयपूर्वं न प्रवर्तत लोकः तथा च लोकविरोध इति।”<sup>८१</sup>

उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि के इन दो गतियों के आधार पर उन्हें संशय का हेतु कहने से जो कुछ उपलब्ध है सर्वत्र उसका संशय होना चाहिये। उपलब्धि के द्वैविध्य से जो संशय होता है उस संशय से निवारण संभव नहीं है। इस प्रकार वहाँ संशय होना निश्चित है। हमारे अनुभव में संशय का निवारण नहीं होने से लोकज्ञान बाधित होता है। यह कहना कि विशेष का दर्शन हो जाने से संशय का निवारण हो जाता है तो उद्योतकर का उत्तर है कि उपलब्धि की दो गति होने से यह स्वीकार नहीं है। यह समस्या विशेष का दर्शन होने में भी बनी रह जाती है। यह समस्या बनी रह जाती है कि जिस विशेष का दर्शन हो रहा है वह सत् है या असत् है। सर्वत्र उपलब्धि के द्वैविध्य से संशय होता है और इस प्रकार संशय अनिवारणीय हो जाता है। उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि अनुपलब्धि भी द्वैविध्य होती है। जो अनुपलब्ध है वह अनुपलब्ध हो भी सकता है या पुनः नहीं भी हो सकता है। यह अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था है और इसे वात्स्यायन संशय का हेतु कहते हैं। उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि इसे संशय का हेतु कहने से कहीं भी संशय से छुटकारा नहीं है। इस प्रकार लोक-ज्ञान बाधित होता है। जब घर में सांप नहीं है तो अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय का हेतु कहने से यह संशय होता है कि घर सर्पवान् है या असर्पवान्। इस प्रकारक संशय का निवारण संभव नहीं है। इस युक्ति के आधार पर उद्योतकर कहते हैं कि उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय का पृथक् हेतु मानने से लोक-ज्ञान का विरोध हो जाता है। अतः ये संशय के हेतु नहीं हैं।<sup>८२</sup>

वाचस्पति कहते हैं कि उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि के इस द्वैविध्य के आधार पर उन्हें संशय का हेतु कहना उचित नहीं है। उपलब्धि या अनुपलब्धि की निश्चय पूर्वक निःशंकाता नहीं होती है। इन्हें संशय का हेतु मानने से उच्छेदवाद का जन्म होता है। वात्स्यायन यह नहीं कह सकते कि अनभ्यासदशापन्न में उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था से संशय होता है। अभ्यासदशापन्न में यह अव्यवस्था नहीं पायी जाती है फलतः वहाँ संशय नहीं होता है। वाचस्पति के अनुसार अनभ्यासदशापन्न में भी उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था से संशय नहीं होता है। उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था से संशय होने के लिये विषय में समानधर्म का ज्ञान आवश्यक है। अनभ्यासदशापन्न में दूर से वह्नि के ज्ञान में यह संशय नहीं होता कि वह पर्वत है या बादल। वह्नि, पर्वत, और बादल में किसी भी प्रकार से धर्म की समानता नहीं है। दूर से वह्नि के दर्शन में यह संशय हो सकता है कि यह कुसुम के फूल का ढेर है या उषाकलीन प्रकाश। इन तीनों में समानता है। यहाँ समानधर्म का ज्ञान इतर कारण के साथ मिलकर संशय उत्पन्न करता है। इस प्रकार समानधर्म के दर्शन के बिना अयोग्यानुपलब्धि से भी संशय नहीं होता है। वाचस्पति के अनुसार सूत्र में उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय का पृथक् हेतु कहने से विशेष के दर्शन से भी शंका का निवारण नहीं होता है। हमें सर्वत्र शंका होनी चाहिये और इस प्रकार से प्रमा का उच्छेद हो जाता है।<sup>53</sup>

उदयनाचार्य का कथन है कि अनभ्यासदशापन्न में भी उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था से संशय नहीं होता है। विषय की उपलब्धि में अन्य प्रमाण नहीं होने का निश्चय ही अनभ्यासदशापन्न कहलाता है। इस स्थिति में विषय में सामान्य ज्ञान ही होता है। विषय के सामान्यबुद्धित्व की उपलब्धि से सत्यत्व असत्यत्व का हमें संदेहहोता है। यदि अनभ्यासदशापन्न का यह अर्थ अभिप्रेत है तो यह सूत्र के प्रथम पद से ही जाना जाता है। अतः अनभ्यासदशापन्न में भी उपलब्धि या अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था संशय का हेतु नहीं है। यह कह सकते हैं कि अनभ्यासदशापन्न में हम उसके उपायक अर्थ में संदेह करते हैं। यदि

यह अभिप्रेत है तो इस स्थिति में संदेह अर्थ के स्वरूप के कारण हो सकता है, या देशकाल के कारण हो सकता है, या प्रकार के कारण हो सकता है। अनभ्यासदशापत्र में अर्थ में संशय स्वरूपतः नहीं हो सकता है क्योंकि यहाँ विरोध हो जाता है। अर्थ में संशय स्वरूपतः होने से हमें 'यह यह है या नहीं है' नामक कथन प्राप्त होता है। परन्तु यह कहना कि 'यह यह है या नहीं है' संभव ही नहीं है। अतएव उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार अनभ्यासदशापत्र में उसके उपायक अर्थ में संदेह स्वरूपतः नहीं कहा जा सकता है। पुनः उदयनाचार्य कहते हैं कि अनभ्यासदशापत्र में उपायक अर्थ में देशकाल के आधार पर संशय निद्रा के संकट से ही संभव है। निद्रा के संकट से संशय होने में संशय मानसिक ही कहा जा सकता है। निद्रा का संकट का अभाव के निश्चय से संशय के इस कारण का निषेध हो जाता है। अतः अनभ्यासदशापत्र की स्थिति में उसके उपायक अर्थ में संशय देशकालतः नहीं होता है। इतर कारण सहित विषय के समानधर्म का ज्ञान ही संशय उत्पन्न करता है। दूर से वहि के ज्ञान में उपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था होती है, परन्तु हमें यह संशय नहीं होता कि विषय पर्वत है या बादल। उदयनाचार्य का कहना है कि विषय 'स्थाणु है या पुरुष' नामक कथन में स्थाणु या पुरुष उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि के अनुत्पाद के कारण ही अव्यवस्थित होते हैं। उदयनाचार्य कहते हैं कि अनभ्यासदशापत्र के मूल उदाहरण में जल का ज्ञान अप्रामाण्य की शंका के कारण ही अव्यवस्थित होता है। अतः उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार अनभ्यासदशापत्र में भी उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था से संशय नहीं होता है।<sup>६४</sup>

वाचस्पति कहते हैं कि समानधर्म के दर्शन के बिना अयोग्यानुपलब्धि से भी संशय नहीं होता है। उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार अयोग्यानुपलब्धि से उत्पन्न संशय का विषय अत्यन्तानुपलब्धि श्रेणी के अन्तर्गत नहीं है क्योंकि अत्यन्तानुपलब्धि की हमें स्मृति नहीं होती है और संशय के लिये स्मृति अपेक्षित है। अयोग्यानुपलब्धि के विषय का संशय उपलब्धि की श्रेणी के विषय का भी उल्लेख नहीं करता है। यह कहा जा सकता है कि हमें यह संशय नहीं होता है कि 'परमाणु है या नहीं' और इससे

यह सिद्ध होता है कि परमाणु है ही। उदयनाचार्य कहते हैं कि यह संशय देशकाल विशेष से संपन्न धर्मी को ग्रहण करने से होता है। उस प्रकार से उपलब्ध होता हुआ वह परमाणु स्वरूपतः नहीं, अन्वय से, व्यतिरेक से, या विप्रतिपत्ति से स्मरण किये जाते हैं। उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार संशय का प्रत्येक हेतु विषयव्यवस्था के प्रति हेतु नहीं होता है। सामग्री के भेद से संशय तीन प्रकारक सिद्ध होता है और विषय के भेद से संशय पाँच प्रकारक नहीं अपितु अनेक प्रकारक होते हैं।<sup>६५</sup>

उद्योतकर संशय को कारण के आधार पर और स्वभाव के आधार पर भेद करते हुए कहते हैं कि जो संशय को पाँच प्रकारक मानते हैं उन्हें भी संशय में कारणकृत भेद और स्वभावकृत भेद में अन्तर करना चाहिये। वात्स्यायन यदि कारणकृत भेद मानते हैं तो उन्हें संशय को पाँच प्रकारक नहीं अपितु अनेक प्रकारक कहना चाहिये। अब यदि संशय के स्वभाव भेद से संशय को पाँच प्रकारों में विभाजित करते हैं तो संशय का स्वभाव भेद असंभव होने से संशय का एक ही रूप प्राप्त होता है। संशय होना ही संशय है। अतः संशय पाँच प्रकारक नहीं कहा जा सकता है।<sup>६६</sup>

वाचस्पति के अनुसार सामग्री के भेद से संशय तीन प्रकारक होता है और विषय भेद से तो संशय के अनेक प्रकार हो जाते हैं। वाचस्पति के शब्दों में —

“सामग्रीभेदेन भेदे त्रैविध्यं संशयस्य सामग्रीनिवेशिकारणभेदेन तु न पंचविधः, अपित्वनेकविध इत्यर्थः।”<sup>६७</sup>

(२)

## श्री शंकर मिश्र द्वारा वात्स्यायन और उद्योतकर के मतों का खंडन

लेख के प्रथम खंड में न्यायचतुर्ग्रथिका के परिप्रेक्ष्य में संशय प्रकरण की चर्चा में विचलन दिखाया गया है। लेख के इस द्वितीय खंड में यह दिखाया गया है कि न्याय का समानतन्त्र वैशेषिक का मत न्याय से पूर्णतया भिन्न है। कणाद अपने वैशेषिकसूत्र के दूसरे अध्याय के द्वितीय आह्निक में संशय के हेतु पर विचार करते हैं। श्री शंकर मिश्र अपने वैशेषिकसूत्रोपस्कार में संशय सूत्र की व्याख्या करते हैं और वात्स्यायन, उद्योतकर, वाचस्पति, एवं उदयनाचार्य के मतों का खंडन करते हुए अपना स्वतन्त्र मत स्थापित करते हैं। श्री शंकर मिश्र का कथन है कि कारण भेद के आधार पर संशय को पाँच प्रकारक कहना या तीन प्रकारक कहना असंगत है। अनभूयमान विषय में समानधर्म के ज्ञान से, विशेष का अप्रत्यक्ष होने से, तथा विशेष की स्मृति होने से संशय होता है। वैशेषिकसूत्र के अनुसार —

“सामान्यप्रत्यक्षाद्विशेषाप्रत्यक्षाद्विशेषस्मृतेश्च संशयः।” ८८

दूर से किसी विषय के प्रत्यक्ष में हमें वृक्ष तथा पुरुष दोनों के समानधर्म मात्र का प्रत्यक्ष होता है, और उनका विशेषधर्म जैसे हस्त—पाद या शाखा—कोटरादि का दूरता दोष के कारण प्रत्यक्ष नहीं होता है। पुनः हमें वृक्ष तथा पुरुष दोनों का स्मरण होता है। हमें यह ज्ञान होता है कि यह वृक्ष है या पुरुष। विषय का हमारा यह ज्ञान संशय कहलाता है। वात्स्यायन गोतमीय सूत्र की व्याख्या करते हुए संशय के पाँच हेतु और इस आधार पर पाँच प्रकारक स्वीकार करते हैं। उद्योतकर संशय का तीन हेतु स्वीकार कर संशय को तीन प्रकारक कहते हैं। इन दोनों ही मतों के विपरीत श्री शंकर मिश्र कहते हैं कि संशय का न पाँच प्रकार, या न तीन प्रकार अपितु एक ही प्रकार होते हैं। यह एक भिन्न विषय है

कि दूसरी रीति से जैसा कि कणाद स्वयं कहते हैं कि संशय के दो प्रकार हैं। श्री शंकर मिश्र अपने उपस्कार में लिखते हैं कि –

“तथा च संशयो न त्रिविधो न वा पंचविधः किन्चेकविध एव, प्रकारान्तरेण तु द्वैविध्यं सूत्रकृदेव स्पष्टयति।” ८६

श्री शंकर मिश्र के अनुसार सामान्यवान् धर्मी का प्रत्यक्ष होने से वहाँ मतुप् प्रत्यय का लोप होता है। इस प्रत्यय के योग से विषय में विशेष का होना सिद्ध होता है। इस प्रत्यय के लोप से धर्मी में हमें विशेष का प्रत्यक्ष नहीं होता है। विशेष एक व्यावर्तक धर्म होता है और वह धर्म एक को दूसरे से भिन्न करता है। वक्र-कोटरादि वृक्ष का व्यावर्तक धर्म है, और हाथ तथा मस्तक पुरुष का व्यावर्तक धर्म है। अनुभूयमान विषय में हमें स्थाणुत्व और पुरुषत्व नामक दो कोटियों का स्मरण होता है। इस प्रकार 'मतुप्' प्रत्यय के लोप से सामान्यवान् धर्मी का प्रत्यक्ष होने से, परस्पर भेद करने वाले विशेषधर्म के अप्रत्यक्ष से, तथा विशेष की स्मृति से वहाँ दो कोटियों संशय का दूसरा हेतु है, परन्तु श्री शंकर मिश्र के अनुसार असाधारणधर्म का अन्तर्भाव साधारणधर्म में ही हो जाने से असाधारणधर्म को संशय का पृथक् हेतु कहना उचित नहीं है। असाधारणधर्म व्यावर्तक धर्म होने से संशय का कारण होता है। असाधारणधर्म को संशय का कारणत्व व्यावृत्ति द्वारा होता है। यह धर्म सपक्ष और विपक्ष दोनों से व्यावृत्त होता है। सपक्ष और विपक्ष में नहीं होना एक साधारणधर्म ही है। इस प्रकार असाधारणधर्म का साधारणधर्म में अन्तर्भाव हो जाने से वह संशय का पृथक् हेतु नहीं है। श्री शंकर मिश्र के अनुसार विप्रतिपत्ति भी संशय का पृथक् हेतु नहीं है। विषय में दो विरोधी ज्ञानों से उत्पन्न दो वक्त्यों का नाम ही विप्रतिपत्ति है। जैसे 'शब्द नित्य है' और 'शब्द अनित्य है' नामक दो वाक्य विप्रतिपत्ति कहे जाते हैं। श्री शंकर मिश्र कहते हैं कि इन दोनों वाक्यों से उत्पन्न दो विरोधी ज्ञान विषय में एक काल में संभव नहीं है। विषय में दो विरोधी ज्ञान मिलकर संशय का कारण नहीं हो सकते हैं। 'शब्दत्व' असाधारणधर्म है जिसका अन्तर्भाव साधारणधर्म में हो जाता है, या

सत्त्वप्रमेयत्व नामक साधारणधर्म संशय का हेतु है। इस प्रकार विप्रतिपत्ति भी संशय का हेतु नहीं है।<sup>60</sup>

गोतमीय न्याय में हमें यह ज्ञान होता है कि 'यह इस प्रकारक ही है'। ज्ञान उनके अनुसार अध्यवसाय रूप होता है। अनध्यवसाय रूप ज्ञान गोतमीय न्याय में स्वीकार नहीं होने से वे विषय में असाधारणधर्म के ज्ञान को संशय का कारण कहते हैं। विप्रतिपत्ति दो परस्पर विरुद्ध वाक्य होते हैं। एक भावात्मक और दूसरा निषेधात्मक। विप्रतिपत्ति की अन्वयशालिता तथा व्यतिरेकशालिता के कारण उसे संशय का हेतु कह गया है। वात्स्यायन उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय के दो पृथक् हेतु कहते हैं। सत् भी उपलब्ध होता है और शक्ति में असत् रजत भी उपलब्ध होता है। इससे स्पष्ट है कि उपलभ्यमानता सत् और असत् दोनों में पाया जाता है। यह उपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था कहलाती है और इस अव्यवस्था से हमें संशय होता है कि उपलभ्यमान सत् है या असत्। पुनः वस्त्र से आवृत्त सत् जल भी अनुपलब्ध होता है, और आकाशकुसुम भी अनुपलब्ध होता है। अनुपलभ्यमानता सत् और असत् दोनों में पायी जाती है। यह अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था है और इससे संशय होता है कि अनुपलभ्यमान सत् है या असत्। श्री शंकर मिश्र उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को सामान्यधर्म में अन्तर्भूत करते हैं। वे कहते हैं कि उपलभ्यमानता सत् और असत् दोनों में समान होने से सामान्यधर्म है। पुनः अनुपलभ्यमानता सत् और असत् दोनों में समान होने से सामान्यधर्म है। यहाँ सामान्यधर्म के प्रत्यक्ष से ही संशय होता है। अतएव उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय का पृथक् हेतु कहना उचित नहीं है। उद्योतकर द्वारा प्रस्तुत संशय के तीनों कारण समानधर्मा हैं। संशयत्व से अवच्छिन्न संशय नामक कार्य के प्रति तीनों कारणों की कारणता उनके समानधर्मत्व से ही संभव है। फलतः संशय में हमें वैजात्य की कल्पना नहीं करनी चाहिये। यह नहीं कहना चाहिये कि अमुक संशय अमुक जाति का है। इससे स्पष्ट है कि संशय एक ही जाति के होते हैं। उन तीनों कारणों में से किसी भी एक से संशय होने से और अन्य कारणों को नहीं होने से व्यभिचार दोष आ

जाता है। इस हेतु से श्री शंकर मिश्र संशय का तीन कारण नहीं मानते और संशय के त्रित्व को अस्वीकार करते हैं। जिस प्रकार से तृणजन्य वृद्धि और मणिजन्य वृद्धि में हम वैजात्य की कल्पना करते हैं उस प्रकार से संशय में वैजात्य की कल्पना संभव नहीं है क्योंकि संशयत्व से अवच्छिन्न समान कार्य के प्रति कारणों की कारणता की कल्पना कारणों के समान धर्मत्व से ही संभव है। अतः संशय में वैजात्य के आधार पर कारण भेद से त्रित्व स्थापित नहीं किया जा सकता है। श्री शंकर मिश्र के अनुसार उनका मत समीचीन नहीं जो संशय में वैजात्य स्थापित करने के लिये कहते हैं किसी संशय में विधिकोटित्व (भाव पक्ष) प्रधान होता है, तो किसी संशय में निषेधकोटित्व (निषेध पक्ष) प्रधान होता है, तो किसी संशय में दोनों पक्ष प्रधान होता है। संशय यहाँ व्यापक नहीं होने से ये संशयत्व से अवच्छिन्न नहीं है। संशय यहाँ अवच्छेदक नहीं है। इस प्रकार वे कहते हैं कि संशय का एक ही कारण है और कारण भेद के आधार पर संशय न तीन प्रकारक होता है और न पाँच प्रकारक। यह भिन्न विषय है कि सूत्रकार कणाद ने अन्य प्रकार से संशय को दो भागों में विभाजित किया है।<sup>69</sup>

जिज्ञासाजनक ज्ञान को संशय का लक्षण कहा जा सकता है। शंकर मिश्र के अनुसार अनिश्चयात्मकज्ञान भी जिज्ञासा उत्पन्न करता है, अतः जिज्ञासाजनक ज्ञान को संशय का लक्षण कहना उचित नहीं है। वे कहते हैं कि अनिश्चयात्मक ज्ञान में भी जिज्ञासा होने से वहाँ भी यह लक्षण घटित हो जाने से संशय का यह लक्षण अतिव्याप्ति दोष से दूषित हो जाता है। संशय संस्कार का अजनक ज्ञान भी नहीं है। निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान संस्कार का जनक नहीं होता है और संशय को संस्कार का अजनक कहने से यह लक्षण निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान में भी घटित हो जाता है। इस प्रकार यह लक्षण भी अतिव्याप्ति दोष से दूषित है। संशय को विशिष्ट ज्ञान मानने से उसके विशिष्टज्ञानत्व के कारण संशय को संस्कारजनकत्व होने से यह लक्षण असंभव दोष से दूषित हो जाता है। धर्मी को संशयत्वजातिमान होना भी संशय का लक्षण नहीं है। शंकर मिश्र कहते हैं कि धर्मी के एक अंश में संशयत्व का अभाव होने



से उस अंश में संशयत्व जाति का अभाव होता है, फलतः धर्मी को संशयत्वजातिमान कहना उचित नहीं है। यह नहीं कह सकते कि संशय जाति को धर्मी में उस अंश में नहीं होना जाना नहीं जा सकता है। अतएव यह स्पष्ट है कि धर्मी के एक अंश में संशयत्व जाति का अभाव होने से धर्मी को संशयत्वजातिमान होना संशय का लक्षण नहीं है। इन सभी लक्षणों को खंडित कर श्री शंकर मिश्र कहते हैं कि एक धर्मी में विरोधी नाना प्रकारक ज्ञान होना संशय कहलाता है।<sup>63</sup>

श्री शंकर मिश्र संशय के दो प्रकार मानते हैं – बाह्य विषय से सम्बन्धित और अन्तः विषय से सम्बन्धित। बाह्य विषय से सम्बन्धित संशय को वे दो वर्गों में विभाजित करते हैं – दृश्यमान धर्मी से सम्बन्धित और अदृश्यमान धर्मी से सम्बन्धित। जैसे ऊर्ध्वत्व से विशिष्ट धर्मी के दर्शन से संशय होता है कि वह धर्मी स्थाणु है या पुरुष। यहाँ संशय दृश्यमान धर्मी से सम्बन्धित है। पुनः जंगल में झुरमुट के अन्दर गो-गवय पिंड में सींग मात्र के दर्शन से संशय होता है कि पिंड गो है या गवय है। यहाँ धर्मी दृश्यमान नहीं है। शंकर मिश्र कहते हैं कि वस्तुतः यहाँ संशय सींग नामक धर्मी से ही सम्बन्धित है। हमें संशय होता है कि सींग गौ का है या गवय का है। इच्छा मात्र के आधार पर यह विभाजन किया गया है। वह सामान्य अनेक स्थल में पाया जाता है और संशय का कारण है। एक धर्मी में देखा गया सामान्य भी संशय का कारण होता है। स्थाणु और पुरुष में समान रूप से पाये जाने वाले 'ऊर्ध्वत्व' संशय का कारण है। 'दृष्टवत्' में वति प्रत्यय का प्रयोग साम्य के अर्थ में हुआ है। वति प्रत्यय का प्रयोग होने से 'ऊर्ध्वत्व' स्थाणु और पुरुष दोनों में साम्य है। अपने समक्ष धर्मी में ऊर्ध्वत्व को देखने से संशय होता है कि धर्मी स्थाणु है या पुरुष है।<sup>63</sup>

श्री शंकर मिश्र के अनुसार एक धर्मी में देखा गया सामान्य भी संशय का हेतु होता है। वह जो पहले एक धर्मी में जिस प्रकार से देखा था दूसरे समय उस प्रकार से नहीं देखे जाने से संशय होता है। श्री शंकर मिश्र के अनुसार सूत्रकार 'संशय का हेतु' नामक पद का प्रयोग नहीं

करते हैं और इस पद का प्रयोग शेष रह गया था। चकार का प्रयोग पहले कहे गये कथन और इस समय के कथन के समुच्चय का बोध कराता है। पहले चैत्र को सकेश देखा था, कालान्तर में चैत्र को निष्केश पाया गया। चैत्र को निष्केश देखना अयथा का तात्पर्य है। चैत्र का मस्तक वस्त्रावृत होने में संशय होता है कि चैत्र सकेश है या निष्केश है। इस उदाहरण में चैत्रत्व नामक समानधर्म संशय का कारण है। चैत्रत्व एक ही धर्मी में देखा गया है और वह अभिन्न चैत्रत्व संशय का हेतु है। इस प्रकार शंकर मिश्र के अनुसार एक धर्मी में देखा गया सामान्य भी संशय का हेतु होता है। उपलभ्यमानत्व नामक समानधर्म ही संशय का हेतु है।<sup>६४</sup>

श्री शंकर मिश्र के अनुसार अन्तर्विषयक संशय भी सामान्य के प्रत्यक्ष से ही होता है, अन्य कारणों से नहीं। उनके अनुसार इस प्रकारक संशय विद्या और अविद्या से होता है। इसी हेतु से सूत्रकार कणाद कहते हैं कि विद्या और अविद्या से संशय होता है। जैसे ज्योतिषी जब चन्द्र ग्रहण के विषय में कहते हैं तो उनका कथन सही हो सकता है या पुनः गलत भी हो सकता है। उस ज्योतिषी को संशय होता है कि उनका ज्ञान सही था या गलत। यह अन्तर्विषयक संशय है। ज्ञान कही विद्या और कही अविद्या होता है। अतः विषय के ज्ञायमानत्व के आधार पर संशय होता है कि विषय सत् है या असत्। संशय के इस उदाहरण में संशय 'ज्ञायमानत्व' नामक सामान्य के प्रत्यक्ष से ही होता है, अन्य कारण से नहीं। इस प्रकार से श्री शंकर मिश्र वात्स्यायन द्वारा कहे गये संशय के लक्षण में उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था नामक दो पृथक् हेतुओं को निरस्त करते हैं।<sup>६५</sup>

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## उपसंहार

लेख के प्रथम खंड में वात्स्यायन, उद्योतकर, वाचस्पति, और उदयनाचार्य के संदर्भ में तन्त्रान्तर्गत विचलन और श्री शंकर मिश्र के परिप्रेक्ष्य में समानतन्त्री भिन्नता दिखायी गयी है। सिद्धान्तों के व्यूह को तन्त्र कहते हैं। 'सिद्ध' और 'अन्त' से बना यह 'सिद्धान्त' पद सिद्ध का आश्रय होता है। वाचस्पति के शब्दों में –

"सिद्धस्य संस्थितिः सिद्धान्तः" ६६

भूत के प्रसंग में हमारी अवधारणा ही 'अन्त' कहलाती है। भूत का सामान्य और विशेष लक्षण स्पष्ट होने से वह सिद्ध कहा जाता है। 'यह अर्थ है' से अर्थ का सामान्य लक्षण और 'अर्थ इस प्रकारक है' से उसका विशेष लक्षण स्पष्ट होता है। सिद्धान्त में अर्थ का सामान्य और विशेष लक्षण दोनों स्पष्ट होते हैं। अर्थ को प्रदर्शन के लिये ही सिद्धान्त का प्रतिपादन किया जाता है। शास्त्र को तन्त्र कहते हैं और शास्त्र में एक दूसरे से संबद्ध अर्थ के समूह का उपदेश दिया जाता है।

"तन्त्रमितरेतराभिसंबद्धस्यार्थसमूहस्योपदेशः शास्त्रम्।" ६७

शास्त्र में सूत्रकार एक लक्षण रेखा खींचता है और उस लक्षण रेखा के अन्तर्गत का विचलन उस तन्त्र के बौद्धिक विकास को सूचित करता है। गमन की दिशा सरलरेखीय, वक्ररेखीय, या तिर्यक रेखीय हो सकता है। सरलरेखीय गमन में युक्ति का विस्तार नहीं होता है। अतः सरलरेखीय गमन में बौद्धिक विकास नहीं होता है। वक्ररेखीय गमन की दिशा ऊर्ध्व और अधोमुखी दोनों होने से सिद्धान्तों का प्रतिपादन ही नहीं हो पाता है। तिर्यकरेखीय गमन में युक्तियों का विस्तार होता है। युक्तियों के विस्तार में वितान के कारण तन्त्रान्तर्गत विचलन की दिशा तिर्यकरेखीय होती है। वाचस्पति के अनुसार समानतन्त्र में 'समान' पद

एक का पर्याय है और इसीलिए न्यायशास्त्र नैयायिकों के लिये समानतन्त्र और सांख्यादि दर्शन परतन्त्र है। इस लक्षण को स्वीकार करने से वैशेषिक न्याय का समानतन्त्र और श्री शंकर मिश्र का उपस्कार न्याय के समानतन्त्र का एक ग्रंथ कहा जा सकता है।

“समानशब्द एक पर्यायः। नैयायिकानां हि समानं तन्त्रं न्यायशास्त्रम्, परतन्त्रं च सांख्यादिशास्त्रम्।” ६८

श्री शंकर मिश्र के उपस्कार में संशय के लक्षण और हेतुओं के प्रसंग में विचलन नहीं अपितु भिन्नता पायी जाती है। उनकी यही भिन्नता उन्हें न्याय परंपरा में एक प्रमुख आचार्य के पद पर स्थापित कर देती है। वात्स्यायन संशय का पाँच और उद्योतकर मात्र तीन हेतु मानते हैं। वाचस्पति संशय के भावात्मक पक्ष पर बल देते हैं और कहते हैं कि संशय में हमें सत्य जानने की इच्छा होती है। इस प्रकार नैयायिक संशयवादी नहीं हैं। विषय और उसके स्वरूप में भेद होने से संशय स्वरूपतः और विषयतः हो सकता है। जब यह कहते हैं कि विषय स्थाणु है या पुरुष तो संशय विषयतः होता है। जब यह कहते हैं कि विषय इस प्रकारक है या उस प्रकारक तो संशय स्वरूपतः होता है। उद्योतकर, वाचस्पति, और उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार संशय मानस केन्द्रित नहीं अपितु बाह्यार्थ केन्द्रित होता है। यही कारण है कि वे उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय का हेतु नहीं मानते हैं। इन्हें हेतु कहने के लिये ज्ञातृस्थ और ज्ञेयस्थ धर्म में भेद करना आवश्यक है। वात्स्यायन ज्ञातृस्थ और ज्ञेयस्थ धर्म में भेद करते हैं तथा उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को ज्ञातृस्थ धर्म कहते हैं। उनके अनुसार ये दोनों संशय के पृथक् हेतु हैं। ज्ञातृस्थ धर्म ज्ञाता के अधीन होने से बाह्यार्थ का विरोध हो जाता है। बाह्यार्थ का विरोध होने से ही उद्योतकर इस भेद को अस्वीकार करते हैं। वे धर्मि का धर्म और धर्म के हमारे ज्ञान में भेद करते हुए कहते हैं कि धर्मि का धर्म संशय का कारण नहीं अपितु धर्म का ज्ञान संशय का कारण है। विषय का स्वरूप और संशय में अनुभूत विषय के स्वरूप में भेद के आधार पर कहते हैं

कि समानधर्मादि से उत्पन्न विषय के स्वरूप का अनवधारणात्मक प्रत्यय जिसमें विषय का विशेषधर्म अवधारित नहीं होता है संशय कहलाता है। संशय में विषय के स्वरूप का अनुभव नहीं होता है। विषय के स्वरूप का अनुभव होने से संशय नहीं होता है। पुनः जिसका हमें कभी अनुभव नहीं हुआ है वह संशय का विषय नहीं हो सकता है क्योंकि अननुभूत का स्मरण संभव नहीं है और जिसका हमें स्मरण नहीं वह संशय का विषय नहीं हो सकता है। इसे स्पष्ट करने के लिये विषय की धर्मिता और धर्मता में भेद करना आवश्यक है। विषय धर्मिन् होता है, इसीलिए विषय धर्मिता से हो सकता है। पुनः विषय में धर्म होता है, इसीलिए विषय धर्मता से हो सकता है। अननुभूत धर्मिता से या धर्मता से ग्रहण नहीं होता है, इसीलिए अननुभूत में स्मरण का अभाव होता है और जिसका हमें स्मरण नहीं वह संशय का विषय नहीं हो सकता है।

भाष्यकार सूत्रकार का अनुसरण करते हुए कहते हैं कि विषय में समानधर्म का ज्ञान होने से संशय होता है, परन्तु उद्योतकर के अनुसार मात्र समानधर्म का ज्ञान होने से संशय नहीं होता है। उद्योतकर के अनुसार समानधर्म का ज्ञान, विशेष की आकांक्षा, और उपलब्धि तथा अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था समस्त रूपसे संशय के हेतु हैं। इन तीनों में से कोई भी एक या कोई भी दो संशय के हेतु नहीं हैं। उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्थाको वाचस्पति साधक-बाधक प्रमाण के अभाव के पद में और साधक-प्रमाण तथा बाधक-प्रमाण की व्याख्या इदन्ता और अनिदन्ता के पदों में करते हैं। इदन्ता का नहीं होना साधक-प्रमाण का अभाव तथा अनिदन्ता का नहीं होना बाधक-प्रमाण का अभाव है। उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था अन्य पदों का विशेषण होने से वे पृथक् रूप से संशय के हेतु नहीं हैं।

विषय में अनेकधर्म का ज्ञान संशय का दूसरा हेतु है। संशय प्रकारण में 'अनेकधर्म' नामक हेतु सर्वाधिक विवादास्पद है। इस समस्त पद का विग्रह करते हुए एक नैयायिक दूसरे से भिन्न हो जाते हैं। इस 'अनेकपद' से समानजातीय और असमानजातीय दोनों का बोध होता है।

समानजातीय का धर्म उसे असमानजातीय से भिन्न करता है। इस विषय को उदयनाचार्य निवर्त्य निवर्तक सम्बन्ध से स्पष्ट करते हैं। एकदेशीय नैयायिक के अनुसार एक धर्म को अनेक में होना और अनेकधर्म को एक में होना अनेकधर्म कहलाता है। निश्चय ही अनेकधर्म की ये दोनों व्याख्या 'अनेकधर्म' पद को दो प्रकारों से विग्रह करने का परिणाम है। भाष्यकार के अनुसार 'अनेकधर्म' से असाधारणधर्म का बोध होता है और यह असाधारणधर्म समानजातीय को इतर जाति से भिन्न करता है। 'अनेकधर्म' एक प्रत्यय होने का और एक प्रत्यय नहीं होने का हेतु है। अभेद एक प्रत्यय का और विशेषधर्म एक प्रत्यय नहीं होने का हेतु है। एक प्रत्यय होने को और एक प्रत्यय नहीं होने के हेतु को ही वाचस्पति अनेक कहते हैं। उस अनेक प्रत्यय का हेतु 'अनेकधर्म' कहलाता है। विभाग से उत्पन्न शब्द का विभागजत्व शब्दों में अभेद का और इतरों से भेद का हेतु है। जहाँ विभागजत्व पाया जाता है वह एक जाति और जहाँ विभागजत्व नहीं है वे भिन्न जाति के हैं। विभागजत्व शब्द का असाधारणधर्म है और यह द्रव्य, गुण, और कर्म से व्यावृत्त होने से संशय का हेतु है। शब्द का विभागजत्व हमें द्रव्य, गुण, और कर्म का व्यतिरेक रूप से स्मरण कराता है। शब्द अपने विभागजत्व के कारण द्रव्य और कर्म से व्यावृत्त हो जाता है और हमें संशय होता है कि द्रव्य और कर्म से व्यावृत्त वह शब्द क्या गुण है, गुण और कर्म से व्यावृत्त वह शब्द क्या द्रव्य है, गुण और द्रव्य से व्यावृत्त वह शब्द क्या कर्म है। इस प्रकार शब्द का विभागजत्व निषेधात्मक रूप से तत् – तत् द्रव्य, गुण, और कर्म प्रत्येक का स्मरण कराते हुए संशय का हेतु हो जाता है। नैयायिक शब्द के विभागजत्व से उसका संशयत्व सिद्ध करते हैं और वैशेषिक उससे निश्चयत्व सिद्ध करते हैं। वैशेषिक के अनुसार विभाग विभागज होता है और विभागज विभाग एक गुण है। विभागज विभाग के तुल्य शब्द भी एक गुण है। इस प्रकार शब्द का विभागजत्व निश्चय का हेतु है, संशय का नहीं। वाचस्पति और पुनः उदयनाचार्य वैशेषिक के इस मत का निराकरण करते हैं। शब्द का विभागजत्व शब्द के निश्चयत्व का हेतु तभी कहा जा सकता है यदि विभाग विभाग का

असमवायि कारण हो। विभाग को विभाग का असमवायि कारण कहने से शब्द के विभागजत्व के आधार पर शब्द का गुण होना सिद्ध होता है और वह विभागजत्व निश्चय का हेतु होता है। विभाग को शब्द का असमवायि कारण मानने से शब्द का विभागजत्व संशय का हेतु होता है। इस प्रकार नैयायिक कहते हैं कि वैशेषिक का मत कि शब्द का विभागजत्व उसके निश्चयत्व का हेतु है संशय का नहीं एक विवादित मान्यता है।

नैयायिक का कहना है कि विभाग विभागज नहीं अपितु कर्मज होता है। वैशेषिक का कथन है कि विभाग को कर्मज कहने से विभाग से संयोग का नाश और संयोग-नाश से द्रव्य का नाश होता है। वाचस्पति इस समस्या का समाधान द्रव्य का उत्पादकसंयोग का अप्रतिद्वन्द्वी विभाग और द्रव्य का उत्पादकसंयोग का प्रतिद्वन्द्वी विभाग में भेद के आधार पर करते हैं। वे कहते हैं कि कर्म द्रव्य का उत्पादकसंयोग का अप्रतिद्वन्द्वी विभाग का जनक होता है। द्रव्य के नाश के लिये कर्म को द्रव्य का उत्पादकसंयोग का प्रतिद्वन्द्वी विभाग का जनक होना चाहिये। अतः वाचस्पति के अनुसार विभाग को कर्मज कहने से द्रव्य का नाश नहीं होता है। वैशेषिक कहते हैं कि क्रिया और विभागजनकत्व में व्याप्ति की अवधारणा संभव नहीं है, फलतः उनके अनुसार विभाग कर्मज नहीं कहा जा सकता है। वाचस्पति कहते हैं कि क्रिया विभाग का हेतु होता है और एक क्रिया दूसरी क्रिया से विलक्षण होता है। विलक्षण क्रिया से उत्पन्न विभाग नामक कार्य भी विलक्षण होता है। क्रिया अपनी विलक्षणता के कारण द्रव्योत्पादकसंयोग का अप्रतिद्वन्द्वी विभाग का जनक हो सकता है या द्रव्योत्पादकसंयोग का प्रतिद्वन्द्वी विभाग का जनक हो सकता है। अतः विभाग को कर्मज कहने से द्रव्यनाश की समस्या नहीं उठती है। उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार कर्म की विलक्षणता स्वीकार करने से वैशेषिक के मत का विरुद्ध सिद्ध हो जाता है और विभाग के कर्मज होने से वैशेषिक द्रव्यनाश की समस्या नहीं उठा सकते हैं। उदयनाचार्य कहते हैं कि वैशेषिक को विभाग की विलक्षणता अवश्य स्वीकार करनी चाहिये अन्यथा वे यह नहीं कह सकते कि

विलक्षण क्रिया से विलक्षण कार्य उत्पन्न होता है। कर्म की यह विलक्षणता उसकी जाति के कारण हो सकती है या सहकारियों के कारण हो सकती है। उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार अनुत्पादकसंयोग का विरोधी विभाग का जनक होना ही कर्म का उपहार है।

कुछ नैयायिक 'अनेकधर्म' की व्याख्या 'असमानधर्म' के पद में करते हैं। सूत्र और अपनी व्याख्या में तारतम्यता स्थापित करते हुए ये नैयायिक कहते हैं कि 'समानधर्म' का संशय के हेतु के रूप में प्रयोग हो जाने से 'अनेकधर्म' को 'असमानधर्म' के अर्थ में ग्रहण करना चाहिये। यह प्रश्न उठता है कि यदि 'असमानधर्म' ही अभिप्रेत है तो पुनः सूत्र में इसी पद का प्रयोग क्यों नहीं किया गया? इस पद का प्रयोग नहीं करने के दो कारण दिये जा सकते हैं। असमानधर्म से अनेक से व्यावृत्त का लाभ नहीं होता है और सूत्र में असमान के स्थान पर 'अनेक' का प्रयोग करने से एक वर्ण का लाभ होता है। इन्हीं दो कारणों से सूत्र में 'अनेकधर्म' का प्रयोग किया गया है। ये नैयायिक कहते हैं कि 'अनेक' को 'असाधारण' के अर्थ में ग्रहण करने से 'असाधारणधर्म' जो निश्चय का हेतु है संशय का हेतु हो जाता है। फलतः 'अनेकधर्म' का असाधारण के अर्थ में नहीं अपितु असमान के अर्थ में ही ग्रहण करना चाहिये। पीछे यह कहा जा चुका है कि समानधर्म या असाधारणधर्म का व्यभिचारित्व के अतिरिक्त अन्य कोई संशय का हेतु नहीं है। वह समानधर्म जो बिना व्यभिचार के सभी में पाये जाते हैं संशय का हेतु नहीं है। वही समानधर्म संशय के हेतु हैं जो अन्वयी नहीं होते हैं। उसी प्रकार से असाधारणधर्म को व्यभिचारी होने से वह संशय का हेतु और अव्यभिचारी होने से निर्णय का हेतु होता है। व्यभिचार भावात्मक और निषेधात्मक दोनों स्थितियों में पाये जाने से इसके दो भेद हो जाते हैं – विधीयमान व्यभिचार और प्रतिषिध्यमान व्यभिचार। जब समानधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय होता है तो विधीयमान की स्थिति में व्यभिचार होता है, और जब अनेकधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय होता है तो प्रतिषिध्यमान की स्थिति में व्यभिचार होता है। इसी भेद के आधार पर सूत्र में 'अनेकधर्म' को पृथक् रूप से अभिधान किया गया है। वाचस्पति इस विवाद को



एक नई दिशा प्रदान करते हुए कहते हैं कि वस्तु का असमानधर्म उसे उसके समानजातीय और असमानजातीय से व्यावृत्त करता है। वस्तु का असाधारणधर्म अनेक में नहीं पाया जाता है। अनेक से व्यावृत्त होना अनेकधर्म का लक्षण है। यह लक्षण 'असमान' पद को ग्रहण करने से प्राप्त नहीं होता है। अतएव सूत्र में 'अनेकधर्म' को ग्रहण किया गया है और इस पद से 'असाधारणधर्म' अभिप्रेत है। असाधारणधर्म व्यतिरेक रूप से संशय का हेतु होता है। 'अनेकधर्म' को नञ समास से व्याख्या करना भी समीचीन नहीं है। नञ समास से व्याख्या करने से विषय में एक से अधिक धर्मों का होना ही 'अनेकधर्म' कहलाता है। इस व्याख्या के अनुसार विषय में दो विरुद्ध अव्यभिचारी धर्म प्राप्त होते हैं और विषय में दो विरुद्ध अव्यभिचारी धर्म प्राप्त होने से हमें संशय होता है। प्रतितर्क की सहायता से उद्योतकर 'अनेकधर्म' की व्याख्या 'असाधारणधर्म' के पद में करते हैं। सूत्र में 'विप्रतिपत्ति' को संशय का तीसरा हेतु कहा गया है। विषय में विरोधियों का दर्शन होना ही विप्रतिपत्ति है। विषय में विरोधी या व्याघाती कथन एक साथ नहीं पाये जा सकते हैं। फलतः संशय होता है। वात्स्यायन विषय की उपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय का दो पृथक् हेतु मानते हैं। परन्तु उद्योतकर, वाचस्पति, और उदयनाचार्य इन दोनों को संशय का पृथक् हेतु नहीं मानते हैं। इन तीनों के अनुसार ये दानों अन्य तीनों पदों के विशेषण हैं। इसी को ध्यान में रखते हुए सूत्रकार 'विप्रतिपत्ति' पद का प्रयोग करते हैं।

'अनेकधर्म' का नञ समास से व्याख्या करना भी समीचीन नहीं है। नञ समास से व्याख्या करने से विषय में एक से अधिक धर्मों का होना ही 'अनेकधर्म' कहलाता है। इस व्याख्या के अनुसार विषय में दो विरुद्ध अव्यभिचारी धर्म प्राप्त होते हैं और विषय में दो विरुद्ध अव्यभिचारी धर्म प्राप्त होने से हमें संशय होता है। प्रतितर्क की सहायता से उद्योतकर 'अनेकधर्म' की व्याख्या 'असाधारणधर्म' के पद में करते हैं।

सूत्र में 'विप्रतिपत्ति' को संशय का तीसरा हेतु कहा गया है। विषय में विरोधियों का दर्शन होना ही विप्रतिपत्ति है। विषय में विरोधी या व्याघाती कथन एक साथ नहीं पाये जा सकते हैं। फलतः संशय होता है। वात्स्यायन विषय की उपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय का दो पृथक् हेतु मानते हैं। परन्तु उद्योतकर, वाचस्पति, और उदयनाचार्य इन दोनों को संशय का पृथक् हेतु नहीं मानते हैं। इन तीनों के अनुसार ये दोनों अन्य तीनों पदों के विशेषण हैं। इसी को ध्यान में रखते हुए सूत्रकार 'विप्रतिपत्ति' पद का प्रयोग करते हैं।

वात्स्यायन 'उपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था' को और 'अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था' को क्रमशः चतुर्थ और पाँचवाँ हेतु मानते हैं। कहीं कहीं प्रत्यक्ष में तत्त्व के व्यवस्थापक प्रमाण की अनुपलब्धि होने से हमें संशय होता है कि क्या जिसका हमें प्रत्यक्ष हो रहा है वह सत् है या असत् है। वृक्ष के मूल और शाखा में जल होता है, परन्तु हमें उसका प्रत्यक्ष नहीं होता है। पुनः जो असत् है उसका भी हमें प्रत्यक्ष नहीं होता है। अतः हमें संशय होता है कि जो अप्रत्यक्ष है वह सत् है या असत्। भाष्यकार के अनुसार जो उपलब्ध है वह उपलब्ध हो भी सकता है या पुनः नहीं भी हो सकता है। पुनः जो अनुपलब्ध है वह अनुपलब्ध हो भी सकता है या नहीं भी हो सकता है। भाष्यकार के अनुसार यही उपलब्धि और अनु-पलब्धि की अव्यवस्था है, तथा ये दोनों संशय के हेतु हैं। इन दोनों को संशय का कारण कहने से लोक में जो भी कुछ उपलब्ध या अनुपलब्ध है उसके प्रसंग में संशय होने से हम निश्चयपूर्वक प्रवर्तित नहीं हो सकते हैं। जो कुछ उपलब्ध या अनुपलब्ध है सर्वत्र उसका संशय होना चाहिये। भाष्यकार के मत का अनुसरण करने से जो उपलब्ध है वह उपलब्ध हो भी सकता है या नहीं भी हो सकता है। पुनः जो अनुपलब्ध है वह अनुपलब्ध हो भी सकता है या नहीं भी हो सकता है। इस द्वैविध्य से जो संशय होता है उस संशय से निवृत्ति संभव नहीं है। संशय का निवारण नहीं होने से लोक-ज्ञान बाधित होता है। विशेष का दर्शन होने से संशय का निवारण नहीं होता है। यह

समस्या रह जाती है कि जो विशेष उपलब्ध है वह सत् है या असत् है। लोकज्ञान बाधित होना विशेष के दर्शन होने में भी बना रहता है। उपलब्धि की ये दो गति उन सभी में होती है जो उपलब्ध है। इस प्रकार संशय अनिवारणीय हो जाता है। पुनः जो अनुपलब्ध है वह अनुपलब्ध हो भी सकता है या नहीं भी हो सकता है। इस अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय का हेतु कहने से हमें संशय से छुटकारा नहीं है और इस प्रकार हमारा लोकज्ञान बाधित होता है। उपलब्ध या अनुपलब्ध को निश्चयपूर्वक निःशंकता नहीं होती है, फलतः सर्वत्र संशय होना चाहिये। इससे उच्छेदवाद का जन्म होता है। यह युक्ति नहीं दी जा सकती कि अनभ्यासदशापन्न में उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था में संशय होता है। अनभ्यासदशापन्न में भी उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था में संशय नहीं होता है। उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था विषय में समानधर्म के ज्ञान के साथ संशय उत्पन्न करती है। अनभ्यासदशापन्न में दूर से वह्नि के दर्शन में हमें यह संशय नहीं होता कि वह पर्वत है या बादल। इन तीनों में किसी भी प्रकार से धर्म की समानता नहीं है। दूर से वह्नि के दर्शन में यह संशय हो सकता है कि यह कुसुम के फूल का ढेर है या उषाकलीन प्रकाश, क्योंकि इन तीनों में समानता है। यहाँ समानधर्म का ज्ञान इतर कारण के साथ मिलकर संशय उत्पन्न करता है। उदयनाचार्य अनभ्यासदशापन्न के सभी संभावित तात्पर्यों को स्पष्ट करते हुए वाचस्पति की युक्तियों को और अधिक विकसित करते हैं। उनके अनुसार अनभ्यासदशापन्न में भी उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था से संशय नहीं होता है।

विषय की उपलब्धि में अन्य प्रमाण नहीं होना अनभ्यासदशापन्न होना कहा जा सकता है। इस स्थिति में हमें विषय में सामान्य ज्ञान ही होता है अर्थात् विषय को सामान्यबुद्धित्व होता है। विषय के सामान्यबुद्धित्व की उपलब्धि से सत्यत्व या असत्यत्व का संदेह होता है। उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार सामान्यबुद्धित्व की उपलब्धि से संशय होना सूत्र के प्रथम पद से ही जाना जाता है। अतः उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था संशय का हेतु नहीं है। विषय के उपायक अर्थ में संदेह होना

अनभ्यासदशापत्र का दूसरा तात्पर्य होसकता है। उपायक अर्थ में संशय स्वरूपतः या देशकालतः संभव है। उपायक अर्थ में स्वरूपतः संशय होने से हमें 'यह यह नहीं है' प्राप्त होता है जो असंभव है। पुनः उपायक अर्थ में देशकालतः संशय निद्रा के संकट से ही संभव है। निद्रा के संकट में संशय मानसिक ही होता है। यह संशय बाह्यार्थ केन्द्रित नहीं होता है। निद्रा का संकट नहीं होने से संशय के उस एक कारण का निषेध हो जाता है। अतः अनभ्यासदशापत्र के उपायक अर्थ में संशय देशकालतः नहीं होता है। तृतीय विकल्प को निरस्त करते हुए उदयनाचार्य कहते हैं कि विषय का समानधर्म का ज्ञान इतर कारणों के साथ मिलकर संशय उत्पन्न करता है। 'विषय स्थाणु है या पुरुष' नामक संशय में उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था उनके उत्पाद के कारण नहीं अपितु दोनों के अनुत्पाद के कारण होती है। उदयनाचार्य के अनुसार अनभ्यासदशापत्र के मूल उदाहरण पर विचार करने से पाते हैं कि जल का ज्ञान की अप्रामाण्य की शंका के कारण ही अव्यवस्थित होता है। इस प्रकार उदयनाचार्य कहते हैं कि अनभ्यासदशापत्र में उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था से संशय नहीं होता है।

यह प्रश्न विचारणीय है कि संशय के तीन हेतु होने का औचित्य क्या है? 'समानधर्म' से विषय में समानधर्म का होना सूचित होता है। भावात्मक पक्ष होने से यह विधीयमान धर्म है। 'अनेकधर्म' असाधारणधर्म होता है। इस धर्म से अन्य धर्मों का निराकरण होता है। निषेधात्मक पक्ष होने से यह प्रतिषिध्यमान धर्म है। इन्हीं कारणों से 'समानधर्म' और 'अनेकधर्म' को संशय का हेतु कहा गया है। 'विप्रतिपत्ति' नामक तीसरा हेतु वक्तागत होता है। श्रोता यह नहीं जानता कि कौन वक्ता विषय का सम्यक् प्रतिपादन कर रहा है और कौन मिथ्या प्रतिपादन कर रहा है। इस प्रकार विप्रतिपत्ति से श्रोता को संशय होता है। भाष्यकार पाँच प्रकारक संशय स्वीकार करते हैं। उन्हें संशय में कारणकृत भेद और स्वभावकृत भेद में अन्तर करना चाहिये। भाष्यकार यदि कारणकृत भेद मानते हैं तो उन्हें संशय के पाँच प्रकार नहीं अपितु अनेक प्रकार मानने चाहिये। यदि संशय के स्वभाव के भेद के आधार पर उसे पाँच प्रकारक

मानते हैं तो संशय का स्वभाव भेद असंभव होने से संशय का एक ही रूप प्राप्त होता है। संशय होना ही संशय कहलाता है। वाचस्पति स्पष्ट कहते हैं कि सामग्री के भेद से संशय का तीन ही प्रकार है और विषय भेद से तो संशय के अनेक प्रकार हो जाते हैं।

लेख में यह विचार भी किया गया है कि क्या संशय पाँच या तीन प्रकारक होता है, या पुनः संशय का एक ही प्रकार होता है? श्री शंकर मिश्र अपने उपस्कार नामक ग्रंथ में इस प्रश्न पर विचार करते हुए कहते हैं कि विषय में 'समानधर्म' का ज्ञान ही संशय का एक मात्र हेतु है। इस प्रकार संशय न पाँच प्रकारक न तीन प्रकारक अपितु एक ही प्रकारक होता है। उनके अनुसार सामान्यवान् धर्मी में मतुप् प्रत्यय का लोप होने से हमें विशेष का प्रत्यक्ष नहीं होता है। वे कहते हैं कि सामान्यवान् धर्मी का प्रत्यक्ष से, मतुप् प्रत्यय नहीं होने से विशेषधर्म का अप्रत्यक्ष से, तथा विशेष की स्मृति से धर्मी में दो कोटियों का स्मरण होने से संशय होता है कि धर्मी स्थाणु है या पुरुष। वे असाधारणधर्म का अन्तर्भाव साधारणधर्म में करते हुए कहते हैं कि असाधारणधर्म संशय का हेतु नहीं कहा जा सकता है। विप्रतिपत्ति भी उनके अनुसार संशय का हेतु नहीं है। विषय में दो विरोधी ज्ञान से उत्पन्न दो वाक्यों का नाम ही विप्रतिपत्ति है। दो विरोधी ज्ञान विषय में एक काल में संभव नहीं होने से विप्रतिपत्ति भी संशय का हेतु नहीं है। उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था का अन्तर्भाव सामान्यधर्म में हो जाने से ये दोनों भी संशय के पृथक् हेतु नहीं हैं। उनके अनुसार उद्योतकर द्वारा प्रस्तुत संशय के तीनों ही हेतु समानधर्मा हैं। संशयत्व से अवच्छिन्न संशय नामक कार्य के प्रति तीनों कारणों की कारणता उनके समानधर्मत्व से ही संभव है। संशय में वैजात्य की कल्पना नहीं की जा सकती है और संशय का एक ही प्रकार होता है। तीनों कारणों में से किसी भी एक से संशय का होना स्वीकार करने से, और अन्य कारणों के नहीं होने से व्यभिचार दोष आ जाता है। फलतः संशय के तीन कारण नहीं हैं और इस प्रकार संशय का तीन प्रकार स्थापित नहीं किया जा सकता है। वैजात्य स्थापित करने के लिये यह नहीं कहा जा सकता कि किसी संशय में

विधिकोटित्व प्रधान होता है, तो किसी संशय में निषेधकोटित्व प्रधान होता है, और पुनः किसी संशय में दोनों पक्ष प्रधान होते हैं। इस प्रकार एक मात्र समानधर्म का ज्ञान ही संशय का हेतु है और कारण भेद के आधार पर संशय न तीन प्रकारक या न पाँच प्रकारक होता है। वे संशय के सभी लक्षणों का खंडन करते हुए कहते हैं कि एक धर्मी में विरोधी नाना प्रकारक ज्ञान होना ही संशय कहलाता है। श्री शंकर मिश्र अपना मत स्थापित करने के लिये वात्स्यायन, उद्योतकर, वाचस्पति मिश्र, तथा उदयनाचार्य की व्याख्या को खंडित करते हुए अपना मत प्रतिपादित करते हैं तथा स्वयं को प्राचीन न्याय के एक स्तम्भ के रूप में स्थापित करते हैं।

### संदर्भ:

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The Nature of *Jñāna* (Knowledge) in Advaita  
Epistemology with special reference to *Bhāmatī* of  
Vācaspati Miśra

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**V.N. Sheshagiri Rao**

I

Vācaspati Miśra was a versatile genius with encyclopedic learning. He had a wonderful expositional skill and presentation of whatever subject or system he chose to handle. A popular name to be reckoned with, he was a great authority in deciding the philosophical issues of Advaita.

*Jñāna* (knowledge) in Advaita Vedānta is understood in two ways: 1. *Vṛtti Jñāna* (empirical/relative knowledge) and 2. *Svarūpa Jñāna* (Absolute or Foundational knowledge). *Vṛtti Jñāna* accounts for the ordinary distinction between the knower (*jnatṛ*) and the known (*jñeya*). Avidyā or nescience according to Advaita is the cause of *Vṛtti Jñāna*. *Antaḥkaraṇa* ( internal organ) consists of *buddhi* (intellect), *manas*( mind) and *ahamkāra* ( I- notion). The function of *antaḥkaraṇa* is called *vṛtti*. *Vṛtti* is a modification of *antaḥkaraṇa* ; modification in the form of desire, resolve, doubt (*saṁśaya*), faith, lack of faith, firmness, lack of firmness, modesty, certitude, pride, recollection, fear, cognition etc. The *antaḥkaraṇa* passes from doubt to certitude in knowledge.

The *Svarūpa Jñāna* on the other hand, is transcendental and non- relational. It is identified with Brahmaṇa, the highest metaphysical principle. Thus, the distinction between *Svarūpa Jñāna* and *Vṛtti Jñāna* is basic and central to Advaita epistemology. It is against identifying these two *jñānas*. Infact, we can talk of Advaitic epistemology only in terms of *vṛtti jñāna* which is relegated to the domain of avidyā or nescience. All the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) come under the ambit of *vṛtti jñāna*.

## II

In Indian logic, the concept of *saṁśaya* (doubt) is of paramount significance. The Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika, which is a *pramāṇa śāstra* has given room for the concept of the *saṁśaya*. *Samśaya* or doubt, is like a catalyst in the epistemologies of both India and West. It can produce a desire to know. It is the starting point of all logical enquiry. When things are unknown, there is no room for doubt. When there is ascertainment of things, then doubt, takes its rise. In the philosophical vādas (theories), there is no ascertainment (*nirṇaya*) without any doubt. In this sense, doubt is closely related to the category of *nirṇaya* or ascertainment.

In the case of *tarka* (disputations) also, there is room for doubt. Disputation is necessarily preceded by doubt. In fact because of doubt, validity of a statement made is disputed. Why for that matter, before anything is ascertained and established, doubt plays its role. Before mind chooses between alternatives such as : “whether it is a post or man”,

doubt reigns supreme. Doubt is a case of uncertain knowledge. As long as doubt or uncertain knowledge continues, so long there is no place for definite conclusions.

Thus, doubt (*samśaya*), in its initial stage, promotes the study and research in Philosophy in general and epistemologies of the East and the West in particular. It occurs in the absence of the awareness of the difference among many incompatible presentations attributed to the same thing at the same time, resulting in the failure to form a definite judgment. But doubt cannot remain as doubt forever. It has to end up in the end on the onset of valid knowledge. The proof for the existence of doubt is the doubter himself.

### III

Gautama mentions, in his Nyāyasūtras sixteen categories. The third category among them is doubt. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, classification of entire categories is made into *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge) and *prameya* (objects of cognition). Doubt is included in the latter as an object of cognition. Doubt is regarded as the basis of all reasoning and hence has been given independent status.<sup>1</sup> The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika makes a distinction between wrong cognition and doubt. Right cognition presupposes doubt because the latter could be obtained only when one is in doubt! In this sense a higher status is given to doubt and not to wrong cognition (*Nyāya Sūtra*- I-I-41). What is doubt? How is it defined by Gautama? Doubt is a conflicting judgment on the precise character of an object.<sup>2</sup> This definition is endorsed by

*Nyāya Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, *Nyāya-Vārtika* of Udyotkara and *Nyāya- Vārtika-Tatparya-ṭīka* of Vācaspati Miśra. The clear words of Vācaspati are : “Doubt is the apprehension of diverse and contradictory forms in respect of one and the same object, in the form of whether ‘this or that’?”<sup>3</sup>. This is the standard definition of doubt endorsed by almost all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. The definition implies that doubt is constituted of knowledge of various contrary properties in one and the same thing. Infact, that is a condition for arising of doubt.

#### IV

Gautama classifies doubt into five kinds, says Vātsyāyana<sup>4</sup>. But there is difference of opinion as to other Naiyāyika’s classification of doubts. Udyotkara and Vācaspati do not agree with Gautama and Vātsyāyana on this point. According to them, the types of doubt are only three<sup>5</sup>. Keśava Miśra also accepts three types of doubt.<sup>6</sup> Jayanta Bhaṭṭa of *Nyāya Mañjarī* and Bhāsarvajña of *Nyāya-sāra* accept five kinds of classification. Praśastapāda and Viśwanātha of *Nyāya Siddhānta Mukṭāvalī* accept only two kinds. So are the modern Naiyāyikas accepting only two kinds of doubt. And Śaṅkara Miśra asserts that doubt is only of one form.<sup>7</sup>

In the Nyāya-Sūtras, words such as *upalabdhi*, *anupalabdhi* and *avyavasthā* occur. Keśava Miśra opines that they characterize, all the three forms of doubt. The three kinds of doubt, according to him are :

1. Doubt due to common characteristics' perception (*samāna dharmaja*).
2. Doubt due to unique characteristic apprehension (*asamāna dharmaja*)
3. Doubt due to contradictory statements (*Vipratipatteḥ*)

When certain common attributes of two things, without noticing any distinguishing feature between them are observed, there occurs the doubt of first kind. For instance, observing whether the object ahead is a post or a person, observing common features of both such as tallness, width etc. But the observer fails to notice the distinguishing features such as the curvedness of the post or failing to observe the head, hands etc of a person.

The second kind of doubt may now be explained: Doubt occurs when one observes some peculiar attribute or characteristic of a thing. For instance, when one apprehends smell, which is the special quality of *pṛthvī*. But this act does not indicate whether smell subsists in eternal and non-eternal things. When he fails to see any reason, the natural doubt that arises is whether earth is eternal or not. The point is, if smell is not present in eternal things, it will be non-eternal, and it will be eternal if smell is not present in non-eternal things.

It is now time to explain the third kind of doubt. If there is difference of opinion about one and the same thing and if there is no special reason to accept or reject either then, the third kind of doubt occurs. For instance according to the

Mimāṃsākas sound is eternal; but according to the Naiyāyikas it is not. What should the hearer do now? If he finds no special grounds, doubt occurs whether sound is eternal or not.

## V

A distinction has to be drawn between doubt (uncertain knowledge) and error or illusion (*bhrama*). Both are invalid knowledge: In error or illusion an object is present before the observer, but it is not cognized as it is, but otherwise. And in the case of doubt also, the object is before the observer, but there is, in the mind of the observer uncertainty regarding the status of the object. Doubt is an inner state of mind; it cannot be directly cognized or inspected by anyone; the doubter himself is the proof of doubt! Error leads to a definite judgment in the sense that the observer cognizes a thing. But in doubt since the observer is in an uncertain state of mind, he cannot arrive at a definite conclusion. In this sense, doubt is an uncertain knowledge of the present object. In doubt the object presented to one's cognition is not wrongly cognized or differently known, but simply doubted.

## VI

Vācaspati, the Advaitin is a propounder and supporter of the view that knowledge is self-luminous (*svayaṃ prakāśa*) and self – valid (*svapramāṇa*)<sup>8</sup>, both in respect of its origin (*utpatti*) and ascertainment (*jñapti*). Valid knowledge and means of valid knowledge in his view, as for all Advaitins, have reference to nescience (*avidyā*). Even the knowledge



of *śruti*, which is regarded as a *parama pramāṇa* is nescience-born and hence illusory.

According to Vācaspati, doubt as discursive thinking, works empirically. It is of the nature of dry and uncertain knowledge. Discursive thinking starts with doubts and ends up in skepticism and despair. It has to come out of its circuitous reasoning in the end. If doubt surfaces at all, it is only in the *vṛtti-jñāna* and is born of avidyā or nescience.<sup>9</sup> It has got to be transcended in Absolute knowledge or the *Advaita Jñāna*<sup>10</sup>, asserts Vācaspati. Thus according to Vācaspati, *jñāna* and *ajñāna*, both are forms of relative knowledge or *vṛtti-jñāna* and should in no way be equated with *svarūpa-jñāna*, which is ontological. According to Advaita, *vṛtti-jñāna* (empirical knowledge), which may be correct or wrong is a form and hence an appearance of *svarūpa-jñāna*. Advaita has no hesitation to declare, that the so called *vṛtti-jñāna* is not eligible for the title *jñāna* (knowledge), unless it is illumined by the foundational consciousness or Brahmanā. The internal organ, bereft of the foundational consciousness (Brahmanā) is as good as inert matter (*jaḍa*). In the view of Advaita, the empirical knowledge which is held to be final by realistic schools, is not really final and ultimate but only phenomenal. It is discursive in character. It is real because it is presented, it is false because it is denied in the end. Vācaspati accepts psychological realism as well as metaphysical Idealism in his theory of knowledge. The knowledge in itself or Absolute knowledge (*svarūpa-jñāna*) is extraneous to and independent of psychic apparatus. It is Brahmanā itself.

When all is said and done, the question remains: How to realize, Brahmanā the ultimate Reality? It is of course through *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* (*vṛtti jñāna*), says Vācaspati. It is of the nature of intelligence residing in the knower (*jñāntṛ*). This *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* when carried on with relentless meditation on the ultimate truth Brahmanā results in the intuition of Brahmanā. Though Brahmanā appears to be conditioned by *antaḥkaraṇa*, in the process of meditation, at the final stage of cognition, the *antaḥkaraṇa* itself is on the brink of destruction – asserts Vācaspati<sup>11</sup>. Thus, in the stage of final cognition, the *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* (in the form of ‘*ahaṁ brahmāsmi*’, I am Brahmanā), ends up in the intuition of Brahmanā by destroying itself, just as the dust of the clearing nut (*kataka raja*) mixed with muddy water, removes the dirt and disappears itself making water clear.<sup>12</sup>

Thus the *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti*, though of the nature of nescience, by a prolonged meditation with diligence, ends up in the intuition of Brahmanā. This view is technically called *prasamkhyāna*.

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Notes and References :

- <sup>1</sup> ‘*Tatra nānupalabdhe na nirñīte'rthe nyāyāḥ pravartate kim tarhi? Saṁśayite'the*’  
--- *Nyāya Bhaṣya* (NB) with Prasannapada, Vātsyāyana (Sudhi series- 10, Varanasi, 1986) P-6.
- <sup>2</sup> *Nyāya Sūtra* I-I-23
- <sup>3</sup> *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā*, Vācaspati Mīśra (Ed: Pandit Sri Rajeswara Sastri Dravid, Kasi Sanskrit Series-24, Chowkhamba Sanskrit-Samsthan, 1989) P-243.

- <sup>4</sup> *Nyāya Bhāṣya* PP 45-48
- <sup>5</sup> Potter K.H. Ed : Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol-II (Motilal Banarsiddass, Delhi, 1993) P-171. P-255.
- <sup>6</sup> *Tarkabhāṣā* ; Keśava Miśra Ed: Iyer S.R (Chowkamba, 1979) P-223
- <sup>7</sup> Vaiśeṣika Sūtras with Upaskara : Saṅkara Miśra (Chowkhamaba Sanskrit Samsthan, Varanasi, 1969), P-75
- <sup>8</sup> Bha. Ca. Su- P 8, 15, 23.
- <sup>9</sup> Bhamati Catuh Sutri (Bha.ca.Su) P-50.
- <sup>10</sup> see Bhamati. P- 444, 449, Anantha Krishna Sastri's Edition.
- <sup>11</sup> Bha.Ca.Su P -78
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid. P. 80

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## A Case for Indirect Doxastic Voluntarism

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**Proyash Sarkar**

Beliefs seem not to be under direct control of human volition. This feature of beliefs, appears to come into conflict with the normativity of human cognition, in the absence of which epistemology becomes impossible. This paper deals with Doxastic Voluntarism and Involuntarism, in the context of the controversy between Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā on this issue. The issue is of crucial importance to these two schools (along with others which I have not dealt with in this paper), since the very possibility of a prescriptive doctrine of liberation (*mokṣa-śāstra*), as such doctrines have been developed in the Indian subcontinent, depends upon an amicable solution of this problem.

### **Belief and Normativity**

Belief plays a central role in modern Western epistemology, as when characterized in some particular way it qualifies as knowledge. Though there are a few dissenting voices, most epistemologists endorse this view while advancing their own respective version and explanation of knowledge. There are people who are of the

opinion that Indian epistemology does not have the concept of belief. It is indeed very difficult to find out the element of belief in Nyāya. There is hardly any notion in Nyāya that directly corresponds with the Western concept of belief. The first thing to note about beliefs is that beliefs may be either dispositional or episodic, and in epistemology the dispositional sense prevails. But in Nyāya all mental states, except perhaps mental traces (*bhāvanā*), are episodic. So, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to equate belief with any mental state admitted in Nyāya. However, considered as an occurrent state, belief counterposes doubt. But what does this counterposition mean? Apparently, it is pointless to state this conflict between doubt and belief, because in the Nyāya context no two episodic mental states can occur in the same subject at the same time. Belief and doubt being mental states are also episodic, and hence, they cannot possibly occur together. If this is true then so also for other mental states like desire and pleasure. Thus taken in the sense of *unable-to-be-colocated* (with doubt), this counterposition cannot be regarded as a unique feature of beliefs. The same problem vitiates our explanation, if we take it merely in causal sense such that belief eradicates (causally) doubt. For in the Nyāya system all subsequent mental states destroy the immediately preceding states, though it is accepted by all that beliefs do really eradicate doubt. The Naiyāyika takes this ‘counterposition’ or ‘eradication’ in a very special sense of ‘sublation’ to mean that a belief eradicates any doubt that occurred in the same cognitive agent as that having the belief, has in common with the belief the same subject and at least one predicate

mentioned in it (*ullikhyamāna*). The type of mental state that sublates a doubt in this sense is called, in Nyāya terminology, ‘*niścaya*’. Therefore, with some reservation, we can translate ‘*niścaya*’ as ‘belief’. In the Nyāya context a ‘mental state’ does not mean a state of the mind or something that is occurring in the mind, it rather means something that is occurring in the self (*atman*), and generally, can be known through the instrumentation of the mind (*manas*). Nyāya considers the mind as the internal sense organ, which is instrumental in the perception of the mental states. However, mental traces (*bhāvanā*), virtues (*dharma*) and vices (*adharma*) are three types of mental states that cannot be subject of perception. They are only inferred. Returning to our original issue, certain specific processes (*pramāṇa*) generate beliefs, according to Indian philosophers, and Nyāya restricts the number of such belief forming processes to four—perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony. All the other belief forming processes accepted by other schools are reduced by Nyāya to the four accepted by them. The theory of *pramāṇa* gives a causal account of knowledge. The Indian philosophers had all along been aware about the tension between a causal-nomological account and normativity. The first problem that crops up with regard to any theory of *pramāṇa* is that given a causal account of cognition, such an account of awareness does not make room for imperatives and without testimonial imperatives (*vidhi-s*) liberation (*mokṣa*) becomes unmeaning. Furthermore, the causal-nomological account does not make room for

normativity, and without normativity epistemology leads to nowhere.

### **Arguments against Direct Doxastic Voluntarism**

Several arguments have been offered against direct doxastic voluntarism (DDV), a claim that we can directly control our beliefs, if we will to do so. Against this claim the classic argument urges that if we could control our beliefs, we could entertain any proposition as true, irrespective of whether we thought them to be true. Furthermore, if DDV is true, then we should be able to be aware with regard to any belief we have formed that we voluntarily arrived at it. But we have no such awareness of voluntarily arriving at beliefs. So, DDV is false. There is an empirical belief argument, which has a limited scope, as it applies to only a specific kind of beliefs. Our empirical beliefs, the argument runs, reflect how the world is. So, we have an empirical belief, if it is true and my perceptual apparatuses are working properly. Therefore, we cannot entertain an empirical belief about something which is false. The intentional act argument claims that if DDV is true, then our beliefs should be under our voluntary control—we should be able to decide which things are to be believed and which are not, involving our intention. But we cannot control our beliefs by intention. Therefore, DDV is false. We will not enter into a critical assessment of these arguments, for that is not the point at issue. We will rather assess the Indian philosophers' argument in the light of

these arguments, and only in that context we will reflect upon these arguments.

The same is often sought to be established with a 'phenomenological argument.' It is argued that beliefs are non-voluntary mental state. Beliefs just happen to, or occur in, us. At the sight of a tiger, you cannot believe to be seeing a deer, however hard you may try. This argument in its present form is not immune to criticism. Don't we contemplate and debate to reach at decisions (beliefs) on issues we have not yet decided? The case of *debate* as a counterexample to the argument under consideration is highly contentious. It may be urged that in case of a debate the contending parties already hold firm beliefs about issues. They only try to change the views of the opponents. But at least the case of contemplation seems to stand against belief non-voluntarism. In the Indian context of philosophical debate (*kathā*) the contending parties provide arguments against each other's position to 'convince' the opponent and also to help the arbitrator reach a 'decision.' The proper method for doing this is to clinch the point at issue with help of debate (*vāda*). For all practical purposes convincing, in this context, stands for making someone to believe something. But if this analysis is correct, then the case of convincing someone would not stand in the way of belief involuntarism, since 'making someone to believe' may be translated as '*causing* someone to believe.' But doesn't the *decision* taken by the arbitrator indicate his/her voluntary assent to a position after listening arguments for and against it? Apparently, it makes a strong case against



belief involuntarism. However, on a closer scrutiny it becomes clear that a causal-nomological account of the same phenomenon can also be possible, if not more compelling. It may be urged that the arbitrator's *decision* is nothing more than being convinced in the sense explained above.

### Jayanta against the Mīmāṃsā Thesis

Mīmāṃsā accepts the Vaiyākaraṇa thesis that the meaning of a verb is an action.<sup>1</sup> According to the Mīmāṃsaka, since the term '*jñāna*' (cognition) originates from the root verb '*jñā*', '*jñāna*' refers to an action—a mental action (*mānasīkriyā*)—of the cognitive agent (*puruṣa-vyāpārah*). Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refutes the Mīmāṃsā position on the ground that there is no such general rule that a verb would always refer to an action. He presents as counterexample a grammatical rule—'*cheek [is] (gaḍi) a part of the face*'. Jayanta asks his opponents as to what action this verb '*cheek [is]*' (*gaḍi*) refers to.<sup>2</sup> He further argues that in contentious context of epistemology the cognition of the form, 'I cognize the jar (that this is a jar)' the term '*jar*' refers to the object, '*I*' to the self, and we have to work out what the verb '*cognize*' stands for in this context. The opponent cannot just take it for granted that it stands for an action, for that is precisely the point at issue.

It still remains, at least, so thinks Jayanta, to prove that the verb '*know*' does not stand for any action. To understand his contention we have to keep in mind two further theories

advocated by the Mīmāṃsaka—(1) that actions are *imperceptible* intermediary causes (*vyāpāra*) operating between physical efforts and the volition (*kṛti*) of the agent, and (2) that actions are *inferred* from their perceptible results.<sup>3</sup> As against the Mīmāṃsaka, Jayanta argues that actions (according to the Mīmāṃsaka) are imperceptible. If cognition were actions, it would be imperceptible (*parokṣatvāt*)<sup>4</sup>, that is to say, they would never be perceived (*nityaparokṣa*). But the present instance shows that cognition can become the object of perception. He further argues that if cognition were action, then a Mīmāṃsā authority, like Śabara-svāmī<sup>5</sup> wouldn't mention cognition separately from action.<sup>6</sup> Jayanta is not claiming that cognition is always revealed through perception, as according to him, we can also infer our perceptual states. What he is denying is the theory that cognition is always revealed through secondary means, like inference. If we accept the action theory of cognition, then the former thesis would follow as corollary. Jayanta's rejection of the action theory follows from his denial of this corollary.

### Śāṅkarāchārya's Argument

In a different context Śāṅkarāchārya<sup>7</sup> succinctly draws the same distinction between cognition and action, refuting the view that cognition is a type of action. Śāṅkara summarily rejects the Mīmāṃsā view claiming that cognition and action are dissimilar to each other (*vailakṣaṇyāt*). Actions, according to him, have three features—(1) they are independent of the nature of the objects, they directed at,

(2) they are normative in character, that is to say, they are subject to imperatives, and (3) they are induced by subjective factors of the agent, like volition and desire. All these three features need further clarification. The first feature tells us that actions are independent of their objects. This is not to say that actions are non-intentional; this only means that the object of an action of an agent does not determine which course of action the agent will take. If there is a glass of water before me I may either take it or ignore it. By the mere fact of being water this object does not induce any action in me. It is my thirst or my *desire* for water that prompts me to take it. This explains the third feature of action that actions are subject to the agent's subjective factors like desire, volition, and aversion. Since human actions are guided by volition or free will, they are also subject to imperatives or injunctions. This second feature of action opens a scope for ethics, since ethics deals with the normativity of human action. Contemplation (*dhyāna*) and thought (*cintana*) are *mental actions*. That is why the agent is free to decide whether to think of (or contemplate on) a certain object, or not to think about (or contemplate on) it, or whether to think about it otherwise, the way in which the object is not. In contrast, cognition lacks all these three features. Cognition is objective (*vastu-tantra*), in the sense that the nature of the object determines the nature of the cognition. Cognition is produced by particular sources (*pramāṇa*-s), which reveal their respective objects as they are. This does not mean that cognition cannot be false or that there is no room for error. Quite on the contrary, the main thesis of Advaita

philosophy depends on the very possibility of illusion. The above contention makes a much weaker claim that if a piece of cognition is produced by a truth yielding source (*pramāṇa*), it reveals the object as it is. To put it more precisely, when the cognition is true, that is, a case of *pramā*, the source is regarded as a truth yielding source (*pramāṇa*).<sup>8</sup> Cognition, according to Śāṅkara, is neither dependent on the subjective factors of the agent (*puruṣa-tantra*) like desire and volition, nor can it be subject to injunctions (*codanā-tantra*). This we call the ‘psychological argument.’

That what is caused by a source of true cognition (*pramāṇa*) cannot be subject to norms, according to Nyāya. This comes under the larger claim that anything coming under a causal-nomological law cannot be subjected to normativity. This is not only the contention of Nyāya, but also the contention of other systems of Indian Philosophy, like Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta that accept the causal theory of *pramāṇa*. Nyāya uses ‘*cintana*’<sup>9</sup> (thought/contemplation) to stand for any cognitive state of the cognizer, in which sense thought is no different from cognition; but unlike Advaitin he does not consider it as action. For him, thought is a mental property. Thus the difference between the Nyāya and the Advaita theory of cognition lies in the fact that while Nyāya uses the terms ‘*buddhi*’ (intellect/judgment), ‘*jñāna*’ (cognition), ‘*pratyaya*’ (discernment) and ‘*cintana*’ (thought) synonymously and gives a uniform theory for all of these, the Advaitin distinguishes between cognition (*jñāna*) on the

one hand, and contemplation (*dhyāna*) and thought (*cintana*) on the other, maintaining the latter two as action.

### **A Case for the Nyāya Position**

The Indian philosophers' argument against DDV mentioned above is immune to at least one serious criticism against DDV faced by other arguments mentioned above. Sceptics and other philosophers, like Descartes, have shown that we often raise doubt about which we have firm belief, and after conscious deliberation if we succeed in eradicating that doubt, we again restore belief in the same. This is the method that was endorsed by Descartes in his philosophical enterprise. However, this does not provide any support to DDV, as instead of proving voluntary belief formation, this argument merely proves, if it proves anything at all, that we can have doubt about the objects of our belief. This may be regarded as argument from hyperbolic doubt. No mental state is permanent. Belief being a mental state can also be shaken by subsequent doubt, if there are grounds for the latter. This fact hardly proves DDV, unless it is also claimed that such doubts are again eradicated by subsequent conscious deliberation. This observation goes against the first three arguments, against DDV mentioned above. If we can eradicate doubt to arrive at beliefs, then it can be claimed that such beliefs result from our voluntary effort and that we are aware of such efforts. The Classic Argument relies on the claim that we have no control over our beliefs and that we are never aware about voluntarily arriving at beliefs. The argument

from hyperbolic doubt refutes this argument by making at least one convincing case against it. At least in case of belief eradicating hyperbolic doubt we seem to become aware about voluntary acquisition of beliefs. The empirical belief argument is correct to the extent that acquisition of beliefs concerning empirical content is not always under our voluntary efforts. But it is incorrect in claiming that our beliefs are always formed by the way the world is. We often have false beliefs—an illusion or a delusion. The argument from hyperbolic doubt shows that we can entertain doubt about our empirical beliefs and that by conscious voluntary effort we can arrive at beliefs by eradicating doubt. The intentional act argument hinges on the claim that beliefs are not guided by intentions. However, the argument from hyperbolic doubt seems to have shown that some beliefs are promoted by intentions.

The argument from hyperbolic doubt cannot be posed against the causal-nomological argument advanced by Nyāya and other Indian schools of philosophy. The argument from hyperbolic doubt only shows that doubts are possible about things we believe in and that we often arrive at beliefs after entertaining such doubt. The causal-nomological account of cognition does not deny these facts. It only claims that beliefs are causally determined. Beliefs are products of appropriate causal factors. That is why these Indian philosophers reject DDV and claim that beliefs are produced in the presence of appropriate *pramāṇa*-s. The cases of hyperbolic doubt and its subsequent belief could be explained in the same way, that is, in a causal-

nomological way. If the causes of doubt are present, doubts are produced, including doubts of the hyperbolical form; and beliefs are produced, if the causes of belief are present.

## Conclusion

This shows that Nyāya does not accept DDV, nor does it accept doxastic involuntarism. But it accepts indirect doxastic voluntarism (IDV). We cannot immediately decide whether or not to believe in something, according to IDV. Our beliefs are spontaneously formed by certain belief-forming processes that we endorse, consciously or unconsciously. This does not imply a total lack of control over our beliefs. Nyāya claims that we can choose an appropriate *pramāṇa* to arrive at a belief. This gives us indirect control over our beliefs, which in its turn, creates a space for normativity in Nyāya epistemology and also opens the scope for the prescription of the attainment of self-knowledge for liberation (*mokṣa*).

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### Notes and References:

- <sup>1</sup> ‘...*kriyāvacano dhāturiti jānāterapi kriyaiva syāt, sa ca kriyā jñātātmā puruṣa-vyāparah*’.—Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Nyāyamañjarī*. Vol. 1, edited by Gaurinath Shastri, Varanasi, Sampurnand Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya Press, p. 31.
- <sup>2</sup> ‘*nāyam niyamaḥ kriyāvacano dhāturiti ‘gaḍi vadanaikadeṣe’ iti-  
api darśanāt.*’ *Ibid.* p. 31.
- <sup>3</sup> The original Mīmāṃsā position is that actions are cognized through postulation (*arthāpatti*). However, Nyāya interprets this position as that actions are *inferred* from their results

(...phalānumeyo jñānavyāpāro.... Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Ibid*). The Nyāya reading is due to the fact that Nyāya reduces postulation to inference.

<sup>4</sup> Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Ibid*.

<sup>5</sup> ‘*buddhikarmaṇī api hi pratyabhijñeyete, te api nitye prāpnuta*’, *Śābarabhāṣyam*, 1/1/20.

<sup>6</sup> Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Ibid*.

<sup>7</sup> Śaṅkarāchārya, *Śārīraka-Bhāṣyam*, 1.1.4, in Swami Visvarupananda (ed. &trans.) *Vedāntadarśanam*, Vol. 1, pp. 177-9.

<sup>8</sup> We will take up this issue in more details later.

<sup>9</sup> The Nyāya definition of ‘*upodghāta saṅgati*’ may also be mentioned in this regard. In the context of a book or a monograph it is incumbent on the author to show how the earlier discussion is connected with the subsequent (immediately succeeding) discussion. There are several ways of establishing of showing relevance of such subsequent discussion. Sometimes the *thought* on (*cintā*), or discussion of, a topic naturally gives rise to further questions leading to an examination of another topic embedded in the former—this is what the Nyāya experts understand by ‘*upodghāta saṅgati*’ (*cintām prakṛti-siddharthaṁ upodghātaṁ vidurbudhāḥ*). Jayanta Bhaṭṭa uses this term as a verb, though he claims that in spite of being a verb it does not refer to any action. *Ibid*. p. 31.

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## Restoring Knowledge-claim: A Dispeller of Nāgārjunian Polemic

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### Dipayan Pattanayak

Conceiving Indian Philosophy as a high-rising tower, we see that there are four pillars of this construction namely- *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, *pramātā* and *pramiti*. By *pramiti*, the Indian thinkers understand resultant veridical cognition. The instrument by means of which the cognition in question is derived is designated by them as *pramāṇa*. The object and subject of the cognition resulted are entitled by them as *prameya* and *pramātā* respectively. It is by means of *pramāṇa* that a *pramātā* can obtain *pramiti* regarding the *prameyas*.

Of these four principles *pramāṇa* and *prameya* have occupied important role in Indian philosophical discourse. The term ‘*pramāṇa*’ is derived from the expression *pramā*, which again is a derivative of *mā*. ‘*Mā*’ refers to cognition and subsequently *pramā* to veridical cognition. There can be two different types of derivation of *pramāṇa* and two different connotations: instrument of veridical cognition and veridical cognition itself. [with the suffix ‘*lyuṭ*’ (in the sense of *karaṇa*), it may give rise to the sense - instrument of veridical cognition ; taking ‘*lyuṭ*’ in the sense of *bhāva*, the same term may be an indicator of veridical cognition itself.] In the same way, the expression *prameya*, to some

extent, is equivocal. It bears two different connotations - restricted and general. In its restricted sense, '*prameya*' indicates only those objects, whose knowledge is directly associated with the attainment of liberation. It is in this sense of the term, Gautama, the founder of Nyāya Philosophy, spoke of twelve kinds of *prameya*<sup>1</sup>. There is, however, an etymological meaning of the term in which it is ordinarily used. In this general sense '*prameya*' signifies the knowable objects or the objects of knowledge<sup>2</sup>. In this wide sense *prameya* includes everything, whether it is known or not.

Generally, the expression *pramāṇa* is understood in the sense of epistemic instrument. The Indian thinkers are not in agreement about the number of *pramāṇas*. Some of them admit only one, like *pratyakṣa*; there are others who admit even ten or more like *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda*, *arthāpatti*, *anupalabdhi*, *aitihya*, *sambhava*, *ceṣṭā* and *prathibhā*. Regarding *prameya* too they are not in agreement. While some schools advocate monism, some others are in favour of dualism or pluralism. Despite the disagreement regarding nature and number nearly all schools of Indian philosophy are in agreement about the possibility of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*.

This dichotomy which is admitted almost by all schools, has come under the severe attack of some exceptional thinkers. In Indian philosophical literature the expression '*Vaitaṇḍika*' is found to be used to mean them. Without holding any position they used to refute the position of

others. In its strictest sense the designation ‘*Vaitaṇḍika*’ can be easily ascribed to Jayarāsi Bhaṭṭa who proposes eradication (*upaplava*) of all principles in his epoch-making work *Tattvopaplavasimha*. Even before birth of Buddha, there was a thinker named Sañjaya<sup>3</sup> to whom application of the designation of *Vaitaṇḍika* can be extended quite aptly. While attacking the views of others, Sañjaya and his followers took help of a dialectical technique. Assuming the possible alternatives that could be conceived in the issue they endeavored to nullify all of them. This technique which had been adopted by the Mādhyamika Buddhists later was much familiar as *prasaṅga*. This *prasaṅga* technique received its devastating form in the hands of Nāgārjuna. Nāgārjuna put forward severe criticism against the Nyāya category system in his writings like *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* etc. In the last two, especially in Kārikās number 2 to 21 of *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* and 31 to 51 of *Vigrahavyāvartanī* we witness the refutation of the first two categories namely *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. An attempt will be made in this article to restore the claim of knowledge from Nyāya point of view by nullifying Nāgārjunian polemic against the *pramāṇa-prameya* dichotomy.

Nāgārjuna is seen to develop four lines of argument to prove it that there is no such thing as *pramāṇa* which can be claimed to be the source of valid cognition. In the first form of argument he purports to reveal; that there can never be any temporal relation<sup>4</sup> between the so called *pramāṇa*

and its object. In the 12<sup>th</sup> Kārikā of *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*,<sup>5</sup> Nāgārjuna points out that *pramāṇa* can neither precede *prameya*, nor be preceded by the *prameya*, nor can they be said to be simultaneous. If the *pramāṇa* precedes the *prameya* then of what should it be called the *pramāṇa*? If the *prameya* didn't exist before the *pramāṇa* then what is to be ascertained by means of *pramāṇa*? *Pramāṇa* cannot be preceded by *prameya* either. If *prameya* is established as *prameya* prior to the occurrence of *pramāṇa* then the *pramāṇa* could not be regarded as *pramāṇa*. If *pramāṇa* comes after *prameya* then the *pramāṇa* becomes useless and fails to be designated as *pramāṇa*. The idea of a non-existent *pramāṇa* of an existent *prameya* would be as absurd as a hare's horn. The third alternative is also not tenable as the cause and the effect cannot exist at the same moment. Two simultaneous things like two horns of a cow cannot be related in causal relation with one another. Thus the *pramāṇa prameya* relation cannot take place in past, present or future.

In the second, Nagarjuna took the trouble to make it clear that *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are relational<sup>6</sup> concepts, which belong to the mental world only. In the third line of argument, which is an extension of the second, it is claimed that the notion of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are confused<sup>7</sup> and reversible. In *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*, Nāgārjuna endeavors to establish this. *Pramāṇa*, he points out, can be regarded as *pramāṇa* only in reference to *prameya* or knowable objects. On the other hand the *prameya* can be regarded as *prameya* only in relation to a *pramāṇa* or instrument of knowledge.

The case bears resemblance with the father son relation. A person can be described as a father only in relation to his son and vice-versa. On account of *pramāṇa* the *prameya* is established as *prameya*. Again on account of the *prameya* the *pramāṇa* is established as *pramāṇa*. Viewed from one perspective, *prameya* is the *sādhya* or probandum and the *pramāṇa* is *sādhana* or probans; from another it is *pramāṇa* which plays the role of *sādhya* and the *prameya* as *sādhana* or probans. Thus the so called distinction between *pramāṇa* and *prameya* becomes meaningless.

In the last line of his arguments, Nāgārjuna urges that the admission of *pramāṇa*, as a means of establishment of *prameya*, would lead to infinite regress<sup>8</sup>. To the *pramāṇavādīns*, adoption of *pramāṇa* is a must. If there is no balance nothing can be weighed.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, they argue, if there is no *pramāṇa* at all, the knowable objects cannot be grasped. So admission of *pramāṇas* is obligatory. Nāgārjuna does not agree with the opponent here. He asks, if it is not possible to establish *prameyas* without *pramāṇas*, then how can the *pramāṇas* themselves be established without further *pramāṇas*? Especially after advocating the thesis “*pramāṇatāharthopapatti*”<sup>10</sup> (i.e. all objects are established by *pramāṇas*) the opponent cannot adopt the view that the *pramāṇas* themselves are independent of justificatory grounds or *pramāṇas*. Either the *pramāṇavādīns* have to admit that there are *pramāṇas* in favour of the *pramāṇas* or they will have to abandon the thesis ‘*mānādḥīnāmeyasiddhi*’<sup>11</sup>, that is all the objects are to be established by means of *pramāṇas*.

Consequently there are two ways left. Either the *pramāṇavādīns* have to concede that *pramāṇas* are valid by themselves, which as *parātaḥ pramāṇavādīns* the Naiyāyikas cannot admit, or they would agree that *pramāṇas*, like all the other *prameyas*, are subject to justificatory condition. But both of these alternatives are untenable. If it is admitted that the *pramāṇas* are established by other *pramāṇas* there will be an infinite regress in the long run. If we think that the *prameya* Py1 is established by *pramāṇa* Pn1 and the *pramāṇa* Pn1, in turn, is established by *pramāṇa* Pn2, the result will be *regresus ad infinitum*. As the series of *pramāṇa* is infinite, its beginning cannot be determined. And if there is no beginning there cannot be any middle or end.<sup>12</sup> In this difficult situation the principle “*pramāṇas* are established by means of other *pramāṇas*” will be ruled out.

The cognitivists like Naiyāyikas have tried their best to meet the aforesaid objections. In their response to the first allegation, the Naiyāyikas point out that if *pramāṇa* is non-existent owing to non-establishment of its temporal position with *prameya*, by the same logic the denial statement issued by the opponent, would also fail to be connected with its objects of denial, in three points of time;<sup>13</sup> and hence that denial too would be counted as unreal. To the Naiyāyikas there can be no fixed established rule regarding the temporal relation of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. Citing illustrations in support of their position they claim that occurrence of a means of knowledge is possible before or after the occurrence of the object of

knowledge. Occurrence of both even takes place simultaneously. Thus something can be designated as *pramāṇa* by yielding *pramā* in any point of time.

However the question remains, until and unless the cognition occurs how can the designations like *pramāṇa* and *prameya* be ascribed to something at all? The designation ‘*pramāṇa*’ or ‘*prameya*’, they would argue, is applicable to something only in relation to some veridical cognition that is *pramā*. Nothing could be addressed as *pramāṇa* or *prameya* before origination of the veridical cognition.

To a Naiyāyika like Vātsyāyana this allegation seems to be a shallow one. To him the terms *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are not necessarily used as actual operative epistemic instruments or object of that valid cognition which is actually taking place. In common usage<sup>14</sup> such statements are often issued ‘bring the cook, he will do the cooking’ and there is nothing wrong in these utterances. In the same way the expression *pramāṇa-prameya* may be used to mean a possible epistemic instrument or a possible epistemic object. By apprehending these terms in the sense of actual operating instruments and actually accomplished objects, the opponent has committed the blunder as he has no right to do that thing.

Like the former the objection of relativity seems irrefutable at the very outset. This objection was raised in a different form by Sextus Empiricus in *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*. Sextus laid emphasis on the point that a relative thing

cannot have real existence. Now if it is taken for granted that relatives do not have reality, *pramāṇa* and *prameya* would also be treated as unreal.

This objection of relativity too seems implausible to the Naiyāyikas. To them relativity cannot be counted as a mark of unreality. By considering relatives as unreal, Nāgārjuna and his followers have diluted the difference between what is intrinsically real (*svarūpasat*) and what is real only epistemologically (*jñātatayāsat*). Here the *Śūnyavādīns* may disagree with the Naiyāyikas by saying that the notion of *svarūpa* of a thing is imaginary, as there is no such intrinsic property or individuality of anything at all. The character or property which is often ascribed to an object is only relatively real. A thing, for example, which is described as ‘long’, is long in relation to some other thing which is short. Again, a thing, which is considered as ‘short’, is treated as ‘short’ in relation to some other thing which is long. Neither of these properties have absolute existence of their own.<sup>15</sup>

This allegation, to Gautama, is not right, as it involves contradiction.<sup>16</sup> The contradiction, involved in this position may be shown in the following way: If a thing, Vātsyāyana points out, considered as short in relation to something long, it is clear that property of being long is a non-relational one. Again if a thing is considered as a long in relation to something which is short, the property of being short must be taken as real or non-relational. Now if both are mutually dependent with one another, the denial of one



would imply the denial of the other. In that case it cannot be claimed that the property of being short is determined only relatively to the property of being long and vice-versa.

Though not identical, a similar charge is leveled against the presupposition of *pramāṇa* in addition to the charge of relativity. It is pointed out by Nāgārjuna, in the beginning of *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* that the notion of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are confused and reversible; there is no regularity in their application. It is on account of some means or *pramāṇa* that some object is established as *prameya*. Again on account of that very object or *prameya* the means is established as *pramāṇa*. Thus in establishment of *prameyatva* (i.e. the property of being an object of *pramā*) of the latter, the former is playing the role of means, while in establishment of *pramāṇatva* (i.e. the property of being an instrument of *pramā*) of the former the latter is playing as a means. Thus both are purported to play the role of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* simultaneously. Since there is no regularity in their designation, Nāgārjuna urged, none of them can be treated as real.

Here the question arises, does the irregularity of designation suggest unreality of something? The same thing may be designated differently from several standpoints. A person who is familiar as a professor to his neighbors happens to be husband to a lady, father to a little girl and son to an old woman. The expressions like the author of *Gitanjali*, the son of Debendranath Tagore, the grandson of prince Dwarakanath, the only Indian Nobel

laureate in literature, the founder of Shantiniketan, refers to the same person, Rabindranath Tagore. This variation in designation does not prove unreality or non-existence of Rabindranath.

The charge of infinite regress seems too cumbersome at the very outset. If the *prameya* is indebted to *pramaṇa* for its establishment, *pramāṇa* too, (as it is being counted as *prameya*) would depend on another *pramāṇa* for its ascertainment; and the second on a third, the third on a fourth. As a result, the first *pramāṇa* would remain unestablished. The light analogy which is supposed to be admitted by Gautama to check the regress is announced unfit by Nāgārjuna on the ground that light does not reveal anything.

In polemic of this objection it may be mentioned in the very beginning that the regress is not inevitable from the Nyāya point of view. It is true that establishment of any object, to Naiyāyika is subject to means or justification. They are not ready to recognize reality of any object independent of justification or epistemic instrument. And if there arises any doubt in the veracity of that very instrument, they would not hesitate to take help of another instrument. However endless repetition of this process is not permitted in Nyāya tradition. By citing several instances of everyday practice, Naiyāyikas prove it that the regress apprehended does not occur in everyday life.

Here the proponent may object that if *prameyas* are established by means of unestablished justificatory

conditions, the difference between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇābhāsa* would disappear. This apprehension seems implausible to the Naiyāyikas. For they are not ruling out the possibility of a *pramāṇa*'s being justified by another. The lamplight, which plays the role of an instrument in revelation of a jar, may also be apprehended by our visual organ; that organ, in turn, can be established by some inference. Thus the question of justification of a *pramāṇa* by another is always left open. But that openness does not lead us to infinity.

In this way the Naiyāyikas have tried their best to prove the hollowness of the allegation raised by the cognitive skeptics.

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Notes and References :

- <sup>1</sup> *Goutamiya Nyāyadarśana* with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, ed. Anantalal Thakur, aphorism 1/1/9, 1997, pp 9.
- <sup>2</sup> pre commentaries 2 *Yadartha Pramiyate tat Prameyam*. Ibid, pp 1
- <sup>3</sup> *Logical and Ethical Issues*, Bimal Krishna Matilal, ed. p.55.
- <sup>4</sup> *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*, F.Tola & C.Dragonetti , ed.p.63.
- <sup>5</sup> *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*, F.Tola & C.Dragonetti , ed.p.63.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid. p.99
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid. p.55
- <sup>8</sup> *Nādeḥsiddhistatrāstinaiva madhyasyanāntasya //*  
*Viḡrahavyāvartanī*,32.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p.59.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p.59. /*Nyāya-sūtra*, Vol-IV.
- <sup>11</sup> *Nyāya Darśan*, Fanibhusan Tarkabagis, ed. (4/2/29).

- <sup>12</sup> *Nādeḥsiddhistatrāstinaivamadhyasyanāntasya // -  
Vigrahavyāvartanī*,32.
- <sup>13</sup> Nyāya Tarkatirtha, Taranath and Tarkatirtha Amarendramohan: *Nyāyadarśanam*, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1936-1944, p.425.
- <sup>14</sup> Vātsyāyana, *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, 2/1/11.3
- <sup>15</sup> Gautama, *The Nyāya-sūtra*, Mahāmahopādhyāya Gaṅgānātha Jhā, Motilal Banarsidass publishers pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1912-1919, p.1519.
- <sup>16</sup> 'Vyāhatatvādayuktam' - *Nyāya-sūtra*- 4.1.40.

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Nature of Number and Knowledge of Mathematical Truths:

a comparison between *Principia Mathematica* and *The Līlāvati*

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Philosophy of mathematics, as is generally held, is the branch of philosophy that studies the assumptions, foundations, and implications of mathematics, and purports to provide a viewpoint of the nature and methodology of mathematics, and to understand the place of mathematics in people's lives. Traditionally, in Western philosophy, mathematical knowledge has been understood as universal and absolute knowledge, whose epistemological status sets it above all other forms of knowledge. The traditional western foundationalist schools of formalism, logicism and intuitionism sought to establish the absolute validity of mathematical knowledge by erecting foundational systems. Although modern philosophy of mathematics has in part moved away from this dogma of absolutism, it is still very influential, and needs to be critiqued. So I wish to begin by summarizing some of the arguments against Absolutism, as this position has been termed<sup>1</sup>.

It is expected that an adequate philosophy of mathematics should account for a number of aspects of mathematics including the following:

1. Epistemology: Mathematical knowledge; its character, genesis and justification, with special attention to the role of proof.
2. Theories: Mathematical theories, both constructive and structural: their character and development, and issues of appraisal and evaluation.
3. Ontology: The objects of mathematics: their character, origins and relationship with the language of mathematics, the issue of Platonism.
4. Methodology and History: Mathematical practice: its character, and the mathematical activities of mathematicians, in the present and past.
5. Applications and Values: Applications of mathematics; its relationship with science, technology, other areas of knowledge and values.
6. Individual Knowledge and Learning: The learning of mathematics: its character and role in the onward transmission of mathematical knowledge, and in the creativity of individual mathematicians.

Indian epistemological view point, in general, appears to be radically different from the standard Greek or modern western view which seeks to establish mathematical knowledge as infallible absolute truth. Further, the views concerning the nature of mathematical objects such as numbers etc., appear to be based on the framework developed by the Indian logicians and differs significantly

at the foundational level from the class/set-theoretic universe of contemporary mathematics.

It is argued that Indian epistemological view point on the nature of mathematical objects etc, could contribute in a significant way to the development of mathematics today as they appear to have the potential of leading to an entirely new edifice for mathematics. A comprehension of the Indian methodologies with regard to mathematics would also help in making contemporary Indian mathematics come on its own and make its mark in the world of science. In the Indian tradition mathematical knowledge is not viewed to be in any fundamental sense distinct from that in natural sciences. The Indian mathematicians declare that the purpose of *Upapatti* is to clarify, disambiguate, remove all confusions etc, and to convince the fellow mathematicians of the validity of a result.

In the present paper, we will try to understand the nature of *number* as mathematical objects, and how do we get the knowledge of that.

Also we will try to understand how they would explain the knowledge of the ground for mathematical truths from the same perspective.

In this context we will confine ourselves all and only to the arithmetic part of Bhaskara's *Siddhānta-Śīromani*<sup>2</sup>, especially to *Lilāvati* (also known as *pāṭīgaṇita* or *aṅkagaṇita*), named after his daughter, and consists of 277 verses; and *Principia Mathematica*<sup>3</sup>.

It covers calculations, progressions, measurement, permutations, and other topics, where the ancient Indian philosophy of mathematics has been discussed following Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine.

*Lilāvati* is divided into 13 chapters and covers many branches of mathematics, arithmetic, algebra, geometry, and a little trigonometry and measurement. More specifically the contents include:

- Definitions.
- Properties of zero (including addition, subtraction, division, and rules of operations).
- Further extensive numerical work, including use of negative numbers and surds.
- Estimation of  $\pi$ .
- Arithmetical terms and squaring.
- Problems involving interest and interest computation.

## **2. Philosophy of Mathematics in *Principia Mathematica*:**

Well-known foundational movements in mathematics started basically due to the following crises:

- Emergence of a number of non-Euclidean geometrical systems.
- Emergence of a host of paradoxes.



Russell observes that the main reason regarding the above mentioned inconveniences in mathematics are-

- Commitment to the existence of class / set.
- Unrestricted allowance for class/set formation.

To get rid of these Russell introduced two devices<sup>4</sup>-

- Theory of Incomplete Symbols (to maintain non-committal to the existence of class).
- Theory of Logical Types (to impose a rule for class formation).

**2.1.Theory of Incomplete Symbols** (a more general version of his theory of descriptions) introduces a new and powerful method of analysis that is in many ways guiding force to advanced analytic philosophy. Existence is treated here as a property of propositional function. It follows that the kinds of objects which are said to exist will depend on the kinds of propositional functions which are said to be satisfied; and this is the source of Quine's celebrated dictum that '*to be is to be the value of a variable*'. An ascription of existence cannot significantly be coupled with the use of a logically proper name.

**2.2.Theory of Logical Types** gave the grammar of the logical language in which Russell wished to explain mathematical notions. The primary objects or individuals (i.e., the given things not being subjected to logical analysis) are assigned to one type, say, *type 0*.

Propositional functions applicable to individuals are assigned to.

<i>type 0.</i>	<b>arnab</b>	(‘a’)
<i>type 1.</i>	<b>‘arnab is a fool’</b>	(‘f(a)’)
<i>type 2.</i>	<b>“‘arnab is a fool’ is true”</b>	(‘g(fa)’)

To exclude impredicative definitions within a type, the types above type 0 are further divided into orders.

Basic theses of Russell’s Program as expounded in *Principia Mathematica* can be summarized as follows<sup>5</sup>:

✓ Logic and Language-

- Theory of descriptions constitutes the core of the general theory of meaning.
- Distinction between logical form and grammatical form of linguistic expression.
- Language for logic has predicate variables with order /type indices and individual variables.
- Logic is the general theory of the structure.
- Material implication and other logical connectives are not relation signs.
- No denoting concepts.
- No bridge between categorical logic and the new quantification theory (variables of the new quantification theory taken as primitive).

- No substitutional theory of propositions emulating simple types of attributes / classes.
  - Axiom of reducibility and axiom of infinity are admitted.
  - Recursive definition of ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ justifying order component of the order / type indices on predicate variables.
- ✓ Ontology-
- Abolition of propositions (elementary and general) as single independent entities, instead the multiple relation theory of judgment is admitted
  - Admission of universals (type free with both a predicable and individual nature).
  - No non-existent objects since truth conditions for sentences with names can be given by descriptions.
  - Abolition of classes as entities.
  - Abolition of numbers as entities.
- ✓ Epistemology-
- Principle of acquaintance upheld, and acquaintance with universals, sense-data and the subject admitted.

### **3. Russell’s Theory of Classes and Number:**

In the *Principia Mathematica*, Russell, along with Whitehead, maintains that the theory of classes, although

provides a notation to represent them (classes), it avoids the assumption that there are such things as classes. Russell seeks to give a definition of symbols for classes on a similar line as definitions of descriptions, taking them as incomplete symbols. Such definition will assign meaning (i.e., truth or falsity) to statements in which words or symbols representing classes occur. Such a definition will assign meaning to statements containing class-symbols, eliminating all mention of classes from a proper analysis of those statements. If this becomes possible then Russell would say that symbols for classes are mere conveniences, like descriptions, they are ‘logical fictions’.

### 3.1. Class as Incomplete Symbols<sup>6</sup>:

In the *Principia Mathematica* this technique of deriving an extensional function from a function of a given function is presented in the form of the following definition:

$$f (\{z: \psi z\}) = (\exists \emptyset)[(x) (\emptyset x \equiv \psi x). f \{z: \emptyset z\}] \quad \text{Df} \\ [*20.01]$$

The definition \*20.01 in the *Principia Mathematica* actually stipulates the condition when a statement asserting some ‘propositional function’  $\psi x$  can be made.

The condition is that there must be a predicative function  $\emptyset$   $x$  formally equivalent to  $\psi x$  such that an assertion  $f$  of  $\emptyset x$  is meaningful (i.e., true/false). The equality between the two formally equivalent propositional functions is their identical extension, which renders the assertion  $f$  of  $\psi x$  to

be considered as the assertion  $f$  of  $\emptyset x$ . Thus,  $f$  of  $\psi x$  can be considered as an assertion of this common extension. For the sake of convenience this extension is called 'the class determined by the propositional function (condition)  $\psi x$ '. In this way an assertion  $f$  of  $\psi x$  becomes an assertion  $f$  of the class determined by the propositional function (condition)  $\psi x$ .

In the above, by a predicative function what is meant is — *a function of one variable which is of the next order above that of its argument, i.e., the lowest order compatible with the order of that argument.*

The definition \*20.01 is in fact the definition of a class in use. This definition basically effectuates reduction (translation) of statements nominally about classes to statements about their defining conditions [Russell, B. (1919)].

### 3.2. Requirements of 'Class' <sup>7</sup>:

Now, if a symbol is to serve as a class it must fulfill the following conditions:

- i) A class is always determined by a predicative propositional function, and that a predicative propositional function must determine an appropriate class.
- ii) Two formally equivalent propositional functions determine the same class and two propositional functions that are not formally equivalent to each other

must determine two different classes. This is known as *the principle of extensionality for classes*.

- iii) There must be a mechanism for defining not only classes, but classes of classes also.

Russell has shown in *Principia Mathematica* that classes of classes too have all formal properties of classes of individuals. We will see shortly that numbers have been defined by Russell as classes of classes which are similar to each other.

- iv) The question whether a class is a member of itself or not, will not be entertained in the theory of classes. Type theory takes care of this.

- v) Mathematical induction involves reference to all natural numbers less than/equal to a certain, number  $k$ . This brings in the notion of universal class, i.e., class of all individuals, class of all classes etc.

However, unless all the elements of a so-called universal class are of the same logical type, questions regarding the legitimacy of a universal class will continue to be raised. In the theory of classes, as proposed in *Principia Mathematica*, the class consisting of all elements of a given type is called a universal class, the class determined by the 'propositional function' (condition) ' $x = x$ ', and is symbolically represented by ' $V$ '.

Thus,  $V = \{x : x = x\}$  [24.01]

The null class, symbolically represented by ‘ $\Lambda$ ’, is the complement of  $V$ , or,

$$\Lambda = -V \text{ [*24.02].}$$

In this context, in *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* Russell defines unit class by saying — A class  $\alpha$  is said to be a “unit” class if the propositional function “‘ $x$  is an  $\alpha$ ’ is always equivalent to ‘ $x$  is  $c$ ’ ” (regarded as a function of  $c$ ) is not always false, i.e., in more informal language, if there is a term  $c$  such that  $x$  will be a member of  $\alpha$  when  $x$  is  $c$  but not otherwise. [Russell, B. (1919)]. Taking ‘ $x$  is an  $\alpha$ ’ as ‘ $\emptyset x$ ’, symbolically we may put it as follows —

$$\alpha = (\exists c) (x) (\emptyset x \equiv x = c) \text{ Df.}$$

In general, a class  $\alpha$  is the collection of all those entities  $x$ ’s that satisfy a predicative propositional function  $\phi z$ .

The predicative functions are brought in to ensure that the hierarchy of logical types is strictly maintained in formation of a class and also in formation of any statement about classes.

The definition 20.01 is a definition in use of an expression ‘ $\alpha$ ’ such that  $\alpha = \{z : \psi z\}$ ; in other words, 20.01 is a definition of “the class determined by the propositional function (condition)  $\psi z$ ”, whenever there is a predicative function  $\emptyset z$  equivalent to  $\psi z$ , and ‘ $f\{z : \emptyset z\}$ ’ is significant.

However, in *Principia*, there is a separate definition of ‘class of classes’, not only because the notion of number is

defined in terms of the notion of ‘class of classes’, but also because of some deeper reason. We will discuss about it in the next section.

The following is the definition in use of ‘class of classes’.

$$f\{\alpha : \psi\alpha\} = (\exists\phi)[(\alpha)(\psi\alpha \equiv \phi\alpha).f(\phi)] \quad [*20.08]$$

The above definition actually stipulates the condition when a statement involving the propositional function ‘ $\psi\alpha$ ’, where  $\alpha$  is a class, can be made. The condition is that there must be a predicative function ‘ $\phi\beta$ ’, formally equivalent to ‘ $\psi\beta$ ’ such that an assertion of ‘ $f(\phi\alpha)$ ’ is meaningful (i.e., true or false).

In *Principia Mathematica*, classes of individuals are proved to satisfy certain properties like,

$$(x)(\psi x \equiv \emptyset x) \equiv [\{z : \psi z\} = \{z : \emptyset z\}] \quad (*20.15),$$

$$[\{z : \psi z\} = \{z : \emptyset z\}] \equiv (x)[x \in \{z : \psi z\} \equiv x \in \{z : \emptyset z\}] \quad (*20.31),$$

$$[\{z : \emptyset z\} = \{z : \psi z\}] \rightarrow [f\{z : \emptyset z\} \equiv f\{z : \psi z\}] \quad (*20.18)$$

etc.

Russell then shows that classes of classes satisfy all these properties also.



### 3.4. Number in terms of Class<sup>8</sup>:

We know that arithmetic is all about numbers. Numbers are of two kinds — *cardinal numbers* and *ordinal numbers*. Informally speaking, a cardinal number is the number that we speak of in answer to the question “how many”? It is the number indicating the strength of a set/class. On the other hand, ordinal numbers are numbers that we speak of while counting the elements/members of a set as the first, the second, the third, and so on.

In mathematics, there are mainly two traditions of defining numbers. One is the Frege-Russell tradition of defining numbers as classes of similar classes/sets of equivalent sets; the other tradition goes back to Dedekind and also to Peano, in which fundamental properties of numbers are given in the form of some axioms/primitive propositions.

Russell has defined cardinal numbers as equivalence classes of classes; and ordinal numbers as equivalence classes of well-ordered classes of the same type, in accordance with their respective logicist programs.

The number of a class is the property that belongs to the class collectively and not distributively. Definition of number by abstraction as some common property shared by similar classes does not satisfy the condition of uniqueness. This definition does not guarantee that there is exactly one common property shared by two or more similar classes.

To avoid this problem Russell defines numbers as classes of similar classes. They are unique in respect of their extensions. A cardinal number, i.e., the cardinality of a given class is the class of all classes similar to the given class.

Thus, Russell's definition of the number zero, is the class whose only member is the null class.

The definition of the number one is the class of all singletons, and the definition of the number two is the class of all couples, and so on.

In general, a number is anything which is the number of some classes.

Since, the number of a class has already been defined without reference to 'number', the question of circularity does not arise.

Unlike definitions of numbers by abstraction, Russell's definitions of numbers as classes of classes ensure that each particular number is unique. Because, each particular number, according to Russell, is identified with a class (of similar classes) that is identical only with itself. If there is another class of similar classes to be identified with a particular number, then by the principle of extensionality this second class would be identical to the first class.

The above definition of a cardinal number given by Russell is the definition of a particular finite number. It remains to be seen how the series or progression of natural numbers,

i.e., 0, 1, 2, 3,..... and also infinite cardinal numbers are to be defined by Russell.

### 3.5. Peano's Postulates for Natural Numbers<sup>9</sup>:

Peano encapsulates the whole of the theory of natural numbers with the help of three primitive ideas — 'zero', 'number' and 'successor', and five postulates.

Let '0' mean  $X_0$ , 'number' mean the whole set  $W$  of terms, and let 'successor' of any term  $X_n$  mean  $X_{n+1}$ . Then, we may express Peano's five postulates as follows —

A1) 0 is a number.

[That is, 0. is a member of the set  $W$ , i.e.,  $0 \in W$ ]

A2) The successor of any number is a number.

[That is, taken any term  $X_n$  in the set  $W$ ,  $X_{n+1}$  is also in the set, i.e., for each  $X_n \in W$ , there exists a unique  $X_{n+1} \in W$ ]

A3) No two numbers have the same successor.

[That is, if  $X_m$  and  $X_n$  are two different members of the set  $W$ ,  $X_{m+1}$  and  $X_{n+1}$  are different, i.e., if  $X_m, X_n \in W$  such that  $X_n \neq X_m$ , then  $X_{n+1} \neq X_{m+1}$ .]

A4) 0 is not the successor of any number.

[That is, no term in the set  $W$  comes before  $X_0$ , i.e., there is no  $X_n \in W$  for which  $X_{n+1} = 0$ .]

A5) Any property which belongs to 0, and also to the successor of every number which has the property, belongs to all numbers.

[That is, any property which belongs to  $X_0$ , and belongs to  $X_{n+1}$  provided it belongs to  $X_n$ , also belongs to all  $X_i$ 's,  $i \in I = W$ , i.e., if  $S$  is a subset of  $W$  such that  $X_0 \in S$ ,  $X_{n+1} \in S$  for every  $X_n \in S$ , then  $X_i \in S$  for all  $i \in I = W$ .].

The above five postulates give the fundamental property of a progression or, a series of the form —  $X_0, X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n, \dots$ .

In any series of the above form, there is a first term, a successor to each term (so that there is no last term), no repetitions, and every term can be reached from the start in a finite number of steps. Every progression, according to Russell, is a series that verifies these five postulates. 'Zero' is given the name to its first term, the name 'number' to the whole set of its terms, and the name 'successor' to the next in progression.

The fifth postulates in particular, which is known as the *Principle of induction* gives the nature of a progression.

### 3.6. Russell's Definition of Cardinal Numbers Satisfying Peano's Postulates:

Now, it is to be seen how Russell captures the notion of progression of natural numbers in his theory.

Peano's three primitive notions are given in Russell's theory through definitions. Cardinal number is defined as the number of a given class. Each particular number is an instance of cardinal number. Zero is defined as the cardinal number of the class consisting only of the null class of a given logical type.

$$0 = \{\Lambda\} \text{ Df.}$$

Let us now define the notion of 'successor', following Russell.

"The successor of the number of terms in the class  $\alpha$  is the number of terms in the class consisting of  $\alpha$  together with  $x$ , where  $x$  is any term not belonging to the class."<sup>7</sup>  
[Russell, B. (1919)]

It can be shown that in Russell's theory we get  $n+1$ , i.e., the class of all classes having  $n+1$  terms as the successor of  $n$ , i.e., the class of all classes having  $n$  terms.

Let us take the number  $0 = \{\Lambda\}$ .

Then, by the above definition, the successor of 0, i.e., 1 is the cardinal number of the class  $\Lambda \cup \{x\}$ , where  $x$  does not belong to  $\Lambda$ .

In other words,  $1 = \{\{x\}\}$ . Whatever  $x$  may be,  $\{\{x\}\}$  is the class of a class having only one member, and of any class equivalent to it.

The successor of 1 is 2. 1 is the cardinal number of the class  $\{x\}$ , whatever  $x$  may be. Then, 2 is the cardinal number of the class  $\{x\} \cup \{x'\}$ , where  $x'$  does not belong to  $\{x\}$ . Thus,  $2 = \{\{x, x'\}\}$ . That is, 2 is the class of a couple.

In this way, it can be shown that 3, which is the successor of 2, is the class of a trio, and so on. In general, the notion of successor would give  $n+1$ , i.e., the class of all classes having  $n+1$  terms, as the successor of  $n$ , i.e., the class of all classes having  $n$  terms.

Thus, Peano's first two postulates come through in Russell's theory of classes, in which numbers are defined in terms of classes.

Now, we would try to understand how Peano's fourth postulate is also available in Russell's theory of classes.

Let us recall that 0 is the class  $\{\Lambda\}$ . Also, suppose that 0 is the successor of some number  $k$ . Then, 0 is the cardinal number of the class composed of  $k$  number of elements together with any  $x$  that is not a member of the class of  $k$  elements. Then, 0 becomes the cardinal number of the class consisting at least of  $x$ . This implies  $x \in \Lambda$  which, we know, is false. So, it is not true that there is some number  $k$  such that 0 is the successor of  $k$ .

The fifth postulate of Peano is given by a definition in Russell's theory. But, before stating that definition we have to understand the notion of posterity first. The posterity of a given natural number with respect to the relation "immediate predecessor" (which is the converse of "successor") is all those terms that belong to every hereditary class to which the given number belongs. A hereditary class, in its turn, is a class having the successor of  $n$ , that is,  $n+1$  as its member whenever  $n$  is a member of that class, for any  $n$ .

Now, let us present, following Russell, the fifth postulate of Peano, that is, the *principle of mathematical induction*. The postulate is —

The "natural numbers" are the posterity of zero with respect to the relation "immediate predecessor" which is the converse of "successor".

It is not difficult now to understand how any assigned natural number can be generated from zero by successive steps from "next to next".

Thus, in Russell's theory, cardinal number is defined first, and then a natural number is defined as a cardinal number satisfying the principle of induction. In fact, a natural number is a finite cardinal number. By the principle of induction, all natural numbers given by Peano's axioms are generated in Russell's theory of classes. The collection of these natural numbers is an inductive class of which 0 is a member and if any natural number  $n$  is a member of this

class, then its successor  $n+1$  is also a member of this class. In other words, the numbers forming such an inductive class are *inductive numbers*.

Now, if the process of generating natural numbers by successor function is to generate numbers infinitely, then the third of Peano's postulates, namely, 'no two different numbers have the same successor' must hold good.

However, this can be ensured only if the totality of objects in the universe is assumed to be infinite. The *axiom of infinity* is just this postulate. According to this postulate —

*“if  $n$  be any inductive cardinal number, there is at least one class of individuals having  $n$  terms.”*<sup>10</sup>

Assuming Peano's third postulate to hold good, it can now be said that the class of inductive numbers is an infinite class. Then the cardinal number of this class cannot be one of the inductive numbers, it must be something new. For example, the number of elements in a series starting from 0 to  $n$  is obviously none of 0, ...,  $n$ , but  $n+1$ . Thus, the cardinal number of the class of inductive numbers is a new number, say  $\omega$ (omega), which is none of the finite inductive numbers 0, 1, 2, ... .

$\omega$ (Omega) is the first *transfinite cardinal number*, which is the class of all classes similar to the class of inductive or natural numbers. Other transfinite cardinal numbers are defined accordingly in Russell's theory.



However, this attempt of *Principia Mathematica* leads to some serious doubts about its goal. Some of which are as follows:

- It fails to explain the knowledge of different types of numbers.
- It fails to provide a satisfactory account of *class*, by means of which numbers were sought to define and knowledge of mathematical truths were sought to explain.
- It admits a logic which is higher order and hence not complete.
- It fails to address Gödel's incompleteness thesis.

#### 4. Philosophy of Mathematics in *The Lilāvati*:

Now, we will try to understand the nature of *number* as mathematical objects, and how do we get the knowledge of that from the perspective of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine. Also we will try to understand how they would explain the knowledge of the ground for mathematical truths. In this context we will confine ourselves all and only to the arithmetic part of Bhaskara's *Siddhānta-Śiromaṇi*, especially to *Lilāvati* (also known as *pāṭīgaṇita* or *aṅkagaṇita*), named after his daughter, and consists of 277 verses. We should note here that, in order to understand the study of mathematics, *Lilāvati* offers the characteristics of mathematics as *Ganayate saṁkhyāyate tadgaṇitaṁ*<sup>11</sup>. This *Gaṇita* is mainly of two types: *Vyakta Gaṇita* (also called *Patigaṇita*) and *Avyakta Gaṇita* (also

called *Bija Gaṇita*). It tends to take what is now-a-days referred to as the constructivist approach with regard to mathematics.

#### 4.1. Nature of Number:

Numbers or, *saṃkhyā* according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are objective realities. Just as entities are seen to be in possession of different kinds of qualities (*guṇaḥ*) like colors, tastes, they do possess numbers as their qualities. When we perceive a certain object as blue, corresponding to our perception (*pratyakṣa*) of blue through *saṃyukta-samavāya sannikarṣa*, there is blue color in the object. Similarly when we count realities belonging to different categories (*Padārtha*) as one, two, three, such numbers exist in them. And this philosophy is the crux of *The Lilāvati*.

One may argue that “Oneness” (Number one) is not a separate reality but only a specific form of the object. Śrīdhara observes that in that case the use of two words viz. “one” and “Pot” will become superfluous since they refer to the same object.<sup>12</sup>

We must know as Uddyotakara argues that we have cognitions of “one” and “many” and they must have causes just as we have colors in the objects for our cognition of colors. Our cognition of “one” and “many” are different from our cognition of a Pot. Hence they must have causes other than the Pot and the causes for our cognition of “one” and “many” is the quality “number”.<sup>13</sup> And hence, numbers

are the qualities inhering in the substances and they are the basis for our usages “one” and the rest. Vaiśeṣikas held that number as a quality belongs to and inheres in substances only.<sup>14</sup>

Then again, one may object that, if we say “this picture is painted with four blue colors”. Wherein number belongs to qualities which suggest that number four as a property of four-blue-colors should inhere in the blue colors (qualities).

*The Lilāvati* maintains that this usage should not be interpreted to mean that number (four) inheres in qualities (blue colors) for it contradicts the Vaiśeṣika dictum that *a quality cannot inhere in qualities*.<sup>15</sup> They contend that when one says that “this picture is painted with four blue colors” it has to be understood that the substance painting (picture) constitutes the substratum for both the number four and the blue colors to inhere in and thus adhere to the rule that “a quality cannot inhere in a quality.”

However, according to Raghunātha when one says that “this picture is painted with four blue colors”, our awareness here is that number four belongs to the quality (blue colors) and not to the substance picture. Hence, he contends, that it is reasonable that we link number four to the quality blue color as such. He observes that number four resides directly in the quality blue color by inherence (*Samavāya*). Raghunātha, however, respects the old Vaiśeṣika view that “one quality cannot inhere in another quality” by accepting number as a distinct category.<sup>16</sup>

## 4.2. Knowledge of Progression of Number:

Now, the question is how can *The Lilāvati* explain our knowledge of progression of cardinal numbers?

Following Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *The Lilāvati* would first distinguish between the eternal and the non-eternal numbers. And second, among the latter, i.e., non-eternal numbers between (1) those that are produced by the respective numbers of their cause and (2) those that are produced by the enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*).

Number oneness (*ekatva*) is eternal in eternal entities such as souls, minds etc. and non-eternal in products such as cloths, pots and the like. Oneness of an entity, such as a cloth, is produced by oneness of its inherent cause like, yarn. Kaṇada would say that the quality of the cause-substance, yarn, produces the corresponding quality of the effect substance.<sup>17</sup> The color of the cause substance, yarn, produces the color of the effect substance, cloth (as *asamavyāyi kāraṇa* of cloth).

Similarly the quality oneness of the effect substance, cloth must be held to be produced by the oneness of its inherent cause yarn.

But all numbers from duality (*dvitva*) onwards are produced by our enumerative cognition.

So, is it that the contention of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that numbers from duality onwards does not exist in objects always?

*The Lilāvati* maintains that when we, for instance, say that a cloth is blue, here we perceive the blue color of the cloth produced by the blue color of its cause (yarn). Similarly when we claim to perceive the quality *oneness* in the cloth we perceive a quality originated by the corresponding quality of its cause, yarn.

In both these cases we perceive qualities that had already been existing in the objects. But when we perceive two objects e.g. two Pots as two, here our perception of the quality 'duality' is not one of perceiving a reality which had already been there, but it is a case of perceiving a reality which is produced in the two Pots for the time being by our enumerative cognition.

So, is it that the numbers from duality onwards are not as much objective as number one or other qualities?

The answer is: No. They are equally objective and independent of our cognition, but there is this difference – whereas number one in a product is produced by a similar number of its cause, numbers from duality onwards are produced by our enumerative cognition. Hence the duration of the former is likely to be longer (existing as long as its substratum exists) whereas the duration of the latter is relatively shorter. But whether they last longer or disappear after a few moments, there are ontological correlates corresponding to our notion of all numbers.

While going through the system of *The Lilāvati*, we should not confound the processes involved in the origination of

numbers from duality onwards and our perception of them. The number duality, for instance, originates in the two Pots in the very moment when the enumerative cognition operates as “this is one” and “this is one”. But our perception of duality does not take place immediately.

When we perceive any two objects (Pots), we do not cognize them immediately as two.

- First we perceive each Pot as “this is one” (*‘Ayaṃ Ekam’*), “this is one” (*‘Ayaṃ Ekam’*). This is called enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*).
- This enumerative cognition gives rise to the quality, duality in the Pots in the second moment. The duality which has originated thus is not perceived at once.
- In the third moment after the emergence of duality, we perceive the universality of duality (*dvitva*) for in the absence of our perception of the universality of duality we cannot account for our determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) of duality.
- In the fourth moment we perceive the quality duality inhering in the two Pots. This is how the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika explains the origination and our perception of all numbers from duality onwards.

Now, we may be curious to know if *zero* is considered as a Number in *The Lilāvati*?

*The Lilāvati* maintains that – *dhanayor dhanam ṛṇam ṛṇayordhanaṛṇayor antaram samaikye kham*<sup>18</sup>. That means, the sum of two positive numbers is positive, sum of two negative numbers is negative, and the sum of two equals with opposite is zero.

So, zero as a number can be known all and only with the help of other numbers.

But, here we have some anomalies.

*First*, when duality originates, where does it ‘reside’? Does it ‘reside’ in each of the two objects? If it ‘resides’ in each of the two severally then we must be able to say ‘two’ when we perceive even one of them which is absurd.

*Second*, after the destruction of one of the two objects we must be able to say “two” when we see the remaining one alone.

*Third*, duality produced by the *apekṣābuddhi* of one man (X) must be perceptible for another or for any other person (Y) who looks at them without themselves producing it again. In other words, Y must be able to perceive the already existing duality produced by the *apekṣābuddhi* of X without himself producing it by his own *apekṣābuddhi* again and for that reason anyone who looks at those two objects must perceive them as two immediately for it is a case of simply perceiving what exists already.

In the system of *The Lilāvati* we find that on account of the absence of the usage that “one is two” and because of the

usage that “one is not two”, duality is supposed to reside in both objects taken as a group by the relation called “collective extensivity” (*paryāpti*).<sup>19</sup> *Paryāpti* is a relation by which numbers from duality onwards reside in the objects taken together and not in its members.

The assumption of *paryāpti* as a relation by means of which numbers reside in groups of objects and not in any member of the group steers clear of all our doubts. First in as much as number two (duality) resides in the two objects taken as a group and not in any of the members of the group of two objects, we are free from the apprehension that we may have to say in respect of one of the two objects as “two”.

The second anomaly, that we must be able to see duality even in one of them after the destruction of the other, also vanishes on the assumption that duality resides in the two objects taken as a group. The answer to the third objection requires the discussion of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika notion of origination and destruction of the numbers from duality onwards. As we have stated already first our enumerative cognition in the form “this is one” and “this is one” comes into operation. Second this results in the emergence of the duality in the two objects. Third we perceive the universality of duality. Fourth we perceive duality as such. But this duality will not continue to be present in the Pots for long for being a product of enumerative cognition; it gets destroyed after the destruction of the enumerative cognition. The Naiyāyikas hold the view that this enumerative cognition being a transient psychical phenomenon gets destroyed in the fourth moment and with



its destruction its product duality also gets destroyed in the fifth moment. Thus duality will not be present in the two objects (Pots) after the fifth moment. However the person may continue to possess the knowledge (*jñāna*) of the objects as two even after the destruction of duality and knowledge of duality should not be confounded with our perception of duality. Thus if we understand the implications involved in the production and our cognition of duality, the anomaly that one man must be able to perceive the duality produced by the enumerative cognition of another does not simply arise.

## 5. Conclusion:

So, in view of above, we can summarize the following.

In *The Lilāvati*, following Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, *Samkhyā* or number is considered as quality (*Guṇaḥ*), which resides in substance (*Dravya*) via the relation of inherence (*Samavāya*), which is also the relation between whole and parts, *Jāti* (genus or universal) and *Vyakti* (species or individual) etc. This *Samavāya* is the relation by which a *Samkhyā* such as *Dvītva* is related to each of the objects of a pair, and gives rise to the cognition (*Jñāna*): ‘*Ayam dvītvam*’ - This (one) is (a) locus of two-ness. Apart from this, the number-property, *Dvītva* is related to both the objects together via a relation called *Paryāpti* (completion) and gives rise to the cognition 'these are two'. So, there are two ways in which number-properties such as one-ness or unity, two-ness or duality, three-ness etc., are connected with things numbered-

firstly via *Samavāya* relation with each thing,

and

secondly via *Paryāpti* relation with the things together.

The *paryāpti* relation connecting the number-property to the numbered things together is taken in *The Lilāvati* to be a *Svarūpa Sambandha* (or a self-linking relation), where the two terms of the relation is identified ontologically. Thus, according to *The Lilāvati* any number property such as two-ness is not unique. There are indeed several two-nesses, one associated (and identified) with every pair of objects. There are of course the universals such as *Dvīvatva* which inhere in each particular two-ness associated (and identified) with each pair of objects.

The fact, that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikācāryas talk of the relation *Paryāpti* by which number property such as two-ness resides in both the numbered objects together and not in each one of them, has led various scholars to compare it with the Frege's theory of numbers<sup>20</sup>. According to Bertrand Russell<sup>21</sup>, there is a unique number two, which is *the set of all sets* of two elements (or pair of objects).

Thus the number two is a set of second-order somewhat analogous to the universal two-ness of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikācāryas which may be thought of to be a property of second-order.

The most crucial way in which *The Lilāvati* (following Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory) differs from all the modern

western formulations is that, it talks only in terms of properties and that too with clearly specified ontological status, and totally avoided notions such as set whose ontological status is dubious. Any number property such as two-ness associated with a pair of objects is ontologically identified with the pair, or both the objects together, and not with any 'set' (let alone the set of all sets) constituted by such a pair.

Apart from their theory of numbers, the general approach of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikācāryas is what may be referred to as 'intensional' as opposed to the 'extensional' approach of most of western logic and mathematics. It is precisely because of the fact that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikācāryas have built a very powerful system of logic which is able to handle properties as they are (with both their intensions and extension) and not by reducing them to classes or sets (which are pure extensions, with the intension being abstracted away), that there seems to be a great potential for the methodology of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logic in creating an entirely new edifice for mathematics. For, as is generally understood: Mathematics, as it exists today, is extensional rather than intentional. By this we mean that, when a propositional function enters into a mathematical theory, it is usually the extension of the function (i.e. the totality of entities or sets of entities that satisfy it) rather than its intension (i.e. its 'context' or meaning) that really matters. This leaning towards extensionality is reflected in a preference for the language of classes or sets over the

formally equivalent language of predicates with a single argument.

If the elementary propositions of the theory are of the form  $F(x)$ , ( $x$  has  $F$  - where ' $F$ ' is a predicate with a single argument which runs over a domain of individuals) then it is indeed true that it is but a matter of preference whether we use the language of predicates or of classes (of all those individuals which satisfy the corresponding predicate). However, the elementary propositions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logic are of the form ' $xRy$ ' which relate any two entities (not necessarily individual substance)  $x$ ,  $y$  via a relation  $R$ . The elementary proposition in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logic is always composed of a *Viśeṣya* (qualificand  $x$ ), *Viśeṣaṇa* or *Prakāra* (qualifier  $y$ ) and a *Samsarga* (relation  $R$ ). Here,  $y$  may also be considered as a *dharma* (property) residing in  $x$  via relation  $R$ . Using these and many other notions, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians have developed a precise technical language, based on Sanskrit, which is unambiguous and makes transparent the logical structure of any (complex) proposition and which is used in some sense like the symbolic formal languages of modern mathematical logic. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians seem to have used this language mainly as a vehicle of conducting philosophical discourse concerning the nature of entities (*Padārthas*) and their relations.

Contemporary mathematics, being rooted entirely in the modern western tradition, does suffer from serious limitations which can be traced to the kind of epistemology

and philosophy of mathematics which have governed the development of mathematics in the western tradition right from the Greek times.

Firstly there is the perennial problem of *foundations* posed by the ideal view of mathematical knowledge as a set of infallible absolute truths, which is basic to the western epistemology of mathematics. As is well known, the continued effort of philosophers' mathematicians of the west to secure for mathematics the status of indubitable knowledge has not succeeded; and there is perhaps a growing feeling that this goal may after all turn out to be impossible. Surely this could lead to progress in mathematics, but it would be progress of a limited kind and within the narrow confines of the western quest for indubitable knowledge in the domain of mathematics.

Apart from the problems inherent in the very goals set for mathematics, there are also several other serious inadequacies in the western epistemology and philosophy of mathematics which are nowadays being seriously discussed by many scholars. Most of these, center around the issue that the ideal view of mathematics as a formal deductive system causes serious distortion in the very practice of the science of mathematics. Some scholars have argued<sup>22</sup> that this ideal view of mathematics has rendered philosophy of mathematics totally barren and incapable of providing any understanding of the actual logic of mathematical discovery.

We wish to emphasize that the Indian epistemology of mathematics, if sufficiently researched upon by present day scholars, may lead to a major revision of the current concepts on the nature of mathematical knowledge and its validation. Another important foundational issue in mathematics is that concerning the nature of mathematical objects. Here again the philosophical foundations of contemporary mathematics are extremely unsatisfactory with none of the major schools of thought, namely Logicism, Formalism or Intuitionism, being able to give satisfactory account of what indeed is the nature of the objects (such as numbers) dealt with by mathematics and how they are related to (other) objects in the world.

What we have indicated above, are just a few examples of how the methodology of Indian mathematics could turn out to be of considerable relevance for the development of mathematics today.

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On Nāgārjuna's Stance in his Critique of *Samśaya* and  
*Pramāṇa*

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**Saroj Kanta Kar**

Nāgārjuna is often regarded as a sceptic for not advancing any expressive opinion of his own while he criticizes others' metaphysical and realistic views and their enunciating epistemic projections. In this context, it is important to ask, 'why should a philosopher criticize any standpoint at all, if he has nothing to presume, convey or propose?' Can a philosopher go on to use reason, practice certain methods in his criticism of *pramāṇa* without sanctioning any credibility to it? Can *pramāṇa* be thrown away outright? If not, what is the necessity of such critiquing? Meditating upon these questions, this discourse is an attempt to appreciate the motive or philosophical standpoint of Nāgārjuna in critiquing the realist view on the context of *pramāṇa and samśaya* so that any ascription of scepticism upon him can be ruled out. This can be achieved by adopting a meta-philosophical approach, namely, discussing upon the factors, such as his spiritual and philosophical affiliations that lead him against the realists' approach of the mentioned categories.

**Keywords:** *Pramāṇa, prameya, vaitaṇḍika, prasaṅgāpādāna, svabhāva, niḥsvabhāvatāchakraka, itaretarāśraya, anāvasthā.*

## Nāgārjuna's Prime Concern leading to Critique of the Realists

Nāgārjuna exhibited a unique approach in the history of Indian philosophy. At his time metaphysicians took either of the extreme standpoints like eternalism / essentialism (*śāśvatavāda/ svabhāvavāda*) vs., nihilism / non-essentialism (*uchchedavāda*), etc., whereas he took no side among them.<sup>1</sup> He had a unique approach, where things were treated at two levels: accepting everything empirically functional at a level of truth called empirical truth / reality (*vyāvahārika satya*), but not adhering to such nature of things as ultimate at a higher or deeper level of understanding and realization. The higher level would be reached by having *yathābhūtarśana* by analysis and yogic vision. It results in metaphysical view-less-ness (*dr̥ṣṭi śūnyatā*). It would help in transcending the usual sides of the issues: eternalism / essentialism and nihilism / non-essentialism. This is one of the important aspects of Nāgārjuna's philosophical enterprise, for which he argued against the realists.

Nāgārjuna's ingenuity is due to his philosophical genesis in the Buddha. Buddha's teaching of *pratītyasamutpāda* states that everything comes into existence by depending upon causes and conditions, and therefore here there is no place of eternal dharma of anything nor also there is eternal nature of anything. Further, as becoming is nature of phenomena, complete annihilation or denial of the empirical is also not possible. For Nāgārjuna this teaching posits neither nihilism nor eternalism of the cosmic

process, yet there is no denial of results of actions of the individuals.<sup>2</sup> In the process of becoming interrelatedness, there is hardly any independent, unique eternal entity (*sattva / dharma*) or own nature (*svabhāva*). Thus, he reached at the *svabhāvasūnyatā* and *dharmasūnyatā*, which are derived through *pratītyasamūtpāda* analysis, and the analysis is made on the empirical becoming of things, beings and concepts. This being the case, Nāgārjuna has to transcend the views of *svabhāva*, *dharma* and denial of the empirical, and this is *dr̥ṣṭīsūnyatā*, a transcendental level of understanding. Thus, he accepts relativity of things and beings, concepts and views, and thereby rejects their absolute constructions, such standpoints, and denounces any reification of entity-hood supposed in essentialist and realist terms. At the same time, he allows the empirical existence, action and meaning of all that come into being or becomes meaningful. This is clear in his initial verses in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, where he salutes the Buddha for teaching the *pratītyasamūtpāda* for deliverance from the phenomenal and conceptual construction of any absolutistic nature or extremes, such as nihilism (*uchchedavāda*) and eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*) etc.<sup>3</sup> Such suppositions and thoughts, that explain the world in terms of fixed essences or eternal intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) or its opposite, are persistently criticized upon, in order to walk in the path of liberation by overcoming Ego and its attributes. The intention is lucidly clarified in the *Ratnāvalī* as he narrates,

‘The assumption of ego exists as long as the *pañchaskandhas*, *ahamkāra* being existed, then follows the

actions having its results and births over and again. Like this, knowing the cause, the effect and cessation of them, one can know neither existence nor non-existence of the world in reality. 'To conceive that actions have no effect is *nāstitā dr̥ṣṭi* (nihilistic standpoint.) This, as heard, is wrong view, and not leading to merit. Usually it leads to hell and rebirth. To conceive that actions have their effects is heard to *astitā dr̥ṣṭī*. It is called perfect view and it consists merit and leads to good path. Unlike these two options, there is quietude of the conception of *asti* or *nāsti*, *pāpa* or *pūṇya*, *durgati* or *sugati* as said by the great people.' The contention is that liberation consists in the wisdom of transcendence of affirmation and negation, good and evil, heaven and hell.<sup>4</sup> The wise should adopt this in order to be liberated.'<sup>5</sup>

The above-mentioned contention clearly shows that Nāgārjuna's philosophical position and spiritual genre made him to transcend the opposite alternative extremes as well as all such conceptions regarding metaphysical or epistemic issues as these are only speculative view or *dr̥ṣṭis*.<sup>6</sup> This is one aspect of his transcendentalism of *dr̥ṣṭi-śūnyatā*. He adopted a middle path (*madhyamāpratipat*) - avoiding the extreme views of nihilism and eternalism or essentialism about anything, and at the same time without doubting about the empirical reality of the phenomenal world, i.e., not denying any empirical efficacy of *pramāṇas*, so also fecundity of morality, spirituality, *karma* and their effects as relative to causes and conditions. This is his relativism regarding the empirical. The three –

transcendentalism, middle path and relativism make up his philosophical framework. That which would go against his established framework, will obviously be criticized. This happens as the realistic projection and depiction of the matters of fact go against his framework, but it does not say that he doubted the empirical facts and values as a sceptic. His framework supports moral and spiritual motives, which no sceptic would need, and for this reason he would not be understood as a sceptic here. His arguments when taken in discrete manners and out of contexts, may seem to be sceptical, but taken together, with the context and his philosophical framework, can indicate his relativism regarding the empirical facts. In consideration of his philosophical framework, spiritual lineage and his noble intentions, his position can be comprehended as a transcendentalism regarding the Reality and transcending positive or negative and any alternative in his philosophy.<sup>7</sup> Transcendentalism is one aspect of his philosophy where he overcomes the limits and pangs of conceptualizations about metaphysical speculations, and there is no conflict in this regard. Relativism is another aspect of his philosophy about the empirical matters of fact, where relativity and dependent origination is a rule. Thus, as a relativist and transcendentalist, he took on the realists.

### **Nāgārjuna's Critique of the Essentialist *Pramāṇa* of Nyāya**

Assuming Nāgārjuna's philosophical standpoints and spiritual lineage as depicted in the above section, the same may be understood to be conveyed by him in his criticism

of the realist Naiyāyikas. Relativity or inter-dependency as the true picture of empirical phenomena, proves *niḥsvabhāvatā*, a non-essentialist apprehension of things, so also of *pramāṇa*, *prameyas*, *samśaya* and other *padārthas*. With this supposition, he argued against the realist supposition of essentialist status of things as everything is independent and unique and supposed to establish the independent, unique and essentialist conception of *padārthas*. So, he questioned only the independent status of *pramāṇas* based on the claim, but not the relative status of *pramāṇas*, which is the actual fact and would go with his own position. Arguing against the independent and essentialist status of *pramāṇas* and *prameyas*, he went on to prove that independently none of them can be established. It also indirectly shows that they are relative to each other.

To take up the intention of critiquing the realists in the *Vaidalyaparakaraṇa*, as Lindtner puts it, Nāgārjuna is believed to say, 'In order to put an end to the arrogance of those logicians (tārkika[s]) who out of conceit of their knowledge are keen to debate, I shall grind them to little pieces.'<sup>8</sup> This specific reaction here focuses on the context that the Naiyāyikas and their debates were gaining strength from all debaters' indispensable acceptance of reality of distinguished categories of *pramāṇa*, *prameyas*, and all forms of debates like *tarka*, *jalpa*, *vitandā* etc., which would prove acceptance of their realist thesis, and knowing this Nāgārjuna advances to dismantle the credibility of the very categories. His arguments that logically exposed the difficulties in the realist's view of *pramāṇa* and other

*padārthas* did not show that he had any doubt on their empirical certainty.

### Examination of independent status of *pramāṇas* in relation to *prameyas*

1. The Realist Naiyāyikas have the *pratijñā* that *pramāṇas* are that which establishes the *prameyas*. If this is the case. How is the *pramāṇa* itself established?
  - (a) It may be said that *pramāṇās* are established by themselves, then the definition of *pramāṇa* is ridiculed, because here it becomes a *prameya*.
  - (b) If one *pramāṇa* is established by another *pramāṇa*, then that second *pramāṇa* will similarly need still another *pramāṇā*, thus it may lead to infinite regress or *anāvasthā*, where neither the former nor the middle nor the latter can be established.<sup>9</sup>
  - (c) If, on the other hand, it is said that the *pramāṇas* are established without any other *pramāṇa*, then it amounts to say that everything is established or proved by *pramāṇa*, but *pramāṇa* itself does not need to be proved.<sup>10</sup> It leads to *pratijñā hāni*.<sup>11</sup>
2. Assuming the Naiyāyikas' view that *pramāṇas* are either *svataḥ prāmāṇya* or *parataḥ prāmāṇya*, Nāgārjuna examines these options.

Exposition of *Svataḥ prāmāṇya*:



- (a) If *pramāṇa* is established by itself, i.e., independently, without relating itself to the *prameya*, then 'how it is to be regarded as *pramāṇa*?'<sup>12</sup>
- (b) If without relating to or establishing the *prameya*, *pramāṇa* is established, then none of them is established,<sup>13</sup> in as much as the former is supposed to establish others and the latter is supposed to be established by the former, but this does not happen here in supposing the *svataḥpramāṇataḥ* of either *pramāṇa* or *prameya*.
- (c) If *prameyas* are established, without *pramāṇas*, then 'what is the necessity of *pramāṇa*?'<sup>14</sup>

Exposition of *parataḥ prāmāṇya*:

- (a) If it is said that the *pramāṇas* are established by other it means, one *pramāṇa* is to be established by another *pramāṇa*, or by establishing a *prameya*. However, both the ways are untenable.
- (b) If one *pramāṇa* is established by another *pramāṇa*, by what the second one is established? If the second one depends upon third one and so on, the matter leads to infinite regress. Further, how can a *pramāṇa*, which is yet to be established, can establish another *pramāṇa*?
- (c) On the other hand, if establishment of *prameya* establishes the *pramāṇa* and *vice versa*, then it will be like father is defined by son and son is defined by father. In this co-dependence or *itaretarāśraya*, the

roles of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* will be interchanged.<sup>15</sup> It may fall into *chakrakadoṣa*, i.e., moving round and round.

Therefore, Nāgārjuna concludes that (i) *pramāṇa* is neither established by itself without relating to any other, i.e., *prameyas*, (ii) nor by other *pramāṇas*, (iii) nor *pramāṇa* and *prameya* by each other.<sup>16</sup> Thus, it is shown that if the *pramāṇa* or *prameya* are taken exclusively independent in essentialist conceptions, they are not established.

In the above, the criticism strikes at the mutual independent status of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. It indirectly suggests their relativity. If these were thought of in relation to each other as dependent phenomena, that would depict the real picture and would not attract any disproving. Relativity is the true picture of every empirical thing, so also of the *pramāṇa* and *prameya* and all others in discourse – this is Nāgārjuna's intent of probe in the disputes. By explaining this, Nāgārjuna might be rendered that his exposition here is about non-establishment of independent status of *pramāṇā*, but not a denial (*pratiṣedha*) of their relative status, which is a fact. His argumentation is to be taken, not just a denial, but as an exposition that it is not possible to establish *pramāṇa* and *prameya* as independent *padārthas*, in essentialist terms.<sup>17</sup>

Next to *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, Nāgārjuna criticised *śamśaya* or doubt itself as a separate category, i.e., independent *padārtha*. He put it in a *prāsaṅgika* way that 'there is no place of doubt, if something is comprehended;

and if something is not comprehended no doubt also arises therein either'.<sup>18</sup> He has taken two possibilities, complete comprehension and non-comprehension leaving aside any intermediary or relative stage in between. Here, let us reflect, 'why he does not consider the normal situation of doubt, such as, in the case of insufficiency of information for knowledge or where the previous knowledge is at a stake or certainty is still awaited -all the situations that are expected by the realist?' May be it is due to the realist assumption of doubt as an independent activity, having independent status it cannot be related to any comprehension, nor can it be part or step of any non-comprehension. Logically, all things that are independent must have mutual exclusion. Accordingly, comprehension and non-comprehension being independent where is the question of doubt. Doubt, being an independent factor / entity, is also not possible to be related to or part of non-comprehension or process of comprehension. The same contention 'that any supposition of independent entity in essentialist terms is difficult', is also applied here and to all other *padārthas* in Nāgārjuna's treatment of them. However, it might not mean that he had any doubt on their practical utility. Thus, the aforesaid criticisms of *pramāṇa*, *prameya* and *saṁśaya*, where Nāgārjuna espouses their relativistic position in his criticism of their independent position, may not be considered to lack their practical efficacy. The efficacy is due to their relative status, which is an empirical truth.

## Whether Nāgārjuna is Sceptic or Relativist

The ascription of scepticism on Nāgārjuna may be contrasted with other scholars' varied depiction of his approaches, arguments and philosophy. David J. Kalupahana understands non-absolutistic, non-foundationalist and non-essentialist character of Buddhism and for Nāgārjuna as well.<sup>19</sup> Sometimes, he also points out empiricist and analytical approaches of Nāgārjuna.<sup>20</sup> For relying upon rationalization and argumentation for justification or criticism in use of reasons, Nāgārjuna may be seen as rationalist or critical philosopher. T.R.V. Murti takes him as a critical philosopher of the genre of Kant. Some may also see intuitionism in him for the contention in *prajñāpāramitā sūtra*. Considering thus, any thinker may characterize any aspect of his philosophy in a way and, if possible, extend the same ascription to his total philosophy. There may be suggestions for analytic, anti-metaphysical and therapeutic interpretation of Nāgārjuna.<sup>21</sup> Considering all these, since his philosophy ensued from interpretation of *prāṭīyasamutpāda* and criticises independent *svabhāva* underpinning an assertion of relativity of phenomenal things, he may preferably be ascribed as a relativists in connection to his stand on empirical phenomena, and at the same time he is a transcendentalist as he does not take any position between the alternatives he criticised.

In the context of ascription or characterization of a philosophy or any piece of that philosophical enterprise or the philosopher, it is better to think of a method of approach. The philosopher must have some action or

method and some purpose of being engaged in that action. Evaluating upon the action, method or purpose, it can easily be said that the purpose has primacy over the method as well as action. It is because, the same purpose or philosophical content or commitment may be established by alternative methods. Sometimes, there may not be any purpose or presupposition or entanglement, but free following of methods, or random actions slowly get configured into some coherent position or standpoint of the philosopher. As soon as the position is carved out the purpose is defined therein which is followed up by the philosopher and his actions follow it. Considering these situations, purpose always gets priority over method and actions in a philosopher. The same happened in Nāgārjuna's case, where he possessed a spiritual and philosophical affiliation, had spiritual experiences, and follows his interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda* or relativism. All these get configured a purpose for him. Being so, he was not a free analyst but has a relativist philosophy, Buddhist kind of spiritualism. Hence, any characterization of him upon his method, like scepticism here, is weaker than the characterization of relativism that is made on the purpose or philosophical commitment. Over and above, here the method is also based on relativism. Hence, it is preferable and more plausible to ascribe that Nāgārjuna's rejection of *pramāṇa* is a case of relativism. Like any consideration, relativism, has narratives of reality of non-essentialism and thereby suggestion for a type of moral and spiritual life for *nirvāṇa-upāya kauśala* for *kuśala*. Such motive, motif and benefits in Nāgārjuna

would be defied if scepticism were advocated in Nāgārjuna's philosophy. Like any other Indian philosopher belonging to the lineage of morals and spiritual practices, he wouldn't be value neutral, and therefore cannot be sceptical in this regard too. His value centric philosophy is sustained by relativism that he took up as the key philosophical insight and technique, and therefore, it is preferable to ascribe relativism on him in the present context regarding his stand on phenomena.

The *prāsaṅgika mādhyamika* line of interpretation claims for himself a *vaitaṇḍika* position, where a view is rejected without advancing an alternative view at the same parlance. To a novice's mind, this seems to be a sceptical exercise. Nāgārjuna, as a *vaitaṇḍika who also* posited no (anti) thesis of his own in the same level, would have been taken similarly as a sceptic. However, he is *vaitaṇḍika* in his methods only, but not in his philosophy. Being so, his arguments remain successful since these reject the notion of essentialist view of *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, *saṃśaya*, and isolated entity-hood or *svabhāva*, and its tacit implication is that these are relative. The relativity between them is also pointed out, where the conception of *svabhāva* has no place. This is the very purpose that Nāgārjuna presupposed in most cases of his argumentation. For this philosophical purpose and for explaining relativity, he uses the sceptical exercises as a *vaitaṇḍika* method in many contexts. The method and the purpose or priority among them being taken together constitute the philosophical position, and at this point, one may give weightage to the method alone and

ascribe scepticism on him, whereas one may value his philosophical reminiscence of relativity and apprise the context of critiquing *pramāṇa* as a case of relativism. It is because, upon close scrutiny, and in the line of aforesaid primacy of purpose or end over means, as discussed above, it can be seen that the *vaitanḍika* position is a technique, a means, for a philosophical end, which is relativism regarding phenomena and view-less-ness regarding certain metaphysical issues. Here, following the consideration of end, goal or purpose as major over method, Nāgārjuna can be ascribed with relativism regarding phenomena and transcendentalism regarding view-less-ness when it comes to the transcendental aspect of the Reality.

### **On Characterization of Nāgārjuna against the Realist / Essentialist**

The arguments that Nāgārjuna advances against the essentialist Nyāya are primarily *prasaṅgapādānam* or *reductio ad absurdum* argument. It is a special type of argument that only takes up the opponents' thesis and demolishes it by showing absurdity in it. There is no antithesis or alternative to be established in replacing the opponents' thesis in order to prove exactly whatever the critique is supposed to uphold. Coinciding with this Nāgārjuna says elsewhere that 'I have no thesis or *pratijñā*' (*nāsti mama pratijñā*). This has been understood extensively for all cases of *prasaṅga* arguments where Nāgārjuna does not seem to provide any clear position just like in the case of engaging with Nyāya in VV and VP. This may be taken as a sceptic announcement. This specific

standpoint of Nāgārjuna, shows his consistency of supposing no view while refuting the essentialist, because he has the purpose to cancel all views (*sarvadr̥ṣṭipraharāṇa* / *prahāṇa*) in the context. Such situations are again interpreted as scepticism in Nāgārjuna. However, these may not be extended beyond the context to say that Nāgārjuna has no philosophical position and nothing to say at all. There is a difference between saying that 'someone has no alternative or counter thesis against or in place of the rejected thesis' and 'someone has no purpose in the argumentation or no business at all in the philosophical engagements. To elucidate with an example, a person, like a strong wind, sweeps away all dry leaves, and may not put other dry leaves in the same place, may be, its action or purpose is only to sweep away and make it clean. What for is there the sweeping clean? The person may have some purpose, or the wind have some cause. Similar may be the case of Nāgārjuna's declaration that 'he has no thesis' (*pratijñā*) or antithesis against the refuted ones, but still he might have some purpose or that there might have some cause of such saying and arguing. He might just want to clean the conceptual hazards, so that the truth or reality would be seen as it is. Thus, looking internally within the debate he has no counter thesis, but looking coherently and comprehensively beyond the debates, on the purpose of the debate, he can be assigned with a position at a meta level, and this position may be characterized as relativism in respect of empirical truth and transcendentalism in the context of higher levels of truth, throughout his philosophy. To assume relativism and transcendentalism (for different



contexts) in Nāgārjuna means to denounce scepticism for him.

There is a little difference between relativism and scepticism for which a relativist may look like sceptic. Scepticism generally (a) raises the reasons about something impossible, (b) it does not advance the solution or alternative about the issue. However, both 'a' and 'b' are seen in Nāgārjuna's case, which other Mādhyamikas have accepted as it is their *vaitaṇḍika* method,<sup>22</sup> and for this reason, he is judged as a sceptic at this level, and no relativism can be advanced at this level. Now, ask any sceptic, 'what is his purpose of advancing the sceptical arguments?' 'No purpose except exposing the issue,' – this would be the answer from the sceptic. For Nāgārjuna, however, there is a purpose in the non-establishment of knowledge, that is, eradication of any supposition of essential immutable intrinsic nature in the phenomena, which can allow phenomenal changes in man for moral and spiritual growth. Moreover, if a *vaitaṇḍika* has such spiritual aim and corroborating moral and spiritual practices, on which it is found firm with certainty, he cannot be termed a sceptic. For this reason, Nāgārjuna may not be called a sceptic in all levels, though a *vaitaṇḍika*. He is a *vaitaṇḍika* at the level of the arguments – level -1, but has philosophical and spiritual purpose at a meta-level – level -2, which is relativity and *niḥsvabhāvatā*. One may fairly refer to this for rejecting any assumption of relativism, but it is not possible. In this respect, it can be understood that the actions of level -1 may not be

applicable to level - 2. Moved by benevolence and his duty towards saving people, a soldier kills the attackers and plunderers. Here, the soldier is killer in one level, but is also a kind, dutiful saviour in another level. Similarly, Nāgārjuna's exhibition of destructive dialectic argument may lead to the action of scepticism in one level, but it may not conflict with the ascription of relativism upon him in another (meta) level, i.e., purpose.

Consider the purpose of Nāgārjuna that can make a room for possibility of relativism in the context. While advancing the destructive dialectic against the Nyāya essentialist realist epistemology, Nāgārjuna mentions why he criticizes the *pramāṇas*. He says, 'If you [i.e., essentialists and realists] think that things as *prameya* are established through the *pramāṇa*, then how the *pramāṇa* (i.e., perception, inference, verbal testimony, and comparison) are established?'<sup>23</sup> Thus, criticism of *pramāṇa* was conditional for the context and purpose of eradication of the realist essentialist conception of *prameya*. Such conditionality and purpose may not be taken for ascribing scepticism. Rather, the purpose of Nāgārjuna behind the necessity of criticism of *pramāṇa* may be taken, and that is the exposition of *niḥsvabhāvatā* and relativity. Thus, the ascription of relativism of Nāgārjuna in the context of debates on *pramāṇa* is well supported by his Mādhyamika position, where the middle path is adopted avoiding the extremes. The Mādhyamika philosophical enterprise also aims at *sarvadr̥ṣṭipraharāṇa*, and for this reason any 'ism'

is also a provisional use as required for understanding his transcendental position.

**Concluding Remark:** Considering between scepticism and relativism, 'which one of them is more appropriate to Nāgārjuna?' His arguments showing non-establishment of *pramāṇas*, *prameya*, *saṃśaya* etc., as independent entity, form a logical exposition. The arguments strike at their independence that supposedly deny their relativity or interrelation. Moreover, when the independent status of *pramāṇas*, *saṃśaya*, etc., are refuted and that too by referring to their relative status, their dependent or relative status is indicated. Relativity rules the roost in Nāgārjuna's philosophy and that is also visible in the cases of *pramāṇas* and *prameyas*. These categories, like any other complementary empirical phenomena, are interdependent or relative, and hence are lacking any individual status (*svabhāva*) - thus is the relativism of Nāgārjuna.

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Notes and References:

- <sup>1</sup> *Prachhā śāṃkhya, aulukya, pulandra ... asti nāsti vyatikramah ... Ratnāvalī. Svabhāva....* in MK.
- <sup>2</sup> *Śūnyatā ca na chochchedah saṃsāraśch na śāśvataṃ. Karmaṇo 'vipraṇāśāścha dharmo buddhena deśītaḥ.* MK. 17. 20.

- <sup>3</sup> *Anirodham anuṭpādam anucchedam aśāsvataṃ, Anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam. MK. 1.*  
*Yañ pratīyasamutpādam prapañchopaśamaṃ śivam, Deśayāmāsa sambuddhastam vande vadatām varaṃ. MK. 2.*
- <sup>4</sup> *Skandhagrāho yāvat asti tāvat evāham iti api, Ahamkāre sati punaḥ karma janma tataḥ paraṃ, R. 1.37., also R.1.38, 43, 44, 45, 57, 58.*
- <sup>5</sup> *Asīti śāśvatagrāho nāstīyuchchedadarśanam, Tasmādaṣṭitvanāstīve nāśrīyate vichakṣaṇaḥ. MK.15.10.*
- <sup>6</sup> *Sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya yaḥ saddharmaṃ deśayat, anukampāmupādāya taṃ namasyāmi gautamaṃ. MK.27.30.*
- <sup>7</sup> *R. 1.60, 61, 62*
8. Lindtner, Chr. *Nagarjuniana : Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nagarjuna*, Buddhist Tradition Series, Motilal Banarasidass Publishers, Pvt., Ltd., New Delhi, 1982. P.88. [Hence as VP]
- <sup>9</sup> *Anyaiḥ yadi pramāṇaiḥ pramāṇa siddhirbhavet tad anāvasthā, Nādeḥ siddhistatrāsti naiva madhyasya nāntasya. VV. v.32.*
- <sup>10</sup> *Teṣāṃ atha pramāṇair vinā prasiddhiḥ vihiyate vādaḥ, Vaiśamikatvaṃ tasmīn viśeṣa hetuścha vaktavyaṃ. VV.v33.*
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>12</sup> *Yadi svataścha pramāṇa siddhiḥ napekṣa tava prameyani, Bhavati pramāṇa siddhirnaparapekṣā svatahsiddhiḥ. VV. v 40.*
- <sup>13</sup> *Anapekṣya hi prameyān arthān yadi te pramāṇasiddhiriti, Nabhavanti kasyachid evam imāni tāni pramāṇānī. VV.v 41.*
- <sup>14</sup> *Atha tu pramāṇa siddhirbhavatyapekṣaiva te prameyāni, Vyatyaya evaṃ sati te dhruvaṃ pramāṇa prameyānāṃ te pramāṇasiddhya prameya siddhiḥ prameya siddhyacha, bhavati pramāṇa siddhirnastyu bhayasyāpi te siddhiḥ, VV. v 45-6.*
- <sup>15</sup> *Pitra yadyutpadyah putriyadi tena civa putreṇa, Utpadyah sa yadi pitā vada tatropadyati kah kam ?*  
*Kaścha pitā kah putrastara tvaṃ bruhi tavubhayapi cha, Pitṛputralakṣaṇādāhārau yato bhavati no sandehaḥ. VV.v 49-50.*
- <sup>16</sup> *Naiva svataḥ prasiddhirna parasparataḥ para pramāṇarvā. Na bhavati na-ca prameyāirna chapyakasmāt pramāṇaṃ. VV. v 51.*  
*Also Na svataḥ na parataḥ no dvābhyaṃ nāpya hetutaḥ. Utpannajātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvachana kechan. Mūlamadhyamikārikā 1. 1.*
- <sup>17</sup> VP. P. 88.
- <sup>18</sup> VP. P.89

- <sup>19</sup> Kalupahana, David J, *A History of Buddhist Philosophy Continuities and Discontinuities*, University of Hawai Press, Hawai, 1994.
- <sup>20</sup> Kalupahana, David J, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nagarjuna*, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1986, 1994. P.39. VP. P. 87.
- <sup>21</sup> Prof. G. C. Nayak has taken Nagarjuna as an anti-metaphysical and analyst philosopher. Ref. *Nirvana in Candrakīrti's Prasannapada: A Study in the Madhyamika Concept of Nirvana in the Context of Indian Thought*, IAS, Shimla, India, 2006.
- <sup>22</sup> Chandrakīrti has taken up this standpoint called *prāsaṅgika*, which has been taken as the *mādhyamika-vaitaṅdika* position. Here the *Mādhyamika* exposes the ridiculous situation of the opponents, instead of giving any of his alternative standpoint. See, Karuṇā Bhattacharya, 'Mādhyamika et Vaitandika', *Journal of Asiaticque*, 263, 1975, pp.99-102.
- <sup>23</sup> *Yadīcha pramāṇataḥ teṣāṃ prasiddhīḥ arthānāṃ, teṣāṃ punaḥ prasiddhīḥ bruhi katham te pramaṇānāṃ. VV. XXXI.*

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Reflections on Prof. Biswambhar Pahi's Delineation of  
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Methodological and Epistemic Principles

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**Arvind Vikram Singh and Manish Sinsinwar**

This paper is an attempt to throw some light upon the delineation of some methodological and epistemic principles of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (NV) systems, made by Prof. Biswambhar Pahi in his revisionary commentary, on the twin tradition, *Vaiśeṣika Padārthavyavasthā Kā Paddhatimūlaka Vimarśa*<sup>1</sup> (VPV). Also some reflections have been made on his methodological and epistemic reformation, i.e., his objectives behind such reformations, what epistemic implications are made by these reformations and upon some questions that are implied by these.

**1.**

The fundamental objective of *Vaiśeṣika Padārthavyavasthā Kā Paddhatimūlaka Vimarśa* by Prof. Biswambhar Pahi has been to seek a possibility of a harmony between system-centric commitment and a thinker-centric freedom or creativity<sup>2</sup>. He states his reformatory program as twofold- (i) identification of the most fundamental methodological, epistemic, ontological and axiological principles of NV and (ii) to facilitate the natural evolution of the twin systems, by a critical re-assessment of their principles<sup>3</sup>. As per him, the former is necessary so as to

delimit system-centric commitment and the latter is necessitated by thinker-centric creativity. Doing so he has made vital contemplation and an original revision of the methodological, epistemic, ontological and value-theoretic principles of NV. The ontological and in turn value-theoretic revisions made by him are based on what he sees as the basic methodological and epistemic principles of NV. We have made an expository summary of some of his views upon NV Epistemology, with the objective of furthering a dialogue among the scholars of Indian Logic and Contemporary Indian Philosophy. The more important task however, is to see the epistemic implications of Pahi's methodological-epistemic exercise with NV. It may be worth to mention, that he views such methodological and epistemic principles divided as universally and locally accepted; the former ones, are again seen by him as divided into essential and accidental; yet again the former of these, are of two types, namely, fundamental and non-fundamental<sup>4</sup>. His enterprise has been to delineate such principles which are both essential and fundamental.

## 2.

### **A Review of some Methodological Principles**

Pahi sees theory-construction as a synthetic and organic whole, which begins with methodological and then epistemological principles<sup>5</sup>. The section of his text VPV, that received more attention however is value-theoretic. For an instance in an anthology, that was based on papers written on VPV and other of his writings<sup>6</sup>, twelve of the

fifteen papers were related to his ontology and axiology; none was purely concerned with his methodological/epistemic reformation/ideas. The only argument for including the methodological principles here, is that the major ones of these, are epistemic in nature and play a vital role in the further development of his reformation.

The key *anāgantuk* (non-accidental) and fundamental methodological principles of NV as per Pahi are:

1. *Loka-pratīti*
  - a. *Abādhitā-pratīti*
  - b. *Yathopalabdhi-vyavasthā-nyāya*
  - c. *Anyathā-anupapatti-nyāya*
2. Principles pertaining to nature of rationality
  - a. *Prayojanavattā*
  - b. *Vyāghātaśūnyatā*
  - c. *Lāghava*
  - d. *Mūlocchedī Anvasthā-parihāra*
  - e. *Vinigamanāviraha*
3. *Śāstra-nirmāṇa-paddhati*

Of these, we propose to discuss only 1a. and 1b., as these have importance in ascertaining Pahi's epistemic position and also as an exhaustive treatment of each of the above principle, is beyond the scope of this paper.



## A.

*Loka-pratīti* is marked as the foremost principle of theory-construction in order, by Pahi, and we feel that this is not a sheer coincidence. The term is paraphrased by Pahi in English as common-sense.<sup>7</sup> Pahi discusses the interrelation of common-sense and philosophy under this. A due regard to common-sense by theorists and epistemologists is essential as per Pahi, which is as per our view a straight outcome of his realism.

Common-sense has several sub-principles and the first one of these is- *Abādhita-pratīti*. The epistemologist and theoretician is instructed not to disregard the common-sense but rather follow his 'epistemological duty' towards it.<sup>8</sup> A common-sense proposition is to be rejected only and only if there is a stronger *pramāṇa* against it, for an instance the appearance of earth to be flat. Pahi opines that it is 'positivist boundaries' that should restrict our ontological ventures. He cites from Gotama, the view that a theoretician cannot order perceived/inferred facts to behave otherwise.

*Dr̥ṣṭānumitānām Niyogapratīṣedhānupapatti*<sup>9</sup>

The boundaries of such common-sense or *loka-pratīti* are our sense-experience. If one sees the subsequent chapters of VPV on ontology and axiology, one shall see that exercising his thinker-centric creativity he demolishes several tenets of NV which transgress the above 'positivist common-sense'. Common-sense however is not static but

dynamic, sensitive to the development of sciences and the entailments of logic.

In our view, this allegiance to *loka-pratīti* and at the same time, enumeration of categories that are entailed by a 'transcendental logic', such as *samuccaya*, make him a Naiyāyika restrained in the limits of sense-experience and therefore, in our view, his epistemic position is close to Kant.

## B.

*Yathopalabdhi-vyavasthā-nyāya* is another essential and fundamental methodological principle of NV as per Pahi. The compatibility of theory and experience is dealt here by the scholar. *Loka-pratīti* gets further strengthened by this as per Pahi for whom, ordinary experience is the starting point of philosophizing for NV. *Yathopalabdhi-vyavasthā-nyāya* reinforces the naturalist and empiricist inner voice of NV, as it makes mandatory not to dismiss empirical data while theorization. *Yathādarśanamabhyanuḥṅga*, *Nityasya-apratyākhyānam-yathopalabdhi-vyavasthānā*<sup>10</sup>, etc. attest this.

What is more important in Pahi's discussion of the above principle, is his comment on temporal relation between *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. Following Vātsyāyana<sup>11</sup>, he opines that there is no generic rule to govern this but the same should be decided as laid down by the experience in a given case. According to us, this in part answers the *vaitaṇḍik* allegation of *anyonāśrayitā* of *pramāṇa* and

*prameya*. However, in our understanding, an allegiance to *yathādarśanam vibhāgavacanam* is an acceptance of relativity of *pramāṇas*. In our view Pahi, like other Naiyāyikas, misses to accept this openly.

### 3.

#### Review of some Epistemic Principles

The following is the list of essential and fundamental epistemic principles of NV, in the view of Pahi:

1. *Jñāna-anityatāvāda*
2. *Jñāna-saviṣayatāvāda*
3. *Jñāna-nirākāravāda*
4. *Jñāna-para-prakāśavāda*
5. *Pramāṇa-samplavavāda*
6. *Bhākta-pradhāna-nyāya*
7. Causality of Genesis of Knowledge

We shall make a brief reflection upon 2 and 6 of these.

#### A.

Under *Jñāna-saviṣayatāvāda*, Pahi underlines the essentiality of ‘intentionality of cognition’. Any two given cognitions differ owing to a difference of their intended objects. *Na copalāmbho nirviṣayoasti* confirms this. Pahi extends this fundamental principle of NV to revise its principle of *apekṣābuddhijanyatā*. For him, the concept is against the fundamental realist position of NV and that ideas like farness, nearness, numbers greater than one, etc.

can be explained even without accepting *apekṣābuddhijanyatā*. He points out that both Bhāsarvajña and Raghunātha save these ideas, while rejecting the latter.

We feel that this is an honest and consistent reformation made by Pahi, as an acknowledgement of a notion like *apekṣābuddhijanyatā*, is not a strictly realist position.

## B.

Pahi delineates an argument from the tradition, which he makes use of, to prove apriori, the possibility of valid cognition as different from error. He terms this as *Bhākta-pradhāna-nyāya*<sup>12</sup>. We can extend this and use the same analogy to prove apriori, the sanctity of certain knowledge over doubt.

As per Pahi's line of argument, our vocabulary makes use of both primary (*pradhāna* or *śakti*) and secondary (*bhākta* or *lakṣaṇā*) meanings of a term. However, the *bhākta* depends upon the *pradhāna*; it pre-supposes the latter. In a similar manner, in an error situation, the appearance of *rajaṭ* in *śukti*, pre-supposes valid cognition of *rajaṭ*. Vātsyāyana builds on this strong epistemic argument; in his view, the apprehension of *sthāṇu* as *puruṣa*, proves that without the possibility of a valid cognition of *puruṣa*, even an error where *puruṣa* is erroneously seen in a *sthāṇu*, is not possible.<sup>13</sup>

This argument could be well extended to show that in a similar league, without certain knowledge being possible,

doubt is an impossibility. Therefore, in our view, by *Bhākta-pradhāna-nyāya*, the very existence of doubt, apriori proves the possibility of certain knowledge; in other words, *samśaya* proves the possibility of *pramā*; the latter is a logical presupposition of the former.

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Thus to reiterate, in our humble opinion, Pahi's reformation of NV is to a large extent a delimitation of NV inside the boundaries of sense-experience. His commitment to a 'positivist common-sense' should be seen as an attempt to bring back the twin systems into the realm of *lokāyana*. This gets confirmed when we revisit his rejections of God, an eternal and substantial self, *adr̥ṣṭa*, etc. He is at a clear discomfort, with any transgression of limits of sense-experience. Under 1b., Pahi following the Nyāya tradition answers the *vaitaṇḍika* but this must follow an acknowledgement of the relativity of *pramāṇa-prameya*, which he does not do. Commitment to a pure empiricist and realist position makes him revise *apekṣābuddhijanyatā*. His argument for the presupposition of certitude of knowledge by error, which we extend, as a presupposition also made by doubt, is a typical rendition of traditional view, wherein *samśaya* is precisely accepted as a separate *padārtha*, in order to accept *pramā*. One may see in Pahi's work, an omission of a discussion of several epistemic concepts and issues from NV. There is no discussion upon the nature and number of *pramāṇas*, alike categories of Nyāya, issues of significance, such as *khyāti*, *prāmāṇya*, etc. But then one has to remember that the work is primarily an inquiry into

the ontology of Vaiśeṣika; it does not claim to be a comprehensive treatise on the twin tradition and also that he discusses the afore-mentioned methodological and epistemological, ontological and value-theoretic principles, in an attempt to identify the fundamental and core philosophical foundation of NV, before offering a rebuilt Vaiśeṣika *Padārthavyavasthā*.

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Notes and References:

- <sup>1</sup> Pahi, Biswambhar (2000): *Vaiśeṣika Padārthavyavasthā Kā Paddhatimūlaka Vimarśa*, Jaipur: Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan
- <sup>2</sup> Ibid., Preface, pp.1-2 and Chapter 1, p. 5
- <sup>3</sup> Ibid., Preface, p. 2 and Chapter 1, p. 7
- <sup>4</sup> VPV, Preface, pp.3-5 and Chapter 1, p. 8
- <sup>5</sup> Both methodological and epistemic principles are dealt in Chapter 2 of VPV
- <sup>6</sup> Sharma, R. P. and Varshney, Anubhav (2018): *Ācārya Biswambhar Pahi Ke Dārśanik Vicāron Kī Samīkṣā*, Jaipur: Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan (henceforth, ABPS)
- <sup>7</sup> See, Pahi, Biswambhar: Vaiśeṣika System (in Govinda Chandra Pandey (ed.) (2012): *History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization*, vol. 1. Part 5, *A Golden Chain of Civilizations: Indic, Iranic, Semitic and Hellenic. Section 2: Science, Philosophy and Culture*, New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations, pp.495-524)
- <sup>8</sup> VPV, p. 10
- <sup>9</sup> Nyāyasūtra, 3.1.50

<sup>10</sup> Nyāyasūtra 3.2.12, 4.1.28, VPV, pp. 13-14

<sup>11</sup> Nyāya-sūtra-bhāṣya 2.1.11, VPV, p. 13

<sup>12</sup> VPV, pp. 35-39

<sup>13</sup> Vātsyāyana's argument cited in VPV, p. 36

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